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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
Two major changes since 1989 have affected the political economy of Jordan, 
namely: 1) The transformation from an economy primarily based on official economic 
assistance (an induced rentier state economy) to one primarily based on remittance 
income (a private sector rentier economy); and 2) The increased level of involvement of 
the donor community (led by the IMF and the World Bank) which has as its stated aim 
the desire to increase the involvement of the private sector in the economy at the 
expense of the state. The thesis sets out to answer the question: what does rentier theory 
tell us about the effects of these changes on the nature of the state and the private sector 
and the relationship between the two in Jordan? 
The study contends that an induced rentier state economy creates a different 
political economy (induced state rentierism) from a private sector rentier economy 
(private sector rentierism), both of which are different from a 'normal' market economy. 
Evidence for these differences can be found in the natures of the economy, the state, the 
private sector and the relationship between the latter two. 
The research question is answered with the help of four innovative models: 1) A 
measure of the level of the induced rentier state economy; 2) A measure of the level of 
the private sector rentier economy; 3) A five-continua state-market model; and 4) The 
characteristics of induced state rentierism. The concepts of private sector rentier 
economy and private sector rentierism are also introduced. 
The high levels of official economic assistance had by 1989 created a political 
economy which exhibited the characteristics of induced state rentierism: the existence 
of a rentier elite; state ownership and/or control of productive assets; state involvement 
in the market; the use of the economy by the state for political purposes; and the co-
optation of the private sector institutions by the state. The state and the rentier elite's 
raison d'etre had become one of maintaining control of and access to the flows of rent. 
Despite the two aforementioned transformations, the study concludes that: 1) Both 
the state and the rentier elite have been able to continue to rent-seek-albeit in a 
reduced and different format; 2) The economy has moved slightly towards the market-
end of the state-market continuum, as the role of state has altered from one of direct 
control to one using indirect methods, such as regulation; and 3) The features of induced 
state rentierism have been reduced slightly, while the features of both private sector 
rentierism and the market economy have been strengthened slightly. 
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Introduction 
KN'JI'R 0 DU C'JI'JI 0 N 
1.0 OBJECTIVES 
Rentier theory has been used since the beginning of the 1970s to attempt to 
explain the political economy of many of the states in the Middle East. The majority of 
the analysis has concentrated on the oil-producing economies of the states adjacent to 
the Gulf, Libya and Algeria. Although the studies acknowledge the induced rentier 
economies of countries such as Jordan, little work has been undertaken on the actual 
effects of the rent on the political economy of these states. This study aims to start 
filling this gap by looking at changing patterns of rent in Jordan, particularly since . 
1989. 
Considerable volumes of rent in the form of economic assistance (since the 
creation of Transjordan) and remittances (since the 1970s) have entered the economy, 
which in turn has affected the development of Jordan's political economy. Since the 
late 1980s two significant changes have occurred which have the potential to alter the 
nature of the political economy. These changes are: 
~ The transformation from an economy primarily based on official economic 
assistance (OEA) (which tends to be distributed by the state) to one primarily based 
on remittance income (which tends to be distributed through the private sector); and 
~ The increased depth of involvement of the donor community, led by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which has as its stated aim 
the desire to increase the involvement of the private sector in the economy at the 
expense of the state. 
The research question the study aims to answer is: what does rentier theory tell us about 
the effects of these changes on the nature of the state and the private sector and the 
relationship between the two in Jordan? A second question is also addressed in order to 
set the context for the first, namely: how has the nature of the relationship between the 
donor community and the state altered since the start of the active IMF involvement in 
1989? 
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
The research has been conducted on a number of levels. The main pillar of thesis 
is the use of four innovative models to measure the various aspects of the study. These 
models are: 
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+ Six measures of the induced rentier state economy (IRSE); 
+ Four measures of the private sector rentier economy (PSRE); 
+ Characteristics of induced state rentierism (ISR); and 
+ The five-continua state-market model; 
The first two models are used to distinguish between the degree to which an economy is 
affected by the volumes of OEA and remittances. The latter two models assess the 
degree to which the state involvement in the economy has changed during the period 
under study. When using the models, the researcher recognises that the changes 
highlighted are not caused solely by the variations in patterns in rent and/or by the 
influence of the donor community. Other factors also affect the changes, which is the 
reason for introducing the transformations in international, regional and domestic 
ideological, economic and political environments at the relevant points. 
Secondly, the quantitative economic data was collated from a number of printed 
and electronic sources including the IMF, the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Central Bank of Jordan, the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance. The sources in Arabic were translated by a 
number of my Arab colleagues. The economic data often differed between sources but 
to overcome the problem as far as possible one source was used for each set of figures. 
As the analysis was assessing the trends highlighted rather the actual figures, these 
discrepancies were not considered to be a major concern. In addition the effects of 
inflation and exchange rates movements have not usually been taken into consideration 
because the figures are almost invariably concerned with percentages, e.g. government 
revenue as a percentage of OEA and are thus comparing like with like within the year. 
Thereafter, the analysis is concerned with the trends highlighted. 
As the vast majority of the data was not presented in a form appropriate for the 
research the majority of the tables and diagrams have been specifically created by the 
author (these are acknowledged on each occasion). Furthermore in order to assist the 
reader relate the differing aspects of the thesis to the graphs a colour code is used: 
+ A yellow background indicates measures associated with an IRSE; 
+ A blue background indicates measures associated with a PSRE; 
+ A green background indicates measures associated with the state-private sector 
relationship; and 
+ A gold background indicates other measures. 
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The qualitative pillar of the research was built on two foundations: interviews and 
a database. The interviews were conducted in Amman during the researcher's fourteen-
week stay. The Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Amman provided the 
facilities for the research period, as well as allowing the initial access to a number of the 
interviewees. Again the lack of Arabic was not a problem as all the interviewees were 
highly proficient in English. The researcher interviewed people associated with the 
various concerns of the thesis: state and ex-state officials, representatives of the private 
sector and the donor community, and local commentators. The style of the interviews 
(semi-structured and without being taped but recorded in writing by the researcher) was 
conducted in order to encourage a more open discussion. As an experienced 
interviewer, the lack of taping did not impede the accuracy of recording the information 
and opinions gained. 
The database was constructed m order to highlight the relevant political and 
economic events, actions by the state and private sector, and statements by 
representatives of the state and the private sector. The data was sourced from a number 
of authoritative publications including the EIU Country Reports and Country Profiles, 
the Middle East and North Africa, the Middle East Economic Digest, the Middle East 
Economic Survey, Middle East International, Mideast Mirror, Summary of World 
Broadcasts, and Summary of World Broadcasts Weekly Economic Report. In addition, 
the following Jordanian sources were consulted: 
o Three English edition newspapers: the Jordan Times internet edition, (including 
spending a week at the archives in Amman), the Star Online, and the Arab Daily 
during its short spell of publication; 
o The Jordanian Economic Monitor, published by the respected local economist Dr. 
Fadel ai-Fanek, who has close contacts with the state; and 
o Jordan Focus, an electronic publication produced by the Jordan Information Bureau 
in London. 
Although no Arabic sources were consulted at this stage of the research, due to the 
researcher's lack of ability in the language, the strength of the sources available in 
English overcame this potential problem. 
3.0 OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The first chapter highlights the theory and concepts used throughout the study. 
The first part of which introduces rentier theory, beginning with a discussion on the 
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concept ,of rent before moving on to establishing what is a rentier economy. Thereafter 
the discussion focuses on the three types of rentier economies prevalent in the Middle 
East and North Africa: 
+ The pure rentier state economy based on a preponderance of oil income; 
+ The IRSE based on a preponderance of OEA in the economy; and 
+ The PSRE based on a preponderance of remittances. 
As Jordan's economy has been built around OEA (since 1921) and remittances (since 
the early 1970s) the spotlight is on the latter two types of economy. The models used to 
measure the degree of the IRSE and the PSRE are introduced at this stage. Thereafter, 
the analysis emphasises how the political economy of the different rentier economies 
vary from a 'normal' production economy, as well as from each other. Four particular 
areas of difference are concentrated upon: 
+ The economy; 
+ The nature of the state; 
+ The nature of the private sector; and 
+ The relationship between the state and the private sector. 
The special characteristics associated with the IRSE, termed ISR, are then defined, as 
are the features of private sector rentierism (PSR), which are derived from the PSRE. 
These characteristics are used in later chapters to assess to what degree rentier aspects 
are exhibited at various stages of the economic development of the Kingdom. The 
second part of the chapter defines and then discusses how the main concepts (official 
development assistance (ODA); OEA; remittances; the donor community; the state; the 
private sector; the regime; and the rentier elite) are used throughout the thesis. The 
importance of the political nature of donor involvement in countries such as Jordan is 
highlighted through an historical survey of ODA. The five-continua state-market 
model, which measures the degree of the involvement of the state in the economy, is 
also introduced at this stage. This model is used to help assess what type of political 
economy (ISR, PSR, or market economy) is to be found in Jordan at various stages. 
The second chapter turns away from the theoretical and conceptual discussion to 
assess the changing nature of rent in the Jordanian economy between 1921 and 1989. 
The study acknowledges the effects of the changes in the global, regional and domestic 
ideological, political and economic environments on the levels of rent entering the 
economy. These levels of rent are then measured using the models discussed in the first 
chapter. The second chapter concludes that the high point for the IRSE was the late 
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1970s, since when OEA has become progressively less important. In contrast, the 
levels of the PSRE have grown from virtually zero in 1970 to high-level by the end of 
the decade, at which level it has remained. 
The foundations laid in chapter two are built on in the third chapter, which 
evaluates the changing levels of state involvement in the economy as measured by the 
five-continua state-market model. Thereafter, the chapter assesses which characteristics 
of rentierism are present. The premise is that the presence of these characteristics 
would affect how the various actors (the state, the rentier elite and the private sector) 
will react to the conditions imposed by or negotiated with the IMF. The conclusion 
reached is that by 1989, although the economy was becoming more dependent on 
remittances, the political economy maintained the prime characteristics of induced state 
rentierism. By 1989, the rentier elite, which dominated the economic and political 
decision-making processes, was beginning to display signs of internal divisions. 
However, the division between the private and public sectors remained extremely 
blurred and was manifested in four areas: 
+ State involvement in productive companies; 
~ State intercession in the market; 
+ The use of access to the economy by the state for political purposes; and 
+ The institutional structure of the private sector being tied to state purposes. 
The main analysis of the thesis follows in the next four chapters. In chapter four, 
the collapse of the economy, which resulted in the introduction of the first of three (to 
date) structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), is discussed. Thereafter the changing 
patterns of rent throughout the 1990s are discussed using the measures of IRSE and 
PSRE. The chapter concludes that by the turn of the century the IRSE was in decline, 
while PSRE remained strong. 
The involvement of the donor community from 1989 is analysed in chapter five. 
The analysis bears in mind the changing patterns of rent, the changing international, 
regional and domestic environments and the new-found ability of the donor community 
to insist on economic conditions being attached to new OEA. The chapter identifies the 
main members of the donor community, both in terms of volume of assistance and 
influence within the community. Each of the main donors (multilateral and bilateral) is 
then studied to assess its individual impact. The analysis highlights that the differing 
interests within the donor community have allowed the state as an institution to 
maintain a rentier mentality. However, by the end of the period, the reduced volumes of 
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OEA available have helped to close the door to a considerable extent on the state's 
ability to continue to attract OEA. 
The analysis in chapter six switches to an assessment of the ability of the state as 
an institution to resist/accept the conditions sought by the donor community. In 
addition, the reactions of the rentier elite to the threats and opportunities posed by the 
proposed change of economic direction are discussed, as are possibility of splits within 
the rentier elite. Three case studies (privatisation, sales tax and subsidies) are explored 
to assess the objectives of the chapter. The conclusion is that the state has become more 
willing to implement economic liberalisation, particularly since 1998. This change 
seems to have coincided with increasing differences within the rentier elite and a greater 
acceptance of the need to introduce economic change. 
In the penultimate chapter the five-continua state-market model is re-introduced to 
assess the changes in the state-private sector relationship since 1989. The analysis 
concludes that the evidence points to a move towards the market end of the continuum. 
However, the state has been able to maintain a role (albeit different) by reducing direct 
intervention but increasing indirect intervention, via policies such as regulation. In the 
second part of the chapter the changes in the rentier aspects of the political economy 
(the economy, the nature of the state and the private sector, and the relationship between 
the two) are assessed. Although the policies of the donor community have been aimed 
at reducing the characteristics of ISR, these aspects have only weakened, not 
disappeared. In addition, because of the importance of remittances in the economy the 
move has not been completely in the direction of a market-based economy but has been 
subverted to include increased features associated with PSR. 
In the final chapter the first section gives a brief review of the preceding chapters. 
The second part recommends a number of areas for future research. The third section 
assesses the impact of the study on the debate on rentierism in the Middle East and 
North African context, while the final section turns from the theoretical implications to 
the implications for the actors involved. An important recommendation is that the IMF 
and World Bank packages must take into account the political economy of rentierism if 
the aim of the policies is to establish an economy based on the market rather than the 
extraction and allocation of rent. 
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Chapter One: Theory and Concepts 
ClHIAP'JfER ONE 
TlHilEORY AND CONCEPT§ 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the theoretical foundations of the 
thesis, clarify the concepts and discuss how they are used in the context of the research. 
The chapter introduces the lens through which the study is viewed: rentier theory. The 
main concepts of the thesis are also discussed: official development assistance (ODA), 
official economic assistance (OEA), remittances, the donor community, remittances, the 
state, the regime, the rentier elite and the private sector. The first three are the main 
forms of rent relevant to Jordan, while the four remaining concepts are the major actors 
within the thesis. Where relevant the models that are used to measure the degree of the 
induced rentier state economy, the private sector rentier economy and the state's 
involvement in the economy (the 5-continua state-market model) are presented. 
2.0 RENTIER THEORY 
This section introduces the concepts associated with rentierism. The discussion 
starts by introducing the concept of rent, before extending the debate to describing a 
rentier economy. Three sub-sets of a rentier economy are then presented (figure I .I, 
page 11): 
+ The pure rentier state economy, primarily based on oil rent; 
+ The induced rentier state economy (IRSE), primarily based on OEA; and 
+ The private sector rentier economy (PSRE), primarily based on remittances. 
The resulting differences in the nature of both the state and the private sector, and the 
relationship between the two are then developed using a model derived from those 
occurring in a 'normal' production economy. The emphasis is on induced state 
rentierism (ISR) and private sector rentierism (PSR), as both are directly relevant to the 
case study of Jordan. 
2.1 The Concepts of Rentierism 
The huge flows of wealth created by the oil price rises in the early 1970s re-
awakened discussion concerning the idea of rent at the national level. 1 In particular the 
question was raised as to how the accumulation of rent affected the nature and role of 
the state in its relationship with society. As Beblawi correctly argues, the impact of oil 
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mcome on "the role of the state and on economic behaviour in general has been so 
profound in the Arab world during the seventies as to justify special treatment."2 
Mahdavy, in 1970, first used the concept of rentierism in the context of the Middle East 
in his analysis of economic development in Iran, since when the usage has evolved 
through the writings of Beblawi and Luciani, among others. However, the theoretical 
discussion has become distorted by different terms being used for similar concepts.3 
For example, Beblawi defines a rentier economy as "an economy substantially 
supported by expenditure from the state whilst the state itself is supported by rent 
accruing from abroad,"4 a definition, which as will become apparent, ought to be 
applied to a rentier state. The following analysis clarifies the theoretical debate in order 
to establish the effects of rent on two relationships: the state and the donor community 
and the state and the private sector. 5 
Before discussing the concepts of a rentier economy, a rentier state economy, a 
pure rentier state economy, an IRSE and a PSRE, the term 'rent' requires explanation. 
Adam Smith was the first to draw a distinction between rent as a reward for the 
ownership of natural resources, including land and minerals, from other income (wages 
and profit).6 Rent, therefore, differed from normal income because it did not link 
work/risk with reward. Marshall, in 1920, gave a similar definition arguing that rent 
was "the income derived from the gift of nature."7 However, the concept of rent has 
been extended from income accruing from natural resources to include "the amount 
earned that is above the cost of production of the resource/service." 8 In short, rent is 
that anathema of both liberal and radical economics: unearned or undeserved income. 
Five different types of rent can be distinguished at the nationallevel: 9 portfolio, external 
capital, quasi-rents, natural resources and locational rent (table 1.1 ). 
Type of Rent;~,~ , 
Portfolio 
External Capital 
Quasi-Rents 
Natural Resources 
Locational 
Table 1.1 
Typologies of Rent 
1:,~;, Example Accrues to State/ .. 
i·h F;~4 .< .£· Private Sector 
Dividends, Interest State or 
Private Sector 
OEA State 
Remittances Private Sector 
Oil, Phosphates State 
Transit Trade State 
Importance to 
. ~ ~·..c.,;:;Jordan 
Negligible 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
Jordan has accrued rent from each of the five types over the years but the two 
most consistently important have been external capital (in terms of grants and soft 
loans) and quasi-rents (in the form of remittances). Arguably, significant sums of 
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locational rent, to ensure the stability of the regime, have also been received. However, 
the support has almost invariably been in the form of OEA, and to differentiate between 
OEA as external capital and as locational rent would prove impossible. Rent from 
phosphates and potash has also accrued to the state but, perhaps, apart from the mid-
1970s, this source of rent has been insignificant. 10 Portfolio and other forms of 
Iocational rent have been equally insignificant. Therefore, the analysis will focus on 
OEA and remittances. 
What, then, is a rentier economy? Two important elements contribute to the 
concept. Firstly, as is apparent from the five different types, rent will exist in all 
national economies. However, in a rentier economy rent is the predominant contributor 
to the national income. Secondly, as the concept is being defined for the purposes of 
analysing the relationship between the state and the private sector, the rent in question 
must be external. A preponderance of internal rent would have no effect on this 
relationship, merely creating a strong rentier class or group but still requiring the 
existence of a strong productive sector in order to be maintained. 11 Consequently, a 
rentier economy is one in which external rent contributes significantly to the national 
income or, as Mahdavy argues, a "rentier economy is an economy which relies on 
substantial external rent." 12 
However, this definition is subjective: when does external rent become 
significant? At this stage the analysis is concerned with producing an economic 
measure for rent. Once an economy has been proved to contain a degree of rent, the 
analysis will then assess what the political implications are. Furthermore, establishing a 
base line figure, above which an economy is deemed to be rentier and below which it is 
productive, is too cut and dry. Indeed, an economy can switch over time between these 
categories. Consequently, a preferable method is to analyse the degree of rent from 
low, through medium to high, based on the model developed later in the chapter. 
Admittedly, this measure can be open to accusations of vagueness but without a 
comparative analysis of a number of rentier economies (which is beyond the scope of 
this study), it is impossible to design a more objective method. 
While this measure may not seem contentious, assessing the value of any type of 
rent is not straightforward. 13 For example, as is discussed in section three on OEA, the 
amount recorded is not necessarily the value to the recipient state. Furthermore, 
different reputable sources, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), can 
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give considerably different figures for what ought to be the same unit/phenomenon. 
Remittances 14 suffer equal problems of measurement in that they regularly by-pass the 
official banking system and therefore cannot be calculated accurately. Given the 
problems facing official economic figures in Jordan until very recently, the difficulties 
of estimating the levels of remittances by-passing the official system would involve a 
further PhD. In addition, a question arises as to what proportion of the remittance can 
be classified as rent. Should the full amount repatriated be considered or merely the 
excess over the amount which could have been earned in the home country? While this 
discussion is appropriate, the need to delve as deeply is beyond the ambit of this study. 
Consequently, as the analysis is primarily based on figures over a period of time, the 
overall imperative is to use one measure (and as far as possible one source) to ensure 
continuity of comparison. 
2.2 State Rentierism versus Private Sector Rentierism 
So far, the discussion has concentrated on external rent accruing to the national 
economy. An important distinction is now introduced: to which particular sector, 
private or public, the rent accrues. This difference creates what this study terms 'state 
rentierism' and 'private sector rentierism', dependent on the sector to which the rent 
accrues. A rentier economy can comprise of either, or a combination of both: thus both 
a rentier state economy and a PSRE can be considered a sub-set of a rentier economy 
(figure 1.1 ). In the majority of rentier economies in the Middle East, rent accrues 
predominantly to the state in the form of oil revenues (e.g. Saudi Arabia), portfolio 
income (Kuwait), locational rent (Suez Canal revenues in Egypt), and/or OEA 15 (Jordan 
until mid-1970s). However, since the 1970s oil boom, large-scale rent in the form of 
remittances has been channelled into the private sector in a number of labour-exporting 
countries, such as Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. These funds are not received by the state 
but by individuals/families, and therefore the state can only access the funds through 
indirect means, such as taxation or the creation of public sector controlled savings 
schemes. The funds represent latent capital that may be invested in productive or non-
productive assets, consumed through the acquisition of domestically produced 
goods/services and/or imported goods/services, or saved domestically or abroad. In 
each case, with the exception of 'saved abroad', the funds tend to benefit the private 
sector, admittedly to varying degrees but in each case directly, whereas the government 
can only benefit on a secondary or indirect level. The state has no control over the rent, 
although it may adopt policies that allow access to the rent circuit. 
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to state to private sector 
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According to rentier theory, the accrual of rent to the state creates a particular set 
of relations between the state and society in general, and, consequently, between state 
and the private sector. In addition, a particular set of relations between the domestic 
economy and the international economy is formed. This latter relationship impinges 
directly on how the regime interacts with certain international actors, such as the donor 
community in the case of OEA. The accrual of significant sums of rent to the private 
sector has the potential to change considerably the relationship between the state and the 
private sector and, to a lesser degree, the state and the donor community. This aspect of 
rentierism has suffered from a lack of research, 16 which this study aims to help rectify. 
Based on rent accruing to the state or to the private sector, the two poles of a 
rentier economy that can be envisaged are an unadulterated rentier state economy and 
an unadulterated PSRE. As has been highlighted, these polar opposites are only 
possible in theory; in reality, an economy will contain elements of each, which will vary 
over time. The study will now clarify the various terms that are used in rentier writings 
before discussing the effects of rent on the state-private sector and state-donor 
relationships. The next section discusses the difference between a 'normal' production 
economy and a rentier economy. 
2.3 Production Economy versus Rentier Economy 
The starting point for the following discussion is that a rentier economy differs in 
important elements from a production economy. In the production economy the 
national income is predominantly composed of firstly the productive activities of the 
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citizens through wages, and secondly businesses through profit. The state raises 
revenue through direct and indirect taxation of these productive activities in order to 
continue to recreate itself. In the production economy, the production/redistribution/ 
extraction 17 state "has an interest in expanding the income base on which taxes can be 
levied" 18 to ensure its continued role. As the state is limited in size by the amount of 
domestic revenue that can be raised, economic policies formulated by the state have the 
aim of creating economic growth for the economy as a whole in order to sustain the 
state. A degree of consensus is built round the level of taxation levied: in the words of 
Vanderwalle an "historic compromise.'" 9 The private sector, on the other hand, is 
concerned with profit maximisation, which in production economies is a corollary of 
economic growth. 20 The relationship between the state and the private sector can be 
viewed as one in which the private sector expects the state to provide a degree of 
security and protection, without impinging directly on its activities. The two actors are 
clearly delineated, but with a degree of interdependence. Importantly, the private sector 
is not homogenous but is comprised of many different groups, not all necessarily 
pulling in the same direction. The bureaucracy is built around the extractive capacity of 
the state, and is seen to act as a mediator between the state and the private sector, 
through its rules and procedures. On the external level, the state's economic relations 
with the international community are formulated on the need to attract investment and 
to increase exports. Both these measures, if successful, will increase the taxation base 
and therefore sustain the existence of the state. One final point should be borne in 
mind: the state can also expand its activities by borrowing domestically and/or 
internationally. However, the servicing of such debts is merely part of government 
expenditure and is therefore still constrained by the revenue-raising capacity. Thus in 
the production economy the state remains reliant on the economic development of the 
private sector. 
By contrast, the rentier economy, which is an economy where the substantial part 
of its revenue accrues from foreign sources and under the form of rent but "the rent need 
not accrue directly to state,"21 produces a different relationship between the state and the 
private sector, and the state and international community based on a "rentier 
mentality."22 This mentality breaks the conventional work/risk and reward causation 
found in the production economy, with the result that "[g]etting access to the rent circuit 
is a greater pre-occupation than reaching productive efficiency.'m However, the rentier 
mentality is not only about gaining access to the rent circuit but also it allows those with 
the available resources to attempt to gain control of the rent. 24 Finally, protecting 
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control and access becomes an integral part of economic strategy. Thus, the bread riots, 
which have empted occasionally in the Arab world following the withdrawal or 
reduction of subsidies, can be seen as expressions of rentier mentality. The importance 
of gaining and maintaining access or control means "[s]pecial social and economic 
interests are organised in such a manner as to capture a good slice of . . . rent."25 
Government policy takes on a two-dimensional role that involves maintaining control of 
and access to rent, while pursuing a politically-driven expenditure policy. Thus, the 
scene is set for a different relationship between the state and the private sector and the 
state and the donor community in a rentier economy than that which occurs in a 
production economy. 
However, these relationships are further dependent on the type of rent. Two 
important variables occur between the type of rents: to whom the rent accmes, and 
whether a third party plays a significant role (table 1.2). Oil rent accrues directly to the 
state, without the significant intervention of a third actor resulting in pure-state 
rentierism. 26 OEA also accrues to the state, but is dependent to a major degree on the 
political interests of the donor, resulting in an IRSE. This dependence exacerbates the 
volatile nature of rent, which can result in threats of instability for the incumbent 
regime. The pure rentier state economy (oil) and IRSE (OEA) can be considered sub-
sets of the rentier state economy (figure 1.1, page 11 ). Remittances accme to the private 
sector (i.e. a PSRE), on the forbearance of a third party: the state in which the 
expatriates work. The oil revenue slump of the 1980s and the Gulf crisis of 1990 
illustrated the vulnerability of Jordanian remittances to external crises. 
I~ Iiel1t >"' ,:\' 
Oil 
OEA 
Remittances 
Table 1.2 
Differences in Types of Rent 
::#A:ccrues To ~ Third Palty ,:=~::: 
State No 
State Donor Community 
Private Sector Labour-Importing State 
~lfelevance to Jordan , 
Insignificant 
Highly Relevant 
Highly Relevant 
The rentier state is one in which "the government is the principal recipient of the 
external rent in the economy."27 Alternatively, a number of writers prefer the term 
allocative or allocation state. 28 Rather than concentrating on the source of revenue the 
term arises from the main activity of the rentier state, which rather than extracting 
revenue from the population, allocates the rent to the population. Nevertheless, the two 
terms can be used interchangeably. Luciani actually sets a precise figure for when a 
state attains rentier status: "all states whose revenue derives predominantly (more than 
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40 per cent) from oil or other foreign sources and whose expenditure is a substantial 
share of [Gross Domestic Product] GDP."29 To clarify then two different styles of 
rentier state economy are found, based on the type of rent accruing to the state: 
~ Pure rentier state economies, (oil revenue based); and 
~ IRSEs (OEA). 
The following section discusses the first of these and the effects on the nature of the 
state and the private sector, and the relationship between the two. 
2.4 Pure Rentier State Economies: Oil Rent 
The pure rentier states form the basis for the following analysis of the political 
correlates of the rentier state. The initial discussion ignores the influence of the third 
party, which can be found in OEA rent but not in oil rent. Once the basis of the state-
private sector relationship has been established in a pure rentier state, the analysis will 
be extended to account for possible third party intervention, in the form of OEA. 
In the pure rentier state, the state is the prime economic power. As discussed 
earlier, the influence of the rentier mentality results in the state adopting a two-
dimensional policy-making process: maintaining control of and access to rent and 
allocating expenditure rather than the raising of domestic revenues (figure 1.2a, page 
23). The first dimension is focused outwards on the source of the rent. Thus in the case 
of Saudi Arabia, policy would be aimed around maintaining the price of oil and 
ensuring a smooth supply to the world market. The second dimension, namely a 
politically-inspired "expenditure policy",30 can be seen in a number of outcomes: 
+ Infrastructure development, which will be led through state-controlled development 
plans; 
+ State-controlled or state-supported enterprises; 
+ Subsidies both of basic necessities, such as bread, electricity and water, and those 
aimed at favoured businesses, such as cheap loans and tax breaks; 
~ Contracts from the state to favoured businesses; 
+ 'Royal' favours, such as free land in return for political support; 
+ Bureaucracy built around allocative, rather than extractive, mechanisms; 
~ Regulations aimed at preferred businesses, such as partnership agreements in Saudi 
Arabia, which allow foreigners to establish trades and professions in conjunction 
with a Saudi national; and 
+ The state as a major source of employment. 
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The majority of these features impact significantly on the development of a private 
sector, which then becomes dependent on the state for its growth. 
The outcomes of the expenditure policy help to legitimise the rule of the state 
without the necessity for democratic institutions. Citizenship becomes a source of 
economic benefit whether through subsidies or employment, while in return the state 
expects loyalty without political participation. As Najmabadi claims, the traditional 
tribal/kinship networks, already in existence prior to the formation of the Middle East 
rentier state, provide "the new economic and political elite, the backbone of the new 
state bureaucracies, and to a large extent they also provided a ready-made distribution 
network for the new wealth."31 Consequently, pure state rentierism has been able to 
"reinforce traditional forms of tribal networks, linking business and government through 
kinship networks, tribal loyalties and business partnerships."32 The second aspect is 
that economic policy is used to build and reinforce the state, not only through a sizeable 
bureaucracy, but also through industrialisation policies. The state moves into the 
productive sector, either at the expense of, or in co-ordination with, elements of the 
private sector. Thirdly, the expenditure policy creates a short-termism aimed at 
increasing rent, not at long-term policies predicated on achieving sustainable economic 
growth. The failure of the Gulf oil states, in general, to diversify into other sectors to 
reduce their dependency on oil can be seen as a classic example of this short-termism. 
Similarly, in the induced rentier state, the periodic 'world' tours of King Hussein 
pleading for extra OEA, rather than actively promoting a restructuring of the domestic 
economy, were a perfect example of this policy. Indeed, one of King Abdullah's first 
moves, on acceding to throne, was to embark on a world tour with this aim in mind. 
However, the outcome was largely unsuccessful, laying the foundations for the new 
King's acceptance of the need to implement wholesale economic liberalisation. 
What, then, are the effects of pure rentier state rentierism on the private sector and 
on its relationship with the state? Firstly, pure state rentierism creates an imbalance 
between production and the standard of living. Levels of consumption are greater than 
could be afforded in an economy that was reliant only on the productive sector. 
Economically, the high levels of consumption translate into higher than expected levels 
of imports (although these are more than offset by export revenues from oil-indeed 
one of the main features of a pure rentier state economy are high balance of trade 
surpluses), as the higher levels of private consumption are directed towards imports. 
The imbalance skews the interests of the private sector towards catering for the imports 
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needed to feed the level of consumption. The private sector tends, therefore, to move 
towards the service sector, failing to form a vibrant industrial sector. Secondly, as with 
other forms of rentierism the private sector adopts a rentier mentality: rent-seeking 
rather than profit-seeking becomes the order of the day. The rent seeking is manifested 
in the formation of businesses designed to access the allocation of rent by the state, such 
as construction companies, and to access the indirect or second-level rent in the 
economy, e.g. import companies. As these companies become directly and/or indirectly 
reliant on the state for survival they build close relations with it. In addition, individual 
members of the regime are able to establish similar companies to gain access to the rent 
that they themselves disburse. 
The result is state-private sector relations become blurred, as the distinction 
between public and private interests breaks down, or is not clearly differentiated from 
the outset. The blurring is manifested in a plethora of ways. Among the examples is 
the involvement of the state in part-ownership of 'private' companies; "elite 
circulation"33 with the appointment of state officials to the boards of private companies 
and the reverse case with the appointment of elite private sector representatives sitting 
on the boards of state companies; and the voluntary co-aptation of the private business 
associations, such as Chambers of Commerce and Industry and, in the case of Jordan, 
the Jordanian Businessmens Association. In addition, formal relations between the two 
sectors based on institutions tend to be by-passed and/or fall into disuse, while informal 
contacts become the order of the day. 34 Although accusations of corruption are 
regularly heard, little or no action is usually taken to stop the use of public resources to 
boost private interests. The state acts to provide special favours via legislation, 
subsidies, 'royal' favours, contracts, etc. Rather than being seen as a competitor to the 
private sector in, for example, industrialisation, the state becomes a friend to particular 
private sector interests. 
The blurring discussed earlier means that a distinct private sector, as would be 
found in a production economy, is not evident. The elites of the private sector and the 
state found in the production economy are subsumed in the pure rentier state into a 
combined rentier elite. Importantly, this rentier elite is hierarchical, with the main 
power centre equated with the ruling regime. Thus in Saudi Arabia, the al-Saud family 
is considered the prime element of the rentier elite, while in Jordan the Hashemites fulfil 
the same role. However, for analytical purposes three characteristics of a private sector 
that evolves from this form of rent can be adduced. The first is that the main actors in 
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the private sector are relatively homogenous in their outlook, with the rentier mentality 
creating a bias towards the service sector. Secondly, the private sector becomes heavily 
dependent on the state for its profits and its continued survival. Finally, the private 
sector becomes 'captured' by the state, acting as a tool for the political and economic 
interests of the elite. Thus an independent private sector fails to emerge, but a relatively 
homogenous dependent captive private sector evolves. On the other side of the 
equation, as a consequence of the flows of rent, a different type of state from that of the 
production state develops. The pure rentier state is able to use the rent to buy political 
support from various groups in society, including the private sector elite. Indeed due to 
the resources at its disposal the state can eliminate old classes and create new ones, as 
occurred with the business elite in Saudi Arabia.35 In addition, what was a political 
state elite has now become what can be described as a political state elite with private 
sector economic interests, as the elite has expanded its activities through direct 
intervention in the economy, including the ownership of productive assets. The raison 
d'etre of the pure rentier state is drawn from the rentier mentality and is concerned with 
controlling and gaining access to the flows of rent. 
Although intuitively this state would seem to be strong and therefore autonomous 
from society in general and from the private sector in particular, the reverse is actually 
the case. This apparent paradox occurs because of the rentier elite, which is politically 
and economically bound to the political and economic structures created by the oil-rent. 
Thus when levels of rent decline, as happened during the mid-l980s, the apparently 
strong state is unable to implement the change demanded by the international 
community to overcome the potential collapse of the economy?6 The close relationship 
between the state and private sector based on the new rentier elite acts as a major 
impediment to the threat of change. The elite, with its short-term rentier mentality, 
lobbies against changes that they perceive are not to be in their immediate interest. The 
political and economic interests of the elite have become dependent on the status quo. 
Rather than becoming autonomous, oil rentierism creates a state whose links with the 
private sector make wholesale, speedy change almost impossible to implement. 
2.5 Induced Rentier State Economies: OEA Rent 
Having discussed pure state rentierism (i.e. no third party involvement) the 
analysis now assesses the differences between oil rent and OEA rent. Firstly, an 
important difference between these rents is the relative importance of each in the 
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economy. In the pure rentier state, oil rent can account for in excess of 90% of the 
Gross National Product (GNP), whereas in induced rentier states based on OEA rent the 
importance is considerably less, but nevertheless still remains significant. As the level 
of rent accruing to the state is less, the influence of the state in the economy is also 
reduced. However, the overall effect will be to dilute, but certainly not negate, the 
various features of the state-private sector relationship in comparison with a pure rentier 
state. Thus, as opposed to the pure rentier state, the two sectors will still become 
blurred but the rentier elite will be less homogenous and less powerful. In addition, the 
state will less easily be able to create and destroy classes, and the private sector will be 
captured to a lesser degree. The symbiosis between the two sectors will nonetheless 
ensure that the adoption of any change of economic direction, which threatens the 
immediate interests of the elite, will be challenged. 
Secondly, OEA is dependent on a third party, the donor, whose interests are 
invariably political, thus resulting in the funds, and, therefore, the state being highly 
vulnerable to political and economic events outside its control. With oil rent, the state 
controls the source of the rent (but certainly not all the market conditions), in contrast to 
OEA where the donor controls the flow of rent. In order to continue to access OEA the 
state has to adopt, or be seen to attempt to adopt, policies (whether in the field of 
security, politics or economics), which meet the criteria of the donor, without affecting 
the short-term stability of the regime. 37 However, until the end of the 1980s in the 
bipolar Cold War world the recipient state was often in a position to threaten the donor 
with a change of sides; thus maintaining high levels of OEA. The result was that states 
such as Jordan became hooked on the 'cocaine' of OEA, adopting a rentier mentality at 
the external level of economic decision-making in order to avoid the 'cold turkey' of 
withdrawal. Since the late 1980s, the move towards the imposition of political and 
economic conditions by donors on the recipients has reduced the leeway for the rentier 
state to implement domestic economic, and to a lesser degree political, policies outside 
the global norm. In addition, the scope for playing one donor off against another has 
diminished, almost to zero, since the end of the Cold War. These two factors have 
reduced the autonomy and space for manoeuvre of the rentier state vis-a-vis the donor 
community, providing a rein on the rentier mentality. How the support of the donor 
community for the enhancement of the private sector's role in the economy changes the 
relationship between the state and the private sector, given the existence of a relatively 
homogenous rentier elite, is one of the questions that will be addressed in the following 
chapters. A further question that will be addressed is: whether the state can prove 
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resilient in the face of donor conditionality due to historical state-private sector 
relationship? 
A further difference from the pure rentier state is that the induced rentier state can 
afford to nm budget deficits (excluding ODA). As the deficits are funded by the ODA, 
a higher level of government expenditure is possible paralleling the higher consumption 
levels of the private sector in the pure rentier state. In times of recession, this feature 
allows the donor community to be able to apply extra pressure in having the recipient 
state adapt new economic policies. 
To summarise, the characteristics of the IRSE are: 
+ A dependency on OEA; 
+ A high level of imports, which help to create a chronic balance of trade deficit (in 
comparison high earnings from oil revenues more than offset high levels of imports 
in a pure rentier state economy); 
+ A high level of state expenditure resulting in continual budget deficits (excluding 
ODA); 
• Economic sectoral imbalances in favour of services; and 
+ High levels of consumption in comparison to GDP. 
The state: 
+ Follows a two-dimensional policy of maintaining control of and access to rent and 
pursuing a politically motivated expenditure policy (figure 1.2b, page 23); and 
• Has the ability to create and destroy classes. 
The private sector is: 
+ Relatively homogenised in outlook; 
+ Dependent on the state; and 
+ Service oriented. 
The relationship between the private and public sectors is blurred, which results in: 
+ The creation of a rentier elite; 
+ Elite circulation between the two sectors; 
+ Voluntary co-aptation or 'capture' of the private sector by the state; 
• Informal rather than formal contacts between the private sector and the state; and 
• Endemic corruption. 
Regularly, rentier theory analysis uses only the one measure, rent as a percentage 
of GNP, to assess the degree of rent in the economy. However, this indicator does not 
reveal the full picture. Therefore this study uses a model based on a combination of six 
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measures to present a more accurate reflection of the situation with regard to the IRSE. 
Although calculating OEA as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) can assess 
the importance of OEA to the economy, this measure does not necessarily reflect the 
position fully. The funds must be circulated within the economy, not merely redirected 
externally for debt repayments or to private banks in Switzerland.38 If the funds are 
circulated within the economy the effects can be seen in government expenditure. Thus 
the higher the percentage of expenditure accounted for by OEA, the greater the level of 
state rentierism, as the OEA and oil rent allows the state to contribute a higher share of 
the GNP than would be the case in a production economy. Thirdly, the government 
retains the ability to raise revenues domestically, via taxation. The less the government 
relies on domestic revenue the greater the effects of the IRSE ought to be. The overall 
effects on government expenditure and revenue are reflected in the budget deficit, 
which can be offset by the use of OEA. Persistent trade deficits can also be 
compensated for by regular inflows of OEA, sustaining an unbalanced economy. 
Finally, the volume of OEA in relation to the population must also be considered, as 
relatively bigger populations will dilute the effects of OEA. In order to take account of 
these factors, the thesis will use six measures to assess the degree of the IRSE: 
+ Gross OEA as a percentage of GNP; 
+ Gross OEA as a percentage of government revenue; 
+ Gross OEA as a percentage of government expenditure; 
+ Gross OEA as a percentage of budget deficit, excluding OEA; 
+ Gross OEA as a percentage of trade deficit; and 
+ Gross OEA per capita. 
In normal circumstance, a high degree of correlation ought to exist between the SIX 
measures. 
2.6 Private Sector Rentier Economies: Remittances 
The discussion now moves from state rentierism to the opposite end of the rent 
continuum, private sector rent in the form of remittances. An economy based on 
remittances displays a number of similarities to state rentierism, but significant 
differences are also apparent. As with other forms of rent, the predominance of 
remittances in the economy ensures that a rentier mentality is adopted by both the 
private and public sectors. This rent-seeking mentality is again manifested in the public 
sector in a dual policy (figure 1.2c, page 23). Firstly, in order for the state to reproduce 
itself the continuing flow of remittances must be ensured. Policy-making, as far as 
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possible, becomes directed at maintaining relations with the labour-importing 
countries. 39 Secondly, the state adopts economic policies that attempt to ensure access 
to the flow of remittances, as the state is unable directly to control or access the flows of 
rent, as it was able to do under state rentierism. For example, although direct taxation 
on inward capital transfers is possible, this method either discourages the transfer of 
remittances or else unofficial channels are used to by-pass the taxation. Therefore, the 
state's most realistic option for raising domestic revenue on remittance income is via 
indirect taxation, for example through custom duties on the imports fed by the 
remittance economy. Thus, although significant trade deficits are experienced, policies 
will rarely be taken to cut the levels of imports. In addition, businesses with direct 
access to the flow of rent will be encouraged by the state, via different types of 
incentives. These businesses can then be subject to taxation, further allowing the state 
to gain indirect access to the flow of remittances. The state can also access the flow by 
establishing compulsory or voluntary savings schemes under its control. However, the 
lack of direct access to the rent flow results in less finance being available to the state, 
which in turn is less able to move directly into economy but also is unable to provide 
the level of social services associated with both a production economy (paid for by 
taxes) and a rentier state economy (paid for by rent). 
Although the private sector ought to be able to move into the productive sector 
three factors combine to produce a private sector that is service-oriented. As in the case 
of OEA, remittances create an imbalance between production and consumption, since 
higher standards of living than would be expected can be maintained, and again this 
extra consumption is disproportionally directed towards imports. In addition, the 
adoption of the rentier mentality ensures the private sector is geared towards providing 
the services that are needed by the remittance economy, such as banks and the import 
trade sector. Finally, as discussed above, the policies of the public sector reinforce the 
bias towards the service sector. 
On the other hand, the private sector is able to develop independently of the state. 
Remittances can guarantee "the financial independence of the private sector."40 Indeed 
in Chaudhry's study of the Yemen, the author found that the private sector was able to 
replace the state in areas of social welfare, such as education and health provision. 41 
Although, the economy as a whole develops a bias towards the service sector, the flow 
of remittances does allow the private sector to form a series of different interest groups, 
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similar to the production economy. Overall, the private sector therefore becomes 
service-oriented, independent of the state and relatively heterogeneous. 
The relationship between the two sectors is therefore based on an apparently weak 
state and a strong private sector. The result is that the formal lines of communication 
between the two either atrophy (if they existed originally) or fail to develop as fully as 
in a production economy. In addition, the independence of the private sector from the 
state ensures that the informal contacts of the rentier state do not materialise. 
Intuitively, the outcome would seem to be a strong and autonomous private sector 
and a weak state with little control over the private sector. However, in times of the 
retrenchment of remittances, the independence of the state from the private sector 
allows the former to adopt a policy of economic change. The reason for this set of 
affairs is due to the development of separate elites under PSR. In her study, Chaudhrl2 
found that remittances helped to boost the position of the "traditional southern Suni 
merchant class,"43 with the northern tribes continuing to staff the apparatuses of the 
state such as the bureaucracy and the army.44 Thus remittances "accentuated the 
longstanding disequilibria in the social composition of the bureaucracy and army on the 
one hand and the merchant class on the other."45 In other words, under PSR the state 
and private sector elites are able to develop independently of each other, in contrast to 
ISR. The lack of elite rotation, voluntary co-aptation of the private business 
associations and informal contacts between the two sectors allowed the state and private 
sectors to remain separate entities. Thus when remittances retreated in the mid-1980s 
the apparently weak state was able to implement policies that were detrimental to 
powerful private sector interests. 
Similarly to the case of the IRSE a model, on this occasion using four measures, 
has been developed to assess the degree to which an economy can be termed as a PSRE. 
The first measure of the level of the PSRE is the ratio of remittances to GNP. Again, 
however, this indicator does not paint the full picture. Firstly, the volume of 
remittances will be diluted when spread over a larger population. In addition, 
remittances are often used to fuel levels of imports, producing a trade deficit, which, as 
with OEA, can be sustained by remittances. Finally, the relative importance of 
remittances to OEA needs to be established in order to distinguish which is more likely 
to have the greater effect on state-donor and state-private sector relations. 
Consequently, the analysis uses four measures of private-sector rentierism: 
+ Remittances as a percentage of GNP; 
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• Remittances per capita; 
• Remittances as a percentage of trade deficit; and 
+ Remittances as a percentage of OEA. 
2.7 Induced State Rentierism and Private Sector Rentierism 
This discussion of the different forms of rentierism has allowed the diverse 
outcomes caused by different types of rent to be drawn out. The first difference 
highlighted has been the relationship between the type of rent, the state and the private 
sector (figures 1.2a, 1.2b and 1.2c). In the case of the pure rentier state economy, the 
state has significant control over the allocation of rent, which itself is relatively more 
important in the economy than in the case of the IRSE. In the latter case, the state is 
also constrained by the influence of the donor community. The state's role is further 
diluted in the case of the PSRE, as it cannot control the flow of rent but can only adopt 
policies that will allow it access to the flow of rent. 
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The primary concerns of this study are the cases of the IRSE (OEA) and PSRE 
(remittances). In each case a certain set of characteristics are apparent: in the case of 
the IRSE these characteristics have been termed ISR, and for the PSRE, they are 
referred to as PSR. The theoretical discussion has highlighted that PSR has similarities 
to ISR in that both: 
+ Are dependent on rent (albeit of different types); 
+ Suffer from chronic balance of trade deficits due to the high levels of imports; 
+ Show high levels of consumption in comparison to GDP; and 
+ Produce economies that tend to be service-oriented. 
However, vital differences are also in evidence. Under PSR: 
+ The state does not have control over rent but adopts different policies that allow it 
access to the rent. In addition, the level of expenditure policy is necessarily more 
restrained due to the restricted level of revenues; 
+ The private sector becomes more heterogeneous; 
+ The private sector develops independently of the state; 
+ The political and economic elites remain separate; and 
+ The relationship between the private and public sectors is based on formal but weak 
institutions. 
In the case of Jordan, OEA has been an important (if somewhat fluctuating) aspect 
of the economy from its inception. Only from the early 1970s, however, have 
remittances become a significant feature on the economic landscape. Chapters two and 
three investigate what happens to the state-private sector relationship in a case where 
remittances become an important factor in an economy in which the state and the 
private sector have already formed a symbiotic relationship, based on ISR. 
Theoretically, remittances ought to allow a private sector elite to (re-)emerge, and thus 
to (re-)gain independence from the state, but the rentier elite may be able to access the 
flow of remittances due to its close relationship with the private sector, ensuring no 
change in the balance of power in the economy. 
3.0 ODA, OEA, THE DONOR COMMUNITY AND REMITTANCES 
Having established the theoretical basis of the thesis, attention now turns to 
defining the major concepts associated with rent, namely: 
+ Official Development Assistance (ODA): 
+ Official Economic Assistance (OEA); 
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o The donor community; and 
o Remittances. 
The discussion highlights the problems associated with each concept and how they are 
used in the context of the study. In particular, the discussion highlights the political 
nature of both OEA and remittances. Hence, an economy based on either becomes 
vulnerable to external changes outwith the control of the recipient state. 
3.1 ODA or OEA 
ODA 46 is a term developed by the Development Assistance Committee47 (DAC) 
of the OECD.48 The DAC was established by the OECD in 1966 with the aim: 
"to secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made 
available to less-developed countries and to improve their effectiveness. To 
this end, Members periodically review together both the amount and the 
nature of their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral and multilateral, 
and consult each other on all aspects of their development assistance 
policies."49 
As Stokke argues, the DAC, which contains the majority of the major bilateral donors, 
has been "assigned a norm-setting and monitoring function by the OECD member 
governments as far as ODA is concerned."50 The DAC definition, which has evolved 
since its initial conceptualisation, has been controlled by the donor countries. At no 
stage have the recipient countries, through organisations such as United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the G-77 or Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), attempted to formulate their own version. 
Instead the recipients have focused their efforts on attempting to establish targets for the 
donor countries to achieve (footnote 90). 
In the early DAC reports all 'flows of resources' from the rich to the poor 
countries were merely divided into official (i.e. governmental) or private. The 
unspoken assumption was that all transfers were considered to be of benefit to the 
recipient nations. 51 This supposition was based on the dominant post-war theory of 
economic growth that underdevelopment was the result of endogenous constraints, 
particularly capital shortage, in the economies of the poorer nations. At this stage any 
flow of capital into the country was considered helpful in freeing the blockages that, in 
turn, ought to promote faster economic growth, to the benefit of all the citizens in the 
recipient country. 52 Myrdal highlights the weakness of treating all 'flows of resources' 
as beneficial to the recipient state. He cites the example of Portugal's protracted 
colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique until 1964. The transfer of resources needed 
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to fight the wars, rather than to achieve economic growth, resulted in Portugal assuming 
"the place of honour as having the largest flows to underdeveloped countries in 
comparison with its gross national product."53 
The DAC responded to criticisms of their figures by distinguishing between 
concessional, (i.e. ODA) and non-concessional flows (Other Official Flows). The 
category ODA has since become the institutional definition for official aid. The initial 
definition was: 
"all flows to less-developed countries and multilateral institutions (as 
defined for this purpose) provided by official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive agencies, which meet the following 
tests: 
a) They are administered with, as the main objective, the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries, and 
b) They are intended to be concessional in character, i.e. their terms are 
significantly softer than the terms normally available for commercial 
transactions with less-developed countries such as guaranteed private export 
credits. "54 
In 1973, the second condition of the definition was altered to "it is concessional m 
character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent."55 The definition was 
slightly reworded in 1979, without altering the meaning, namely: 
"those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided 
by official agencies, including states and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following terms: 
a) It is administered with the promotion of economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and 
b) It is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 
25%."56 
The DAC definition of ODA comprises three elements: 
+ The source of the flow requires to be official, i.e. governmental; 
+ The terms should be concessional (i.e. below market rate); 57 and 
+ The objective should be for the development of the recipient country. 
The definition is therefore concerned not just with describing ODA per se, but is also 
prescriptive, stating that the main objective should be specifically for developmental 
purposes of the recipient country. As is discussed in the next section, differing 
interpretations of this definition cause problems for measuring and comparing the flows 
of ODA. 
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3.L1 Clarifying the Definition of ODA 
This section clarifies a number of aspects concerning the use of the term ODA, 
including the problems of measurement and comparison, the prescriptive element of 
development, and the reporting of non-DAC flows. 
Firstly, the question of what qualifies as ODA has to be raised. Donor countries58 
are able to include various elements such as "administrative costs, imputed costs of 
students from SCs59 (since 1984) and aid given to refugees from SCs in the North",60 
but which do not directly benefit the recipient country.61 In addition, subscriptions to 
multilateral organisations, such as the World Bank or regional banks, are included, 
although these funds may not be used for ODA purposes.62 Secondly, the practice of 
tying ODA to the commercial activities of the donor state reduces the value to the 
recipient.63 Erler considers that tying aid reduces the value of the ODA to the recipient 
by as much as 20%,64 while Chenery argues the value is reduced by "25% or more as 
compared to the system of competitive bidding."65 Thirdly, the concept of policy 
incoherence can reduce the value. Raffer and Singer cite the case of subsidised 
European Union (EU) beef exports to West Africa, which undermined a separate EU 
programme aimed at supporting local beef production.66 
The researcher also faces difficulties when comparing aid flows not just between 
countries at any one time, but also over time intra-country and inter-country. The 
figures for ODA are always denominated in dollars, but a comparison of the value to the 
recipient must take into account three further factors: the exchange rate,67 inflation68 and 
purchasing power parity. 69 
A further problem associated with the definition of ODA is the prescriptive aspect 
that the main objective of the funds should be used for developmental purposes, which a 
number of critics argue is concerned not just with promoting economic growth, but also 
should be concerned with reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality. 70 A major 
critique, which has been continuously proposed since the modern era of aid commenced 
following the end of the Second World War, is that national interests rather than 
altruism are a driving force for a donor's motivation. A number of studies highlight that 
in reality the objectives of development are subverted to varying degrees by the 
political, economic and security interests of the donors.71 The interests themselves are 
products of historical and geo-political factors, 72 such as colonialism in case of the UK, 
France, Spain, Portugal and The Netherlands.73 A number of the 'middle power' 
countries, such as Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, have 
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traditionally based their aid policies on "humane internationalism,"74 but even these 
countries are moving towards policies based on self-interest.75 Until recently, 
multilateral assistance was considered not to be influenced by political, economic and 
security interests. 76 However, Burnell 77 lists a series of studies that have shown this not 
to be the case. Among the examples cited are the exclusion of Taiwan from the UN in 
1971 at the behest of China and the pressure placed by Japan on the World Bank to 
soften its sanctions imposed on China following Tiananmen Square in 1989. Melior 
and Masters78 add further strength to the criticism of the neutrality of multilateral ODA 
by pointing out that the renewal of funding of multilateral institutions (which qualifies 
as ODA), especially in the World Bank, is a highly political process. 
ODA is not restricted to the DAC countries. Two other sources have been 
important: countries associated with the Soviet bloc79 during the Cold War and the 
OPEC countries, 80 particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. The accuracy of the figures for 
the non-DAC countries, as reported by the DAC, are even more suspect than those for 
the DAC members, as these figures are largely estimates since no obligation exists on 
the non-DAC members to provide details to the OECD. For example, Kaiser81 
distinguishes three phases of DAC reporting on Soviet ODA. During the first phase 
from 1961 to 1974 the estimates were considered honest. However, in the period from 
1975 until 1980 the figures were increasingly understated to allow for political points to 
be scored. Finally in the third period the estimates were re-valued upwards for fear of 
losing credibility. Wide-ranging figures are given for the share of OPEC ODA. 
Bobiash claims that in 1975-76 OPEC aid accounted for 27.8% of world ODA. 82 On 
the other hand, Burnell argues that in 1975 OPEC aid was 40.5% of the level of DAC 
ODA,~13 a figure, which would account for over 35% of global ODA. Raffer and 
Singer84 cite an example where the World Bank shows Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) ODA at US$7 .246bn in 1979 while the OECD discloses 
US$5.1905bn for Arab countries and agencies in the same year. The same two sources 
show a difference of over US$3bn or 50% in 1980. These discrepancies show not only 
the difficulties associated with estimating ODA but also that the figures can be used for 
political purposes, with, for example, the DAC playing down the value of non-DAC 
ODA. A similar example can be found with Jordanian ODA figures. In the period 
1967 to 1973 the difference between the OECD and the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
figures for Arab assistance is in excess of 320% (table 1.3). In order to maintain 
consistency and in view of the problems that have been experienced with the official 
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economic figures issued by the Jordanian state over the years, this study will be based 
primarily on the OECD figures from their inception in 1960. 
Table 1.3 
Arab Assistance according to CBJ and OECD, 1967-1973 (JDm) 
Year OECD~ " :t~BJ. ~ Difference 
1967 0.0 13.0 13.0 
1968 0.0 39.5 39.5 
1969 0.0 39.6 39.6 
1970 12.6 35.9 23.3 
1971 0.5 18.9 18.4 
1972 0.7 23.7 23.0 
1973 33.6 30.5 -3.1 
Total 47.4 201.1 153.7 
.. Sources: OECD, InternatiOnal Development StatistiCS, CD ROM 2000 edition, (Pans: OECD). The 
figures have been adapted by the official exchange rate of Jordanian Dinar 1 (JDI)=US$2.8. CBJ, 
(various), Annual Report, (Amman: CBJ). 
The study will use the term ODA when quoting figures from official sources such 
as the OECD, IMF, World Bank, and CBJ. However, as a result of the difficulties 
discussed, the author prefers to use the term OEA. The concept of OEA includes not 
only ODA but also all official grants and loans whether or not they comply with the 
concessionality of 25%. Thus all lending associated with the IMF and World Bank can 
be included. The reason for this inclusion is the importance of the influence of the 
Bretton Woods sisters on the donor community, especially following the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Furthermore by using 
OEA, the objectives of the assistance can no longer be called into question; the study 
merely acknowledges that the donor makes the funds available. 
3.1.2 The History of OEA: Ideology and Donors' Political Interests 
One final feature, the global history of OEA, needs to be addressed to clarify the 
role of OEA in the Jordanian context. "Although its roots may be traced back a long 
way, ODA has a relatively short history."85 Indeed the first example of technical 
assistance was recorded in Japan in 1637 when the Shogunate requested that the Dutch 
United East India Company arrange for a demonstration in the art of casting.86 Three 
different types of roots of modern OEA can be identified: historical ties,87 recent 
precedents, 88 and ideological change89 in response to the depression of the 1930s and 
the subsequent Second World War. 
The five decades of OEA have seen many changes in relations between the richer 
countries and the poorer countries. Among the major significant changes that have 
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occurred are the hegemonic economic ideology; the donor, whether multilateral or 
bilateral, with the strongest influence; and the dominant policy style used by the donors, 
which defines the relationship between the donors and the recipients. By using these 
criteria five overlapping eras of OEA are delineated (table 1.4). 
' ~OOlj"a 
w. @ 
1: Take-Off-US 
Domination 
11: Take-Off-
Growth of 
Institutionalism 
Ill: Basic Needs 
IV: The Counter-
Revolution 
V: Political 
Conditionality, 
Sustainability, and 
Poverty 
.. Years 
Table 1.4 
The Eras of OEA 
Hegemiwc: ···Dominant 
'~=- . 4 Ideolo'gy · "w n~or 
Late 1940s- Keynesian United States 
1950s Growth sets agenda 
1960s- Early Keynesian DAC sets 
1980s Growth regime 
parameters 
Late 1970s- Keynesian DAC sets 
Early 1980s Growth regtme 
parameters 
1980s Supply Side IMF sets 
Monetarism agenda 
1990s Supply Side World Bank 
Monetarism influences IMF 
agenda 
pominantcPoJicy 
~~cc Style 
State building via 
industrialisation 
State building via 
industrialisation 
Decentralised 
Basic Needs via 
state 
Minimal state, 
maximum market 
State vital but 
sharply limited 
Although five eras can be identified, the major shift occurred during the 1980s 
during which each of the three criteria underwent a fundamental change. The 
Keynesian ideological dominance of the post-war era had focused the emphasis for 
development on the state. Thus OEA was channelled through the state with the 
emphasis on achieving economic growth through industrialisation. For a short spell in 
the late 1970s moves towards a new policy began based on the recognition that despite 
three decades of OEA, levels of poverty and unemployment were not being reduced. In 
the era of Basic Needs policies attempted to overcome these problems by focusing on 
the provision of primary education, health, housing and safe drinking water. However, 
the state was still considered by the majority of those involved to be the best method of 
dispensing OEA. This period also witnessed the growth of the institutionalisation of 
OEA including: 
~ The creation of the DAC; 
+ The formulation of the definition of OEA; 
~ The setting of targets for the donors to achieve;90 
+ The increased involvement of the multilateral institutions, in particular the World 
Bank and the IMF; and 
+ The creation of the regional development banks.91 
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During the three post-war eras OEA was driven by the perceived success of the 
European Recovery Plan, the Cold War,92 the second wave of decolonisation93 and for a 
short time during the 1970s by the increased oil revenues accruing to the OPEC states. 94 
A profound sea change occurred in the realm of OEA during the 1980s. The 
1980s debt crisis among the developing countries,95 the lack of a coherent southern 
position on OEA,96 the recession in the West with the consequent ideological change to 
monetarism and the introduction of SAPs all placed the IMF in pole position to dictate 
the new OEA policy agenda. Other members of the donor community, including the 
World Bank, the Paris Club and the bilateral donors linked their funding to the 
recipient's agreement and adherence to the SAPs. 
The IMF analysis of the debt crisis, based on the 1981 World Bank Report on 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (often called the Berg Report),97 was that excessive 
government spending produced budget deficits and inflation. Furthermore, incorrect 
government policies had resulted in over-valued currencies, balance of payment 
difficulties and a lack of attention to the supply side of economy. Thus the failure of 
development was now seen to be due to the economic policies of the recipient 
governments. 98 The perceived solution was the introduction of SAPs, where structural 
adjustment can be defined as "the transition from an unviable economy into a self-
sustaining one through altering the structures in the economy."99 SAPs were based on 
the assumption that states interfere with economic efficiency and therefore harm 
development. Therefore the order of the day was for a slim, efficient, accountable 
bureaucracy, the aim of which was to create the necessary conditions for a free market 
economy. To achieve the objective, SAPs use four inter-related components: the 
restructuring of incentives; the revision of public investment priorities; an improvement 
in budget and debt management; and the strengthening of institutions. 100 
For OEA, the result was the overthrow of the hegemony of development 
economics based on Keynesian theory and the intervening state by the counter-
revolution of the new development paradigm "based on markets, competition, and 
private initiative and enterprise'.lot and a minimalist state. OEA was provided almost 
purely in support of the SAPs through Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), which were 
granted on the proviso that the countries adhered to strict economic conditions of the 
SAPs. In order to help achieve compliance the funds were issued in tranches. Thus 
OEA became an instrument to achieve the economic policy desired by the neo-liberal 
counter-revolution and was used not for the direct relief of poverty (indeed arguably it 
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was now used to create poverty) but for short-term macro-economic relief, with the 
stated aim of long-term economic growth. 
The implementation of economic conditionality or what Stokke terms "first 
generation conditionality" 102 meant a significant change in the already asymmetrical 
relationship between the donor and the recipient in favour of the latter. In the previous 
eras OEA usually came with various conditions attached, but these were invariably 
micro-economic and did not attempt to change the economic policy direction of the 
state. 103 The ability of the IMF to apply conditions to its lending had been incorporated 
into its Articles of Agreement as early as 1969, 104 but was not used extensively until the 
1980s. 105 
Although exponents of SAPs, such as Krueger, 106 argue that conditionality is a 
result of policy dialogue between the IMF and the recipient, this position ignores totally 
the asymmetrical power relationship between the two parties. The key element of 
conditionality is "the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate 
aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient." 107 
Thus the emphasis is on coercion rather than encouragement and is concerned with 
future rather than past conditions. 108 
The 1990s saw further 'fads' being added to the aid agenda. The economic 
conditionality of the 1980s has been joined by political conditionality 109 or "second 
generation conditionality," 110 which has four areas of focus: human rights, 111 good 
112 d . . 113 d . . . 114 0 h h governance, emocrattsatlon an participatiOn. t er areas, w ich presently 
influence the rhetoric, if not the actual policy of the aid regime, are 'sustainable 
development' 115 and addressing poverty through 'human development'. 116 A number of 
factors helped bring about the concentration on these new elements. The first factor 
was the realisation that SAPs had not been successful in achieving either economic 
growth or poverty eradication. Secondly, two reports were influential: the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) commissioned 
'Adjustment with a Human Face', which recommended bringing poverty back on the 
OEA agenda, and the Brundtland Report, which focused on the sustainability of 
economic growth. Thirdly, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent wave of 
democratisation also had a profound effect on the aid agenda reducing the volumes of 
OEA available to the recipient countries. 117 In addition: 
"the new international circumstances which prevailed after 1990 meant that 
the west could now attach explicit political and institutional conditions to 
aid without fear of losing its third world allies or clients to communism." 118 
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Furthermore, assistance for the East European states and the new states of Central Asia 
diverted funds from the traditional geographical areas. 119 
As with the advent of economic conditionality, political conditionality allowed the 
blame for the lack of success on development to be passed onto the recipients: on this 
occasion the reason promulgated was the lack of Western-style administrative and 
political systems and/or the lack of human development. 120 Despite the lack of 
empirical evidence 121 and the work of such writers as Leftwich 122 the logic of this 
position remains hegemonic in the OEA regime. The new position was an adjustment 
to that of the 1980s, when theory and practice considered that the state's involvement in 
the economy was inherently detrimental to the chances of economic growth. The 
acceptance now was that the state was necessary, albeit within sharply defined limits. 
However, while economic conditionality has been deliberately and extensively 
imposed on countries undertaking structural adjustment, political conditionality policy 
has been "more ad hoc than one of deliberation." 123 As Stokke points out "second 
generation conditionality has been confined to a very large extent to declamatory 
policy." 124 A number of reasons have been proposed for the ad hoc nature of political 
conditionality. For instance, Stokke argues that no regime exists for political 
conditionality because "individual donor governments act, on their own or jointly with 
others, more or less on an ad hoc basis." 125 Secondly, no agreement occurs between the 
various donors, with the World Bank seeking only the imposition of good governance, 
others such as the UK are more concerned with the implementation of democracy, and 
finally the Nordic countries are more interested in the economic and social aspects of 
human rights. A third argument is the level of hypocrisy involved in the imposition, 
including the desire to promote transparency and accountability to the decision-making 
processes in the recipient countries, while these features are often missing in the IMF 
and the World Bank themselves. Finally, many question the assumption that the 
imposition of all or some of the elements of the political conditionality will help to 
promote economic development. As Leftwich argues, the process of economic 
development is more closely related to the nature of the state than to the level of 
1. . I . . . t26 po Itlca partiCipatiOn. 
Furthermore, a similar lack of coherence and implementation can be found in the 
case of human development. Although the level of recognition among the donors has 
been high on the need to address the causes of poverty, 127 little action has been 
forthcoming. 
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The changes in the 1990s have allowed the World Bank to assert a degree of 
influence over its sister organisation, the IMF, through the recognition of the need to 
introduce a social safety net in the SAPs, and also to make the SAPs more responsive to 
the needs of the poor. At the same time, the World Bank has taken over the lead on the 
institutional side of the aid regime. This move has been achieved through the 
consultative groups, which were initially established to co-ordinate new aid pledges but 
have now become a "semi-formalised review of recipient's progress with policy 
reform.',t 28 
From the analysis, five overlapping but distinct eras of OEA have been 
recognised. The first three periods all occurred when Keynesian theory dominated 
economic thinking. OEA was initially expected to contribute to the take-off of the 
nascent economies of the poorer nations, many of which were shaking off years of 
colonial rule. The first two phases of OEA can be distinguished from the third by the 
different policies. The short-lived Basic Needs period saw an attempt to use OEA to 
build an infrastructure that would benefit the poor directly, rather than hoping that 
economic growth would trickle down to the poor via industrialisation as in the former 
periods. It must be noted, however, that the recipient state was considered to be the 
prime facilitator through which OEA passed in the first three eras. The second and third 
periods also witnessed a growing institutionalisation of OEA, with the establishment of 
a number of multilateral institutions and the creation of a set of principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures. 
The 1980s saw a profound change in the realm of OEA. During the 1970s two 
massive oil price hikes created structural changes that eventually resulted in a debt crisis 
for the developing countries. The debt crisis switched the focus back to macro-
economic policies, with the result that OEA was expected to help the recipients 
introduce SAPs. The ideological basis shifted the state from centre stage to one that 
was expected to bow out from the theatre. For the first time, the power in the OEA 
regime moved from bilateral to the multilateral institutions, in particular the IMF, 
backed by the World Bank. This shift in the balance of power also saw the introduction 
of the concept of economic conditionality. 
A further global change at the end of the 1980s, this time political with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in the introduction of the fifth phase of aid. This 
era is defined by the use of political conditionality with an emphasis on good 
governance, democracy, human rights and participation. Unlike the break at the 
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beginning of the 1980s, the fifth phase is merely an additional layer of conditionality to 
the economic conditionality of the fourth phase. In addition, two further features came 
to the fore: sustainable development and a re-focusing on poverty via human 
development. The state was brought out of retirement to play a vital but clearly 
delimited role. 
These eras are important in the analysis of the case study of Jordan that follows, in 
particular for chapters two, four and five. In addition, the increasingly asymmetrical 
relationship globally between the donor community and the recipients from the fourth 
era in the 1980s informs the context of the main body of the thesis. 
3.2 The Donor Community 
The previous section highlighted the preference for the use of the term OEA rather 
than ODA, and the different historical phases of OEA. The study now moves on to a 
discussion of the term 'donor community'. Two aspects are dealt with: the definition of 
and how the term is used, and the membership of the donor community. 
The term 'donor community' is used in the thesis to refer to the group of official 
donors, 129 whether bilateral or multilateral, which dispense OEA. Bilateral donors are 
the states, whereas multilateral donors can be divided into four categories: 130 
+ The global system, where donors and recipient are global, comprising the UN 
agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF; 131 
+ The Regional Banks, which concentrate their resources on a particular geographical 
area· 132 
' 
+ The "bilateral multilateral systems" or "multinationals" 133 where the members are 
limited by a common bond but the recipients are be global; 134 and 
+ The 'hybrid' organisation such as the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD). 135 
The global system can be sub-divided into the UN family 136 and the Bretton Woods 
sisters. The division is extremely important for analytical reasons due to the different 
power relations within the two types of organisation. Power within the IMF and World 
Bank and its 'soft loans' offshoot, the International Development Agency (IDA), is 
based on the size of funding by the donor country-a one-dollar, one-vote system. 
Therefore the richer nations, such as the United States, are more easily able to dictate 
policy. Indeed the voting system of the World Bank is such that the USA has an 
effective veto on any substantial change, which requires a qualified majority of 85%, 
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the US having over 15% of the total votes. 137 Furthermore the president of the World 
Bank, who is given wide autonomy, must always be a citizen of the United States. 138 
On the other hand, in the United Nations (UN) family voting follows the one-country, 
one-vote system, allowing in theory, if not in practice, more autonomy for the less 
privileged countries. The outcome of the different power structures has resulted in the 
donor countries preferring to use the World Bank and the IMF, as the tools for 
development, rather than the UN family. The effect has been the dominance of the aid 
agenda by the Bretton Woods sisters. 
Multilateral OEA is often argued to be more beneficial to the recipient than 
bilateral OEA for three groups of reasons: 
• The nature of the multilateral organisations, stressing their apoliticalness 139 and 
transparency; 140 
+ The institutional advantages of the multilaterals based on their size and the 
availability of economies of scale in terms of specialisation, 141 leadership, 142 co-
ordination, 143 the ability to undertake large projects 144 and returns on capital; 145 and 
• The weaknesses inherent in bilateral OEA related to national interest146 and 
commercialisation. 147 
However, these arguments have been successfully refuted, with the exception of returns 
on capital, by, among others, Raffer and Singer, 148 and Burnell. 149 
A major criticism of the multilateral-bilateral debate is that both components have 
been treated by the majority of analysts as monolithic entities. In practice, differences 
occur within the multilateral institutions, which render blanket arguments less effective. 
Arguably the Bretton Woods sisters, the IMF and the World Bank, have tended to be 
more supportive of donor interests than recipient needs, in comparison with the UN 
family. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, a split has been evident in the 
positions of the IMF and the World Bank, with the latter organisation paying increasing 
attention to the importance of the effects on the social aspects of the recipient. 
Similarly, bilateral OEA can be measured on a continuum of self-interest to altruism, 
with, for example, the US nearer the self-interest end, while the Nordic countries can be 
placed near the altruism end of the scale. 
However, the importance is not whether multilateral or bilateral is more suitable 
for the donor but the relationship within the donor community. As discussed in section 
3.1.2, the bilateral donors originally dictated the aid regime but since the 1980s the 
IMF, backed by the World Bank, has become the dominant power. This aspect has 
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become important in the case of Jordan, particularly since 1989 (chapters four, five, six 
and seven). 
3.2.1 The Donor Community, the State and the Economy 
From the 1980s the dominant economic ideology, economic liberalism, decreed 
that the state's involvement in the economy in any form was considered to be 
detrimental to achieving economic development. The donor community, in particular 
the IMF and the World Bank, have been major proponents of this ideology, with the 
result that since the 1980s their involvement in a country has been based on the 
prescription of rolling back the state and promoting the private sector. 
As discussed in the introduction, in order to answer the research question the 
thesis measures the varying degrees to which the state has been involved in the 
Jordanian economy through a five-continua model. The five measures used by the 
model are: 
+ Contribution to the national economy; 
+ Involvement in planning; 
+ Institutional development; 
+ Support for the private sector; and 
+ Government ownership of productive assets. 
The changes in these five measures are used to help in assessing whether the role of the 
state in the economy has been reduced in line with the conditionality sought by the IMF, 
along with other members of the donor community. 
The analysis of the contribution to national economy studies the ratio of 
government expenditure and revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in order to 
assess the changes between the contribution of the public and private sectors. This ratio 
highlights the current balance between the private and public sectors; in contrast the 
ratio of public and private contributions to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 
measures investment levels, which affect future trends. GFCF is the total spending on 
fixed investment (e.g. plant, equipment) in the economy over a one-year period. The 
figure excludes capital consumption (fixed capital lost due to wear and tear). 150 In a 
productive economy such as the UK more than 70% of GFCF is undertaken by 
businesses, while the rest is accounted for by government investment and personal 
sector investment in dwellings, 151 whereas in an IRSE, the state would dominate the 
share of GFCF. 
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The next field of analysis concerns government planning. This aspect is mainly 
analysed through the series of official development plans that commenced in 1962. By 
assessing the projected levels of investment between the private and public sectors, the 
commitment of the state in involving the private sector in future development can be 
analysed. As infrastructural development by the state may be of benefit to the private 
sector, e.g. better port facilities assist exporters, the analysis where possible dissects 
investment into social and services, infrastructural and productive. 152 The study also 
discusses the context and outcome of the plans, as well as the level of private sector 
involvement in the planning process. The planned incentives to the private sector are 
also highlighted. 
Next, the model assesses the impact of the various state and semi-state institutions 
created to assess their intended role in the economy, whether aimed at assisting the 
private or public sector. Allied to the budget and planning is the level of state support 
given to the private sector through financial assistance and legislation. Support is 
analysed by studying incentives, subsidies, protection, equity investment and the 
funding of large-scale surveys. Given the propensity for regulations to produce 
unintended consequences the regulations are analysed to assess not only the intended 
impact but also the outcome. 
Government ownership IS also assessed. State owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
Jordan can be divided into three categories. These categories are pure state enterprises 
that are owned and operated by the state; autonomous or semi-autonomous enterprises 
that are fully owned by the state but operated (at least theoretically) on a market basis; 
and finally mixed enterprises consisting of both public and private investment and 
operating on a market basis (table 1.5). 
Table 1.5 
Typology of State Owned Enterprises in .Jordan 
lr>~ \ )' ·.~ ··.·. Owner~MJ>,"i: " Control .... < ·. ~,Opeiation· · +m rt_ 1} 1.· )gn:1.J' d ,:; 
State State State State Controlled 
Autonomous State Semi-Autonomous Market 
Mixed State and Private Fully Autonomous Market 
3.3 Remittances 
The discussion now switches the emphasis from OEA to remittances, which are 
considered as the portion of international migrant workers' earnings sent from the 
country of employment to the country of origin, 153 usually to the immediate family of 
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the expatriate workers. These remittances can be the equivalent of a substantial 
proportion of the merchandise exports in a number of countries. 154 However, despite an 
IMF definition of remittances, 155 as with OEA, severe problems are associated with the 
measurement of these flows. Inconsistencies in the interpretation of the reporting result 
in difficulties of calculating the exact figures. Secondly, not all remittances are in the 
form of cash: in-kind transfers also occur. 156 Furthermore, the level of remittances is 
understated as the figures recorded apply only to those remittances received through 
official channels. However, no reliable estimates are available for the transfers using 
the unofficial channels, although Abella, writing in 1989, estimates that in countries 
such as Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Egypt the total could be tripled. 157 
The actual volumes of remittances depend on a number of factors, including the 
size of the migrant workforce, the level of their earnings and their willingness to remit. 
The final factor is, in turn, dependent on macro-economic factors, such as the economic 
conditions in the host country, the differential in interest rates between the two 
countries, the exchange rate, and incentives offered by the labour-exporting country. In 
addition, socio-demographic characteristics affect the levels remitted, including the 
length of time spent abroad (generally, the longer the time abroad the less the value of 
the remittances). 158 
Although the transfers increase the standard of living of the recipients, not all the 
macro-economic effects are positive. Remittances may be used by the recipients in a 
number of ways, such as investing in productive or non-productive assets, consumed 
through the acquisition of domestically produced goods/services and/or imported 
goods/services, or saved domestically or abroad. However, as discussed previously, the 
increase in the standard of living encourages spending on imports, creating difficulties 
in the balance of trade of the labour-exporting country. Furthermore, countries, such as 
Jordan, have regularly adopted policies aimed at ensuring high levels of remittances, 
including maintaining high interest rates and an over-valued currency. However, these 
policies have a detrimental effect on promoting the supposed prime objective of creating 
an export-oriented industrial economy. 
Remittances have formed an important part of the Jordanian economy since the 
mid-1970s and in terms of their share of the rent, remittances have become 
progressively more important. This relative increase forms a core element of the final 
chapters of the thesis. 
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4.0 STATE, REGIME, RENTIER ELITE AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
This section discusses how the final four concepts (the state, the regime, the 
rentier elite and the private sector) are understood and used in the context of the study. 
The state and the market (a nebulous concept which can be represented institutionally 
by the private sector) interact in the modern world to create 'political economy' .159 
Neither the state nor the market exist in pure form, and both have changed with time, 
along with the balance of power within their interdependent relationship. International 
political economy (IPE) analyses how these "two organising principles of social life" 160 
interact at the global level: indeed a number of writers view IPE as a battleground 
between the two concepts, 161 proscribing prescriptive solutions in favour of either. 
4.1 The State, the Regime and the Rentier Elite 
At the beginning of the 21st century one of the major debates in IPE revolves 
around whether the state is in retreat or whether it has merely repositioned itself in the 
face of the changing international climate driven by the end of the Cold War and 
globalisation. A major flaw in the whole debate is the lack of agreement over the nature 
of the state. Despite (or perhaps because of) the extensive usage and the longevity (over 
four centuries) 162 of theoretical debate over the nature of the state, this concept remains 
"the most opaque term in the whole of political vocabulary." 163 Indeed, Held argues 
that the term is the most contested in political and social theory. 164 
Among the many uses of the term, three stand out: 
+ The state as a sovereign political entity with international recognition, its own 
boundaries and its national symbols; 165 
+ The state as a single entity, which is able to define a coherent rational approach to 
decision-making in the national interest; and 
+ The state as an arena of contestation, in which economic decision-making is the 
outcome of interaction between various domestic and international forces. 
In rentier theory, the state is used in both the latter two senses. In the first sense, the 
state is an actor that is able not only to destroy and create classes but also to follow a 
two-dimensional policy of gaining access to rent and expenditure policy in order that it 
can continue to recreate itself. In the second sense, the state is an arena of contestation, 
in which the rentier elite uses the apparatus of state, such as the political system, the 
bureaucracy and the security forces, to maintain its position of dominance. 
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Throughout the study, the state is used in all three senses discussed earlier. When 
referring to the state of Jordan, the first sense of a sovereign political entity is used. The 
state as a single entity forms much of the analysis in defining the degrees of rentierism 
in the economy, when the state-market continuum is used as a measure (chapters two 
and four). The state as an arena of contestation can be seen throughout the thesis with 
the analysis of the rentier elite's attempts to maintain access to the sources of rent, 
whether OEA or remittances. This method of analysis follows the model used by Owen 
in his recent article. 166 
As with the term state the term rentier elite is open to debate. For the purposes of 
this study the rentier elite is broadly defined as an informal group that holds the key 
positions in the political decision-making set-up (including the top posts in the 
bureaucracy and the security services), as well as the leading decision-makers and 
power-brokers in the economic field. In Jordan, membership of the group has 
traditionally been based around a network of families with close ties to the ruling 
Hashemite dynasty. Indeed, descendents of Emir Abdullah's original supporters when 
he first came to Transjordan remain within the rentier elite. However, the composition 
of the group is dynamic as new members are able to join, while previously important 
families can be by-passed. An important aspect of the rentier elite has been the degree 
to which this group have been able to dictate the political and economic agenda of 
Jordan for their own purposes, within the constraints imposed by the international, 
regional and domestic environment. 
In the rentier state in the Middle East, the principal actors are the state, the regime 
and the rentier elite. The three are interdependent and overlapping, with the rentier elite 
forming one part of the state. However, the ability of the rentier elite to gain access to 
and to control the preponderance of rent in the economy allows it to dominate the 
decision-making process. The regime is at the apex of the rentier elite: in the case of 
Jordan this is the Hashemite royal family. Ultimately in this relationship the regime 
attempts to use the state to maintain its position of dominance but different elements 
within the state, such as the bureaucracy, are able to subvert (to varying degrees 
depending on the issue and their access to resources) the policy for their own interests. 
Indeed the regime's interests may not always equate with those of the wider rentier 
elite. The tension among these three actors, within the constraints of the structures of 
the global and domestic political, economic and security structures, provides the context 
for the analysis of the thesis. 
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4.2 The Private Sector 
The private sector is that "part of an economy in which goods and services are 
produced and distributed by individuals and organizations that are not part of the 
government or state bureaucracy." 167 In a market-based economy, the private sector is 
considered the antithesis of the state. This public/private dichotomy has informed much 
of the thinking behind the IMF's SAPs, which considers state involvement in the 
economy divisive but, in contrast, the private sector is considered as the potential engine 
for economic development. However, as the discussion on rentier theory highlighted, 
the division between the two is not clearly defined in a rentier state, particularly at the 
important elite level. The blurring does not mean that an independent private sector is 
not present, merely that the one that exists is unable to exert any significant influence on 
the economic and political decision-making process. 
Although the thesis tends to use the private sector as a single entity, for example 
in the measures on the state-market continuum, it cannot always be conceived of as a 
homogenous actor. Different sectors require or seek different types of interaction with 
the state at different times. For example, broadly speaking, industrialists may seek 
protection from imports through the imposition of customs duties and quotas. On the 
other hand, those involved in the export/import business do not want these barriers to 
trade. This heterogeneity must be borne in mind throughout the study. 
Finally, the perception of the Transjordanian-Palestinian divide in Jordan remains 
strong with the former being associated with the public sector and perceived as 
obstructive to the private sector, which is associated with latter. Although a number of 
recent studies have challenged this dichotomy particularly at the level of the elite, the 
perception remains powerfully embedded in the minds of many Jordanians and scholars 
of Jordan. This perception has a powerful influence in disguising the blurred nature of 
the relationship between the state and the private sector. 
S.OSUMMARY 
This chapter has established the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the 
study. The next chapter sets the context for the later analysis by highlighting the 
historical evolution of the rentierism in the economy of Jordan from its formation as a 
state under the British mandate in 1921 to the start of the IMF' s SAP in 1989. 
1 The gold entering Spain from the Americas in the sixteenth century is an oft-quoted example of an early 
example of a rentier economy. 
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88 The recent precedents were land-lease, the creation of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, and the European Recovery Plan (ERP) (commonly known as the Marshall Plan). 
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The South Commission ( 1990) wanted the figures increased to 0.20% by the end of the 1990s. The latest 
initiative has been the attempt to have the 20:20 Compact accepted by the aid regime. The compact, 
which was agreed at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, has two parts. First is the 
promise by donors to allocate 50% of ODA to the social sectors. Secondly, a joint agreement by 
recipients and donors to ensure that 20% of ODA will be allocated to basic social services, while the 
recipients will allocate 20% of their expenditure to the same cause. However as Raffer and Singer note, 
the targets are "accepted by most but implemented by few DAC donors." Raffer, K. and Singer, H.W., 
(1996), op. cit., p.69. 
91 The Regional Banks include the Inter-American Bank Development Bank established in 1959, the 
African Development Bank (1964), the Asian Development Bank ( 1966), the Caribbean Development 
Bank (1969) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( 1991 ). 
92 The Truman Doctrine, announced on 12th March 1947, became one of containment through financial 
assistance based on the premise that economic stability would stop the spread of communism. Griffin 
argues that ODA would have been impossible without the Cold War. Griffin, K., (1991), "Foreign Aid 
after the Cold War", Development and Change, vol. 22, p.640. 
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auspices of OPEC, its offshoot OAPEC, the Arab League or the Organisation of Islamic Countries. The 
organisations include AFESD (1971 ); OPEC Fund for International Development (1976); IFAD (1977) 
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Programme for UN Development Organisations; Islamic Solidarity Fund; IsDB; Islamic Development 
Fund; OPEC Special Fund. van den Boogaerde, P.V., (1991), op. cit. 
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denationalisation to devaluation, deflation and decontrol. 
101 OECD, ( 1995), Development Co-operation- Development Assistance Committee 1994 Report, (Paris: 
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In the next two chapters the context for the analysis of the effects of the 
involvement of the IMF-led donor community on state-private relations after 1989 is 
discussed. The changing rentier elements in the economy help forge the nature of both 
the state and the private sector, and a particular set of relations between the two. These 
historic rentier aspects then inform the reactions of the rentier elite to the IMF' s 
attempts from 1989 to change the structure of the Jordanian economy. This chapter 
establishes the changing nature of the rent in the economy from 1921 to 1989, while 
chapter three highlights the effects of the changes on the nature of the state and the 
private sector, and on the state-private sector relationship. 
OEA and remittances are highly dependent on external conditions and to a lesser 
degree on internal conditions. Thus the analysis is based on four different but 
overlapping time-spans, 1 which are differentiated by the changes in the political, 
economic and security environment. The four eras are: 
o Mandate Transjordan: from the early 1920s to the mid-1940s; 
o State-building in independent Jordan: from the late 1940s to the early 1970s; 
~ The 'years of plenty': from the early 1970s to the early 1980s; and 
o The 'years of lean': from the early to the late 1980s. 
The last two eras are analysed together because of the difficulty of defining a clean 
break between the plenty and the lean. Given the short period of time, an overlap of 
five years (1980 to 1985) would render the analysis less clear. 
Each era is assessed in a similar pattern. Firstly, the important external and 
internal political, geo-strategic and ideological factors are discussed. These factors are 
then related to their effects on the levels of the two major sources of rent in Jordan, 
OEA and remittances, and their relative importance to the economy. Over the period, 
OEA has fluctuated considerably in terms of amount, the relative level of grants and the 
sources. These aspects will be briefly discussed before OEA is measured against GNP, 
per capita, government revenues and expenditure, budget deficit and trade deficit, in 
order to assess the changing degrees of the IRSE. In addition, remittances are assessed 
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against the balance of trade deficit, GNP, per capita and OEA to discover the depth of 
the PSRE. 
An important consideration concerning the relationship between the defining 
events and the changes in rent is raised: the state cannot be considered to be merely a 
blank slate in the equation. For example, with each change in the regional geo-strategic 
relationship, the state was required to reposition itself in relation to the members of the 
donor community. The two constants in the international relations dynamic of the 
region from post-World War 11 until 1989 were the security threats of the Cold War and 
the threats to regional stability, especially in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The 
ability of the Hashemite regime to portray itself as a factor for stability in a region of 
apparently inherent instability enabled Jordan to replace its main sponsor on a number 
of occasions. Thus Britain was the main donor from the 1920s to 1950. From 1950 to 
1956 Britain and the UN were the main donors. Thereafter the USA took over until 
1973, while Arab bilateral assistance then dominated the donor community until 1989. 
2.0 MANDATE TRANSJORDAN: THE EARLY 1920s TO THE MID-1940s 
The state of Transjordan was established following the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire in the First World War. At this stage: 
"Transjordan remained what it had been under the Ottomans: the southern 
appendage of the province of ai-Sham (Damascus or Syria), poor and 
backward, now ravaged by four years of utter neglect, intermittent fighting, 
famine and a dangerous upsurge of bedouin predacity."2 
Following the end of the war "few considered the area east of the Jordan River to be a 
separate entity."3 The Arabs thought of the area as part of Greater Syria. Indeed, 
Faisal, with what he assumed to be British backing endorsed in the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence, sought to establish an independent Arab state based around the concept 
of Greater Syria. On the other hand, Britain and France under the terms of Sykes-Picot, 
along with the burgeoning Zionist movement, considered the area to be part of 
Palestine. In March 1920, the General Syrian Congress in Damascus declared the 
independence of Greater Syria, including Transjordan. The following month, the 
Sykes-Picot division of the Mashraq was formalised at the San Remo conference, with 
Britain controlling the southern portion, including Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. 
Because of the strategic importance to Britain of the area,4 the UK had actively 
sought responsibility for Palestine and Transjordan. However, little thought seems to 
have been given to how to deal with the area. Initially, local administrators, with the 
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help of British officials, were established in Kerak, Salt-Amman and 'Ajlun. Ma'an and 
Aqaba remained part of the Hejaz. As with the previous Ottoman attempts to impose 
centralised authority, the British faced "civil disobedience from the start."5 According 
to Dann, Britain was worried that local anarchy could encourage the French to invade.6 
Two regional events focused the minds of British decision-makers. The first was 
the rebellion in Iraq, which started on the 23rd June 1920 in the mid-Euphrates area and 
spread quickly within Iraq. Although largely suppressed by the end of September, full 
control was not achieved until early 1921 at a cost of four hundred lives and £40m? 
Britain, still reeling from the economic cost of the First World War, required a relatively 
cost-free method of controlling the area. The second event was the arrival of Emir 
Abdullah, the younger brother of Faisal, in Ma'an (still under Hejazi rule) with around 
three hundred men8 on the 21st November 1920 and the expressed intention of 
regaining the Arab Kingdom of Syria. By the 2nd March 1921 Abdullah had 
established himself in Amman, having peaceably established a loose form of control 
over the three autonomous administrations of Kerak, Salt-Amman and 'Ajlun. 
On the twelfth of the same month the Cairo Conference opened with the new 
Secretary for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, looking for a solution to the problems of 
the Middle East that remained outstanding from the 1920 San Remo Conference. 
Following the Conference, Churchill arrived in Jerusalem to discuss terms with 
Abdullah, who sought the unification of Transjordan with either Palestine or Iraq.9 
Churchill rejected these proposals. Abdullah agreed to take on interim responsibility for 
Transjordan for six months in return for a monthly stipend of £5,000. 10 The local 
administrations established in 1920 were formally unified on the 1st April 1921. At the 
end of 1921, Britain took a further step in establishing Transjordan as a separate state 
from Palestine by appointing H. St. J. Philby as full-time British resident in Amman. 
The creation of Transjordan can be seen as the result of a confluence of a number 
of events and ideas, none of which took into account the long-term economic viability 
of the country. These political and strategic factors included the need to reward the 
Hashemites for their assistance during the First World War, the question as to what 
should be done with the area to the east of the Jordan, the principle of the mandate 
system, and, perhaps most importantly, the need to satisfy British and French national 
interests in the region. Britain accepted the installation of Emir Abdullah "because it 
required no troops and it was tentative enough not to prejudice other, perhaps better, 
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arrangements that might be possible in the future." 11 For his part Abdullah accepted it 
as a stepping-stone to greater aspirations, such as becoming the ruler in Damascus. 12 
This marriage of convenience was to have a profound effect on the future of 
Jordan. The country itself was a political creation with no sense of national identity. 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, central authority, never very strong in the area, 
collapsed completely with tribal leaders each attempting to carve out a sphere of 
control. The need to create a legitimate central authority was a major priority for the 
new leader. A provisional cabinet was established, in which only one of the eight 
members, Ali Khulqi al-Sharayiri of Irbid, was a native Transjordanian. 13 All eight had 
served with Faisal in Damascus. As Wilson argues "[t]he cabinet looked like a 
government m exile and aptly symbolised Abdullah's ambitions to move on to 
Damascus." 14 The early administrators "were generally more concerned with 
reasserting control in Syria than with making Transjordan an independent, self-
sufficient state." 15 Indeed only two members of the first eight cabinets from 1921 to 
1929 were indigenous Transjordanians. 16 Thus, politically, the ruler was an imposed 
foreigner, and the political elite were in the main foreigners, all of whom were 
expressing Arab nationalist ambitions. 
Formal steps towards the creation of the Transjordanian state continued, with the 
League of Nations formally approving the British mandate in July 1922. This approval 
was followed by the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement of the 25th March 1923 
providing for an autonomous administration under Abdullah. Despite the new 
agreement, Abdullah' s position was not fully secure. He faced internal opposition and 
was distrusted, at least with the finances of the state, by important British advisors. In 
August 1924, the British resident, Colonel Henry Cox, issued an ultimatum threatening 
to withdraw British support unless Abclullah allowed the British greater control of the 
finances. 17 
Internally, civil unrest had been largely curtailed by the late 1920s, partly due to 
Abdullah' s style of patrimonial rule and partly clue to the financial, military and 
diplomatic support from the UK. Nevertheless five National Congresses, although 
supporting the concept of the state of Transjordan, demanded a reduction in the Emir's 
powers. As Vatikiotis argues, the Emir's powers had effectively reduced the legislature 
d b . . 18 to a e atmg society. 
The formal political system was not established until five years later, following 
the signing of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty. A number of laws were 
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promulgated, including the Organic Law of 1928 (in effect the constitution), the 
Electoral Law of 1928, 19 and the 1928 Nationality Law, which "restricted the country's 
nationality to those who were resident of Transjordan in 1924."20 The latter legislation 
was designed to gain support for the new political system. 
By the end of the 1920s, the confluence of events that resulted in the formation of 
Transjordan had laid the basis for the future development of the country. Domestically, 
Emir Abdullah was at the apex of power, with few formal constraints on his actions, but 
as an outsider he found it necessary to purchase his legitimacy, often via financial 
means.
21 Further constraints on Abdullah were the British control of the financial 
subsidy (which not only allowed for the patrimonial political system to be sustained but 
also kept the country afloat), the control of the security apparatus (not just financially 
but in terms of leadership) and the foreign policy. 
The relationship between Britain and Abdullah has been described correctly as: 
"a product of marginal utility .... Marginal utility, however, did not mean 
equality. Abdullah, for Britain, was only one piece in the interlocking 
patterns of allies and proteges stretching from Egypt to Iran which 
maintained Britain's overall position of superiority in the region. Without 
him the pattern might not be so neat, but Britain would still have been able 
adequately to protect its interest and its position."22 
The 1928 treaty in which "Britain laid down the conditions ... with inequality written 
into every clause, was the price of his [Abdullah's] position and one that he was willing 
to pay."23 
The period of the mandate until the declaration of independence in 1946 saw five 
major developments: 24 the creation of a state bureaucracy and security apparatus; the 
building of a limited physical infrastructure; the suppression of internal revolts which 
initially threatened Hashemite supremacy; the stifling of external aggression, in 
particular from the nascent state of lbn Saud in the south; and perhaps most importantly 
"the detribalisation of the desert which allowed for the integration of the Bedouin into 
the state."25 The latter was achieved through the use of land settlement26 and through 
employment in the Arab Legion where the Bedouin were inculcated with the ideas of 
the modern state. 27 Mazur added a further two developments, the introduction of the tax 
system and the change of land ownership from mushaa to individual. 28 Significantly, 
development in the Mandate period, although steady, was always "as a junior associate 
of ambitious Palestine."29 
How the internal and external developments in the mandate era affected the levels 
of OEA is now discussed. 
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2.1 The Creation of the Induced Rentier State Economy 
From the creation of Transjordan, the country has been reliant on external 
economic assistance. As previously argued, British involvement in Jordan was 
motivated by political and geo-strategic concerns rather than by thoughts of economic 
development. The paucity of development of the local economy, the lack of natural 
resources and the absence of any centralised state apparatus meant that economic 
subsidies were necessary from day one. Emir Abdullah was initially granted £5,000 per 
month, which increased to £100,000 per annum (pa) by the mid-1920s. By the mid-
1940s the sum had reached £2m pa, although by this stage the budget was under the 
control of the British rather than the Emir?0 The subsidy was in two forms: budgetary 
support and establishing and maintaining the Arab Legion. However, budgetary support 
was limited and primarily concerned with the maintenance of the governmental 
administration, with only small sums available for welfare purposes. The residual funds 
left little available for development purposes. 
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Sources: 1921122 to 1923/24, Shwardan, B., (1959), Jordan: A State ofTensioa (New York: Council for 
Middle Eastern Affairs Press), p. 164; 1924/25 to 1935/36, Naval Intelligence Division, (1943), Palestine 
and Transjorillill, (no place of publication, Naval Intelligence Division), p. 500 and 1936/37 to 1943/44, 
Konikoff, A, (1946), Transjordan: An Economic Survey, (Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine), p.ll5. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the increasing level of the British subsidy in the Mandate 
period. Importantly, the figures recorded in the mandate era were not straightforward. 
A number of peculiarities existed, such as the allocations for the Transjordan section of 
the Hejaz railway and the improvements in the roads being administered and maintained 
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from the Palestinian budget. 31 Other government obligations were also met from the 
Palestinian budget or via a direct grant from London, which was not recorded in the 
budget figures. For example, the capital and current cost of maintaining the 
Transjordanian Frontier Force from 1926 to 1930 was borne five-sixths by Palestine. 
From 1930 to I 941 this proportion was taken over by the British. Consequently, from 
I 926 to 194 I only one-sixth of the costs appeared in the budget. Thereafter, because of 
the war, the War Office in London took over the funding fully. 32 The effects of these 
peculiarities were to significantly understate the actual level of British grants. 
What, then, was the importance of the British subsidy in terms of the economy? 
Unfortunately, neither the national income nor the population figures are available for 
the period of the Mandate. Furthermore, as government expenditure was linked to the 
amount of revenue available, no deficits were experienced in this era, thereby negating 
the value of the measure of OEA as a percentage of budget deficit. Thus the three 
measures of OEA against GNP, per capita income and budget deficit cannot be used. 
As can be seen from table 2.1, the average percentage share of the British subsidy 
was over 50% of revenue over the period 1924/25 to 1943/44. However, the average 
hides a sharp change in relative and absolute terms from the year 1938/39, before which 
the subsidy had been running at an average of 26.8% of total revenue, ranging from a 
high of 38.2% in 1924/25 to a low of 16% in 1927/28. The initial reason for the change 
was the funding of the Baghdad to Haifa road that followed the route of the Iraqi 
Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline through Transjordan. Grants totalling around £P1 m 
during the period 1938-39 to I 94 I -42 were received from the UK for that purpose. 
Thereafter, British war needs resulted in an increase in military expenditure, which in 
turn saw a jump in the subsidy. Similar results are also experienced in the relationship 
between the subsidy and government expenditure. Thus on both measures from the 
financial year (FY) I 938/39 a sharp increase in the degree of the IRSE is highlighted. 
Table 2.1 
OEA as Percentage of Budget Revenue and Expenditure, 1924/25-1943/44 
Fiscal Year Grants::} Government Grants as Government Grants as ' 
~ (£P)~ Revenue ···=Wg;of Expendi~r'f; o/o of .. ,; 
~ 
..fi. (£P) ·l!~enue (£P) '; ~. ExRenditure J; .. .t '~ 
I 924/25-37/38 1,305,330 4,864,236 26.8 4,859,644 26.9 
I 938/39-43/44 5,74I ,090 8,375,5 I6 68.5 8,615,645 66.6 
I 924/25-43/44 7,046,420 I3,239,752 53.2 I3,475,289 52.3 
Sources: Adapted by author. For years 1924/25 to 1933/34 Naval Intelligence DivisiOn, (1943), Palestine 
and Transjordan, (no place of publication, Naval Intelligence Division), p. 500. For years 1934/35 to 
1943/44, Konikoff, A., (1946), Transjordan: An Economic Survey, (Jerusalem: Economic Research 
Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine), p.95. 
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The final measure of the level of IRSE in the Mandate period is OEA as a 
percentage of trade deficit. Unfortunately, figures for balance of trade (including re-
exports) are not available prior to 1937. As is apparent from table 2.2 a significant 
increase in the IRSE is experienced, with the percentage of OEA against the trade 
deficit increasing from a low of 15.2% in 1938 to 164.8% by 1944. The trade surplus 
recorded in 1943 was an abnormality, with the war forcing up the prices of agricultural 
exports to Palestine. Thus, even with the truncated data available, the evidence supports 
the other measures of an increasing IRSE. 
Table 2.2 
OEA as Percentage of Trade Deficit, 1937-1944 
Year.:" ,, •,; f14Bal~nc,e of ~rade Grants I'H": OEA~as~% ofj; ,,,, 
'fii .,, ~ '!"!: ',',,__, . 
~ 
ii; Deficit** (£P) (£P) Balance of Trade 
1937 523,928 130,510 24.9 
1938 664,003 100,990 15.2 
1939 714,870 404,005 56.5 
1940 827,037 465,201 56.2 
1941 1,423,977 809,214 56.8 
1942 1,044,067 850,333 81.4 
1943 (46,016) 1,245,013 n.a. 
1944 1,194,041 1,967,324 164.8 
Source: Komkoff, A., (1946), Trans10rdan: An Economic Survey, (Jerusalem: Economic Research 
Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine), p.63. 
* In the case of the balance of trade the figures are for the calendar year, whereas the grants refer to the 
FY. Thus the figures for 1937 refer to the balance of trade deficit for that year, but the grants are for 
1936/37. 
** Includes re-exports. 
The creation of Transjordan for strategic British interests, along with the 
imposition of a foreign ruling elite, which required the establishment of a degree of 
political legitimacy, resulted in the establishment of a state based on economic largesse. 
The lack of development and sources of raw materials compounded the need to rely on 
external rent. However, not until the late 1930s with the advent of the building of the 
IPC road, and then the Second World War, could Transjordan have been declared a 
high-level IRSE. 
3.0 STATE-BUILDING AND INSTABILITY: 
THE LATE 1940s TO THE EARLY 1970s 
From 1946 to 1948 a number of events occurred which altered the direct rule of 
Mandate Transjordan by Britain to the indirect rule of an independent Jordan. In March 
1946 a new treaty was signed between Transjordan and the UK, which nominally gave 
independence to the former. As Dann argues, "the body of the treaty was innocuous, 
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but an annex and an exchange of notes made clear that sovereign Transjordan would 
remain a military dependency of Britain."33 As a result, the USA withheld recognition 
of the independence until the 31st January 1949. The treaty was followed in May 1946 
by the adoption of Emir Abdullah as King Abdullah, and in February 1947 a new 
constitution was published replacing the Organic Law of 1928. In March 1948, a new 
treaty, which "softened some of the asperities of its predecessor", 34 was signed between 
Britain and Jordan. However British involvement remained to such an extent that it was 
able to dictate the speed and direction of economic development via the Jordanian 
Development Board (JDB)35 and to establish a currency board based in London to 
regulate the pace of sterling releases to Jordan.36 
The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 introduced a significant change to the rentier 
development of Jordan. As a result of the subsequent annexation of the West Bank, 
Jordan, officially renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, increased in size by about 
one-third, while its population expanded from around 375,000 to I, 185,000.37 Of the 
new subjects, approximately 460,000 were resident on the West Bank, of whom 
between 100,00038 and 160,00039 were separated from their productive lands or from 
their employment in coastal Palestine, due to effects of the new borders. Fmthermore, 
the East Bank had to absorb around 350,000 refugees from the fighting. 
i': i"':' .. UK, .w'•·, 
'JJ:Year ,.JD in" . %;;r 
1950 2.36 44 
1951 3.55 51 
1952 4.60 49 
1953 6.43 52 
1954 5.87 46 
1955 8.04 52 
1956 8.01 54 
1957 1.75 10 
1958 1.34 6 
1959 2.80 11 
Total 44.75 31.3 
Table 2.3 
OEA, 1950-1959 
). UN, USA~~4'I 
• JOJil ··~::% •. . JUJD •.• r@;,;.%. 
3.00 56 0.00 0 
3.36 49 0.00 0 
4.36 46 0.49 5 
4.86 40 0.97 8 
5.50 44 1.25 lO 
4.66 30 2.73 18 
5.47 37 0.47 3 
4.90 29 6.73 40 
4.75 20 16.32 68 
5.40 21 17.32 68 
46.26 32.3 46.28 32.3 
. Arab' Total 
~JD.m .·L% JDm 
0.00 0 5.36 
0.00 0 6.91 
0.00 0 9.45 
0.00 0 12.26 
0.00 0 12.62 
0.00 0 15.43 
0.85 6 14.80 
3.51 21 16.89 
1.50 6 23.91 
0.00 0 25.52 
5.86 4.1 143.15 
.. Source: Brand, L.A., (1988), Palestmtans m the Arab World: InstttutJOn Butldmg and the Search for the 
State, (New York: Columbia University Press), table 9.5. 
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and Jordanian independence, two new 
donors became involved in Jordan: the USA and the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (table 2.3). Until 1949, the 
British had been responsible for 100% of the external economic assistance to Jordan. 
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This dominance came to an end with the commencement of operations m 1950 by 
UNRW A, which was established by the UN to assist the Palestinian refugees in the 
various Arab countries to which they had fled. Indeed Brand argues "UNRW A was a 
lifeline for Jordan: it provided shelter, food, educational facilities, and monetary support 
for one-third of the Kingdom's residents."40 In the first year of operations UNRWA 
assistance of three million Jordanian Dinar (JD3m) became more important than British 
assistance, although British assistance regained its dominance the following year. 
British priorities changed following independence, with investment focusing on 
gradually developing the infrastructure and agriculture. The first British development 
loan, amounting to £1m, was offered in late 1949.41 In spring 1951, Jordan came under 
the British development programme in the Middle East run by the British Middle East 
Office. The following autumn, in response to a request for a loan of £14m, the UK 
granted a second loan of £ 1.5m.42 The loan was contingent on the formation of the 
JDB, the purpose of which was to attempt to co-ordinate development efforts of the UK, 
USA, UNRW A and the Jordanian government. Further development loans followed 
until 1956. 
By the mid-1950s Jordan had moved from being a relatively inconsequential part 
of Britain's jigsaw in the Middle East to "the most reliable link in the chain of British 
bases between Suez and the Persian Gulf."43 In 1956, the British subsidy had reached 
£12.5m,44 of which, in round figures, £9m was for the Arab Legion,45 £2m for 
development and £1m for budget support.46 The British concern with stability both 
regionally and domestically resulted in the Arab Legion remaining fully subsidised by 
Britain until 1957. The importance of the support for the Arab Legion can be seen in 
the proportion of the budget: in 1951 the Arab Legion budget was £4.898m out of a 
total government budget of £9.763m, and in 1957 the figures were £12.272m and 
£23.181 m, respectively.47 Nevertheless, two errors of judgement by the British 
signalled the end of British dominance in Jordanian affairs. The first move was initiated 
by the fear of the spread of Communism, which led Britain to attempt to persuade 
Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact,48 a move interpreted by Arab nationalists as another 
example of imperialism. Although King Hussein had originally agreed to join the 
pact,49 local sentiment forced him to rethink. The ramifications included the 
'Arabisation' of the Arab Legion on the 1st March 1956 when General Glubb Pasha and 
eleven other top-ranking British officers were given two hours to leave the country. 
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The second error was the Suez War that resulted in Jordan cutting ties with France 
on the l st November 1956 but not immediately with Britain, as King Hussein was still 
dependent on the annual subsidy. However, when the 1957 Arab Solidarity Pact was 
signed, the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was abrogated and British dominance of the 
financial affairs of Jordan ended, while simultaneously resulting in the first significant 
Arab financial involvement. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria had promised "to replace 
the various annual grants paid by the British government ... for the armed forces,"50 
providing Jordan did not sign the Baghdad pact. The three countries signed the Arab 
Solidarity Pact on 19 January 1957, in which they agreed to provide a total of £E 12.5m 
pa for a period of ten years, at the end of which the agreement could be re-negotiated. 51 
However, the move by King Hussein in 1957 to establish political control quickly 
removed Jordan from the Arab camp into the USA camp. 
The USA initially became involved in Jordan through the United States Operation 
Mission (USOM) (commonly known as Point Four). USOM was "based on the idea of 
the transfer and demonstration of technology."52 Point Four in Jordan started out on a 
low-key basis but funding increased rapidly to JD2.73m in 1955, 18% of OEA (table 
2.3). By 1954 the Point Four programme employed 1500 Jordanians at higher salaries 
than were available locally, weakening the administration of the nascent government. 
Kingston argues that the size of the US programme overwhelmed local capabilities, and 
when assistance was cut in 1956, from JD2.73m to only JD0.47m,53 the withdrawal led 
to chaos in the development agenda. 54 The Point Four officials were also concerned 
about the British domination of the development agenda in Jordan, resulting in a battle 
between the UK, the USA, the UN and the Jordanian state, which itself was divided 
between supporters of the regime and the nationalists. 55 
The internal political crisis, which had been simmering smce the early 1950s, 
came to a head in April 1957 when King Hussein moved decisively to gain control by 
ousting the government of Nabulsi. The democratically elected parliament was 
dissolved, political parties and trade unions banned, the constitution suspended and 
martial law imposed. On the 24th April Hussein had requested American56 support in 
the event of Israel or the USSR taking advantage of his forthcoming implementation of 
Martial Law. Although the USA had previously declined to increase assistance, the 
following day it proposed "an open-ended offer of support and aid, which led to a long-
term economic aid programme that became something of a sacred cow for the US 
government very quickly."57 On the 29th April an agreement was signed to grant 
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Jordan US$10m of economic assistance. Satloff caJis this agreement "the most quickly 
negotiated in history."58 The USA also tried to pressure Iraq and Saudi Arabia to 
increase support but both refused, the latter claiming that its obligation under the Arab 
Solidarity Pact was sufficient. The initial grant by the USA of US$1 Om (JD3.57m) was 
followed by a further US$1 Om for the army and also US$1 Om for budgetary support. 59 
The 1967 war once again changed the flows of OEA with, on this occasion, the 
USA stopping its funding in retaliation for Jordan's attack on Israel as part of the war. 
However, the Arab states at the Khartoum summit in August to September 1967 agreed 
to fill the breach. Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait promised Jordan either US$112m pa 
or US$96m pa, depending on the source used.60 In addition, emergency grants of 
US$55m61 or US$58m62 were pledged.63 Arab bilateral assistance grew from zero in 
1969 to US$35.4m in 1970. However, the move against the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in 1970 destroyed the new 'front-line state' policy with the result 
that both Kuwait and Libya stopped payments, although according to a number of 
commentators Saudi Arabia continued to pay its share. However, the Saudi 
contribution does not seem to be recorded in the OECD figures as the level of Arab 
bilateral assistance shrank to only US$1.5m in 1971 and US$2m in 1972. 
Although Jordan's reactions to the domestic and regional instability resulted in 
donor countries stopping their financial support, the major change in the global political 
ideology following the end of the Second World War allowed it to replace these donors. 
Although the end of the First World War brought forth calls for the end of imperialism, 
the mandate system in the Middle East could be seen as an attempt to maintain the 
global position of the European powers. By contrast, with the end of the Second World 
War, the major European powers were no longer in a position to maintain their 
territorial imperialist approach. The post-war dominance of the world by the 
superpowers replaced the era of territorial imperialism with an era of economic and geo-
strategic imperialism. This change allowed Jordan to attempt to play-off major regional 
actors such as the USA, the USSR and the richer Arab states against each other in order 
to maintain levels of OEA. 
A second major change in ideology was again influenced from Europe, where 
Keynesian thinking was to prove a major factor in dominating economic planning. 
Until the economic recession of the 1930s the dominant economic paradigm was that of 
liberalism, which essentially favoured a market solution with the state only providing 
internal and external security to allow business to flourish. The recession of the 1930s 
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forced a re-think, with the provision of welfare policies and state intervention in the 
economy becoming the accepted norm. For example, in Britain, the Second World War 
was followed by the introduction of the Beveridge social welfare plan, a national health 
service and social welfare safety net. The commanding heights of the economy, i.e. the 
major industries such as steel, shipbuilding and mining were nationalised, along with 
infrastructures, such as the railways. Thus the state became the focus of development, 
not just in the West but in the developing countries as well. 
3.1 Changing Patterns of OEA: The Late 1940s to the Early 1970s 
As discussed in the previous section, the changing patterns of OEA in this period 
were largely related to the unstable regional and domestic political environment. Three 
changes are traced in the following analysis: the levels of OEA, the importance of 
grants and the changes in the relative importance of different donors . 
Figure 2.2 
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Sources: Adapted by author. 1950-59, Brand, L.A. , (1988), Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution 
Building and the Search for the State, (New York: Columbia University Press), table 9.5, the figures of 
which have been converted to dinars at the official exchange rate of US$2.8:JD1 IMF, (various), 
International Financial Statistics Yeatbook, (Washington: IMF) and 1960-1972, OECD, International 
Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 edition, (Paris: OECD). 
From figure 2.2 three distinct periods for gross OEA during the period 1950 to 
1972 can be distinguished: 
+ 1950-1961: gradually growing rates ofOEA, from US$15m to US$91.8m; 
+ 1961-1968: declining rates ofOEA from US$91.8m to US$25 .4m; and 
+ 1968 to 1972: more sharply increasing rates from US$25.4m to US$278m. 
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Within these time-spans the regional and domestic political environment affected the 
pattern of OEA. Thus, a sharp increase of over 40% in the levels is found between 1957 
and 1958, with the USA becoming the major donor to Jordan for the first time. In the 
second period, the levels slumped between 1966 and 1968 (30.4% between 1966 and 
1967 and 52.7% the following year) as a result of Jordan' s involvement in the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. The adoption of Jordan as a ' front-line state' by the Arab League 
resulted in levels increasing by 92.5% between 1968 and 1969, and again by 68.1% 
between 1969 and 1970. However, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1970 saw a drop of 
26.6% from 1970 to 1971 . 
An important feature of the changing patterns of OEA was a drop in the level of 
grants. Up to 1960 all the gross OEA was in the form of grants. However, thereafter 
the share dropped slowly to 91% in 1966 before declining steeply to 64.6% in 1968. 
Thus in 1968 not only was the total the lowest recorded but also the loan element was 
the highest. By 1972 the share of grants had returned to the 75% level (figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3 
Grants as a Percentage of OEA, 1950-1972 
Year 
Sources: Adapted by author. 1950-59, Brand, L.A. , (1988), Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution 
Building and the Search for the State, (New York: Columbia University Press), table 9.5, the figures of 
which have been converted to dinars at the official exchange rate of US$2.8:JD1 IMF, (various), 
International Financial Statistics Yearl>ook. (Washington: IMF) and 1960-1972 OECD, International 
Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 edition, (Paris: OECD). 
From figure 2.4 the wi ldly fluctuating changes in donors can be seen. Until 1950 
Britain had been Jordan ' s main source ofOEA, but from 1950 UNRWA also became an 
important donor. The abrogation of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in 1957 witnessed 
the end of the UK as an important donor, although its share continued around the 10% 
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mark, with the exceptions of 1970 and 1972. The importance of UNR W A declined 
from 56% in 1950 to 20% in 1958, before growing to over 56% in 1969 (although no 
funds were transferred in 1968). By 1972, it had become an insignificant player, with 
less than a 2% share. The USA moved from being a small player (only 3% in 1956) to 
the consistently largest contributor from 1957, with the exceptions of 1968 and 1969. 
By 1972 the USA funded almost 75% of the gross OEA. Apart from contributions of 
over 20% in 1958 and over 43% in 1970, the Arab states' involvement was minimal . 
Figure 2.4 
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Sources: Adapted by author. 1950-59, Brand, L.A. , (1988), Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution 
Building and the Search for the State, (New York: Columbia University Press), table 9.5, the figures of 
which have been converted to dinars at the official exchange rate of US$2.8:ID1 IMF, (various), 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: IMF) and 1960-1972 OECD, International 
Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 edition, (Paris: OECD). 
3.2 The Rise, Fall and Re-Emergence of the Induced Rentier State Economy 
Having established the changing patterns of OEA (remittances were insignificant 
during the entire period), the analysis now turns to discovering the degree of the IRSE 
using the six measures discussed in the introduction . These measures, which are 
represented in figures 2.5 and 2.6, not surprisingly mirror the pattern of OEA from the 
early 1950sto 1972: 
• The early 1950s-1961: gradually increasing levels of the IRSE; 
+ 1961-1968: decreasing levels of the IRSE; and 
+ 1968-1972: more sharply increasing levels of the IRSE. 
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Figure 2.5 
Indicators of an Induced Rentier State Economy, 1952-1972 
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Sources: Adapted by author. As figure 2.4 plus GNP 1952-1959, UN ESCWA and Department of 
Statistics, (1978), National Accounts in Jordan 1952-1976, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press) and 
1960-1972, CBJ, (various), Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ), and CBJ, (various), Quarterly 
Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ). Population 1954-59, Winckler, 0., (1997), Population Growth and 
Migration in JordaJL 1950-1994, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press) and 1960-1972, CBJ, (various), 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ), and CBJ, (various), Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: 
CBJ). 
Figure 2.6 
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In the first period, the measure OEA per capita increases annually (with only one 
slight fall between 195 5 and 1956) from just over JD 16 to almost JD40. The measures 
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of OEA as a percentage of the trade deficit, of revenue and of expenditure display a 
more erratic climb to the 1961 peak. In contrast, the remaining two measures both 
peaked earlier than 1961: OEA as percentage of the budget deficit in 1956 and OEA as 
a percentage of GNP 1955. Overall, the economy by 1961 could be described as a high-
level IRSE. 
As the economy grew and levels of OEA declined in the 1960s, so the level of 
IRSE as indicated by the six measures declined to a low in 1968. All the measures, with 
the exception of OEA as a percentage of the budget deficit fell consistently during the 
period to previously unrecorded levels. The measure of the budget deficit actually 
fluctuated in an upward direction from 1960 to 1967 but did record a low in 1968. By 
1968, the level of the IRSE was low. 
The problems caused by the 1967 war and the subsequent civil war, along with 
the changing priorities of the different donors, resulted in an increased level of the 
IRSE. By 1972, IRSE had again increased, but on all measures, with the exception of 
per capita OEA, remained below the levels experienced at the beginning of the 1950s. 
Overall, the economy could be characterised as one in which the degree of the IRSE had 
declined from the end of the Second World War, although, at 1972 Jordan could still be 
classified as a medium-level IRSE. 
4.0 ECONOMIC INSTABILITY: THE EARLY 1970s TO 1989 
The main factor affecting the changing patterns of OEA and therefore the degree 
of IRSE until the early 1970s was political instability, both domestically and regionally. 
From the early 1970s, economic factors became the major determinant of the levels of 
rent accruing in the economy. The period commenced with the 'years of plenty', which 
were followed in the 1980s by the 'years of lean'. 
During the years of plenty, the degree of rent in the economy was increased by a 
number of events. The global boom in raw material prices contributed significantly to 
growth in both OEA and remittances. The Arab oil-exporting states were now in a 
position to promise large sums of OEA. Domestically, the civil war ended allowing the 
state to readjust the focus back to development and also to help attract Arab OEA. 
Regionally, the Rabat Arab League meeting of 1974 and the Camp David talks and 
agreement in 1978 to 1979 both helped increase the levels of OEA. 
The major catalyst for change was the oil boom of the 1970s. Due to structural 
changes, which occurred in the oil sector during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
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OPEC countries were able to virtually quadruple the price of oil between 1973 and 
1974. The consequences of the price rise were to fundamentally affect the level of rent 
in the Jordanian economy. The first change was the huge increase in employment 
opportunities, at all levels of skills, for Jordanian nationals in the Arab oil-producing 
countries. The numbers of expatriate workers rose from a mere 5% of the labour force 
in 1968 to at least 30% by 1980, and of these 86% were employed in the Gulf States, of 
which 85% were employed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 64 The nationals were able to 
remit significant sums, increasing from less than JD 15m in 1973 to JD381. 9m in 1982, 
almost 23% of GDP.65 The reliance of the labour market on these two countries was to 
have profound effects as the oil price fell in the 1980s and later during the Second Gulf 
War. 
Secondly, the oil exporting states were now in a position to use the huge increases 
gained in oil revenues to fund wide-ranging development programmes, through both 
bilateral and multilateral channels.66 The forum for developing countries, UNCTAD, of 
which the Arab OPEC states were members, had pressured OPEC to instigate a policy 
to assist those developing countries most affected by the oil price rises. As can be seen 
from table 2.4, eleven multilateral Arab aid institutions were created in the five years 
from 1973 to 1978. In addition, the Arab oil states contributed significantly to the 
IFAD (1976) and were also encouraged to assist the IMF in funding two facilities for 
countries affected by the oil price rise: the Oil Facility and the Supplementary Facility. 
Arab funding of the former was 44.3% and was approximately 32% of the latter.67 
Institutional bilateral Arab assistance commenced with the creation by Kuwait of 
the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development on 31 December 1961. The fund 
allowed the Kuwaitis to develop the art of 'dinar diplomacy', a necessary requirement 
for the newly independent state over which Iraq still claimed sovereignty. The oil 
revenues allowed the other Arab oil-producing states to follow the Kuwaiti example 
with the creation of the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund for Development and the Iraqi 
Fund for External Development. Algeria, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE also granted 
bilateral OEA. In addition, despite the existence of formal bilateral institutions, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE still granted economic assistance direct from their 
national accounts. This inter-state funding has often been informal, with the result that 
the sums are excluded from the OECD figures. Indeed, Brand argues that as much as 
90% of Saudi developmental assistance bypasses the fund. 68 
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Table 2.4 
Dates of Establishment of Arab Economic Assistance Agencies 
. ~!lstitution %7 Date of ,<~' ; ' ' 
' "t:JFormation. 
Bilateral Institutions 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 1961 
General Board for the Gulf and Southern Arabia (Kuwait) 1966 
Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development 1971 
Iraqi Fund for External Develo_pment 1974 
Saudi Fund for Develo...12.ment 1974 
Multilateral Institutions 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 1973 
OAPEC Special Fund0~ 1974 
Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa'u 1974 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 1975 
Islamic Solidarity Fund 1975 
Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries 1976 
Gulf Organisation for the Development of Egypt 1976 
Islamic Development Bank 1976 
OPEC Fund 1976 
Arab Monetary Fund11 1977 
Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development 1978 
Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organisations 1981 
Source: van den Boogaerde, P.V., ( 1991 ), Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional 
Institutions, (Washington: IMF). 
In the early 1970s, Jordan's regional position was one of virtual political 
exclusion from the Arab community. The military action by the Hashemite regime 
against the PLO, the continued claim to the West Bank and the marginal contribution to 
the Arab cause in the October War against Israel all mitigated against regional 
acceptance. 
Only after King Hussein's recognition of the PLO as the sole representatives of 
the Palestinian people at the October 1974 Rabat Arab League meeting was Jordan able 
to return to the Arab fold. Importantly, the renewed acceptance allowed Jordan access 
to the considerable sums of economic assistance available from the oil-producing Arab 
states, especially those of the Gulf. Promises of Arab aid of US$300m pa were 
forthcoming at Rabat. 72 However, Arab assistance was not just restricted to the 
promises at Rabat. Thus Saudi Arabia, for example, promised a further US$216m in 
support for the 1976 to 1980 Development Plan. 73 The return to the Arab fold resulted 
in Arab bilateral assistance increasing from only US$2m in 1972 to US$342.1 m by 
1976, which accounted for virtually the total increase in gross OEA from 1972 
($105.1m) to 1976 ($489.9m). Thus the USA lost its predominant position as the 
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supplier of economic assistance to Jordan. The decision also had a negative, although 
not major, consequence for Jordan, as the PLO now became the official conduit for 
Arab economic assistance to the Palestinians on the West Bank. Countries such as 
Libya and Kuwait had in late 1970 transferred their aid from Jordan to the PLO. 
Jordan's return to the Arab fold was reinforced by the Kingdom's stance during 
the 1978 Camp David talks and the subsequent US pressure on Jordan 74 to join the 
treaty signed between Egypt and Israel. In the months prior to the signing of the 
agreement, both the Americans and the Arab side courted Jordan. When Egypt entered 
into negotiations with Israel following Sadat' s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the 
Arab states agreed to grant Jordan US$1.25m pa for its support under the terms of the 
Baghdad agreement of 1978. At the summit a US$8.35bn fund was agreed to provide 
assistance to the frontline states: US$5bn to Egypt, US$1.8bn to Syria, US$1.25bn to 
Jordan, the PLO US$150m and the Occupied Territories US$150m. The division of the 
payments to Jordan on an annual basis was to be: Saudi Arabia US$350m, Iraq 
US$200m, Kuwait US$200m, UAE US$150m, Libya US$150m, Algeria US$ lOOm and 
Qatar US$80m.75 A significant qualitative difference in Arab aid to Jordan followed the 
1978 Baghdad Agreement. Gross OEA to Jordan jumped from US$445m in 1978 to 
US$1317m in 1979, an increase of almost 200%. 
The oil boom also contributed to the collapse of Keynesianism, the dominant 
economic ideology and practice adhered to by the donor countries since the early 1950s. 
The knock-on effect of the oil price rise (along with that of other raw materials) was a 
combination of high unemployment and high inflation. The phenomenon of stagflation 
was previously presumed to be impossible under the demand management practice of 
Keynesianism. By the beginning of the 1980s, the Chicago School of Monetarists had 
become the dominant theory of economics. In turn, the practices of the members of the 
donor community adopted, to varying degrees, the new ideas. The change of ideology 
and practice was to play an important role in the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
The start of the years of lean coincided with the end of both the oil boom and the 
dominance of Keynesian economic development practice. In addition, the Jordanian 
economy was profoundly affected by the Iran-Iraq war. At the global level, the oil 
earnings of the OPEC countries slumped, caused by a combination of reduced demand, 
which resulted in output dropping from about 31m barrels per day (bpd) in 1979 to less 
than 17m bpd in 1983 76 and lower prices, from a high of around US$33.5 per barrel (pb) 
in 1981 to a low of approximately US$13 pb in 1986.77 The lower revenues contributed 
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to the curtailment of economic assistance by almost 50% in three years, from a peak of 
US$9,585.7m in 1980 to US$4798.3m in 1983. By 1989, the levels had declined 
further to only US$1 ,486.6m.78 Secondly, the donor community was placing a growing 
emphasis on economic liberalism as the main method of attaining economic 
development in the recipient countries. Thus attempts were made to reduce the role of 
the state by either placing conditions on the granting of soft loans or attempting to by-
pass the state by providing assistance direct to the private sector. 
The Iran-Iraq war, which started in September 1980, initially boosted the IRSE, as 
Iraq turned on a charm offensive with its closest neighbour. In 1980, President Saddam 
Hussein, who had already been instrumental in establishing the 1978 Baghdad 
agreement, agreed to a soft loan of US$189.2m, along with grants of US$58.3m. The 
funds were mostly used to improve the port at Aqaba and the road between Aqaba and 
Iraq. In the longer term, however, the close ties were both to exacerbate the recession 
and to create difficulties in addressing the problems facing the economy in the 1980s. 
Firstly, Iraq was virtually bankrupted by the war, and therefore stopped assistance to 
Jordan. Secondly, the threat of instability as a result of the Iraq-Iran war increased 
defence spending in the Gulf States, which feared invasion from Iran. Kuwait's military 
expenditure increased to US$535m in 1980/81, US$712m in 1981182, and US$833m in 
1982/83, the largest increases in thirty years.79 These expenses, in conjunction with the 
declining oil revenues, meant that fewer funds became available for economic 
assistance. 
Despite the promises made at Baghdad ( 1978) and Amman ( 1980), bilateral Arab 
assistance fell annually from the peak in 1979. Once again conflicting estimates exist 
for the actual payments received by Jordan, although al-Madfai, in his carefully 
researched book, produces a set of figures (tables 2.5 and 2.6). According to the 
figures, Libya failed to make any payments, while Algeria only met the instalments for 
the first year. The Libyan and Algerian promises were divided between the remaining 
countries at a conference in Amman in 1980. However, once again these payments 
were made only for a short time. Only Saudi Arabia met its original commitment in 
full, resulting in less than 60% of the promised total being received. 
As is discussed in detail in chapter four, the state failed to recognise (or at least 
failed to change its economic policies in response to) the changing conditions, believing 
that the shortfall in OEA would be made up at a later date. The failure to change 
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economic direction resulted in the IMF becoming deeply involved in the economy and 
economic policy-making from 1989. 
Table 2.5 
Payments Made by Country in Accordance with 
Baghdad Summit of 1978 and Amman Summit of 1980 
Baghdad Suh}mit ~~d .. ·. Amman Summit 
Country Funds PaiH %Paid· : :::.· ~. ... . ~. Funds Paid %Paid 
· .. . Agreeds US$ US,$ . ·::;g i,~gree<ll:IS$ US$ h 
Saudi 3,571,430 3,571,431 100.0 1,026,280 145,496 14.2 
Arabia 
Libya 1,964,280 0 0.0 NIA NIA NIA 
Kuwait 1,964,290 1,315,390 67.0 563,608 39,988 7.1 
Iraq 1 ,857,140 778,134 41.9 532,764 147,882 27.8 
UAE 1,428,570 840,000 58.9 410,702 29,100 7.1 
Algeria 892,860 89,290 10.0 NIA NIA NIA 
Qatar 821,430 342,572 41.7 234,500 41,000 17.5 
Total 12,500,000 6,936,817 55.5 2,767,854 403,466 14.6 
Source: Adapted by author. al-Madfm, M.R., (1993), Jordan. the Umted States and the Middle East Peace 
Process, 1974-1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Appendix D, pp.233-234. Note the 
figure given by al-Madfai for the total paid by Kuwait is JD7,781,340. This figure is obviously a 
misprint. Calculating the yearly figures gives a total of JD778, 134, which corresponds with the cross-
summation of the other totals. 
Table 2.6 
Annual Instalments Received in Accordance with 
Baghdad Summit of 1978 and Amman Summit of 1980 (US$) 
Year· ~gki <; Baghdad :1f;;L ····1'. Amman· ~1{ ~' 
.· 
01 Total ''.:'[' 
1979 1,053,218 196,336 1,249,554 
1980 963,928 152,105 1,116,033 
1981 963,928 55,205 1,019,133 
1982 874,642 0 874,642 
1983 563,572 0 563,572 
1984 517,381 0 517,381 
1985 461,143 0 461,143 
1986 447,143 0 447,143 
1987 463,321 0 463,321 
1988 462,059 0 462,059 
1989 166,482 0 166,482 
Total 6,936,817 403,466 7,340,283 
Source: Adapted by author. ai-Madfa1, M.R., (1993), Jordan, the Umted States and the Middle East Peace 
Process, 1974-1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Appendix D, pp.233-234. 
4.1 Changing Patterns of Rent: The Early 1970s to 1989 
The effects of the changing patterns of economic conditions and ideology on both 
OEA and remittances are discussed in this section. While Western aid up to the early 
1970s had helped "stave off economic privation and maintain a certain controlled level 
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of development, Arab aid was of a completely different magnitude."80 Arab assistance 
was not only on a significantly larger scale, but it was seldom tied, allowing for 
development of infrastructure projects, defence spending and consumer purchases, to 
which the Jordanian economy quickly became addicted. In addition, the funding was 
often in the form of grants. Rent also started to accrue to the economy in the form of 
remittances. 
Gross OEA exploded in the 1970s with annual growth rates of 74.3% in 1972, 
82.2% in 1973, 45.2% in 1974 and an incredible 196% in 1979 following the 1978 
Baghdad Agreement (figure 2.7). The result was an increase from only US$105.lm in 
1972 to a peak of US$1317m in 1979. A small decline was experienced in 1980 of 
1.7% to US$1294m. During the years to 1989 four falls of over 20% were recorded, in 
1982, 1985, 1988 and 1989. However, not until 1989 did the level drop below that 
recorded in 1978. Grants, as a percentage of gross OEA remained high at over 80%, 
with the exceptions of 1977 (74.7%), 1978 (66.5%) and 1986 (79.7%) 
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OEA and Annual Change, 1973-1989 
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Source: Adapted by author. OECD, International Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 edition, (Paris: 
OECD). 
The high level of grants reflected the dominance of the Arab states contribution to 
gross OEA during the period (figure 2.8). In 1972, the USA accounted for 72.3% of 
gross OEA and Arab states only 1.9%: in contrast, by 1974 the Arab share had 
increased to 68 .8% while the USA share had fallen to 15.8%. The year after the signing 
of 1978 Baghdad Agreement the relative shares had changed to 88.7% for the Arab 
states and only 3.2% by the USA. Although the USA share had fallen, the main reason 
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was the size of growth of Arab assistance, from US$2m in 1972 to US$1168m in 1979, 
rather then the decline in American funding from US$76m in 1972 to US$42m in 1979. 
From 1979 to 1985 Arab OEA remained at over 82% of total assistance, thereafter the 
percentage fell annually to 50.5% in 1989. 
Figure 2.8 
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Source: Adapted by author. OECD, International Development Statistics. CD ROM 2000 edition, (Paris: 
OECD). 
American economic assistance to Jordan continued to be predicated on the 
former's policy towards the Cold War and the Middle East as a region, with the position 
of Israel dictating the agenda. Thus, following Jordan's refusal to be drawn into the 
Camp David agreement, USA assistance dropped from US$88m in 1979 to US$22m in 
1984. The USA share fell from 19.8% in 1978 to less than 5.0% from 1979 to 1985. 
As Arab assistance fell, the American share increased to 20.2% in 1989, although the 
actual level of funding in 1989 was actually only US$70m, still less than the 1978 level. 
Meanwhile remittances grew from just less than JD5m in 1971 , at an average of 
almost 100% pa over the next five years, to JD136.4m in 1976 (figure 2.9). The rate of 
increase slowed dramatically towards the end of the decade, with an average growth of 
10% pa from 1977 to 1979 inclusive, before another burst in 1980 and 1981. The end 
of the oil boom did not stop remittances increasing annually until 1984, when the sums 
peaked at JD475m. The average annual growth from 1979 to 1984 was just over 21%. 
Thereafter, the level of remittances fluctuated, with significant drops of 15.2% in 1985 
and 23.4% in 1987, which reduced the levels from a peak of JD475m in 1984 to 
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JD317.7m in 1987, before a recovery was experienced to JD358.3m in 1989. The latter 
amount was still almost 5% less than the level achieved in 1982 (JD381.9m). 
Figure 2.9 
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(various), Annual Report (Amman: CBJ). 
The following section discusses how the changing patterns of OEA and 
remittances between the early 1970s and 1989 affected the changing type of rentier 
economy in Jordan. 
4.2 From Induced Rentier State Economy to Private Sector Rentier Economy 
From the measures of the IRSE portrayed in figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12, although 
not all the measures paint the same picture, in general four different phases can be 
adduced: 
+ 1973-1975176: increasing to a high-level IR.SE; 
+ 1975/76-1978: decreasing to a mid-level IRSE; 
+ 1978-1979: dramatic increase to a high-level IR.SE; and 
+ 1979-1989: long decline to a relatively low-level IR.SE. 
As with the period from 1952 to 1972, the measure against the budget deficit diverges 
from the main pattern. However, of the other five measures all, with the exception of 
OEA per capita, finish the period recording lower levels of IRSE than was the case in 
1973. Based on these results, Jordan was becoming a relatively low-level IR.SE. 
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Figure 2.10 
Indicators of an Induced Rentier State Economy, 1973-1989 
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Indicators of an Induced Rentier State Economy, 1973-1989 
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Figure 2.12 
OEA as a Percentage of Budget Deficit excluding ODA, 1973-1989 
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Indicators of a Private Sector Rentier Economy, 1973-1989 
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In the same period, all four measures of remittances, as highlighted in figures 2.13 
and 2.14, indicate an overall increase in the level of PSRE. However, the measures 
show a degree of conflict. Between 1973 and 1976/77, all the measures indicate 
increasing level of the PSRE. Thereafter, in the period to 1983, the levels remain rather 
static, with the exception of remittances as a percentage of GNP, which shows a decline 
from its 1976 level of 48 .8%. This measure continues to fall until 1987, after which it 
remains static at around 17%. Remittances as a percentage of trade deficit and of OEA 
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fluctuate upwards from 1983, while the final measure per capita initially fluctuates 
upward after 1983 but finishes the period at around the 1983 level. Overall, the amount 
of remittances entering Jordan by 1989 resulted in a relatively high level ofPSRE. 
JFigmre 2.1-'S 
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Sources: Adapted by author. CBJ, (various), Monthly Statistical Bulletitl (Amman: CBJ), and CBJ, 
(various), Annual Report (Amman: CBJ). 
S.O§UMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter has shown the fluctuating nature of rent in Jordan, 
driven by different factors in different time frames. During the Mandate (1921-1946) 
the level of OEA was dependent purely on the British view of the strategic importance 
of Transjordan. The discovery of oil in nearby Iraq and the building of the pipeline 
from Kirkuk to Haifa, and shortly thereafter the Second World War, were important 
elements in increasing the importance of Transjordan for the UK. Consequently, in 
1936/37 the levels of OEA increased dramatically, resulting in Transjordan becoming a 
high-level IRSE. Domestic and regional instability informed the levels of OEA from 
independence until the early 1970s, by which time Jordan had once more become a mid-
level IRSE, after passing through periods of high-level and low-level IRSE. 
The 1970s witnessed a dramatic change in the type of economy in Jordan. The 
increased revenues of the Gulf States allowed the state to benefit from economic 
assistance but at the same time remittances enabled citizens to improve their standards 
of living considerably. By 1976 the measures indicated high levels of both IRSE and 
PSRE. Since 1979 the level of IRSE has declined to a relatively low level, while PSRE 
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has continued at a high level. The following chapter discusses the effects of the changes 
in the IRSE and the PSRE between 1921 and 1989 on the nature of the state and the 
private sector and the relationship between the two. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
§TATEQIP'RIVATE §lECTOR RELAT:U:ON§: 1921 TO 1989 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses how the nature of the state and the private sector, and the 
development of the relationship between the two evolved between 1921 and 1989. The 
three objectives are: 
~ To assess the depth of the state's involvement in the economy; 
~ To establish to what degree the outcome was the result of the changing patterns of 
rent discussed in the previous chapter; and 
~ To assess the nature of the state and the private sector and the relationship between 
the two prior to the involvement of the IMF. 
The conclusions will form the basis for the analysis for the rest of the study. 
Following the pattern of the previous chapter the period 1921 to 1989 is divided 
into the same four overlapping eras: 
~ The early 1920s to the mid-1940s, during which the economy moved towards a 
high-level IRSE: 
+ The late 1940s to the early 1970s; during which the degree of the IRSE continued to 
increase until the early 1960s before declining to a low point in 1968, followed by a 
recovery to a mid-level IRSE by 1972; 
• The early 1970s to the early 1980s, during which high levels of both IRSE and 
PSRE were experienced; and 
+ The early to the late 1980s, during which IRSE collapsed to a low level and PSRE 
became dominant (figure 3.1). 
In these four phases, the state's involvement in the economy underwent a number of 
changes. In the first period, it adopted a laissez-faire approach. By contrast, the second 
period saw the commencement of state involvement through infrastructure provision 
and large-scale industrial projects. The third time-span witnessed an era of state 
domination of the economy, while the fourth stage witnessed the first attempts to reduce 
the economic role of the state (figure 3.1 ). 
The historical development of the private sector differs from that of the state, with 
only three phases being apparent. The first coincides with the period of the Mandate, 
during which the priority of the ruling elite was to enforce, stabilise and legitimise their 
authority. When allied to the British belief in an economic laissez-faire approach, the 
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private sector was able to develop autonomously from the state. Indeed, a number of 
commentators, such as Sha'sha, argue that the private sector exerted a strong influence 
over the government. 1 Significantly, due to the undeveloped nature of the economy, the 
private sector remained small, and concentrated in the agricultural sector. The second 
period lasted until the early 1970s. During these four decades, the private sector 
gradually became more interdependent with the state. In the final period, the approach 
of the state was one of planned economic development, with the private sector's role in 
planning being by way of invitation. By 1989 the private sector, in general, had 
evolved into a parasite feeding on the body of the state (figure 3.1). 
A comparison of the changes in the degrees of ISRE and PSRE and the roles of 
the state and the private sector is represented diagrammatically in figure 3 .1 . 
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In each of the periods, the background context of the changing international and 
domestic economic factors is discussed. Thereafter, the depth of state's involvement in 
the economy is measured using the state-market continuum model developed in chapter 
one. To recap, the model uses five inter-related measures, namely: 
+ Contribution to the national economy; 
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o Planning; 
o Institutional development; 
~ Support for the private sector; and 
$ Government ownership of productive assets. 
Finally, the position of the state, the private sector and state-private sector relationship 
is assessed against the characteristics of ISR and PSR highlighted in chapter one. 
Two factors highlighted in chapter one must be borne in mind in the following 
discussion. Firstly, the distinction between the state and the private sector has become 
increasingly more blurred, making comparison and analysis less easy. For example, 
companies in which the government has a shareholding are regularly listed in official 
statistics as private sector companies. The result is that official figures tend to over-
state the value of the private sector. In addition, neither the state nor the private sector 
can be treated as monolithic. 
2.0 TRANSJORDAN 
Virtually all studies concerning Jordan, whether political, economic or strategic, 
stress two aspects as major influences on its development: the artificiality of the 
creation of Transjordan and the lack of economic viability? However, all states are 
"artificial creations of individuals or groups pursuing political ends."3 Furthermore, a 
number of states, such as Korea and Japan, which could have been termed as not being 
viable at the beginning of the 1920s, were able to become economically self-sufficient 
within the next fifty years. As Tal argues "[w]hat makes Jordan unique are the 
constraints on its freedom of action."4 The constraints, which existed at the beginning 
of the 1920s, were the lack of resources, along with British financial and political 
control. 
In terms of resources "[t]he country had a small population,5 limited agricultural 
land (located primarily in the Jordan Valley and the North), and limited natural 
resources (only phosphates and potash)."6 To these limitations can also be added the 
lack of water, technology, finance, a physical infrastructure (such as roads and 
electricity), and an institutional framework. In addition, there were only l9km of 
coastline with only the one undeveloped port, Aqaba, inconveniently situated for the 
export of goods to the rich markets of Europe. 
The British control had two effects. First, the primary concern of the British was 
to create political stability via the establishment of an effective local administration. 
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Therefore, the concerns were political and geo-strategic rather than emphasising 
economic development. As Khairy argues, the rationale of the British subsidy was not 
economic but to create "a political power capable of asserting itself in the area."7 A 
British memo of 1922 supports this view when the argument propounded was: 
"[w]e regard Trans-Jordan more as a buffer to Palestine than as a country 
capable of development in itself, and at present at any rate, money spent in 
that territory is only justified by the fact that it reduces what might 
otherwise have been spent on military measures in Palestine."8 
Secondly, Britain was committed to the prevailing orthodoxy of economic liberalism. 
This approach dictated that government budgets ought to be balanced, trade was to be 
free, and industrialisation and economic development were not concerns of the state. 
Furthermore, the idea of the welfare state had yet to evolve. All of these resulted in 
only a token effort being made to develop the economy, with no protection available to 
allow indigenous industry to evolve. 
The private sector in Mandate Transjordan was based primarily in the agriculture 
sector due to the undeveloped nature of the economy. Despite only 3% of the area 
being under cultivation,9 Transjordan was self-sufficient in food with the exception of 
tea, coffee and sugar. Indeed wheat, cereals and fruits were exported to neighbouring 
states, mainly Palestine. Konikoff estimated that agriculture accounted for more than 
90% of exports in the pre-World War II period. 10 The figures given by the British 
Naval Intelligence Division, for 1936 to 1940 inclusive, record exports 11 of wheat, 
sheep, barley and fresh fruit accounting for 75% of total exports. 12 A major problem for 
the accumulation of capital necessary to boost the private sector was the periodic 
droughts that regularly affected agricultural output. 
Initially, private sector industry was mostly small-scale flourmills linked to 
agricultural products. 13 By 1944 the number of factories was still limited, partly due to 
the lack of electricity (which was confined to Amman and Zarqa). Three small-scale 
distilleries were in operation (two in Salt, one in Fuheis) and two modern British-owned 
cigarette factories were opened in Amman in 1927 and 1928, employing two hundred 
and fifty people. 14 
Trade "in the modern sense has played an insignificant part in the economic 
system" 15 due largely to local self-sufficiency. In the Ottoman period, the orientation of 
what little trade existed tended to be focused from north to south along the pilgrimage 
route. The building of the Hejaz railway reinforced this tendency. With the British 
- 86-
Chapter Three: State-Private Sector Relations: 1921-1989 
influence in Palestine and Iraq and the building of the IPC pipeline from Kirkuk to 
Haifa, via Transjordan, the axis of trade rotated ninety degrees to an east-west line. 
How the small-scale agriculturally-inclined private sector and the limited 
economic capability of the state were influenced by the infusion of rent is discussed 
next. However, a caveat is necessary. The lack of data in the period reduces the scope 
of the analysis. Therefore, the conclusions are more tentative than in the later sections 
of the chapter. 
2.1 Measures on the State-Market CoJrntinm.!m 
Budget figures for the Mandate period highlight a gradual increase in 
expenditure16 from £P274,868 in 1924/25 to £P462,710 in 1937/38, an average rise of 
4.2% pa over the thirteen years. Thereafter, spending increases dramatically due to the 
building of the IPC road and the Second World War, reaching a peak of £P2,619,757 in 
1943/44. The differences between the period can be seen from the averages displayed 
in table 3.1. The average annual rate of increase for the six years was 35.1 %. 
Unfortunately, the available budget figures do not provide for a breakdown in terms of 
capital and recurrent expenditure. From the figures available, prior to the building of 
the IPC road, expenditure on administration, finance, police and defence (largely non-
productive) accounted for between 56% and 61% of the annual spend. Thereafter the 
figures are too distorted by the war to be of any relevance. 17 In addition, as no national 
income figures are available, no trend on the state-market continuum can be assessed. 
Table 3.1 
Summary of the Central Government Budget, 1924/25-1943/44 (£P) 
. ~~~]fe~~m.le 
1924/25-37/38 4,864,236 347,445.4 
1938/39-43/44 8,375,516 1,395,919.3 
Total 13,239,752 661,987.6 13,475,289 
Sources: Adapted by author. For years 1924/25 to 1933/34 Naval Intelligence Division, ( 1943), Palestine 
and Transjordan, (no place of publication: Naval Intelligence Division), p.500. For years 1934/35 to 
1943/44, Konikoff, A. ( 1946), Transjordan: An Economic Survey, (Jerusalem: Economic Research 
Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine), p.95. 
The state increased, albeit slowly, the physical infrastructure of the country. In 
1934 only 77km of the total of 1438km of roads were not built of earth, but by 1944 
599.2km of the 2000+km of roads were suitable for all weathers. However, the 
Transjordanian section of the Haifa to Baghdad road, which was not built for the 
economic development of Transjordan but "primarily because of imperial interests and 
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considerations," 18 accounted for 340km of the total. The railway network had actually 
diminished since the Ottoman administration, as the section south of Ma'an had never 
been repaired following damage sustained in the First World War. The total track was 
363.9km in 1945, but was little used, with losses being incurred in its operation. 19 The 
port at Aqaba remained undeveloped. 
In the regulatory field, two acts in the early years of the administration can be 
seen as the start of the state's involvement in the market. The first was the 
promulgation of the Law of the Chamber of Commerce in 1924, and the second was the 
establishment of the Higher Economic Committee in the same year, with the Prime 
Minister as chairman. Branches of the committee were established in seven cities and 
villages. 20 The only other significant move was the reform of the taxation system in 
1933,21 with the introduction of an income tax and the Land Tax, the main instrument 
for direct taxation.22 
From the limited data available, the evidence tentatively points to an economy 
that was at the market end of the state-market continuum, with a barely perceptible 
move towards the state end in the latter years of the mandate. The next section assesses 
the degree of ISR exhibited at the end of the mandate period. 
2.2 Laissez-Faire State, Weak but Autonomous Private Sector 
None of the five characteristics of an economy associated with ISR (a dependency 
on OEA, a chronic balance of trade deficit, a continual budget deficit, service sector 
predominance, and high levels of consumption) was present at the end of the mandate 
period. In addition, the state had not yet adopted a policy aimed at accessing and 
controlling rent. The British control of the finances ensured that OEA was granted in 
the British interest rather than the regime's interest. However, the need for Emir 
Abdullah to garner local political legitimacy did result in the limited use of an 
expenditure policy by the regime. The private sector also failed to exhibit any of the 
signs of ISR (a relatively homogenised outlook, a dependency on the state, and a service 
orientation). Finally, the blurred relationship between the state and private sector had 
also failed to materialise. Thus by the mid-1940s, although the economy had been a 
high-level IRSE for almost a decade, the characteristics associated with ISR were not 
present to any degree. 
This apparent paradox was due to three main reasons. Firstly, the rentier aspects 
of the state had only recently become consolidated. Secondly, the private sector was 
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largely self-sufficient and restricted to the agricultural sector, and thus autonomous of 
the state. Finally, and perhaps the main reason, was the importance of external and 
domestic factors. 
At the birth of Transjordan, the ideological leanings of economic liberalism and 
colonialism collided to create a state that was controlled financially by the British 
government. The result was a 'hands-off' approach in both the economy and the market 
of the nascent state. During the two and a half decades of the mandate, the role of the 
government gradually increased but was restricted to very small-scale infrastructure 
projects, limited welfare outlays (mainly as a result of the depression of the 1930s and a 
series of local droughts)23 and the provision of employment, especially in later years 
with army recruitment. No state involvement in industrial development or in the 
workings of the market was apparent. Despite the space provided by the lack of state 
involvement in the economy, the private sector failed to develop, particularly 
industrially, due to the lack of infrastructure, natural resources, capital accumulation and 
skills. 
3.0 INDEPENDENCE TO THE OIL-BOOM 
The significant factors in this period, which affected the economic development, 
were independence, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the annexation of the West Bank, the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Civil War of 1970-71. Additionally, at the ideological 
level, the move towards Keynesianism, with the focus on the state in terms of welfare 
provision and economic development, resulted in the state, rather than the private 
sector, being seen as the key actor in the economic development of the less-developed 
countries. 
Independence allowed the Jordanians to regain a degree of financial control over 
government expenditure. Within the constraints of raising finance, this control enabled 
more funding to be diverted towards economic development than occurred in the 
Mandate era. 
"The economic crisis created by the 1948 war was staggering."24 The need to 
absorb refugees, 25 a process made more difficult by the lack of international assistance 
in terms of speed and finances, 26 resulted in a move towards welfarism by the state as 
education, employment, health and housing had to be provided. The budget was also 
strained by the need to increase military spending in response to the continuing regional 
instability. The private sector was also badly affected, as the war not only cut off the 
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main Palestinian market for which new markets had to be found27 but also the port of 
Haifa, through which the majority of exports were shipped. The result was shipping 
costs increased, as exports were re-routed via Aqaba or Damascus and Beirut. Finally, 
investment in the private sector was curtailed by the continued instability. 
One of the outcomes of the war was the military control of the West Bank by 
Jordanian forces. On the 24th May 1950 King Abdullah announced the annexation of 
the West Bank, which was recognised only by the UK and Pakistan. The move 
"unequivocally altered not only the history of the country but also its political, social, 
and economic structure."28 The West Bankers, due in part to the British Mandate 
policy, were on the whole more economically developed than their East Bank 
counterparts. The result was a boost to the private sector, with the introduction of an 
entrepreneurial middle class, an increase in 'modern' skills and a huge injection of 
capital of £P20m, probably greater than the money supply in Jordan at the time.29 This 
influx gave an impetus to the change from an agricultural to a service-based economy. 
In addition, a new private sector elite, comprising "landlords, financiers, wealthy 
merchants and real estate owners,"30 was in place by the beginning of King Hussein's 
reign in 1952. Over the next decade and a half the private sector "played an important 
role in the development of industry and agriculture and its efforts were responsible for 
the establishment of the phosphates and cement industries and the oil refinery."31 
A major turning point was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which resulted m the 
physical loss of the West Bank: an event Bannerman claims lost Jordan the chance to 
become economically self-sufficient.32 Other analysts are more circumspect: Brand 
argues that the war dealt "the economy a severe blow."33 A major problem in analysing 
the short- to medium-term effect is the lack of accurate information on the exact 
contribution of the West Bank economy to the economy of 'Greater' Jordan. In terms 
of population, both Winckler34 and Kanovsky35 estimate the West Bank as having 40% 
of the population. However, estimates vary considerably on the extent to which this 
40% of the population contributed to the economy. Mazur proposes a figure of 30% of 
GDP,36 while Bannerman hypothesises a contribution of 70% of GNP. 37 Thus if Mazur 
is correct then the East Bank was more productive per capita than the West Bank, 
making the loss a net benefit to Jordan. However, using Bannerman's figure the 
opposite conclusion is reached. For a longer-term analysis, the productive capacity of 
each bank is probably a more accurate assessment of whether the loss would be positive 
or negative. Again, unfortunately, accurate figures are not available and estimates 
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differ, although there is agreement that tourist capacity was greater in the West Bank 
and industrial capacity greater in the East Bank. Figures also vary considerably for 
agriculture, which was still the mainstay of the economy in 1967. Brand argues that 
25% of the productive land was situated in the west,38 whereas Bannerman states the 
figure to be 60-80%. 39 
Apart from the physical loss of capacity, the state-private sector relationship was 
affected in ways similar to those experienced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The 
state budget was once more pressurised by a flood of between 250,000 to 400,00040 
refugees arriving in one week,41 and increased military spending.42 The effects of the 
refugee crisis were not offset on this occasion by the gain of assets, but were 
exacerbated by the loss of the productive assets on the West Bank. In addition, private 
sector agriculture and industry in the Jordan Valley was brought to a standstill by the 
continuing hostilities between Israel and the Palestinianfida 'yyin (commandos). 
The problems created by the continuing regional instability were aggravated in 
Jordan by the civil war of 1970 to 1971. Industry throughout the Kingdom virtually 
ground to a halt. Furthermore, trade was severely disrupted by the actions of 
neighbouring Arab states. Saudi Arabia closed the TAPline43 from May 1970 to 
January 1971. The Syrian border, which after 1967 had become the gateway to Europe 
following the closure of the Suez Canal, was closed. Restrictions were gradually lifted 
from February 1972 when phosphate lorries were allowed to cross, and by December 
the border was completely re-opened. The effects of the Syrian border closure were 
made worse by the closure of the Syrian-Lebanese border from May to August 1972. 
The less important Iraqi borders were closed from the 18th July to the 20th October 
1971, with normal trade relations not being resumed until February 1972.44 In addition, 
Libya and Kuwait, both of whom had agreed assistance to Jordan following the 
Khartoum Arab League Conference in 1967, cut the promised funding of JD23m 
(US$64m) pa. Piro cites one further problem; that of capital flight, 45 i.e. divestment 
from rather than investment in the private sector. 
3.1 Measures on the State-Market Continuum 
The contribution of the government in terms of revenue and expenditure to 
national income fluctuated around the 30% mark from 1952 until 1963, with the 
exception of expenditure, at 39. 7%, in 1960. The expenditure figures do show an 
increase from 28.0% in 1957 to 39.7% in 1960, the years immediately following King 
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Hussein's regain of political control. A sharp dip to around 20% is apparent in years 
1964 to 1966 but the 1967 war reversed the trend, with both figures settling around the 
35% mark from 1968 to 1973 (figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 
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Accounts 1952-1992, (no place: Department of Statistics); and UN ESCW A and Department of Statistics, 
(1978), National Accounts in Jordan 1952-1976, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press). 
According to the JDB, private gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) increased by 
more than fourfold in the period 1954 to 1959, compared with a doubling of public 
GFCF.46 Private GFCF stagnated from 1959 to 1968, during which time the average 
was JD13.2m pa, and, despite the instability, actually grew to an average of JD22.8m pa 
from 1969 to 1973. In the war years of 1967 and 1970 the figures dip below the 
average. Central government GFCF averaged only JD6m pa for 1959 to 1964; 
thereafter, the figures climbed to JD16.6m in 1969. The Civil War saw a steep drop to 
JD9.5m in 1970 and JD11.5m in 1971, before climbing to JD22.1m in 1973 (figure 3.3). 
In figure 3.4, the closing of the gap between the public and private sectors from 1959 to 
1966 is apparent. Nevertheless, private sector levels remained more important on 
average than the public sector GFCF. Following the 1967 war, the public sector 
becomes the most important in 1967 and 1968. Thereafter, the gap grows in favour of 
the private sector until closing again in 1972 and 1973. By the end of the period, the 
gap closed to less than 14%, from almost 45% in 1959; a definite move to the state end 
of the continuum. 
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Figure 3.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1959-1973 
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(various), Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ). 
Figure 3.4 
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Government involvement in planning commenced in Jordan following the 
creation of the JDB in 1951. The British sought to use the JDB to co-ordinate the 
development efforts of the British, the Americans and the UN, as well as the Jordanian 
state.47 As a result of US dissatisfaction, the JDB was reconstituted in 1957, before 
mutating into the National Planning Council in 1971 , under the Planning Law no. 68 of 
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1971. Representatives from the private sector, as well as government officials, were 
included in both organisations. The concerns of these organisations were focused 
initially on project investment before taking on a more wide-ranging approach to 
economic and social planning. 
The first official plan (1962-67), produced by a twelve-man team including five 
representatives from the private sector, was published in 1961. The private sector was 
consulted in the early stages of the planning process and again after the first draft of the 
five-year programme was drawn up. However, the controlling agenda was in the hands 
of the planning committee of the JDB, as were the later stages of the planning process. 
"Partly because of a lack of aggregate economic data, the plan was limited 
to proposals for investment projects and fiscal and administrative reforms, 
without much attempt to design an overall strategy or to make aggregative 
projections for the economy as a whole."48 
The costing of the plan was envisaged at JD127m, of which JD47m was to come from 
the private sector, JD21m from domestic government sources and JD59m from foreign 
sources.
49 The plan contained no specific proposals for attracting the JD47m of private 
sector funding, apart from a change in the tax law "to allow greater retention of earnings 
by corporations and thus greater investment in industry."50 
Table 3.2 
Public and Private Sector Gross Capital Formation, Plan 1964-1970 (JDm) 
Gr«lssfaph :r'l967 ,; 19'68''~ ~:f969 "119"70~ ,:T"" ~i~r~~ti~~ ~¥F ,i~f-,~ .. ·· · ; .. :J~ ~t~: .. :~1:~ rk~; ,:]Jl'''1. ··. · . . 
Central Government 8.6 13.1 21.8 29.8 22.6 19.6 15.3 130.8 
Private Sector 12.1 13.9 15.0 17.6 21.0 24.9 24.7 129.2 
Total 20.7 27.0 36.8 47.4 43.6 44.5 40.0 260.0 
Source: Adapted by author. JDB, (undated), The Seven Year Program for Economic Development of 
Jordan: 1964-70, (Amman: Jordan Development Board), p.34. 
The assumptions behind the plan quickly became out of date "as a result of 
reductions in the levels of budget support, particularly from the United States of 
America, and that a corresponding revision of the program was necessary."51 The plan 
was replaced by the 1964 to 1970 seven-year plan, which was prepared with the help of 
the Ford Foundation and the World Bank. Not officially adopted until approved by the 
Cabinet on 22 December 1965, this plan in turn was cancelled in 1967 as a result of the 
war. The 1964 to 1970 plan was, according to Mazur, ambitious but highly 
implausible.52 Although the plan stated that the preparation "involved the participation 
of a great number of government officials, businessmen, agriculturalists, technical 
experts and others,"53 the government set the goals prior to the planning process being 
implemented. The private sector seems to have had little overall input. The estimated 
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levels of GFCF over the seven years were JD260m, which was to be shared almost 
50:50 between the state and the private sector (table 3.2). By way of comparison, in 
1963 the private sector had contributed 68.2% of GFCF. In terms of total investment 
the plan was therefore advocating a move towards the state end of the continuum. 
The hiatus caused by the 1967 War and the 1970-71 Civil War resulted m 
economic planning being ignored for approximately five years. An interim plan for 
1973 to 1975, the first to be formulated under the new planning law, Law no. 68 for the 
year 1971, was issued at the end of the Civil War. The plan acknowledged that "[i]t is 
also evident that the relative contribution of the public sector to GFCF is on the 
increase."54 The development strategy outlined indicated that "[a]ll possible means are 
to be used to encourage and induce private initiative, and the private sector will be given 
priority in carrying out feasible projects."55 Although the emphasis was on the private 
sector investment, the public sector was expected to provide 55.6% of the JD 179.0m 
total investment.56 
In each of the three plans, the private sector was expected to contribute slightly 
less than 50% of the total investment (table 3.3). However, on closer inspection, in each 
case the majority of public sector investment was to be spent on infrastructural 
development, which in theory ought to assist with private sector development. On the 
other hand, the majority of planned investment in the productive sector was to be 
provided through the private sector, although the ratio between the private and public 
sectors declined from 8.53:1 in the first plan to only 1.65:1 by 1973-75 (table 3.4). 
Table 3.3 
Share of Planned Investment, 1962a1967, 1964-1970 and 1973-1975 
JD60.4m 47.4% JD66.9m 52.6% JD127.3m 
JD129.2m 49.7% JD130.8m 50.3% JD260.0m 
JD79.5m 44.4% JD99.5m 55.6% JD179.0m 
Sources: Adapted by author. JDB, (1961), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Program for 
Economic Development 1962-1967, (Amman: Jordan Development Board, 1961), p.360; JDB, (undated), 
The Seven Year Program for Economic Development of Jordan: 1964-70, (Amman: Jordan Development 
Board), p.34 and National Planning Council, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Three Year 
Development Plan, 1973-1975, (undated: a), (Amman: National Planning Council), p.34. 
The growing government involvement in the economy was manifested m the 
creation of a plethora of state and semi-state institutions with the aim of boosting 
economic development through the private sector. Five specialised credit organisations, 
which were intended to provide loans to both the public and private sector, were created 
in the post-Mandate period. Four of the institutions, the Agricultural Credit 
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Corporation57 (1959), the Cities and Village Development Bank (1966), the Housing 
and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) (1966), and the Jordan Co-operative 
Organisation (I 968) were in public ownership. One private-public capital organisation, 
the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) (1965), which had previously been the 
Industrial Development Fund (1957), was also established. By 1973, the total lending 
portfolio of these credit organisations was JD I 7 .5m. 
Table 3.4 
lPBanned Investment by Sectors, 1962al967, 1964a:D.970 and 1973-1975 (JDm) 
s .. • ;( .... J:rMf:i;.·.· ~ ·~·· ~~2-~f ~ ':< "'~4·'7Qlit < !il'"~' ~*'75;>-'~ 
•en ·• c:;~.; i:lS~cto~"5s;0~;;· ,Qf,lvate Rub lie ~dvat~ · · ~bik··: J~rivate:: . "=J!ublic 
Social and Services 7.53 19.56 67.00 17.06 37.23 27.74 
Infrastructure 22.32 43.77 15.13 90.49 17.80 57.09 
Productive 30.55 3.58 47.07 12.3 I 24.39 14.75 
Total 60.40 66.91 129.20 130.86 79.42 99.58 
Sources: Adapted by author. JDB, (1961), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Program for 
Economic Development 1962- I 967, (Amman: Jordan Development Board, 196 I), p.360; JDB, (undated), 
The Seven Year Program for Economic Development of Jordan: 1964-70, (Amman: Jordan Development 
Board), pp.37-38 and National Planning Council, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Three Year 
Development Plan. 1973- I 975, (undated: a), (Amman: National Planning Council), p.36. 
Among the other institutions established in the period to the early I 970s were the 
following: 
~ Jordan Industrial Corporation (1953), which had the mm of attracting private 
investment; 
~ The CBJ (1964), which replaced the British-established Jordan Monetary Board, the 
functions of which "had been limited to currency issue and reserve management."58 
Previously Jordan had remained in the sterling area. The establishment of the CBJ 
followed by the withdrawal of Jordan from the sterling area, allowed the state to 
adopt a more independent monetary policy. 
+ Jordan Investment Promotion Office ( 1967), which was established "to provide 
assistance to the private sector, particularly to Arab and foreign private enterprises 
in establishing new industries and implementing other economic projects and 
d . . . ,59 expan mg exJstmg ones. 
~ The Royal Scientific Society ( 1970), which was created as a think tank for research 
and development. It was established by Royal Decree and has worked under the 
sponsorship of HRH Prince Hassan. 
~ The Jordan Commercial Centres Corporation (JCCC) (1972), which was established 
under Law no. 2 I for I 972 to assist with export development. The non-profit 
organisation is owned equally by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Jordan 
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Federation of Chambers of Commerce (FJCC) and the Amman Chamber of Industry 
(ACI).60 The Minister of Industry and Trade chaired the board of directors, with six 
members from the public sector, six members from the private sector and one 
member from the Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) and one member from the 
agricultural sector. The JCCC, which was established as Jordan's national export 
development agency, opened several branches abroad to promote exports.61 The 
Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for signing the bilateral trade 
protocols, which set out the level and type of trade with other states, while the JCCC 
"determines the commodities to be put on individual country lists, the accounts and 
who is responsible for the follow-up."62 
An important institution created in this period was the Economic Security Council 
(ESC). The ESC was established by the 1971 Planning Law, in the wake of the 1967 
war "to address economic problems created by the occupation of the West Bank."63 
The Council was composed of the Prime Minister, ministers from the Finance and 
National Economy ministries, along with the Governor of the CBJ, two members of the 
National Planning Council and the Director of the Budget Department in the Ministry of 
Finance. 64 Brand argues that as political repression expanded from the late 1960s the 
role of the ESC increased, with few decisions being made public. The decisions tended 
to benefit a specific group of individuals, companies and banks.65 These members of 
the private sector became dependent on this decision-making process for their 
prosperity. 
Government assistance to the private sector was also provided through 
infrastructural projects. Progress was apparent in the area of transport and 
communications, the port at Aqaba was modernised (to the extent that exports increased 
from a mere 4000 tonnes in 1953 to 657,000 tonnes in 1966),66 a national airline was 
formed, an international airport was built, a programme of road building was 
implemented, and electric power was introduced to wide areas of the country. 
In the post-Mandate period "to promote and shape the growth of the industrial 
sector, the government. .. used protection from import competition, fiscal and credit 
incentives, and a limited degree of government shareholding and direct regulation."67 
Mazur argues that the degree of protection extended increased throughout the 1960s to 
newly-established local industries.68 Import controls, domestic price-fixing, and "the 
use of licences as an effective means of favouring and rewarding special distributional 
interest groups"69 were among the policies adopted. He adds that until the early 1970s 
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the "licensing of new industrial investments was commonly used to restrict the numbers 
of enterprises established."70 Thereafter, nearly all licences were approved, with control 
being implemented through tax incentives under the Encouragement of Investment Law 
1972, which replaced the Encouragement of Investment Law 1967. The reason for the 
change of approach was a change of emphasis by the government in an attempt to adopt 
an export-based approach, as the domestic market was already saturated. 
Government involvement in four of the 'big 5' 71 companies began in the 1950s. 
Table 3.5 details the initial level of state ownership in Jordan Cement Factory Company 
(JCFC), Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC), Jordan Petroleum Refinery 
Company (JPRC), and Arab Potash Company (APC). These figures do not tell the 
whole story. For instance in the case of the JCFC only 10% of the private sector 
allocation of capital was actually subscribed. The government share in all companies 
increased in stages until the 1990s: by then, the government share in JPMC had reached 
90%. In addition, the government took an active role in appointing the boards of 
directors of these companies. As Piro points out, the appointments have been regularly 
used as a reward for political support.72 Another example of the role of the state in 
these companies includes the granting of monopolies. The JPRC was granted the 
monopoly on production and distribution, while the APC was granted a one hundred 
percent concession to exploit the minerals in the Dead Sea. 
Table 3.5 
Details of the Formation of the Main State Owned Enterprises 
JCFC 1951 
JPMC 1953 25.00% 
JPRC 1956 JD4.0m 6.25% 
APC 1956 JD4.5m 53.00% 
Source: Adapted by author. Piro, T.J., (1998), The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan, 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.), pp.S0-51. 
In conclusion, during this period the state, on all measures, took a significant step 
towards the state end of the state-market continuum. The governmental share of both 
national income and GFCF was higher prior to the oil boom than after independence, as 
the newly-independent state threw off the shackles of the British financial straightjacket, 
and turned its attention to industrialisation, social welfare and defence. Total planned 
investment levels tended to be split equally, but the public sector was expected to 
concentrate on infrastructural spending and the private sector on the productive sector. 
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In addition, the government became involved in a number of large-scale industrial 
projects, such as the phosphates sector, injecting large-scale capital in return for a 
shareholding. The National Planning Council argues that in the period 1948 to 1961 the 
public sector concentrated on "creating and strengthening the development 
infrastructure."73 Thereafter, from 1962 to 1966, the "emphasis [was] on the 
development and expansion of productive capacity through the completion of existing 
productive projects such as the East Ghor Canal, the expansion of phosphate production 
and the exploitation and export of other mineral resources."74 
3.2 State as Facilitator, Private Sector as Initiator 
In this period, the degree of the IRSE climbed to a peak in 1960/61, before 
dropping to a low point in 1968, followed by a recovery to mid-level by the early 1970s. 
Despite the overall fall in the degree of IRSE, the state-private sector continuum model 
highlights a significant move towards the state end of the economy. This section 
concludes by assessing what aspects of ISR were present by the early 1970s. 
Four of the five macro-economic measures of ISR (dependency on OEA; 
continual trade deficits; continual budget deficits; and high levels of consumption) were 
all strongly in evidence by the early 1970s. The fifth measure, a service-oriented 
economy, was beginning to grow, accounting for around 25% of GDP in 1973.75 
Furthermore, as was evident in 1956 to 1957 and again in 1967, the state had adopted a 
policy of maintaining access to OEA. In 1970, however, the threat to the Hashemite 
regime by the PLO meant that for a time the regime's survival became more important 
than maintaining access to Arab OEA. The expenditure side of the two-dimensional 
state policy had also grown in terms of infrastructure development, state-controlled or 
state-supported enterprises and support for favoured businesses. However, subsidies of 
basic necessities remained low at this point. Another characteristic of ISR is the ability 
of the state to create and destroy classes. However, the formation of the new private 
sector elite, which was in place by the early 1950s, was more as a result of gaining 
control of the West Bank, than because of ISR. Finally, the private sector had become 
relatively homogenised in outlook and service-sector oriented, but as yet it was not 
dependent on the state. 
The relationship between the state and the private sector up to 1967 is best 
described by the development plans, along with the institutional and infrastructure 
development. These features were in line with the change in the role of the state vis-a-
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vis the private sector, from one of laissez-faire to one where the state acted as a 
facilitator to the private sector. The private sector was still considered to be the main 
engine for leadership, initiative and investment.76 In addition, the political and 
economic elites were still separate entities. However, the relationship altered 
dramatically in the years after 1967. Four years of instability, during which the private 
sector was badly affected, resulted in a hardening of attitudes towards economic 
development. The internal threats to the political elite and the external threats to the 
Kingdom persuaded the regime that economic development should be based in the 
hands of the state. According to Sha' sha, the increase in "government intervention 
came through the invitation and insistence of the private sector."77 While the statement 
may be true, the intervention was driven more by the political and security nature of the 
years immediately following 1967. The private sector, although independent and 
nominally seen by the decision-makers as the leader of economic development, was too 
weak to be able to dictate the development agenda. 
Overall, in the years from independence to the early 1970s Jordan took a 
significant step towards the state end of the state-market continuum and was showing 
increased signs of ISR. Many of those interviewed by the author were at pains to point 
out that Jordan became a state-centred economy by default, arguing that ideologically 
the desire was for a market-based economy. Brand supports this thesis, arguing that 
Jordan "never. .. joined in the Arab-socialist or state-capitalist experiments of the 1950s 
and 1960s of a number of its neighbours."78 The thesis is often advanced on the 
grounds that the state in Jordan did not resort to the process of nationalisation. 
However, unlike in Latin America or certain Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, a 
distinct lack of targets existed for nationalisation. The structural problems facing a late-
industrialising economy, in combination with the need for national and regime security, 
and the dominant economic development ideology was the reason that the Jordanian 
economy became state-centred. The need to create an economy based on industry and 
services rather than on agriculture required the injection of large capital sums. This 
capital was not readily available from private domestic sources, leaving two options 
available: a state-centred approach based on OEA or by attracting private foreign 
investment. The former option was chosen initially through the strange coincidence of 
the dominant ideology of state-centred economic development, the Arab nationalist 
desire to create an independent (from the West) industrial economy through a policy of 
big-push, state-centred industrialisation and the ability of the state to attract rent. Once 
the path had been laid, various elements linked to the domestic security of the elite and 
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the external security of the state ensured that the policy did not deviate. The Arab-
Israeli Wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967 created an atmosphere of instability in the region, 
resulting in attempts to push economic development in the direction of industrial 
modernisation as a means of creating a viable, self-sustaining, independent economy. 
41.0 THE OIL-BOOM YEARS 
The state-private sector relationship altered significantly during this period. A 
major factor in this period was the relative stability following the end of the Civil War, 
and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Other events of importance were the Rabat Arab 
League meeting of 1974, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the Baghdad 
agreement of 1978, and finally the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. In addition, 
the global boom in raw material prices, particularly oil and to a lesser extent 
phosphates,79 contributed significantly to the growing dependence of the private sector 
on the state. 
The end of the Civil War paved the way for both industrial output to be re-started 
and enabled agriculture to return to the Jordan Valley. In addition, with the defeat of 
the PLO the domestic political situation entered a period of relative stability that 
continued until the 1980s drew to a close. The political stability allowed the regime to 
turn its attention from political survival to strengthening the economic development of 
the country. This new emphasis was reflected in a series of social and economic 
development plans covering the periods 1973-75, 1976-80 and 1980-85. 
The oil-boom, which allowed the Arab states to agree to economic assistance 
packages at the 1974 Rabat Conference and the 1978 Baghdad Conference, boosted the 
state's power vis-a-vis the private sector. The huge sums of Arab economic assistance 
permitted the state to address its security concerns and thereafter to monopolise the 
agenda concerning the development of the economy. In addition, the money allowed 
the state not only to become the "owner of major projects"80 but also to move seriously 
into the productive sector. Thus by 1982 the state was responsible for 40% of the GNP, 
almost 50% of GFCF and almost 50% of the workforce. 81 The oil-boom did have a 
positive effect on the private sector through the increase in remittances from JD 15m in 
1973 to JD381. 9m in 1982.82 In theory, the remittances should have increased the funds 
available for investment, but much of the money was spent on consumption of imported 
goods or on housing. 
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Following the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, 80,000 refugees, along with 
their capital, moved to Amman, where hopes existed of replacing Beirut as the financial 
centre of the region. However, within six months, the majority of the businessmen left, 
as Amman's infrastructure was not sufficiently developed to meet their needs. 83 This 
loss further focused the minds of the decision-makers within the state on improving the 
infrastructure. This departure was a blow to the chances of developing an independent 
private sector. 
The Iran-Iraq War boosted the profits of the private sector as Iraq turned to its 
neighbour for many industrial products, as well as for a port of entry for its own 
imports, thereby increasing transit trade. The two countries established the Jordan-Iraq 
Committee for Economic Co-ordination (JICEC) in August 1980, which in turn created 
the Jordan-Iraqi Overland Transport Company. Exports to Iraq jumped from JD28.35m 
(23.6% of total exports) in 1980 to JD63.47m (37.6%) in the following year. However, 
as trade was co-ordinated by the JICEC the private sector effectively relied on the 
government for access to the export market of Iraq. As the war progressed, Iraq became 
mired in debt. In order to maintain the level of trade, the governments agreed an export 
credit scheme, which was controlled by the two states: thus the outcome was increased 
private-sector dependency. As Piro argues "[a] number of economic groups ... became 
tied to Iraq's economy, including the cement and pharmaceutical industries and the 
banking sector."84 
After the ravages of the Civil War the private sector entered the oil boom era in a 
weakened position. Capital accumulation still remained low, while the focus of the 
private sector continued to evolve away from agriculture. Services continued to 
dominate the economy accounting for around two-thirds of GDP, while the importance 
of agriculture continued to decline slowly. Manufacturing had jumped from 6.6% of 
GDP in 1952 to 12.6% in 1973.85 On the other hand the state commenced the era with 
renewed confidence after expelling the PLO and suffering little damage in the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War. How the relationship between the state and the private sector 
developed during the oil-boom years with reference to the continuum model is 
discussed in the next section. 
4.1 Measures on the State-Market Continuum 
The trend lines in figure 3.5 highlight the overall drop in importance of the state's 
contribution to GDP in terms of expenditure and revenue. Expenditure averaged 52.9% 
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of GDP from 1973 to 1979, before falling to an average of 40.9% for 1981 to 1984, 
with revenues also showing a similar drop from 47.3% to 38.1% in the same periods. 
Thus despite the increase in rent available to the state, on this measure the move was 
towards the market end of the continuum. 
Figure 3.5 
Revenue and Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1973-1984 
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Source: Adapted by author. CBJ, (various), Annual Report, (Amman: CBJ). 
Figure 3.6 
!lOO 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1977-1984 
--------. 
700 
600 
500 
~400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
19TI 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Year 
0 Private Go ss FOOd Capital Forrmtion • Go ss FOOd Capital Forrmtion of Central GoveiDIJlmt 
Source: Adapted by author. IMF, (various), International Financial Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: 
IMF). 
Actual investment by the private sector during the 1973-75 plan was JD67m 
compared with public investment of JD75m.86 During the following plan, from 1976-
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80, the levels of investment were ID721.5m (59% of total) for the private sector and 
ID500.4m for the public.87 However, if private sector investment in housing (a largely 
non-productive asset, particularly in Jordan where no mortgage market existed) is 
discounted, then the private sector contribution fell to ID471.3m. The GFCF of the 
central government increased from ID113.4m in 1977 to a peak of ID187.7m in 1981 
before the effects of the oil revenue slump caused the level to drop to ID133.1m in 
1984. Private sector GFCF climbed rapidly from ID87.6m in 1977 to ID484.9m in 
1981. Although the levels fell back to ID393. 7m in 1984, the drop was not as dramatic 
as that seen for the public sector levels (figure 3.6). In percentage terms the private 
sector contribution rose steeply from 43.6% in 1977 to 72.1% in 1981. During the next 
four years the figure remained around the 70% mark before climbing to almost three-
quarters of total GFCF in 1984. Again the evidence points to a move towards the 
market end ofthe continuum (figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7 
Private and Public Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1977-1984 
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Source: Adapted by author. IMF, (various), International Financial Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: 
IMF). 
Three plans were issued in this period: the plan for 1973 to 1975, the plan for 
1976 to 1980 (the first prepared in the oil-boom era), and the 1981 to 1985 plan. The 
1973-1975 plan was produced shortly after the end of the Civil War and was essentially 
designed for short-term recovery. The objective was to "relieve the economic recession 
and the crisis of confidence in the Jordanian economy among foreign investors."88 One 
of the basic assumptions of the plan was that "[t]he private sector should assume an 
active and ever-increasing role in the development effort."89 The contribution of the 
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private sector was to be achieved by reducing the ratio of private consumption to 
income from 87.9% in 1972 to 86.8% in 1975.90 No indication was given in the plan as 
to how this reduction was to be achieved. The total level of investment forecast was 
JD179m,91 with the private sector contributing 44.4%. In the event, private sector 
investment outperformed the plan by 60%.92 
The 1976 to 1980 plan was prepared against a background of tight labour markets, 
inflation, rampant land speculation and unprecedented levels of foreign aid caused by 
the initial effects of the oil boom. The plan was the first to take on "longer term goals 
related to phosphates, fertilisers and potash plants, road networks, sewage, 
communications and water networks."93 The large volumes of economic assistance 
permitted the government to implement a strategy of large-scale project investment, 
with eight projects accounting for 31.8% of the planned investment.94 In addition, the 
plan was a: 
"blueprint for creating a basic and suitable institutional framework, 
modernising and improving the performance of the government system, 
providing a suitable base for the private sector, emphasising manpower 
training and adopting suitable economic policies to augment the absorbtive 
[sic] capacity of the national economy."95 
The 1976 to 1980 plan recognised that the "private sector has a basic role in the 
successful implementation of the plan."96 As with to the previous plan the decision-
makers hoped to reduce the level of private consumption, thereby increasing the levels 
of savings that could be invested. On this occasion the target was to decrease from 74% 
of GNP in 1975 to 61% in 1980.97 The plan discussed increasing interest rates on 
savings and the need to "set up a programme aimed at encouraging savings."98 Among 
the fiscal policy measures highlighted in the plan was the creation of incentives to 
encourage private investment, both domestically and from abroad.99 Monetary 
measures included extending sufficient credit facilities through the banking system to 
h I I f 0 ° 100 encourage t e eve o pnvate sector mvestment. 
The anticipated level of investment was JD765.0m, of which JD580.4m was 
expected to be in the productive and infrastructure sectors, while the remaining 
JD184.6m was in the social sector. The breakdown between public and private was 
49.9% and 50.1% respectively. 101 As with the previous plan, the private sector 
outperformed the target with total investment of JD843.7m, of which the share was 
59%. 102 However, the total hides the fact that the private sector under-performed in the 
productive and infrastructure sectors, investing only JD362.5m against the planned 
amount of JD408.4m. The private sector share in the productive sector was planned at 
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88.8%, but the outcome was only 71.4%. 103 However, this level of private sector 
investment is still significant. 
The 1981 to 1985 plan was prepared against the backdrop of explosive economic 
growth, a result of which was an envisaged real annual growth rate of GDP of 11% at 
factor cost. 104 The outturn was only 4.2% pa. A major assumption of the plan was: 
"that Jordan will continue to pursue a policy of free enterprise, with 
increased opportunities for private initiative and closer co-operation 
between the public and private sectors in the process of development." 105 
The plan also argued that the "private sector will continue to respond favourably to 
developmental efforts and assume an increasingly important role in attaining its 
b. . ,106 o ~ectJves. In addition, the government's v1ew of the relationship between the 
public and private sector was spelled out: 
"The concept of public sector participation in economic projects particularly 
the larger ones, stems from the desire to propagate, support and ensure their 
proper financing and implementation with the purpose of activating the 
socio-economic sectors. On this principle, the public sector extends to the 
private sector the opportunity to contribute a larger share of the capital and 
the management of these projects on a purely commercial basis." 107 
Thus by the beginning of the 1980s the relationship become the antithesis of the early 
1950s, when the public sector was expected to respond to the needs of the private 
sector, to one where the private sector was to respond to the needs of the public sector. 
The continuing flow of economic assistance was once again expected to fund 
large-scale investment. The planned investment levels were for JD3300m of which the 
mixed sector share was to be only 39% 108 (i.e. the private share was to be lower than 
this). Khader and Badran argue that despite the high planned levels of state investment 
the aim was: 
"the maintenance of a mixed economy with a strong private sector, the 
public sector's role being to create the basic infrastructure for private 
business and to promote the larger-scale froductive projects too great to be 
supported by private investment alone." 10 
Among the fiscal policies, which were expected to promote the private sector, the 
government sought to revise the Encouragement of Investment Law and to revise 
customs duties to ensure the growth of local industries. GFCF exceeded expectations in 
the first two plans, but thereafter the recession led to a decline. Government investment 
of JD1,279.5m in the five years accounted for 54.7% of the total investments of 
JD2,341.1 m at 1980 prices: 92.9% of the planned level. 110 
Throughout the period the plans continued to call for the private sector to lead the 
economic development of the country. Although the decision-makers' arguments were 
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strong the actual figures in the plans tended to anticipate investment to be the 
responsibility of the public sector (table 3.6). A comparison of the planned investment 
levels in the 1973-75 and 1981-85 plans 111 suggests that the majority of the public 
sector expenditure was to be spent on infrastructure. Private sector investment, on the 
other hand, was planned to be in the productive sector (table 3.7). The planned private-
public investment ratio widened dramatically from I: 1.25 to 1: 1.56, the highest of any 
of the plans up to that time. 
Table 3.6 
Planned Private Sector Investment Levels, 1973-75, 1976-80 and 1981-85 
PlamF ··· ~::~~? Pri~ate Sector 
· ,j :; ; '; lJ~i,;H. 1Ih~~tfiteJtf:-JDl)l, 
44.4 
1976-80 765 383.3 50.1 
1981-85 3300 1287.0 39.0 
Sources: National Planning Council, (undated: a), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Three Year 
Development Plan. 1973-1975, (Amman: National Planning Council), p.34; National Planning Council, 
(undated: b), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 
1976-1980, (Amman: National Planning Council), pp.39-45; and National Planning Council, (undated: c), 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1981-1985, 
(Amman: National Planning Council), p.41. 
Table 3.7 
Planned Investment by Sector, 1973-1975 and 1981-1985 (JDm) 
. '!rJi.$·;~.~; . ;::Ftlf9i3~7,s '"~'il14)8t~85l;, 
. s~~tor 
Social and Services 111.9 
Infrastructure 17.80 276.2 
Productive 24.39 898.7 94.6 
Total 79.42 99.58 1286.8 2013.2 
Sources: Adapted by author. National Planning Council, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Three Year 
Development Plan. 1973-1975, (undated: a), (Amman: National Planning Council), p.36 and National 
Planning Council, (undated: b), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development, 1981-1985, (Amman: National Planning Council), p.59. 
The specialised credit institutions, which had been established m the previous 
period, gained in strength during the 1970s. A new credit organisation, the Housing 
Bank, was created in 1974 with a mixed public-private sector capital base. Total 
outstanding loans by the six credit institutions rose from JD16.3m in 1972 to JD375.1m 
in 1984, a factor increase in excess of twenty-three while in the same period their total 
assets increased from JD20.6m to JD591.1 m, a factor increase of more than twenty-
eight. Both measures outperformed the growth of eight and one half times in GDP. 
The public sector share of the outstanding loans provided by the credit institutions 
commenced at 31.3% in 1972, fell to a low of 20.9% in 1980, before increasing to 
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27.6% in 1982. The provision of credit allowed for private sector expansion, but at the 
same time added to the dependency of the private sector on the state. 
The state also created two public vehicles for investment in this period. The 
Pension Fund was established on the 1st January 1977, by the Provisional Law no. 6 for 
1976. The Board of Directors was drawn from the government departments; the 
Chairman was the Minister of Finance, the Deputy Chairman was the Governor of the 
CBJ, other members were the Director of the National Planning Council, the Director-
General of the Budget Department, and the Director of the Pension Fund along with two 
other cabinet-appointed members. The investment objectives of the fund were "taking 
into consideration the elements of security and profit, [to give] priority ... to investment 
in productive projects included in development plans." 112 The total assets of the 
Pension Fund, which is attached to the Ministry of Finance, rose rapidly to JD58.5m by 
the end of 1984. The second investment vehicle was the Social Security Corporation 
(SSC) that was established in 1980. By the end of 1984 this institution had total assets 
of JD99.9m. 
In an attempt to boost the economy the state introduced the concept of Free Zones 
and Industrial Estates in this period. The Free Zones Corporation (FZC) was created in 
1976 to oversee the Free Zones. The FZC operates under the Free Zones Corporation 
Law no. 32 for the year 1984, which grants the corporation "independent and 
administrative status." 113 However, the FZC was responsible to the Minister of Finance. 
According to Article 6 of the law, all board members were to be drawn from 
government ministries and the CBJ. 114 In addition, the Director-General, who was 
responsible for the management of the FZC, was "appointed, and his appointment 
terminated, by decision of the Cabinet, provided such decision has been endorsed by 
Royal Decree." 115 Even if companies met the qualifying criteria for the zones, their 
establishment still required permission from the board of directors. Furthermore, the 
Cabinet had the final say as to which industries were to be allowed access to the 
benefits of the zones. 116 Finally, the FZC was "to enjoy all exemptions and privileges 
accorded to Government ministries and departments." 117 As the FZC continues to 
argue: 
"The inspiration behind the Free Zones is that it is one of the State tools in 
development through the allocation of specific geographical sites or areas 
where special laws and regulations are applied different than those applied 
in the remaining part of the State and characterized by exemptions and 
facilities that qualify them to become an investment attraction areas [sic] for 
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the development of export industries, international trade exchanges and 
transit trade." 118 
The objective of the FZC was to undertake the expansion in establishing and 
developing free zones as well as placing them in the service of the national economy. 119 
Although its aim was to attract industrial, trading, investment and service projects 
through exemptions from taxes, import fees, customs duty, and licence fees, as well as 
other benefits, the Corporation was in the main unsuccessful. The first Free Zone had 
been established at Aqaba Port in 1973 to develop the international trade exchanges and 
to serve the transit trade. However, the potential benefits were restricted by competition 
in the region, particularly from the Jebel Ali Free Zone in the UAE. 120 By 1989 only 
one further zone had been created. In common with the Aqaba zone, this zone at Zarqa 
was almost totally dedicated to tax-exempt warehousing 
The Jordan Industrial Estates Company (JIEC) was established in 1980 to provide 
an efficient and organised management approach to the growing manufacturing 
industry. The company is regulated by Law no. 59 of 1985, at which time the capital of 
JD18m was subscribed to by the government (67.5%), the Housing Bank (8.3%), the 
SSC (15%) and the IDB (8.3%) (i.e. there was no independent private sector 
involvement). The Minister of Industry and Trade was appointed chairman, with six 
other board members representing the government, along with one from each of the 
IDB, the Housing Bank and the ACI, the Director-General of the Corporation and one 
representative from industry. The latter two were appointed by the Cabinet. In contrast 
to the FZC, which focused its assistance on trade, the JIEC was concerned with building 
an industrial base. The first site, the Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein Industrial Estate, was 
developed at Sahab near Amman. The second site was not commenced till 1989. Both 
the FZC and JIEC were unsuccessful in achieving their remit of expanding the private 
sector industrial base of the economy. 
Among the other institutional changes in the period were the establishment of the 
Jordan Valley Development Authority, the objective of which was to form a 
comprehensive plan to develop the valley. The Ministry of Labour was created in 1976 
in response to the sudden shortfall in the supply of labour caused by the migration to the 
Gulf States. Part of its remit was to bring women into the economy. This move created 
a need for domestic workers from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Other institutions 
established included the Postal Savings Fund, the Water Supply Corporation, the Public 
Transport Corporation (PTC), the Jordan Geographic Centre, and the Water and Sewage 
Authority for Amman. 121 The creation of the Amman Financial Market (AFM) (i.e. the 
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stock exchange) was an important institutional development in attempting to encourage 
private sector investment, albeit primarily domestic due to the restrictive nature of the 
laws governing foreign investment. 
During the oil-boom years, the state became more deeply involved in the market, 
through subsidies, setting prices and monopolising imports of certain goods, as well as 
establishing shops for government employees. The boom in the early 1970s resulted in 
inflation increasing rapidly, from 4.7% in 1971 to 19.2% in 1974. Prices of basic goods 
rapidly outgrew government salaries, with the result that further subsidies were 
introduced. A brief mutiny by the army in February 1974 resulted in the creation of the 
Ministry of Supply, whose objective was "providing essential foodstuffs in reasonable 
quantity and good quality and at reasonable prices." 122 A monopoly was established 
over imports of wheat, flour, sugar, rice, meat, poultry and olive oil. The Ministry of 
Supply also fixed the wholesale and retail prices of these goods. Thereafter, "on the 
grounds of consumer protection," 123 fixed prices for many locally produced and 
imported goods were gradually added to a portfolio of around forty items. 124 Milk was 
added in 1980. 125 In a related move, the Civil Consumer Corporation, under the control 
of the Ministry of Supply, was established in 1975 "to provide civil servants [and 
military personnel] with durable and non-durable consumer goods at cost price, duty 
free in respect of imported items." 126 
Government policies towards industrialisation in general included import 
protection, fiscal and credit incentives, government shareholdings (later), and direct 
regulation. In order to promote traditional industries and crafts the partly publicly 
owned IDB established the Small Industries and Handicrafts Loan Fund in 1975. 
At the beginning of the period the government held capital of JD9.4m out of the 
total of JD28.9m in twenty-six 127 local companies. 128 This figure excludes the holdings 
of the Pension Fund and the SSC. According to al-Quaryoty, SOEs accounted for 
61.3% of GDP by 1985. 129 Government stakes in the 'big five' increased in this period 
with the establishment of Jordan Fertiliser Industries Company in March 1975. The 
government took an outright stake of 26%, but also invested via its partly owned 
company, the JPMC, a further stake of 25%. The following year the government 
shareholding was raised by a further 25.1 %. 
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4.2 Dictator State, Private Sector Dependency 
The oil-boom era, a period of increasing degrees of both IRSE and PSRE, 
witnessed a move towards the market end of the continuum as measured by investment 
and contribution to the national income. However, on all other measures the state 
became more deeply enmeshed in the economy. Despite these measures, Owen argues 
that the emphasis continued to be on a market economy. His argument is based on an 
analysis of the policies on trade and payments, the banking and monetary system, 
manipulation of tariffs and taxes, and representation of the private sector on the 
National Petroleum Company (NPC) and national consultative council. 130 He states: 
"[e]conomic policy is ... largely a matter of bargaining and compromise. 
While the state is given free rein to set the country's main economic targets, 
to identify growth sectors and to take the lead in providing assistance for the 
larger projects, other goals have to be pursued more circumspectly." 131 
Although the intention may have been to maintain a market economy, the policies 
created an economy in which the private sector became dependent on the state. Given 
these changes, what characteristics of ISR and PSR were present in Jordan by the end of 
the oil boom? 
Again, continuous deficits were experienced in the budget and the balance of 
trade, and the bias was towards services and high levels of consumption. However, by 
the end of the oil-boom the economy had become dependent on OEA. The state was 
now vigorously pursuing a two-dimensional policy towards attracting OEA and using 
expenditure for political purposes. In the latter case, the use of subsidies to the 
population in general had extended the benefits of this policy beyond those close to the 
regime. In addition, the levels of OEA had funded a huge increase in numbers 
employed by the state in the bureaucracy, creating a class dependent on the state "for 
their existence and influence within the economy." 132 Furthermore, the service-oriented 
private sector had become homogenised in outlook and was now dependent on the state. 
The blurred relationship between the public and private sectors was now apparent, with 
signs that the rentier elite was now in place. Other signs of ISR were also present, with 
elite circulation, capture of the private sector by the state, informal rather than formal 
contacts and accusations of corruption all present. 133 Although high levels of PSRE 
were noted, the characteristics of PSR were not apparent (state policy, heterogeneous 
and independent private sector, separate political and economic elites, and a formal 
relationship between the private and public sectors). 
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The reasons behind the development of ISR rather than PSR can be attributed to 
the historical development prior to the oil-boom. The increased revenues allowed the 
state to intervene at a previously unrecorded level. The drive for industrialisation and a 
modern infrastructure was not pursued by the weakened private sector, at least partly 
due to the lack of investment capital. Among the incentives for the state-led 
development was the lack of stability in both the region and domestically, which 
provoked the view that, for security purpose, the commanding heights of the economy 
should be in state hands. In addition, the failure of Amman to replace Beirut as the 
financial centre for the Middle East following the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War 
due to its lack of modern infrastructure further emphasised the need to build a modern 
infrastructure. Finally, the dominant development ideology was still one of state-led 
development, although from the beginning of the 1980s cracks were beginning to 
appear in the consensus. Thus external events and internal security concerns, as well as 
the lack of a vibrant private sector, drove the move to a political economy of ISR. 
5.0 THE RECESSION :YEARS 
Five main factors affected the development of the economy from the early 1980s 
to 1989, namely: 
~ The slump in oil revenues; 
+ The continuing Iran-Iraq War; 
+ The outbreak of the intifada in the Occupied Territories; 
+ An inappropriate economic response to the impending crisis; and 
+ The rise of monetarism as the economic orthodoxy. 
The latter point resulted in an increased emphasis on the private sector as the key 
element in economic development. The effects of the drop in earnings of the OPEC 
countries took time to work through to the Jordanian economy. The drop in the level of 
remittances affected the private sector as a cutback in employment forced 15,000 
expatriate workers to return to Jordan between 1982 and 1984. 134 In addition, higher 
prices in the oil-producing countries resulted in the migrants having fewer funds to 
remit. As well as the slump in remittances, the oil-producing countries were also no 
longer able to provide economic assistance, thus further reducing the spending power of 
the state. However, as discussed previously, the government tried to maintain spending 
levels by borrowing commercially. 
- 112 -
Chapter Three: State-Private Sector Relations: 1921-1989 
A major factor in the developing crisis was that the decision-makers initially 
disregarded the downturn, or at least considered it to be only temporary. In addition, 
despite the evidence to the contrary, the planners based their assumptions on the 
premise that the economic assistance agreed under the Baghdad agreement of 1978 
would be met in full. The decision-makers adopted a: 
"two-pronged strategy of (1) providing all forms of incentives and support 
to private capital, especially the large financial and commercial bourgeoisie; 
and (2) borrowing abroad until Arab money began to flow in again to avoid 
a painful, more thorough going economic restructuring." 135 
The growing emphasis on economic liberalisation and economic conditionality by 
the donor community resulted in Jordan adopting (at least rhetorically) a new economic 
posture from around 1985/86. The need to bonow US$63m from the IMF in 1985, 136 as 
well as from other sources including commercial banks, meant that the country had to 
be seen to adopt a reformist approach to its economic policies. The appointment of 
Zaid al-Rifa'i as Prime Minister in April 1985 was the first signal of the new direction 
based on export promotion, privatisation and the encouragement of investment. These 
moves were supposed to set the scene for the retreat of the state. 
The continuation of the Iran-Iraq War created problems for both the private sector 
and the state. Economic assistance from Iraq dried up and indeed Iraq was actually 
deeply in debt to Jordan by the end of the 1980s. Exporters, particularly the industrial 
sector, also suffered as trade between the countries slumped despite a barter agreement 
and an export credit guarantee scheme, which collapsed through mal-administration, if 
not outright fraud (chapter 4, section 2.1 ). 
The final nail in the coffin was the outbreak of the intifada (which started in the 
West Bank in late 1987) along with the continued cost of supporting the West Bank. 
The result was King Hussein, on the 31st July 1988, formally severed all legal and 
administrative ties with the West Bank. Although this action saved the Jordanian 
economy the cost of salaries and development projects, 137 the uncertainty regarding the 
role of the dinar in the West Bank and the position of Palestinians in Jordan led to a 
capital outflow of US$250m138 (chapter 4, section 2.1 ). 
The private sector was badly hit by the recession, with a number of private 
companies folding and others experiencing a steep decline in profit levels. In 1985 
"twenty of ninety public shareholding companies suffered losses." 139 Thus the private 
sector entered the last half of the decade in a position of dependency on the state, with 
profits falling dramatically. 
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5.1 Measures on the State-Market Continuum 
As the economy entered a period of retrenchment, expenditure as a percentage of 
the GDP fell from 52.5% in 1982 to 40.4% in 1985, before climbing slowly to 42.6% in 
1989. In the latter period, the government attempted the Keynesian approach of 
increased spending to offset the effects of the recession. Expenditure increased by only 
1.7% and 2.2% in 1983 and 1984 respectively, whereas from 1986 to 1989 inclusive the 
average rate of growth was almost 7%. In these four years the comparative rate of 
growth for GDP was 5.5% pa. Revenue to GDP shows a decline for most of the period 
from 47.1% in 1981 to 31.6% in 1987 before climbing to 38.8% in 1989 (figure 3.8). 
Comparisons of government and private consumption show a similar story. The 
government share of total consumption fell from 29.8% in 1981 to 22.9% in 1985, 
before climbing to 27.5% in 1989. The effects of the recession are reflected in the 
GFCF. Private sector GFCF almost halved between 1981 (JD484.9m) and 1985 
(JD245.4m), before recovering to JD370.lm in 1989: only the same level as in 1983. 
Government GFCF, although not affected to the same degree, did drop from JD187.7m 
in 1981 to JD133.1m in 1984, before recovering to JD184m, almost the same as the 
1981 level (figure 3. 9). In terms of relative importance, the private sector's share fell 
from almost three-quarters in 1984 to two-thirds in 1989: a move towards the state end 
of the continuum, despite the fall in the IRSE (figure 3.1 0). 
Figure 3.8 
Revenue and Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1981-1989 
...... 
-
50 
45 
40 
35 
~ ----
15 
10 
5 
0 
1981 
-~ 
-
--....... 
~ 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
Year 
-+-Revenue as a% ofGDP 
____., 
...... 
1986 1987 1988 
---RqJenditure as a% ofGDP 
Source: Adapted by author. CBJ, (various), Annual Report (Amman: CBJ). 
- 114-
~ 
1989 
!{X) 
m 
({j) 
~ 
~400 
300 
:m 
100 
0 
1~1 
Chapter Three: State-Private Sector Relations: 1921-1989 
Figure 3.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1981-1989 
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Private and Public Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1981-1989 
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The development plan for 1981 to 1985, which had been drawn up prior to the 
collapse in oil revenues, quickly became inappropriate for the new economic reality. 
The National Planning Council, which was responsible for the development plans, was 
revamped into the Ministry of Planning in 1984 with the remit to use local input via 
sectoral groups and the govemates for future plans. The Ministry' s development plan 
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for 1986 to 1990, based on the United States Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) 1984 Rural Development Strategy, was a reflection of the attempt to 
overcome regional disparities. Unfortunately the constraints, usually financial, meant 
that national priorities overcame local needs. 14° For the first time, the plan involved "a 
lengthy and conspicuous process of consultation." 141 A five hundred-member general 
assembly was involved, representing most economic and social constituencies. 142 
Significantly, in view of the 1986 privatisation announcement, the plan contained 
no mention of privatisation. Indeed, one of the aims of the plan was "a continuation of 
public sector activity while defining its role as a catalyst and complement to the private 
sector." 143 The plan also acknowledges that "the private sector's role in the 
development process within the framework of the interaction of market forces are of 
particular importance to Jordan's development drive." 144 To this end total central 
government and autonomous institutions investment was anticipated to be JD 1633.4m, 
leaving private sector investment at 47.6% of the total planned investment of 
JD3115.5m. 145 Table 3.8 highlights the sector breakdown of the planned investments. 
The plan was predicated on the assumption that the global recession would continue, 
and that foreign economic assistance could no longer be relied upon. In the event, the 
position became worse than anticipated, with the result that a number of development 
projects, including the West Bank Development Plan, were cancelled or curtailed. As 
with many previous plans, events overtook the process, with the result that the plan was 
eventually discarded. 
Table 3.8 
Planned Sectoral Investment, 1986-1990 
J;i4:_,';'~. ,, ~,{' ··· · · £~i,¥~f~ S,e~icli: .. ;'; 4~ .. ' ~~fubiJ~~St!~b>lll,~ . .:.,';~ ~ t::: ~\ota(0~· '* 
t2 ~~t+IT: S~~~9r > ';~; . "AinqtmRJt Lw0 Sh~r~ '"Amount • ~~~, SJ)a(~F ... (nvestDJ~n~ 
Social & Services JD580.0m 46.8% JD658.0m 53.2% JD1238.0m 
Infrastructure JD350.8m 29.5% JD839.7m 70.5% JD1190.5m 
Productive JD551.2m 80.3% JD135.7m 19.7% JD687.0m 
To tan JD1482.0m 47.6% JI.H633.4m 52.4% JD3U5.5m 
Source: National Planning Council, (undated: d), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Five Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development. 1986-1990, (Amman: Royal Scientific Society Press), p.95. 
The growth of both the specialised credit institutions and the investment vehicles 
continued to outperform the growth of GDP. The total loan portfolio of the credit 
institutions grew by 112.7%, from JD255.lm in 1982 to JD542.7m in 1989, of which 
the public sector share increased from 21.2% in 1981 to 35.2% in 1989. The total assets 
held by the Pension Fund, which became the Jordan Investment Corporation (JIC) with 
the passing of Provisional Law no. 29 of 1988, increased from JD54.8m in 1982 to 
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JD165.6m in 1989. The SSC increased its assets from JD42m in 1982 to JD321.2m in 
1989. Overall the combined assets of the investment vehicles increased by just over 
400% in the eight years. Brand argues that the SSC has proved "an effective way of 
mobilising private income for investment in productive enterprises." 146 
On the 13th September 1986, a Higher Economic Advisory Council (or Economic 
Consultative Council (ECC)) composed of leading representatives of the public and 
private sectors, including the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, was established "at 
the behest of [Amman Chamber of Commerce] ACC president Hamdi Tabba 
[Taba'a]." 147 Its objective was: 
"to study economic conditions and to make proposals and recommendations 
aimed at: 1) co-ordinating economic, financial, and monetary policies at the 
time of their drafting and implementation; 2) developing policies to 
encourage savings and investment and to channel local and foreign 
investment; 3) organising and developing the financial markets; and 4) 
deepening co-ordination between the public and private sectors in 
implementing the development plan.'" 48 
The first meeting was held on 12 April 1987, but thereafter only two further meetings 
were held. 149 Throughout the years, the Council was one of a number of failures to 
formalise public-private co-operation. 
Two other institutional developments were initiated. In spring 1987, the Jordan 
Marketing Organisation was created to "undertake research and advise the government 
on marketing and pricing policies.'" 50 In December 1988, the IDB began offering risk 
capital loans to entrepreneurs to encourage local participation in industrial and tourism 
development projects. 
By the mid-1980s, three ministries were important players in the state-market 
relationship: the Ministry of Supply which used subsidies and price regulation to offset 
(at least theoretically) poverty; the Ministry of Planning which invested in infrastructure 
and capital-intensive projects to help promote the economy and the private sector; and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade which controlled access to trade to a considerable 
extent. Imports were organised through quotas, duties and state monopolies on certain 
agricultural inputs. In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade was responsible for 
negotiating bilateral trade treaties with other sovereign states through joint economic 
committees. The private sector then had to apply to the state, via the JCCC, for a share 
in the agreement. Bureaucratic procedures, which the private sector as a whole was 
unable to influence (mainly due a lack of organisation), were responsible to a degree for 
blocking an increase in trade. 
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In the trade sector "the government has maintained its overall commitment to free 
trade but holds that protectionism is essential if home industries are to develop." 151 
Various changes were announced throughout the period, such as lifting and then re-
imposing restrictions on imports depending on the economic situation. Overall, the 
tendency was to lift restrictions on inputs and basic foodstuffs, whereas restrictions on 
luxury goods were initially lifted but as the recession deepened were re-instated. 
Exports were encouraged through new regulations in 1986 that included income tax 
exemptions. 
In April 1985, Prime Minister Zaid ai-Rifa'i set about lifting restrictions on the 
private sector, including prices and hours of business. In August 1986, the cabinet 
approved a five-point privatisation programme, which was intended to alter private-
public sector relations in favour of the former. 152 The programme included the 
increased involvement of the private sector in public sector companies, through 
ownership and management. In addition, the public sector companies were expected to 
operate on a commercial basis. A paper on privatisation, together with the 1986 to 1990 
development plan, was presented to the Jordan Development Conference, held between 
the 8th and lOth November. Two areas of action were approved. Firstly, promoting the 
private sector through incentives, policies and the legal environment. Secondly, 
advocating the transformation of the public sector through the sale of shares in mixed 
companies, the transfer of autonomous enterprises to the private sector, the 
establishment of private sector universities and the leasing of public land to the private 
sector. 153 Despite the announcement no progress was made before the crisis of 1988 to 
1989 broke. 
The companies approved for privatisation by the Cabinet on the 26th August 
1986154 were RJ, the PTC, and the Telecommunications Corporation (TCC). According 
to Anani and Khalaf, the original proposals also included Aqaba Port but the company 
"appeared to offer less potential given current industrial and economic conditions." 155 
Among other policies aimed at increasing private sector involvement in the 
economy were: 
+ Lifting of import restrictions on rice and flour to allow the private sector to import a 
limited quota: previously in the hands of the Ministry of Supply; 156 
+ Banning the imports of a number goods to protect domestic industry; 157 
+ Reducing custom duties on various industrial inputs; 158 
+ Lifting major curbs on Arab investment in January 1986; 159 
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o Introducing new regulations to boost exports, including exemption from income 
tax; 160 
~ Abolishing the requirement for licensing of new projects; 161 
o Initiating a series of conferences to be held in Amman to attract expatriate 
investment. Among the concessions given to the expatriate community were voting 
rights and places at university; 162 and 
o Outlining a new monetary policy to encourage economic activity in a joint memo by 
the eBJ and the Ministries of Finance and Industry and Trade. Proposals included 
"increasing the Kingdom's reliance on domestic products and manpower, increasing 
government investments, turning financial companies into investment banks and 
attracting more foreign investors and capital." 163 
Direct state involvement in the market increased when government subsidies were 
extended in 1985 to include frozen chicken. By 1989 the range of subsidies included, 
among others, wheat, meat, sugar, cooking and fuel oils, and cement. 164 In addition 
fodder subsidies were available via the co-operative organisations established by the 
state to assist private-sector farmers. In general, from 1983 the government had moved 
from fixing prices to higher subsidies of electricity, petroleum derivatives and essential 
foodstuffs. 165 
The figures for government ownership are clouded by a lack of transparency and 
the adoption of different definitions of state ownership. However, Piro claims that by 
1989 government ownership of the big four amounted to 78% in APe, 90.1% in JPMe, 
56% in JeFe and 24% in JPRe. Anani and Khalaf state that central government 
ownership amounted to 32.2% of the subscribed capital in thirty-one domestic 
companies with a par value capitalisation of JD90.7m. In addition, the central 
government also had shares in a number of pan-Arab joint ventures. Of the autonomous 
investment organisations, the ne had equity of JD37.2m in forty-eight companies, and 
the sse owned approximately JD25m of investments. The total of these three (i.e. the 
ne, the sse and the government) accounted for 25% of the total shareholding in the 
country. 166 In terms of sectors, the government owned 58% of the capital in mining, 
23.2% in manufacturing of which 87% was in four companies (JeFe, JPRe, Jordan 
Glass Factory, and Jordan Engineering) and 20.8% in services. 167 In 1989 the IMF 
listed twenty-four non-financial and nine financial SOEs (table 3.9). 168 However, the 
list is not comprehensive, as among those excluded are the JPRe and the sse. 
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'fablle 3.9 
State Owned Enterprises Acconlling to KMJF 
Aqaba Railway 
Co oration 
Arab Potash Company 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Civil Employees 
Consum tion Co oration 
Free Zones Corporation 
General Transportation 
Co oration 
Himmeh Hot Springs 
Corn an 
Holy Land Hotels 
Co oration 
.,......==;;==~., 
Bank Markazi (CBJ) 
Agricultural Credit 
Co oration 
Housing Bank 
Norn.-JFinan~ian lnsti@tioll)s 
Hotels Corporation 
Housing Corporation 
Jordan Broadcasting & 
Television 
Jordan Cement Company 
Jordan Electricity 
Authorit 
Jordan Glass Factories 
Jordan Hijaz Railway 
Jordan Hotels and Tourism 
Corn an 
Industrial Development 
Bank. 
J m·dan Co-operative 
Or anisation 
Municipal and Village 
Develo ment Bank 
Jordan Phosphate Mines 
Corn an 
Jordan Tourism & Mineral 
Water Company (S a) 
Ports Corporation 
Posts Public Corporation 
Public Mines Company 
Royal Jordanian Airlines 
Telecommunications 
Co oration 
Water Authority 
Pension Fund (JIC) 
Postal Savings Fund 
Public Institution for Social 
Securit Fund 
Sources: IMF, (1988), Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1988, vol. XII, (Washington: IMF), 
p.567 and IMF, (1989), Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1989, vol. XIII, (Washington: IMF), 
p.374. 
5.2 lFailure to Roll Back the State, Continued :Private Sector Dependency 
Despite the calls from 1985/86 for the state to retreat, the recession actually saw 
the state's share of GDP increase. However, on most other measures, the tendency was 
towards a consolidation of the gains made in the previous decade. As Brand argues, in 
the last half of the 1980s "the desire to liberalise was clear, although the successes were 
few."I69 
"Government policy combined attempts to stimulate greater domestic 
private investment, attract foreign investment, cut inefficiencies through 
mergers, provide capital to certain industries to enable them to compete 
more effectively, cut certain subsidies (not including the IMP-triggered 
explosion), privatise certain public-sector companies, and ease banking 
regulations, with efforts aimed at protecting developing industries with 
tariffs and regulations and at easing the unemployment situation through 
greater regulation of the employment of foreign nationals." 170 
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However, the earlier economic development had created an economy, which displayed 
the characteristics of ISR, and that mitigated against the withdrawal of the state. Piro 
terms these as "internal stmctural factors," namely: 
"a domestic coalition more interested in maintaining its standing within the 
economy than in market reform; a symbiosis between the public and private 
sectors resulting in an unclear divide between the two; the use of state-
owned enterprises for political purposes." 171 
Although Jordan "has followed a free-market ideology combined with import-
substitution and latterly (post-1985) an export promotion strategy of development ... 
outcomes have been deficient." 172 Despite the attempts to promote the private sector, 
by 1989 it was only contributing 50-60% of GDP 173 but even this was dependent to a 
considerable extent on the state through contracts, licences, access to bilateral trade 
agreements, etc. 
Significantly, the move towards privatisation was not initiated as a result of 
private-sector pressure, but rather as a pragmatic response by the state to the economic 
crisis gradually enveloping the country. Indeed the private sector was "neither excited 
by nor able to carry out this programme and did not exert noticeable pressure to that 
effect." 174 Although private sector influence on the state decision-making process can 
be found on an irregular and ad hoc basis, the realisation by the successful business elite 
that: 
"part of the reason for their success lies not only in the availability of 
contracts from the state, but also in the relatively stable domestic climate 
that the state provided during the years of authoritarian and martiallaw." 175 
Wilson agrees, arguing that "the private sector has benefited from rather than been 
damaged by increasing public expenditure." 176 Indeed examples can readily be found of 
the parts of the private sector successfully lobbying to halt arrangements that would 
assist other sections of the private sector. In 1987, the state proposed establishing a 
public company to co-ordinate barter deals for private-sector agricultural output and 
mineral resources in return for goods and raw materials used by public-sector 
companies. The move was scrapped after pressure from larger merchants, who gained 
between 5% and 8% commission on imported goods for the private sector. The 
company had been expected to boost exports, as well as save on foreign currency 
reserves. 177 
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6.0 EXPLAINING PRIVATE SECTOR~STA TE RELATIONS AT 1989 
According to the theory of rentierism, in an IRSE such as Jordan, state-private 
sector relations are predicated on a rentier mentality. Thus the state attempts to control 
access to the rent that is predominant in the economy, while the private sector's main 
aim is to gain access to the flow of the rent. The result is a certain set of characteristics 
(ISR) (chapter one), all of which were present in Jordan in 1989, namely: 
+ A dependency on OEA; 
+ A high level of imports, which help to create chronic balance of trade deficits; 
+ A high level of state expenditure leading to continual budget deficits, which are 
funded by OEA; 
+ Economic sectoral imbalances in favour of services; 
+ A high level of consumption in comparison to GDP; 
+ The maintenance of a two-dimensional policy by the state; 
+ A private sector that is relatively homogenised in its outlook, dependent on the state 
and service-oriented; 
• The existence of a rentier elite using elite circulation and overlapping authority; 
+ Voluntary co-aptation or capture of the private sector by the state; and 
+ Informal contacts between the two sectors. 
As a consequence of the expenditure element of the two-dimensional state policy a 
state-based, rather than market-based, economy is formed. The results of this 
expenditure policy (chapter one) were clearly evident in Jordan in 1989, namely: 
+ Infrastructure development led through state-controlled development plans; 
+ State-controlled or state-influenced enterprises; 
+ Subsidies, both of basic necessities, such as bread, electricity and water, and those 
aimed at favoured businesses, such as cheap loans and tax breaks; 
+ Contracts from the state to favoured businesses; 
+ Regulations aimed at preferred businesses; 
+ 'Royal' favours, such as free land in return for political support; 
+ Bureaucracy built around allocative, rather than extractive, mechanisms; and 
• The state as a major source of employment. 
A major part of the policy of the IMF SAP was to reduce these aspects of state 
involvement in the economy while simultaneously increasing its regulatory role. 
As was discussed in chapter one, when an economy based on state rentierism 
enters a crisis, the state as an institution faces major difficulties in adopting policies of 
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economic liberalisation, due to the existence of the rentier elite, who could be potential 
losers. By 1989, the rentier elite in Jordan were facing this problem. The amount of 
OEA was declining and in order to gain future support from the donor community the 
state had to introduce economic liberalisation. In addition, the increasing importance of 
remittances in the economy exacerbated the pressure on the rentier elite. Different 
economic policies were required in order to gain access to this flow of rent. 
At various times, Jordan has attracted high amounts of both state rent and private-
sector rent. However, to conclude that the state-private sector relationship was 
established purely by rent would be wrong. The private sector had remained 
independent of the state until after the Civil War, despite a period of high IRSE from 
1938 to 1964. Only after the degree of IRSE fell did the private sector start to become 
dependent on the state. The structural weaknesses of the private sector had been 
exacerbated by four years of war from 1967 to 1971. When the need to rebuild the 
economy came after the end of the Civil War, the private sector, both domestically and 
internationally, was unable and/or unwilling to lead the way: as the chances of further 
instability made investment extremely risky. 
Thus the defining period in the construction of the private-sector dependence on 
the state occurred following a period of declining state rent. Indeed 1968 was the point 
of lowest relative importance in terms of rent accrual to the state. The foundations of 
the relationship had been built on the structural problems facing a late-industrialising 
economy, in combination with the Hashemite regime's need for national and domestic 
security and the dominant economic development ideology. As discussed in section 
3.2, the strange coincidence of 
+ The interests of the dominant ideology of economic development, which advocated 
a state-centred approach; 
+ The nationalist desire of a group of bureaucrats based in the Ministry of National 
Economy 178 to create an independent (from the West) industrial economy via a 
policy of big-push state-centred industrialisation; and 
• The presence of OEA resulted in a state-led approach to economic development. 
The increased volumes of OEA available following the oil-boom enabled the regime to 
reward supporters more readily and to eo-opt potential opponents with preferential 
access to the economy, through a policy of elite rotation and the use of overlapping 
authority. 179 These latter two elements have a further effect in stopping the building of 
alternative centres of power to the Hashemite regime within the rentier elite. The state 
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was successfully able to act as an allocator of the rents, while the private sector was able 
to grow in a generally risk-free environment. 
The overlap of state-private sector relations, as at 1989, was manifested in four 
areas: state involvement in productive companies, state involvement in the market, the 
use of access to the economy by the state for political purposes, and the institutional 
structure of the private sector. Partial state ownership was not restricted to the 'big 
four' 180 but was also achieved in many companies via both the JIC 181 and the SSC. 
State involvement in productive companies occurred not just in terms of ownership but 
also in the ability to influence the company and the market in which it operated. For 
example, the SOEs were granted certain monopolies (e.g. Jordan Cement Factories was 
granted a monopoly on production and APC was given a one hundred-year concession 
to exploit all minerals in the Dead Sea). In addition, the government made 
appointments to the boards of directors (e.g. the elected board of directors of JPMC was 
dissolved in 1963 and replaced by a government-appointed committee). These 
appointments were used regularly by the regime as a reward for political support. 
Furthermore, the SOEs received subsidies on inputs and outputs, as well as guaranteed 
prices for their products. For instance, loans from the specialised credit institutions may 
be guaranteed by the state (e.g. Jordan Glass Factories in 1981) or given at below 
market rates of interest (e.g. APC, JPMC). 182 
The second manifestation of the private-public relationship was the involvement 
of the state in the market through planning, price controls and subsidies, 183 licences and 
contracts, import restrictions and exemptions, and through investment and credit 
institutions. 184 For example, in the agricultural sector, which is essentially private-
sector dominated, retail prices of basic outputs of fruit and vegetables were set by the 
state, as were the prices of a number of important inputs such as animal feed and water. 
The government also procured grain at a fixed price to encourage domestic production. 
Furthermore, cheap loans and interest write-offs have been a regular feature in the 
agricultural sector. Finally, 'cropping pattern' licences had to be obtained, which 
allowed the state control over the crops grown. In the industrial sector, import 
restrictions were applied through ever-changing tariff and non-tariff means. Tariff 
applications included the use of custom duties and quotas, while non-tariff measures 
included the use of permission licences, import bans, and government monopolies on 
certain commodities. 185 In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade was responsible 
for negotiating bilateral trade treaties with other sovereign states through joint economic 
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committees. In order to obtain a share in the agreement, the private sector then had to 
apply for a licence via the JCCC, which was established in 1972 as a joint venture by 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, FJCC and the ACI. Finally, by the late-1980s, three 
government ministries (the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade) had become important players in the state-market 
relationship. 
The third manifestation was the politicisation of the economy. The first example 
was the creation of classes, including the bureaucracy and the rentier elite, both 
dependent on the status quo. The second element of the politicisation was the ability of 
the state to use appointments on the boards of state companies as rewards or to eo-opt 
potential opponents (elite circulation). In addition, preferential access to the economy 
via a plethora of formal arrangements (including licences, contracts, subsidies and 
incentives) was also used for political purposes, as were informal means such as 'Royal' 
favours. The final aspect of the politicisation of state-private sector relations was the 
degree of informal interaction between the two. Throughout the years, several 
economic committees were established to attempt to formalise procedures whereby the 
private sector was able to provide input into the decision-making process. However, 
none of these committees functioned beyond the first few meetings. 
Although contacts between the private and public sectors were usually informal, 
the institutional organisation of the private sector was highly formalised, with state 
control being implemented through both regulation and the threat or actual use of 
security measures. Until the mid-1980s, the two main institutions of the private sector 
in Jordan were the Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Industry. These two 
institutions were joined by the Jordanian Businessmen Association (JBA) in 1985. 
The Chambers of Commerce in Jordan date back to the early years of the 
Mandate, with the first Chamber formed in Amman in 1923, although one was in 
existence in Salt, prior to the mandate. By means of restrictive voting practices from 
1923 to 1994, the "presidency of the ACC remained among those Palestinian and Syrian 
merchant elites who came to Jordan before independence." 186 The Amman Chamber 
has dominated the umbrella organisation, the FJCC, which was established in December 
1955. The organisation operates in accordance with Jordanian Chambers of Commerce 
Regulation no. 58 of 1961, based on the Law of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
no. 41 of 1949. Membership of the Chambers of Commerce, although voluntary, in 
- 125-
Chapter Three: State-Private Sector Relations: 1921-1989 
reality becomes mandatory since the organisation issues the licence which allows the 
members to operate. 
According to the FJCC, its role is to serve: 
"[a]s a private sector representative, FJCC serves its members interests in all 
economic, commercial, and service fields. FJCC's primary responsibility is 
to co-operate with the country's various public sector bodies to: achieve 
balanced [sic] economy; steer the state's foreign economic relations in 
favour of the private interest; and strive for Arab economic integration." 187 
The objectives of the FJCC are to: 
"I) Engage in public economic/commercial affairs, and harmonize the 
operational policies of its member chambers to serve the Federation's 
objectives; 
2) Participate in local, Arab and international conferences and exhibitions 
which serve economical/commercial purposes; 
3) Cooperate with the concerned Jordanian authorities in gathering and 
streamlining economic/commercial data and statistics on Jordan, and 
circulating such information to the concerned audience inside and outside 
the Kingdom; 
4) Utilize all of its capabilities and resources to cooperate with the 
concerned Jordanian official bodies to develop the Jordanian trade and 
economic system; 
5) Act as the 'official representative' of its member chambers; and 
6) Provide arbitration services in trade disputes at the request of parties into 
the dispute; provided that traders into the dispute do not fall under the 
Jurisdiction of one particular Chamber." 188 
The linkage with the public sector was highlighted in the participation of the FJCC in 
five public-private organisations: the JCCC, the SSC, the Institute of Public 
Administration, the Investment Committee, and the Amman World Trade Centre. 189 
The annual reports of the FJCC indicate less than twenty formal meetings with the 
government in fifteen years. 190 Among the subjects discussed were general problems, 
price violations, and income tax and custom duty concerns. A number of joint 
committees were proposed but no further reference was made to them, leading Brand to 
argue "that they had either short or unproductive lives or both." 191 She concludes that 
prior to 1990: "[i]n general, however, it seems clear that formal meetings were few and 
effective input quite limited." 192 
The lateness of industrialisation allied to the relative unimportance of industry 
prior to the 1960s is highlighted by the fact that the ACI was not established until I 962. 
The legislation concerning the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was revamped by 
regulation no. 59 of 1961 to allow separate Chambers of Industry to be established. By 
1990, the organisation had 9401 members, with a capitalisation of JD I ,559 .4m and a 
total of 109,105 employees. 193 The twelve-member board of directors is chosen by 
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elections on a four-yearly basis. Rather than having a geographical split, as happens 
with the Chambers of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry was split into "fourteen sub-
sectors distributed in accordance with the type of activity or production they are 
engaged in." 194 The functions and duties of the ACI are on two levels: the individual 
member and the country's industrial sector as a whole. 195 According to the ACI the 
"main concern is the continued growth, well being and development of the Jordanian 
economy in general, and the industrial sector in particular." 196 The Chamber 
participates on a number of national boards including the ECC, the IDB, the AFM, the 
JIEC and the JCCC. 197 
Representatives from both organisations serve on various government boards and 
committees, including economic development, vocational training, international trading 
affairs, labour education and adult literacy and training. 198 The representatives also 
participate in joint trade delegations and assist with the drafting of trade protocols. 
In 1985, members of the rentier elite created the JBA, which immediately became 
an influential player behind the scenes in the economic decision-making process. The 
JBA was formed as an independent, non-profit organisation, which operates under Law 
33 of 1966. The objective of the association "is to create and maintain a business 
climate that will enable the private sector to accomplish its role in the sustainable 
economic and business development in Jordan." 199 The select membership200 of around 
four hundred represents the core of the rentier elite which, in the words of the JBA, 
"qualifies the Association to act as the single unified spokesman for Jordanian 
businessmen in communications and meetings with similar foreign businessmen 
associations."201 In this respect the JBA "runs dialogues with ministries concerned with 
economic affairs in Jordan to boost the role of the private sector in the economic 
d 1 . h K" d ,202 eve opment m t e mg om. 
The establishment of the JBA can be seen as a defensive measure by the rentier 
elite against the potential divisiveness of both the economic recession and the new 
export-oriented economic policy. The new economic direction was by its very nature 
bound to result in winners and losers among the old guard, while the recession signalled 
an end to the period of risk-free growth of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Suddenly, 
there was insufficient pie to go around. In this new competitive era, the FJCC and ACI 
were often at odds over which policies to support. In this context, a classic example of 
the differences occurred in August 1988: Hamdi al-Taba'a, the Minister of Industry, 
Trade and Supply (who had close links to the trading community via the ACC), 
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replaced a ban on imports, which had been introduced a couple of years earlier, with 
higher duties. The ban was part of a package of policies aimed at protecting Jordanian 
industry, but it adversely affected the trading community. Also, as Moore argues, the 
ACC had failed to develop the institutional level requisite for the new economic 
climate. For example, the research and information department was not established 
until 1985. Furthermore, by opening its membership base from 1961, and by shifting 
voting power away from the elite, the ACC was no longer a monolithic vehicle for the 
rentier elite. 203 
Other institutions exist within the private sector, often as members of the 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce or the JBA. The Entrepreneurial (or Business) 
Associations, licensed under Law 33 of 1966, fall under the auspices of the Ministry of 
the Interior. "Their aim is to provide a suitable climate for the operation of the 
economic sector to express their views and protect their collective interests."204 A 
second sector is the Tradesmen's Associations and Unions, which are regulated under 
the Jordanian Labour Laws. A final category includes lobbying groups such as the 
Professional Associations and the Business and Professional Women Club. However, 
although these groups, particularly the professional associations, have strong informal 
links with the state over political concerns, they are not as significant as the ACI, the 
FJCC and the JBA in state-private sector relations. 
Figure 3.11 
Preferred Outcomes of New Groups in Rentier Elite 
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The recession of the late 1980s, the decline in OEA, the increase in the relative 
importance of remittances and the change of economic direction all combined to create 
conditions for introducing division within the rentier elite. In the oil-boom era, the 
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state's ease of control of rent and the private sector's ability to gain access to the 
allocation of the rent allowed the rentier elite to present a homogenous economic and 
political outlook. From the mid-1980s the beginnings of a battle for control over and 
access to rent became apparent. Thus, by 1989 the storms of the recession began to 
erode the comfortable symbiosis that had been built between the private and public 
sector elites. Differences within the rentier elite very slowly became more apparent. 
The splits occurred along two axes: private-public sector and reformist-conservative, 
with three different preferred outcomes (figure 3.11). The potential splits are 
considered important, if the IMF was to be able to introduce the degree of change 
wanted. 
The next chapter sets the changing context of the economic and rentier 
development from 1989, before the effects of the IMF-led donor community 
intervention are discussed in chapters five, six and seven. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CHANGING FACE OF RENTIERISM: 1989 TO 2000 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first analyses the reasons for the 
collapse of the economy in the late 1980s, which allowed the Bretton Woods sisters to 
influence the economic decision-making process from 1989. Thereafter, the main 
factors that affected the economy throughout the 1990s are discussed. The second part 
of the chapter, using the measures of the IRSE and the PSRE, assesses the changes that 
occurred in the 1990s. The chapter concludes that by 1999 the IRSE was diminishing, 
although economy rentierism remained strong in the form of the PSRE. 
2.0 THE ECONOMY: 1989 TO 2000 
2.1 The Collapse 
In late 1988, the economy finally collapsed under the weight of inappropriate 
government policy responses to three events: the oil-revenue slump, the Iran-Iraq War 
and the renunciation of the claim of sovereignty over the West Bank. As Satloff argues, 
Jordanian decision-makers ignored "the glaring structural weaknesses in the economy". 
Instead of introducing tighter fiscal policies, the state embarked on a policy of further 
borrowing at commercial rates and expansionary policies that reduced the foreign 
exchange reserves. 1 Furthermore, the revaluation of the dinar at the end of 1987, which 
was intended to attract more remittances, only created greater pain when the dinar was 
floated less than a year later. 
The effects of the drop in oil earnings of the OPEC countries took time to work 
through to the Jordanian economy. Migrant labour was affected in two ways. Firstly, 
15,000 expatriate workers were forced to return to Jordan between 1982 and 19842 
because of a reduction in employment by the Arab oil-exporting countries. Thereafter, 
migrants continued to return, but in significantly smaller numbers. The effect was an 1 
increase in unemployment rates, the need for extra welfare spending by the state and a 
reduction in the income of the families of the returnees. Secondly, higher prices in the 
oil-producing countries resulted in the migrants having fewer funds to repatriate. 
Remittances fell from a high of JD475m in 1984 to JD317.7m in 1987.3 In addition to 
the slump in remittances, the oil-producing countries were no longer able to provide 
economic assistance. Thus grants from Arab countries fell from JD 1077 .8m in 1980 to 
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JD159.8rn in 1989, while soft loans from the same sources fell from JD86.5rn in 1983 
to JD14.9rn in 1989.4 The promises given at Baghdad to provide US$1.25bn pa from 
1978 were not kept, and by 1985, a shortfall of US$2.26bn was already evident: 5 of the 
US$12.5bn promised, less than US$7bn was paid (chapter 2). Finally, exports to Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait fell from JD50.3rn in 1984 (19.3% of exports) to JD40.7rn in 1988 
(12.5% of exports).6 The economic decision-makers started to borrow commercially at -! 
increasingly expensive rates, in the hope that the drop in Arab economic assistance was 
only temporary, (table 4.1). As Finance Minister Awdah admits: 
"[t]his situation was further complicated by the servicing of debts. Jordan 
had indeed resorted to financial institutions to obtain loans for the purpose 
of expediting the development process without asking the citizen to share 
the costs of this servicing."7 
By 1989, commercial loans accounted for 20% of total indebtedness, up from only 6% 
in 1985.8 
Table 4.1 
Jordan's Knternationally Syndicated Loans, 1983al989 
~nilte,sJ ~ 
02/1983 
0711984 
06/1985 
03/1987 
01/1989 
zeitWStJilii i 1\f:a,tlt 
225 
150 
200 
150 
150 7 years 
1/2 
1/2, 5/8 
5/8, 3/4 
7/8 
Source: MEED, "Jordan's Hard Times", 24/02/89, pp.2-3. 
* percent above six-month LIB OR. 
Arab Bank Investment Corn 
Arab Bank 
Arab Bank 
Arab Bank 
Gulf International, Arab Banking 
Co oration, Arab Bank 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War initially boosted the Jordanian economy, 
increasing both economic assistance and the opportunities for trade with Iraq. By 1984, 
the Iraqis had run out of cash due to the costs of the war. However, in order to maintain 
trade a barter agreement was established to swap Iraqi oil for Jordanian exports, which 
had fallen from JD53.5m in 1981 (35% of exports) to JD26.9m (16.8% of exports) in 
1983.9 A further attempt to boost Jordanian-Iraqi trade was the introduction of an 
export guarantee scheme. Although the two steps allowed Iraq to become Jordan's 
most important trade partner by 1988 (with almost 20% of exports 10), a lack of control 
over the export guarantee scheme triggered the final collapse of the Jordanian economy. 
Firstly, despite an agreement to the contrary, many of the exports were actually re-
exports, which meant that the economy was not benefiting to any extent. Secondly, an 
over-spend of US$240m was discovered in May 1988, resulting in the immediate 
freezing of the scheme. 11 However, Jordanian exporters already had stocks built up and 
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paid for, placing immediate pressure on this sector. In addition, the size of Iraq's debt12 
to Jordan, allied to increasing dependence of the entire Jordanian economy on Iraq, 13 
created further pressure on an already weakening dinar. 
The third event was the outbreak of the intifada in the West Bank in late 1987 
which, along with the continued cost of supporting the West Bank, influenced King 
Hussein to formally sever all legal and administrative ties with the West Bank on the 
31st July 1988. While this action saved the Jordanian economy US$60m pa on salaries 
and development projects, 14 the uncertainty regarding both the role of the dinar in the 
West Bank and the position of Palestinians in Jordan resulted in a switch from dinars to 
dollars, and a capital outflow of US$250m. 15 The CBJ unsuccessfully attempted to 
stabilise the dinar but only succeeded in reducing the level of foreign reserves to less 
than two weeks cover of imports. On the 15th October 1988 the dinar was floated, and 
by March 1989, in a series of 'Black Monday' devaluations the official rate was 540 fils 
to the dollar, a 48% fall. 16 The devaluation dramatically increased the cost of debt-
servicing of the foreign loans and subsidies, 17 adding further pressure to the already 
strained economy. 
Between 1987 and 1989 GNP fell from US$6, 169m to US$3 ,673m, GNP per 
capita fell from US$2, 100 to US$1 ,480 and inflation rocketed from 0.2% to 25.8%. 
Poverty increased from 2% in 1987 to 16% in 1992, while unemployment increased 
from 4% in 1981 to 20% by 1991. Additionally, debt climbed from US$1 bn in 1981 to 
US$8.5bn in 1989. 18 The growth of the debt contracted is apparent in table 4.2, with 
over half the contracted debt being agreed in the three years prior to the collapse of the 
economy. In addition, the emphasis switched from development loans to military 
borrowing, with the latter accounting for more than 50% of the loans contracted 
between 1985 and 1988 (table 4.3). By the beginning of 1989, Jordan had become "one-; 
of the most heavily indebted countries in the world." 19 Consequently, debt-servicing 
rose by over 100% between 1987 and 1988 to US$1277m,20 around 22% of GDP. In 
1989 a negative cash flow of US$794m was recorded, with debt servicing totalling 
US$1368m and new loans of only US$574m? 1 Foreign exchange reserves fell from 
US$425m in 1987 to only US$18.7m by June 1988,22 and the dinar lost almost 50% of 
its value between October 1988 and March 1989. 
In November 1988, the first austerity programme was unveiled, with a freeze on 
development projects, an import ban on luxury goods, a rise in fees for foreign workers' 
permits, an increase in customs duties and the introduction of a tax on hotels and 
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restaurants. 23 Neve1theless, by early February 1989 Jordan was forced to abandon the 
launch of a seven-year US$150m Euroloan, after asking "to roll over for three months a 
US$16.6m principal payment on a US$150m syndicated loan due at the end of 
February."24 In addition, the EIU reported rumours that discussions on rescheduling 
overdue American military debt of US$98m were taking place. 25 Although World Bank 
officials were in Amman in February to discuss a new loan, Prime Minister Rifa'i 
denied that negotiations with the IMF were in progress.26 However, official 
confirmation of the seriousness of the situation was acknowledged on the 28th February 
1989, when the intention to request a stand-by facility from the IMF was officially 
announced. 
,'' • .:.;1;;:'( ~:fi~te> ?k 
Before 1977 
1977-1979 
1980 
1981-1983 
1984 
1985-1988 
Total 
Table 4.2 
Accumulation of Indebtedness to 1988 
1 '119 
937 
982 
1,540 
(*) 1,430 
6,140 
(**)12,148 
9.5 
8.0 
8.4 
13.0 
8.9 
52.2 
100.0 
Source: Adapted from speech by P.M. Badran to Parliament on economic strategy reported in SWB 
Weekly Economic Report, Third Series ME/WOllO, 09/0l/90, pp.Al/4-6. 
* Suspect this figure should read US$! ,034.6m, which would allow the total to become US$11.752.6. 
** Suspect this figure should read US$11 ,752.6m (which is total in table 4.3) as the percentage in the 
third column are correct for the revised figure. 
Table 4.3 
Use of Loans from 1921-1988 (US$m) 
( .;. ~\.~i . ~.~: :rilierof! Usel . ~~;.: .. ,, :.;;:~ . ', .. ~1~9~~~-I~~ss .. ~s' · J9856JJ9ssr'!! ~i:ltotai' 
To Cover Deficit in Budget 192.3 777.7 970.0 
Development Loans 2,755.2 1,192.9 3,948.1 
Military Loans 1,369.4 3,181.8 4,551.2 
Public Security Loans 0.0 155.4 155.4 
Development Loans Guaranteed by State 1,300.3 827.6 2,127.9 
Total 5,617.2 6,135.4 11,752.6 
Source: Adapted from a speech by P.M. Badran to Parliament on economic strategy reported m SWB 
Weekly Economic Report, Third Series ME/WOI!O, 09/01/90, pp.Al/4-6. 
2.2 Factors Affecting Economic Development: 1989 to 2000 
Following the intervention of the IMF, eight further factors between 1989 and 
2000 constrained the ability of the state to impose its will on the development of the 
economy, namely: 
+ The advent of political liberalisation; 
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• The indebtedness of the Petra Bank and Royal Jordanian (RJ); 
+ The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the continuing sanctions against the former; 
+ The peace process and its subsequent failure; 
+ The signing of international economic agreements; 
+ The drop in global commodity prices; 
+ The recession in Asia; and 
+ The death of King Hussein. 
The economic crisis precipitated a new era of political liberalisation, with the 
April 1989 riots drawing forth a promise by the King to reconvene parliament and allow 
elections in November (the first elections since April 1967). In April 1990, a broadly-
based commission27 appointed by the King was established to formulate a National 
Charter, which "would govern political life in the country and lay the quasi-
constitutional foundations for the democratisation process."28 The National Charter was 
ratified in July 1991. Martial Law was completely lifted in March 1992, to be followed 
by the re-instatement of political parties in late 1992, allowing candidates in the 1993 
elections openly to express their political affiliation. Further elections, although less 
free, were held in 1997, with the next elections scheduled for November 2001.29 Also, 
in 1992, the authorities permitted overseas human rights organisations to be established 
in Jordan: a move which indicated a new degree of political tolerance in the Kingdom. 
The new political openness (although still limited by Western standards) restricted to a 
degree the ability of the state to implement economic policies, such as the cuts in 
subsidies demanded by the IMF (chapter 6). 
A further constraint for the state was the failure of the Petra Bank, with its 
potential to undermine the banking system in Jordan, and the debts built up by RJ. The 
CBJ had to inject US$250m into these two enterprises in the early 1990s when the 
foreign exchange reserves were already low.30 
The regional context was extremely fluid in the early years of the 1990s. The 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the subsequent US-led action to free Kuwait in January 
1991, resulted in Jordan becoming internationally ostracised, since King Hussein's 
moves for an Arab solution were interpreted on the international stage as support for 
Saddam Hussein. The Gulf crisis proved calamitous for the slowly recovering economy 
in a number of ways. It resulted in: 
+ A drop in remittances, as 300,000 workers and their families were forced to leave 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: only 10% were said to be reasonably well off, the rest 
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were in "dire need". 31 In September 1991, Planning Minister Ziad Fariz estimated 
that over the next three to five years the cost would be US$4,500m, of which 
US$3,700m was for capital investment in housing, health, transport, water, 
sewerage, and education, while the remainder would be used for recurrent costs;32 
o A flood of short-term refugees, particularly from Asian countries: by October 
around 800,000 refugees had passed through the Kingdom, at a cost of US$40m;33 
o The closure of the Iraqi market following the imposition of sanctions: around 25% 
of Jordan's exports34 and 70% of the industrial capability was geared to Iraq; 35 
~ The loss of economic relations with the Gulf states, which put the final nail in the 
coffin for Arab OEA, cut a major export market and a loss of labour market: 
• Soaring costs of imported oil: prior to the invasion, Iraq supplied around 82% of the 
total oil imported. 36 In July 1990 the spot price of Iraqi crude was US$14.75 pb, by 
September the price of Saudi crude (the most favourable alternative) was US$36 
pb;37 
$ A cut in entrepot trade to Iraq and Kuwait: approximately 70% of the cargo handled 
at Aqaba had been bound for Iraq before the War;38 
~ The effective closure of the port at Aqaba, due to sanctions inspections, thereby 
increasing the cost of trade for Jordan: the blockade was estimated to cost Jordan 
US$14m pa;39 and 
• A reduction in the number of tourists. 
In total the estimated loss to the Jordanian economy in the twelve months preceding the 
outbreak of the War was at least US$1,200m (the World Bank) and as high as 
US$2, 144m (the Minister of Finance Jardaneh).40 
However, on the positive side, increased pledges of funding from Japan, Germany 
and the EU potentially offset the loss of OEA from the Gulf States and the USA. By 
March 1991, pledges of special support, channelled through the Gulf Financial Crisis 
Group, totalled US$1 ,230m, of which US$470m had reportedly been received.41 The 
economy also received a short-term boost from the money repatriated by the returnees, / 
which was spent mainly in the construction sector creating a short-term economic 
boom. Jordanian's were estimated to have spent US$600-700m on housing in 1992 and 
US$50-150m on industrial and commercial building. In addition, government spending 
was estimated to have been US$250m.42 
The new pre-eminence of the USA in the Middle East following the ousting of the 
Iraqi troops from Kuwait, resulted in all sides involved in the Palestinian dispute being 
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pressurised into peace negotiations, commencing in Madrid in October 1991. Jordan's 
strategic importance in the dispute paved the way for its international rehabilitation, 
although relations with the Gulf States took considerably longer to repair. Following 
the signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel in September 1993, Jordan 
and Israel signed a Common Agenda for Peace a day later,43 followed by the 
Washington Declaration44 on the 25th July 1994 and the signing of the Peace Treaty in 
the October. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict had long been recognised as a major stumbling block to 
the development of the Jordanian economy. However, with the signing of the peace 
treaties the regional situation was expected to improve dramatically, bringing a 
significant peace dividend to the economy of Jordan. The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
paved the way for a series of agreements between the two countries in areas such as 
tourism, transport, air service, environmental protection and trade. In accordance with 
the Treaty, in July 1995, Jordan repealed the Israeli Boycott Laws of 1953 (banning 
trade with Israel), of 1958 (boycotting Israel) and of 1973 (banning the sale of land to 
Israel or Israelis). Furthermore, the peace process was expected to open up the markets 
of the PNA, to which the Israelis controlled access.45 To this end, a "wide ranging 
economic co-operation agreement" was signed between Jordan and the PNA on the 7th 
January 1994, with the hope of gaining up to US$500m trade pa.46 
Part of the international efforts to 'normalise' the peace involved the 
establishment of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) annual economic summits: the 
first was held in Casablanca at the end of October 1994, the second in Amman one year 
later, Cairo in 1996 and a fourth in Doha in 1997. These conferences increasingly 
emphasised the need for private sector, rather than government-led, economic 
development. At the first conference, the World Bank emphasised the regional nature 
of economic growth, suggesting that "growth prospects would be enhanced by the 
development of productive trans-national partnerships, both among countries in the 
region and between MENA .countries and external partners."47 One example of the 
trans-national approach following the peace treaty was the joint Jordan-Israel proposed 
initiative for developing the Jordan Rift Valley for which the World Bank assisted with 
the preparation of the preliminary report. 
A further international development was the start of the EU-Mediterranean 
countries dialogue in Barcelona in November 1995, with the aim of creating a Free 
Trade Zone between the EU and eight Arab countries, including Jordan, by the year 
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2010. Jordan entered into the Euro-Med agreement in I997, although at the time of 
writing the agreement has not been ratified by the EU. The Jordanians also acceded to 
membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 1999. Both these 
agreements moved the country firmly in the direction of an open economy and 
acceptance of the global norms of economic decision-making, thereby reducing the 
economic options available to the state. 
Despite the problems caused by the Second Gulf War, the injection of returnees' 
capital created a mini-boom that lasted until the mid-1990s, averaging real GDP growth 
of almost 9% between 1992 and I 995.48 The growth petered out by I 996 due to a 
number of factors including: 
~ The end of the short-term boost given to the construction sector of the economy by 
the returnees; 
• The lack of progress in the peace process; 
• The continuing sanctions on Iraq; 
~ The decline in oil prices; and 
Q The slowdown in East Asia. 
Each factor negatively impacted on the export market and on the potential for foreign 
and domestic investment, two of the main problem areas that the SAP was attempting to 
address. 
The 1996 recession was followed by a global financial crisis in 1997 to 1998, 
which seriously hit foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries as Western 
investment was returned to the home countries. Unfortunately, this crisis proved to be 
badly-timed for Jordan, which had just embarked seriously on a privatisation process 
that required foreign funding to succeed. Commodity prices also fell as demand 
slackened, hitting Jordan's main export of phosphates. 
In July I 998, the Royal Court announced that King Hussein had been diagnosed 
with lymphoma. His treatment, which was predicted to be lengthy, required to be 
undertaken abroad. His triumphant return in January 1999, apparently having 
recovered, was quickly overshadowed by complications. He died a few days later in 
Amman, having earlier appointed his son, Abdullah, as Crown Prince, in preference to 
his brother, Hassan, who had been the designated heir for over thirty years. The move 
came as a shock, particularly in light of the lack of experience of the new king in the 
political sphere. However, King Abdullah moved swiftly to appoint his own men in 
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positions of power, without upsetting the fragile political balance m Jordan. The 
accession progressed smoothly, despite initial fears to the contrary. 
The new king initially attempted to build on the sympathy evoked by the death of 
his father by setting out on a tour of the Gulf States to gain economic assistance. By 
April, however, in an interview with the newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, he stated he 
understood the Gulf States': 
"present circumstances, and that's why we did not ask for assistance or 
financial grants, but look forward to close economic cooperation that 
ensures the interests of both sides, like opening the doors to Jordanian 
workers and opening markets to Jordanian produce."49 
Furthermore, in May he travelled around the capitals of the Western creditor countries 
attempting to obtain debt relief of 50%.5° Despite the backing of President Clinton, the 
world tour was a failure, with the proposal receiving a lukewarm reception from most 
countries. The King quickly realised the world had changed. Despite the initial 
promises of new OEA 51 (and even with the strong support of the USA) economic 
assistance was a thing of the past. In a statement to the Lower House in June 1999 
Prime Minister Rawabdeh stated that "up till this moment Jordan has not received one 
dinar of the financial aid ... don't expect help from anyone."52 As a result the new king 
adopted a pragmatic position echoing the 'Washington consensus'. 
3.0 RENTIERISM: 1989 TO 1999 
Building on the changing global, regional and domestic environment highlighted 
in the previous section, this section uses the model developed in chapter one to measure 
the changes in the degrees of rentierism from 1989 to 1999. The first part analyses the 
changes in the IRSE, while the second discusses the changes in the PSRE. 
3.1 Measures of the Induced Rentier State Economy: 1989 to 1999 
As with the previous eras discussed in chapter two, the volumes of OEA 
fluctuated considerably throughout the period, although from 1994 to 1999 the changes 
smoothed out into a gradual decline (figures 4.1 and 4.2). The consistency in the latter 
years at least allowed the government to set realistic targets and plans. The volume of 
OEA increased by over 180% in 1990, from US$346m the previous year to US$970m. 
Although the volume remained high in 1991 at US$963.8m, by 1993 the amount was 
below the 1989 figure. An increase of almost 85% was seen between 1993 and 1994 
before the gradual decline set in to 1999. One further trend that is highlighted in figure 
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4.1 is the move towards grants making an increasing contribution to the total volume of 
ODA to 83% by 1999, from a low of 46% in 1992. 
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How then have these changes in volume been reflected in the measures of IRSE? 
The first measure used is OEA as a percentage of GNP (figure 4 .3). Although the 
percentage was relatively high in 1990 and 1991 at around 25%, for the rest of the 
period the figure was below 11%, with a decline from 10.4% in 1994 to an all-time low 
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of only 5.8% in 1999. The fluctuations in OEA per capita are also highlighted in figure 
4.3. The per capita figure almost trebles between 1989 and 1990, from JD63.4 to 
ID 187.3 . Thereafter, the value fluctuates downward, reaching JD68 by 1999. 
Figure 4.3 
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Three other measures of the IRSE, OEA as a percentage of trade deficit, of 
government revenue, and of government expenditure, follow the same pattern of 
peaking in 1990 and 1991, before dropping to 1993, then showing a slight recovery in 
1994 before gradually declining to the end of the 1990s (figure 4.4). On each of 
measure the low point occurs in 1993, rather than in 1999. Nevertheless, the degree of 
the IRSE was far below that of the late 1980s. 
The final measure, gross OEA as a percentage of budget deficit excluding OEA, 
follows a different pattern (figure 4.5). The percentage climbs to a peak of almost 
100% in 1992 from only 31.6% in 1989: thereafter, the figure drops to 39.7% in 1998, 
before recovering to almost 50% in 1999. On this measure, the IRSE has actually 
increased by the end of the period. 
Figure 4.5 
OEA as a Percentage of Budget Deficit excluding OEA, 1989-1999 
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Although the measure of the budget deficit differs from the norm, the figures 
indicate powerfully that the era of the IRSE had ended by 1999. The years 1990 and 
1991 can be considered merely the last gasp of this dying phenomenon. Was a similar 
story apparent in the case of the PSRE? 
3.2 Measures of the Private Sector Rentier Economy: 1989 to 1999 
As can be seen from figure 4.6, remittances increased dramatically between the 
start of the period and 1999 (JD1179.8m), despite a drop from 1989 (JD358.3m) to 
1991 (JD306.3m): ironically these were the same years that the IRSE was experiencing 
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its final recovery. Although the trend of remittances has been positive, the annual 
change indicates that the path has been far from smooth (figure 4.6). The major change 
was recorded between 1991 and 1992: an increase of 46.6%. Increases over 20% were 
also recorded in 1993 and 1996. 
Figure 4.6 
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Remittances as a percentage of GNP fell from 1989 (16.2%) to 1991 (11.6%): 
thereafter, the figure climbed to a peak of 22.8% in 1997, before finishing at 20.6% in 
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1999 (figure 4. 7). The next measure as a percentage of trade deficit also increased by 
1999, despite an initial slump from 61.2% in 1989 to only 30.8% in 1991, the lowest 
figure since 1975. However, by 1999 the percentage stood at 89.1%, an all-time high 
(figure 4.7). Remittances per capita fell from JD115.2 in 1989 to JD82.8 in 1991, 
before recovering to a peak of JD255.1 in 1997, indicating the increasing importance of 
remittances to the economy (figure 4.8). The final measure used by the study 
remittances as a percentage of OEA, had climbed from around 20% in 1972 to more 
than 180% in 1989; however between 1989 and 1991 the trend reversed, with the figure 
falling to 46.7% (figure 4.8). Thereafter, another U-turn was experienced, so that by 
1993 the amount was in excess of 300%. Another decline occurred in 1994, but since 
that time, the figure moved steadily upwards, peaking at 354.3% in 1999. 
Figure 41.8 
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4.0 IRSE VERSUS JP§RJE 
Prior to the 1990s, perceived and actual threats of global, regional and domestic 
instability had helped Jordan become addicted to OEA. However, in the 1990s despite 
continued instability in the form of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the situation in Iraq, 
Jordan was no longer able to get its 'fix'. Three changes contributed to the situation: 
~ The end of the Cold War; 
~ The end of the large dollar surpluses of the Arab oil-exporting countries; and 
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o The consolidation of the orthodoxy of economic liberalisation: indebted states such 
as Jordan were now expected to follow the policies of financial restraint with 
borrowing restricted to uses associated with the SAPs. In addition, the new 
orthodoxy regarded OEA as inherently destabilising for the recipient's economy. 
Thus, the measures of the IRSE and the PSRE have highlighted that the trend of 
the 1980s (the move from the former to the latter) continued in the 1990s, with the 
exception of 1990 and 1991, which can be considered the last fling of the IRSE. Table 
4.4 illustrates the pattern of declining IRSE, while simultaneously remittances have 
filled the gap to push Jordan into PSRE. 
Table 4.4 
IRSE versus PSRE, 1989-1999 
197.4 333.0 N.A. N.A. 
Remittances JDm N.A. N.A. N.A. 306.3 1179.8 
Per capita JD 63.4 187.3 68.0 115.2 82.8 240.0 
%of GNP 8.9 26.5 5.8 16.2 11.6 20.6 
% of Trade Deficit 33.7 66.0 25.2 61.2 30.8 89.1 
ODA as% of Remittances 55.1 214.2 28.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Remittances as % of ODA N.A. N.A. N.A. 181.6 46.7 354.3 
Sources: Adapted by author from OECD, (2000), International Development Statistics, CD-ROM 2000 
edition (Paris: OECD) and CBJ, (various), Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ). 
The introduction of the IMF into the equation coincided with the end of the Cold 
War, which heralded the apparent victory of market economics over state economics. 
The change in the international arena gave confidence to the Bretton Woods sisters that 
the policies of economic liberalisation were now the correct solution to the problems of 
the indebted countries. This newly-found confidence encouraged the IMF and the 
World Bank to apply stricter and more intrusive conditions to the countries in which 
they became involved, resulting in fewer options being available for the domestic 
governments. The next chapter analyses the outcome of the new era of conditionality 
on the donor community and its relationship with the regime in Jordan. Thereafter, 
chapter six turns to the question of how the rentier elite adapted to the need to re-
address the balance between the public and private sectors imposed by the IMF and the 
World Bank in return for their continued assistance. 
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CJH[APTER FIVE 
DONOR COMMUNJ[TY liNVOL VJEMENT: 1989 TO 2000 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the donor community's involvement in Jordan between 
1989 and 2000. Throughout the 1980s, the impact of the troika of the Cold War, 
Keynesian development practices and the large dollar surpluses of the Arab oil-
exporting countries, upon which a rentier mentality had evolved, had been gradually 
eroded. These changes resulted in an overall reduction in the global levels of OEA 
through the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the transition states of the ex -Soviet empire 
were given precedence in the field of economic assistance, particularly by two of the 
main donors, the USA and Europe. Furthermore the primacy of the economic 
orthodoxy based on the monetarist school of thought resulted in assistance being 
granted only with strict conditions attached. Countries such as Jordan, were not only 
less able to attract OEA, but also the recipients had to adopt new economic policies to 
attract further OEA. As indicated in previous chapters, from independence, and in 
particular from the early 1970s, the state as an institution attempted to offset economic 
problems by rent-seeking, rather than by building the economy through, say, 
industrialisation. Given the changes in the international environment in the late 1980s 
and the changing patterns of global OEA in the 1990s, could the state as an institution 
continue to attract and also control access to rent? The evidence in the previous chapter 
indicates that OEA continued to decline during the period to just over 5% of GNP. Was 
this trend an indication of the success of the conditionality of the donor community in 
weaning the economy off rent, or has the state as an institution continued to try, but 
ultimately failed due to the changing patterns of global OEA, to retain control over rent 
by adopting a policy of economic liberalisation? 1 This set of policies has been espoused 
by the major actors in the donor community, with increasing stridency since the 1980s, 
in return for continued financial support. 
The first section assesses the relative importance of the various donors to the 
government in terms of their level of funding and also through the leverage each donor 
is able to exert. The next section discusses the role of the Bretton Woods institutions 
(BWis) and their perceptions of the government's responses by focusing first on the 
IMF, and thereafter on the World Bank. Thereafter, discussion turns to the debt 
negotiations conducted by the government, to assess the impact of debt rescheduling 
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and debt retiral on the government's approach to the process of economic liberalisation. 
The penultimate section analyses the roles of the major bilateral and multilateral donors, 
in the relationship between state, economic liberalisation and rent. The analysis is set 
against the background of the new constraints on the state's ability to adopt economic 
policies of its own choosing and the change in the patterns of rent discussed in the 
previous chapter. The changing relationship between the donor community, the state 
and economic liberalisation established in this chapter, then sets the context for chapter 
six, which assesses the reaction of the state as an institution and as an arena of 
contestation to the new circumstances. 
2.0 RELATIVE VALUES OF THE DONOR COMMUNITY 
Table 5.1 indicates the level of disbursements by the donor community in the 
period 1989 to 1999.2 In terms of value to the Jordanian economy, total OEA was just 
over 3.5 times as valuable as the assistance from the IMF, the World Bank and debt 
relief. In addition, 65% of the total of OEA was in the form of grants, thereby 
increasing the value to the economy. The grants themselves, from 1994, included the 
debt relief granted by Jordan's external creditors. 
Table 5.1 
Donor Community Involvement, 1989-1999 (US$m) 
fJ ~>~r:· 'i ~. IMF: .·~ Wrlr:ld'i; · · .. ebi~·· .~j ,2IS~ppovt~ ~~~ ~dta~ ... ···q~.@g~ti . ':.;'(~ q• :~·'if~ilk';; : · 'Relie'f~~ '; z·tf'~} ~ 1 1':· *OD' r· :.G.,aqt .. ··'' ·., ,,'0 _ .. / '"'- 1 
1989 84.9 223.0 0.0 307.9 346.0 285.9 
1990 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 970.0 739.9 
1991 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 963.8 444.3 
1992 30.1 0.0 0.0 30.1 452.9 234.8 
1993 15.2 135.0 0.0 150.2 341.3 201.5 
1994 93.9 86.6 184.0 365.4 629.3 435.8 
1995 115.0 140.0 200.2 455.2 606.5 378.3 
1996 119.3 180.0 184.2 483.5 548.6 331.3 
1997 133.0 122.0 148.0 403.0 548.6 363.1 
1998 32.1 40.0 115.0 187.1 477.4 333.7 
1999 75.8 175.0 94.8 345.6 469.7 391.3 
Total 699.3 1111.6 926.2 2737.1 6354.1 4139.9 
Sources: Figures for IMF adapted from IMF, "Jordan: Transactions with the Fund from January 01, 1984 
to October 31, 2000," IMF website, http://www.imf.org/np/tre/tad/extrans 1.cfm?memberKeyl=530&end 
Date=2000%2D10%2D31 %2000%3A00%3AOO and IMF, "Jordan: IMF Credit Outstanding as of 
October 31, 2000", IMF website, using exchange rates given in IMF, (2000), International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, vol. LIII, 2000, (Washington: IMF), p.20. Figures for World Bank from World 
Bank, (various), The World Bank Annual Report, (Washington: The World Bank). Figures for debt 
rescheduling for 1994 to 1999 from CBJ, (various), Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ). Figures 
for Total ODA and Grants 1989 to 1997, OECD, (2000), International Development Statistics, CD ROM 
2000 edition (Paris: OECD) and 1998 and 1999 figures from OECD, OECD website, 
http://www.oecd.org/scripts/ede/DoQuery.asp. 
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Importantly, as discussed previously, the IMF and World Bank loans are not 
considered to be ODA, as the interest charged is at market rates. However, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) was 
able to issue the occasional small grant, such as the Global Environment Facility Grant 
of US$2.7m in May 1996. Despite the failure to provide ODA, as will be discussed 
throughout the chapter, the role of the Bretton Woods sisters is integral within the donor 
community. Although the World Bank has provided more loans than the IMF, the latter 
organisation has taken the lead in the SAP process: not until the IMF loan conditions/ 
agreements have been met does the World Bank agree to lend further sums. In addition 
the BWis set the tone for the conditions of the involvement of other members of the 
donor community. Despite the supposedly non-political nature of the IMF and the 
IBRD, the gap in funding from 1990 to 1992 coincided with Jordan's status as persona 
non grata on the international stage, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
3.0 BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
3.1 IMF Involvement 
Table 5.2 
Agreements with the IMF, 1989~2000 (SDRm) 
~SAP I~ v:'~~!JtFacillty • \ j :::!:1 r'" Date.~~~~· .. Dat~~ri ~Amount"' ·~w::t ~. "i\:1# . • j~ l Arrangement . Expirr:·: 1 ,Agreed.· .. Jfr --
I Stand By Ordinary 14/07/89 13/01/91 60.00 26.80 
n Stand By Ordinary 26/02/92 25/02/94 44.40 44.40 
Extended Fund Ordinary 25105/943 09/02/96 189.30 130.32 
Extended Fund Ordinary 09/02/964 08/02/99 238.04 202.52 
Ill Extended Fund Ordinary 15/04/99 14/04/02 127.88 36.54 
Compensatory and 15/04/99 14/04/02 34.10 34.10 
Contin_genc_y_ Financing 
Total 693.72 474.68 
Sources: Adapted by author. IMF, "Jordan: H1story ofLendmg Arrangements as of December 31, 2000", 
IMF website, http://www.imf.org/np/tre/tad/extarr2.cfm?memberKey I =530&date l key=2000%2D l2%2D 
31 %2000%3A00%3AOO and IMF, "IMF approves Augmentation of EFF Credit to Jordan", Press Release 
no. 99113, 16/04/99, IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9708.HTM. 
On the 9th March 1989 the government officially requested assistance from the 
IMF and a SAP was quickly negotiated, comprising a standby credit of US$125m. A 
loan of up to US$150m over the following eighteen to twenty-four months was also 
agreed with the IMF's sister organisation, the World Bank. The five-year stand-by 
facility was finally approved on the 14th July 1989 to become the first of three SAPs to 
date (table 5.2). SAP I was overtaken by the events of the Second Gulf War. Thereafter 
a seven-year agreement, SAP 11, was approved in February 1992 that eventually 
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comprised of three facilities. The economic downturn from the mid-1990s necessitated 
the approval of SAP Ill, in April 1999, which is expected to be complete by April 2002. 
From table 5.3 the fluctuating nature of the IMF disbursements is apparent. Immediate 
assistance of SDR66m (US$84.9m) was forthcoming in 1989, but significant further 
levels of assistance were not forthcoming until the mid-1990s, peaking at SDR96.6m 
(US$133.0m) in 1997, as the economic downturn took hold. 1999 witnessed a return to 
high lending at SDR55.4m (US$75.8m). 
Table 5.3 
Transactions with IMF, 1989-2000 (SDR) 
~~~~~r~;¥~al::fl:' ·· ;l;lit~6tlr$~di~riiS;01 ~l ]~~payffi.~ntS;v .. ·. 
" c '"" « 
_:,~H:tfrg~~!Pfti(lj)~: ':: Prin'i!ipaii~ls;', 
1989 66,235,000 28,700,000 3,428,589 73,410,000 
1990 0 7,175,000 6,429,856 66,235,000 
1991 0 0 5,688,025 66,235,000 
1992 22,200,000 7,241,875 5,481,049 81,193,125 
1993 11,100,000 33,117,500 4,562,212 59,175,625 
1994 65,590,000 25,875,625 3,259,148 98,890,000 
1995 75,830,000 5,550,000 6,608,282 169,170,000 
1996 82,200,000 15,262,500 8,431,857 236,107,500 
1997 96,660,000 16,187,500 12,033,711 316,580,000 
1998 23,660,000 6,831,667 15,101,537 333,408,333 
1999 55,420,000 25,965,834 14,000,900 362,862,499 
2000 15,220,000 23,803,333 18,318,904 354,279' 166 
Total 514,115,000 195,710,834 103,344,070 354,279,166 
Sources: Adapted by author. IMF, "Jordan: TransactiOns with the Fund from January 01, 1984 to 
December 31, 2000", IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external!np/tre/tad/extrans l.cfm?memberKey 1 = 
530&endDate=2000%2D 12%2D31 %2000%3A00%3AOO and IMF, "Jordan: IMF Credit Outstanding as 
of December 31, 2000", IMF website, http://www.imf.org/externa1/np/tre/tad/exportal.cfm?memberKey 1 
=530& date 1 key=2000%2D12%2D31 %2000%3A00%3AOO&category=EXC. 
Although the Jordanian economy has been extremely susceptible to factors 
outside the control of the state (chapter 4), the IMF argued, "economic performance was . 
5 ) 
... handicapped by policy-induced structural weaknesses in various sectors." The 
weaknesses identified included an inefficient tax system, high military expenditure, 
extensive sub~i_dy pro~r<lll!l)1eS, extern~! debt-servicing and impediments to trade, which 
adversely affected both exports and the industrial sector. Furthermore, government 
involvement resulted in inefficiencies in the agriculture and energy sectors, while the 
financial sector was considered to be insufficiently developed for a modern market 
economy.6 Based on the perception of these structural weaknesses, SAP I was designed 
to: 
"focus on effecting a reduction in the state budget through reducing and 
controlling government expenditure, increasing domestic revenues, 
improving their collection and rescheduling the repayment of foreign loans. 
These elements also centre on enriching the investment climate to increase 
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savings, investment and exports; to rationalise consumption; to control 
exports; to control inflation rates; and to enhance the pioneering role being 
played by the private sector in the realms of investment, production and 
exportation."7 
To enable the programme to be successful, six targets were set: 
~ The reduction of the budget deficit (excluding external grants) from 24% of GDP in 
1988 to 10% in 1990, or 6% if external grants were included; 
o The reform of the tax system, with steps to introduce a value added tax (VAT) 
system by 1991; 
0 A tight credit policy to be maintained; 
~ A more prudent debt management and borrowing policy to be adopted; 
~ Inflation to be cut from the official estimate of 14% in 1989 to 7% by 1993; and 
$ The current account deficit of 6% GDP in 1988 to be balanced by 1993.8 
These targets were supposed to allow the following three macro-economic objectives to 
be achieved: 
"1) to maintain the stability of the exchange rate of the dinar with its current 
value, which was viewed as realistic and suitable by the IMF delegation; 
2) to realise real growth rates in the GNP in order to make the growth rate 
reach 4% at the end of the five year programme; and 
3) to rely on self-potentials in the realm of the state budget and the balance 
of payments."9 
Before the loan could be disbursed, the state was required to raise the prices of 
certain subsidised goods. Price increases were introduced on fuel, alcohol, soft drinks, 
imported cigarettes, barley, oats, international telephone charges, telephone rental 
charges, car licence and registration fees, irrigated water and taxi fares. 10 Despite 
significant pressure from the IMF, 11 the government was able to retain subsidies on a 
number of basic foodstuffs, 12 a politically important success, which allowed the state, 
rather than the IMF, to be seen by the domestic constituency as dictating economic 
policy. The price increases, which also included a production tax of JD 1 ($1.85) per 
tonne on phosphate and JD2.5 ($4.65) per tonne on potash, 13 were expected to boost 
government revenue by US$72m (JD39m). 14 
These increases were the first major attempt to address the rentier aspects of the 
economy. The result was an outbreak of rioting, which started in Ma'an on the 18th 
April involving around two thousand people. 15 Ma'an, which was a major centre for the 
trucking industry, was already under severe economic pressure because of the downturn 
in the Iraqi transit trade. The fuel price increases were seen as the last straw for a 
community that normally was perceived to be a solid supporter of the Hashemite 
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regime. The rioting spread to other towns and villages in the evening, and over the 
following days spread northwards. By the time full control had been re-established, at 
least eleven people were dead and scores injured. The situation stabilised with the 
formation of a new government under Prime Minister Sharif Zeid bin Shakir, the King's 
cousin, although the final curfew in Ma'an was not lifted until early May. The threat of 
instability undoubtedly affected future attempts by the state and the IMF to address 
issues, such as subsidies and employment, that were potentially socially divisive. 
Even before SAP I was finally approved in July, by the middle of May the IMF 
was already praising Jordan's petformance as "courageous and comprehensive," 16 
though the support was probably for political purposes to offset further domestic 
instability. However, within the year Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) reported 
that the annual review was cut short because the IMF was unhappy with: 
• The budget for 1990, which was believed to underestimate government 
d . 17 expen Iture; 
• The continuation of food subsidies; and 
+ The armaments fund, which was excluded from the budget. 18 
The failure to achieve a satisfactory review would have had a knock-on effect on 
undisbursed funds by the IMF and the World Bank, which had only released US$30m 
of the US$150m agreement, while Japan was reported to be re-considering its position 
for a new loan of US$150m. 19 In addition, further debt rescheduling with the Paris20 
and London 21 Clubs, as well as other creditors, would be put in jeopardy. The position 
was resolved at a further meeting held between the 31st March and the 4th April. 
Nevertheless, the IMF expressed concern about both the implementation and 
effectiveness of the SAP. The result was that the final tranche of US$33m was to be 
further split into three tranches of US$ 1 1 m, allowing the IMF to increase the pressure 
for policy change on the government. The aspects of concern raised were the lack of 
control on the budget, including high military spending and subsidies, and a lack of 
commitment to introducing a V AT system and to restructuring customs tariffs. Despite 
these criticisms, the IMF, in a later report, considered that the economic and financial 
performance had been "encouraging"22 during the year the SAP had been in progress. 
"All policy actions contemplated in the program were implemented which, 
in combination with debt relief and bilateral grants by donors, enabled 
Jordan to meet all the quantitative performance criteria in 1989."23 
Further moves towards implementation of the SAP were abruptly halted when 
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on the 2nd August 1990. The Iraqi invasion resulted "in a 
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sharp rise in unemployment, disruption of trade, loss of remittances and stoppage of aid 
flows from regional countries."24 To this list must be added the loss of US aid, although 
the EU and Japan were quick to fill the gap. The completion of the restructuring 
programme was initially postponed from 1993 to 1995, while the disbursements due in 
September and December were cancelled. In addition, a disbursement of US$75m from 
the World Bank was also cancelled and the rescheduling talks with the Paris and 
London Clubs were put on hold.Z5 However, in December the London Club did agree to 
roll over outstanding principal for another three months.26 Shortly after the start of the 
Gulf War, Jordan stopped repayment of all bilateral foreign debts, except to Arab 
countries. 27 
The IMF did not visit Jordan to discuss the new economic situation until May 
1991, by which time both sides recognised that the targets under SAP I were impossible 
to achieve. At the time, the team agreed that, as the situation following the Gulf War 
had not yet been clarified, further agreement would be postponed until later in the 
year. 28 In October, a seven-year growth-oriented economic adjustment programme was 
agreed in principle. However, the government's reluctance to raise fuel prices by as 
much as 30% delayed final approval by the IMF board until the 26th February 1992.29 
The broad objectives of the 1992 to 1994 phase were to: 
"1) Achieve a significant reduction in the macroeconomic imbalances; 
2) Continue the process of structural reform; and 
3) Achieve balance of payments viability by 1998 while attaining 
satisfactory growth performance in the context of stable domestic prices 
with an increased role for the private sector in the economy."30 
The key policy elements designed to achieve these objectives were to: 
"1) reduce the fiscal deficit substantially, through revenue enhancements 
and containment of current expenditures; 
2) contain credit expansion consistent with the external and inflation 
objectives and with achieving interest rates that were positive in real terms; 
3) continue a flexible exchange rate management, with a view to ensuring 
competitiveness of exports; 
4) carry forward the process of structural reforms initiated in 1989, 
particularly the second phase of tariff reform and the reform of the indirect 
tax system through the introduction of a general sales tax (GST); and 
5) prepare a plan of action for reform of the africulture and water and 
energy sectors for implementation over 1992-94. "3 
The key macroeconomic targets of the SAP, according the Jordan Economic Monitor, 
are presented in table 5.4. Commentators, such as the EIU, argue that the IMF 
recognised the difficult social and political situation faced by the state in Jordan caused 
by the increase in population of 300,000 refugees, the need to maintain food subsidies 
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for social reasons and finally the political sensitivity of the renewed peace process.32 
Consequently, the terms and conditions associated with SAP II were perceived to be 
less onerous than those associated with the previous SAP. 
Table 5.4 
Targets of the 1991-1998 IMF Agreement 
~~,···· 0 ·· ±~;: ·· ·•. ·~%; A$< 1\f:easure 'e,t .. · J·~ · ·}•rl•• . ' . • •• 4 ••.•• ,;. ' l99,l"£' . '}.o { .' .'' ~ ~~'~:.:,.·: t :f.f99s::D 
Budget Deficit (before grants) as% of GDP 18.0% 5.0% 
Public expenditure as % of GDP 44.4% 5.0% 
Domestic revenue as % of GDP 26.5% 30.0% 
Real Economic Growth 1.0% Over4.0% 
Consumption as % of GDP 100.9% 79.5% 
Inflation 10.0% 4.5% 
Foreign and Domestic Borrowing as % of GDP 10.6% 3.5% 
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP 24.0% 0.0% 
Foreign Currency Reserves, Months of Imports 2 months 3 months 
Source: Adapted by author. Quoted in EIU, (1992a), Jordan: Country Report, no. I, (London: EIU), p.l5. 
At the first consultation, in May 1992, discussion centred round a reduction in 
military expenditure, an increase in the consumption tax and the implementation of a 
sales tax as a first step towards VAT. 33 The implementation of the sales tax was to 
become a long-running saga (chapter 6). The IMF report, issued in mid-June 1992, 
acknowledged that Jordan had broadly met most targets and went as far as to commend 
the authorities for pursuing policies in favour of economic growth. However, Jordan 
was criticised for its preparations for structural reform, especially concerning the 
implementation of the sales tax. In response, the government promised in the Letter of 
Intent of June 1992 to implement sales tax by the following J anuary?4 When the IMF 
extended the agreement by a further year, in July 1993, the sales tax remained 
unimplemented, due in part to significant pressure from the private sector, which saw 
the sales tax as both an unnecessary degree of bureaucracy and a threat to profits. 
A three-year SDR 127 .8m (US$181 m) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was 
approved on the 25th May 1994, with the government reiterating its commitment to 
restructuring, including ensuring that the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA) became 
self-financing by 1995, and agreeing to implement the sales tax on the 1st July 1994.35 
The EFF was subsequently augmented twice: on the first occasion by SDR25m 
(US$37m) on the 14th September 1994 and then by SDR36.5m (US$54m) on the 13th 
February 1995.36 These additional loans can be taken as a measure of the approval of 
the IMF for Jordan's commitment to the policy reform programme and success in 
achieving the macro-economic targets. 
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At this stage, the IMF was holding up Jordan as an example for other third world 
countries to follow. Nonetheless, the IMF remained concerned that restructuring in the 
water and power sectors, in terms of tariffs, administrative reform and greater 
privatisation, was lagging. 37 Even so, in June 1995, Paul Chabrier, Director of IMF's 
Middle East Department, said the decision-makers in Jordan: 
"probably have greater vision of where they want to go and how to go about 
it. They are establishing the indispensable basis to move forward with their 
structural reforms and I think it is where the focus has to be."38 
A report made public in September 1995 again praised the state of the economy and the 
economic adjustment programme, although the IMF continued to express concern over 
the privatisation policy (including a bloated public sector), the level of charges for water 
and electricity, subsidies and basic rate of sales tax (currently 7%). 
The Staff Country Report of October 1995 acknowledged that progress of the 
macroeconomic performance during 1992 to 1994 had been "remarkable,"39 but also 
cautioned that the "external position still remains weak and vulnerable."40 Real growth, 
inflation, fiscal adjustment, and balance of payments adjustment all exceeded the 
targets, but official reserves remained weak at about five weeks of imports by the end of 
1994. In addition, "significant progress was made in normalizing payments relating 
with external creditors."41 The 1995 report also indicates forthcoming structural 
reforms. In the fiscal area, the report identifies the need for "further decisive efforts to 
enhance revenue elasticity and efficiency of the tax system and reduce dependence on 
non-tax revenues."42 On the expenditure side the necessity to contain civilian and 
military wages, and food subsidies is highlighted.43 The key policy considerations, at 
this stage, were: 
+ The reform of the GST system, by increasing the rate and the base; 
+ Tariff reform, including the simplification of procedures, a reduction in the number 
of bands, a reduction of non-tariff barriers, and a reduction in the maximum rate by 
increasing excise duties; 
+ Income tax reform, including the elimination of tax holidays (except for less 
developed areas) and the rationalisation of corporation income tax rates; and 
+ The reduction of food subsidies by improved targeting, or through charging the full 
price to all consumers, while protecting low-income households through direct cash 
transfers.44 
In February 1996 both sides agreed to extend the programme to 1998 with the 
provision of an SDR200.8m (US$295m) EFF. The medium-term programme aimed to: 
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"1) achieve an average annual real GDP growth rate of at least 6 percent in 
order to sustain improved living standards and expand employment 
opportunities; 
2) maintain low inflation rates in line with those of industrialised countries; 
3) narrow the external current account deficit to below 3 percent of GDP on 
average, which would lower the debt and debt service burden over the 
medium term; and 
4) build urs gross official reserves to the equivalent of about three months of 
imports." 5 
To achieve the objectives, the government was committed to fiscal restraint, a tight 
monetary policy and flexible interest rates geared to maintaining the relative 
attractiveness of dinar-denominated deposits. It was expected to accelerate the 
structural reforms in tax, budgetary expenditure, the regulatory framework, the financial 
system and the trade system.46 Significantly, the IMF wanted a more determined effort 
to: 
"promote the role of the private sector in the economy through an overhaul 
of the regulatory framework, a comprehensive reform of public sector 
enterprises, an intensified action plan for privatization, and, for the first 
time, an undertaking for the divestment of government holdings in the 
productive sectors."47 
Throughout 1996 and 1997 the IMF issued a series of public statements praising 
the Jordanian efforts at implementing economic reform. Following the February 
agreement, Dr. Mohammed al-Erian, Acting Director of the IMP's Middle East 
Department, commented "[t]he programme further deepens the authorities structural 
reform efforts, most importantly in the areas of government finances, the regulatory 
framework and the trade system."48 In May, Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director 
of the IMF, in an address to the Annual Meeting of the Union of Arab Banks, stated that 
its efforts made Jordan one of three countries whose progress was "particularly 
noteworthy," highlighting the strong, broad-based growth and the substantial reduction 
in unemployment.49 However, critics in Jordan were concerned about the assumptions 
of the government and the IMF, especially concerning inflation and unemployment. 
The official figures for the former were 3-4% but were unofficially estimated to be at 
least in double figures, while the latter was estimated to be considerably higher than the 
official 15% level. 
The praise continued in a press release issued following a Consultative Group 
Meeting in July 1996. The IMF representative, Paul Chabrier, outlined Jordan's 
impressive record of stabilisation and adjustment and indicated that the reform 
programme "deserves the continued support of the international community."50 
However, during the meeting he noted that: 
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"despite strong economic stabilization and reform achievements, generous 
debt reschedulings, two previous CG [consultative group] meetings and 
major external assistance (particularly from Japan), Jordan's balance of 
payments position was still vulnerable to factors outside its control."51 
The factors referred to included the JD circulating in the West Bank and Gaza, the peace 
process and the situation in Iraq. 
Following a meeting in August, which resulted in the release of the second 
tranche of US$60m of the EFF facility, Dr al-Erian stated: 
"Jordan continues to make impressive progress under its structural 
adjustment and reform program. Reflecting the implementation of 
appropriate macroeconomic and structural reform policies, the Jordanian 
economy has registered a high rate of economic growth, low inflation, and 
. . f . h ,52 mcreasmg oretgn exc ange reserves. -
In February 1997, the IMF announced an augmentation to the EFF of a further 
SDR37.24m ($51.8m),53 commenting that: 
"on the basis of steadfast implementation of adjustment and structural 
reforms by the authorities and the strength of Jordan's economic program 
for 1997, the IMF' s Executive Board .. . decided to approve Jordan's 
request for an augmentation of the EFF credit."54 
However, the IMF's 1997 Annual Report, which was generally complementary, 
considered that progress in privatisation was slow, although it acknowledges that the 
institutions for implementing the policy had been established. In addition, the directors 
commented on the need for further budgetary reform, an intensification of structural 
reforms, and the reform of the public pension system and the civil service. 55 
In early 1998, the Planning Ministry was confidently predicting that when the 
IMF agreement ended in February the following year, Jordan would not need to renew 
the facility. However, they confirmed Jordan's commitment to the continuance of 
economtc reform through a one-year programme, which contained the principal 
objectives of privatising government companies: creating the proper atmosphere for 
attracting investment, and addressing the structural imbalance caused by poverty and 
unemployment.56 The commitment to economic liberalisation could be interpreted as a 
method to retain the support of the donor community, thus maintaining access to and 
control of future rents. However, by September, the government publicly 
acknowledged the reality of the situation with the announcement that talks were well 
advanced to extend the IMF reform programme by a further year.57 These negotiations 
took place against a background of economic slowdown, with the World Bank 
forecasting a shrinkage in the economy of 1% in 1998, following on growth of only 
0.7% in 1997. Real wages were estimated to have fallen 20% since the implementation \ 
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of the first agreement with the IMF in 1989. Reserves had declined from US$1700m at 
end of 1997 to US$1400m by the end of August the following year. 58 
In April 1999 the IMF approved SAP Ill, which was valued at SDR161.98m 
(US$220m), and was: 
"in support of the nation's economic adjustment and structural reform 
program for the period 1999-2001, and to help offset the impact of a 
temporary shortfall in exports of goods and services."59 
The funds were divided between a three-year EFF of SDR127.88m (US$174m) and a 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) of SDR34.1 m (US$46m). 
Despite its earlier lavish public praise, the IMF acknowledged that between 1996 and 
1998, economic performance "fell short of goals targeted under Jordan's previous EFF-
supported program."60 The press release highlights success in maintaining low inflation 
and building up foreign reserves, but stressed the failure to achieve real GDP growth 
and the widening of the fiscal deficit to about 10% of GDP. On the structural reform 
front important progress was considered to have been achieved, especially during 1997, 
in financial market development, trade liberalisation and tax reform, but progress was 
thought to have slackened towards the end of the programme.61 
The new facility was designed to stabilise the economy and set the stage for 
sustained recovery over the next two years, with a gradual recovery in the growth rate of 
real GDP to 3%-4%, the maintenance of low inflation and a substantial strengthening in 
official foreign exchange reserves.62 The macroeconomic objectives were to be 
achieved through fiscal consolidation, prudent monetary policy aimed at a stable dinar 
and bolstering foreign reserves, and wide-ranging structural reforms. The latter reform 
agenda emphasises "the areas of taxes, social security, financial sector, trade, and public 
enterprise reform and privatization."63 In the field of privatisation, the government was 
expected to take: 
"significant steps ... to improve the management of the Water Authority of 
Jordan, restructure and privatize the Royal Jordanian airline and the 
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO), and develop a privatization 
plan for the Jordan Telecommunications Corporation."64 
The government was also expected to continue its efforts to protect the vulnerable social 
groups and to promote employment regeneration. The macroeconomic targets agreed 
are highlighted in table 5.5. 
The IMF approved a withdrawal of SDR 10.66m (US$15M) in October 1999. In 
the accompanying news brief the directors "welcomed the improvement in economic 
conditions and confidence ... [which] reflected the authorities' renewed commitment to 
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both macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms."65 However, the government 
was "encouraged" to exercise expenditure restraint and reform the tax system, 
specifically introducing VAT by early 2000, modifying income tax, and reducing 
external tariffs.66 The IMF also "urged the authorities to move forward vigorously with 
structural reform, in particular with the restructuring and privatization of public 
enterprises."67 Finally, "concern" was expressed about the "misreporting of fiscal and 
national accounts data in 1996-98."68 However, the directors welcomed the 
improvements in the compilation of statistics and monitoring of fiscal accounts.69 
l'abne 5.5 
Macroeconomic Targets under 1999-2001 EFF 
2o:O!L~,'·'' ~toor • ~-<·• -~-"~"~ 
2.5 3.5 
Consumer Price Index (annual average) % change 2.8 2.4 
7.9 5.5 4.0 
4.2 2.9 1.4 
Government Debt as a % of GDP 132.6 128.6 124.4 
Current Account Deficit incl. grants % of GDP 0.7 1.7 1.8 
Current Account Deficit excl. rants % of GDP 5.5 5.4 5.3 
4.2 5.2 5.9 
Merchandise Im orts % change 4.0 5. I 6.2 
Source: Adapted by author. IMF, "IMF Approves EFF and CCFF Credits for Jordan", Press Release no. 
99/13, 16/04/99, IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/ 1999/pr9913.htm. 
The second review of the EFF in mid-2000 ended with the release of a further 
SDR15.22m (US$20m). Following the review, Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing 
Director and Acting Chairman, acknowledged the improvement in Jordan's economic 
conditions since the beginning of 1999, which he attributed to "restrained 
macroeconomic policies and the implementation of a number of important structural 
measures, especially in the areas of privatization and trade reform."70 The areas of 
disappointment raised by the IMF included the level of economic growth, which was 
needed to raise per capita incomes and improve welfare. To achieve the growth 
required, the emphasis was to remain on reducing the fiscal deficit and on continued 
structural reform. 
In its Memorandum on Economic Financial Policies (previously Letter of Intent) 
the government agreed to a number of conditions including: 
+ Sales tax to be converted into a fully-fledged V AT by 2001, and the number of 
exemptions to be reduced; 
+ Income tax to be rationalised, tax rates simplified, and the tax base broadened; 
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~ Fuel prices to be revised in the second half of 2000, following a technical study by 
the IMF; 
+ Public pension system to be revised with the ultimate goal of bringing public sector 
employees within the framework of the SSC; and 
+ Public sector services, especially health and education, to be improved.71 
3.2 World Bank Involvement 
Prior to the economic crisis, the World Bank had been providing around 
US$100m pa for infrastructure improvement throughout the 1980s.72 From 1989, the 
emphasis switched to SALs in support of the IMF SAP. At the time, the World Bank 
perceived its role to be "to restore growth and reduce the economic imbalances" in a 
complementary operation to the macro-economic stabilisation programme supported by 
the IMF agreement. 73 The main objective of the adjustment programme was to "create 
an enabling environment for long-run sustainable growth by improving efficiency and 
competitiveness of the economy"74 through the promotion of the private sector at the 
expense of the public sector. 
The World Bank sought to achieve this objective through a number of methods. 
The most obvious method was through conditional lending, often as eo-financiers with 
other members of the donor community. In order to encourage the necessary growth of 
the economy, projects and programmes supported by the loans sought to either develop 
or restructure different sectors considered important but which were deemed to be 
underdeveloped or incorrectly structured. Invariably, the restructuring involved 
attempting to reduce the role of the state, while simultaneously promoting the role of the 
privale sector. Other involvement was achieved by acting as: 
+ Technical advisor on sectoral restructuring and privatisation, including the 
preparation of a report on the private sector in Jordan; 
+ Co-ordinator with other donors; 
+ Sponsor of meetings to attract further pledges of support; 
+ Administrator of grants donated by other donors; 
+ Guarantor for lending on the bond market; and 
+ Propagator of new development practices, such as micro-finance75 or micro-
enterprise schemes. 
The role of technical advisor was apparent in various sectors, such as health, 
energy, agriculture, water, the private sector, and trade. In each case the emphasis was 
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on increasing the role of the private sector in the long term. For example, a government 
plan to turn Aqaba region into a free trade area received considerable technical 
assistance from the World Bank. 76 Furthermore, in 1994, the IBRD prepared a project 
to raise the efficiency of the construction sector by: 
+ Privatising the production activities of the HUDC; 
+ Activating the role of the private sector by providing incentives to build houses for 
low-income groups; 
+ Encouraging competition in the medium- to long-term financing market through the 
creation of a secondary mortgage market mechanism; 
+ Rationalising support for the housing sector to create efficiency; and 
+ Investing in infrastructure in areas with inferior services.77 
Also, during FY1995 the World Bank prepared an assessment of the private 
sector,78 following a World Bank mission to Jordan in November and December 1994. 
The mission was at the behest of the state.79 The report, which was issued in August 
1995, after discussions with the government and the private sector, concluded that its 
focus should be on: 
+ "The changing role of the government as a regulator and owner/operator of 
enterprises; 
+ The regulatory constraints faced by the private sector and how to relax them to 
encourage private investment and business expansion; and 
+ The improvements needed in the financial sector to support these activities."80 
The report argues that "[a]lthough the private sector in Jordan is freer than in 
several other Middle-Eastern countries, it is still unduly constrained by the extensive 
presence of the public sector in the economy and by a restrictive regulatory 
framework." 81 Therefore, the World Bank recommended that the public sector should 
"focus on providing those public goods and services that can only be provided on a 
collective basis and leave competitive activities to the private sector which can perform 
them much more efficiently."82 The change was to be achieved through 
+ "The divestiture/privatisation of public enterprises over time; 
+ The provision of adequate public goods and services (such as public administration 
and legal machinery); and 
+ Regulatory reform."83 
The government's role to assist private sector development required: 
+ To ensure macroeconomic stability and policy credibility; 
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+ To ensure competitive markets, in goods, services, financial and factor markets; 
+ To ensure adequate infrastructure, support services and ancillary activities, all of 
which should have private sector participation; and 
• To ensure the institutional setting allows firms to respond to competitive pressures. 
In the early years of the SAPs the emphasis had been on macroeconomic reform. The 
development of the private sector did not receive strong backing until the mid-1990s. 
The Bank was also heavily involved with the issue of privatisation. For example, 
in August 1996 it consulted with JIC and JCFC on the best methods for divesting the 
former's 49.5% stake in the latter. 84 Furthermore, the IBRD was a major partner in the 
preparation of other entities for privatisation, such as RJ. 
The World Bank also undertook the role of co-ordinating between the many donor 
groups involved in Jordan. However, the success of this role seems to have been 
extremely limited, with many interviewees questioning whether overall co-ordination 
had been achieved, 85 although a number argue that limited sectoral co-ordination had 
occurred. 86 The role also involved arranging donors' meetings in an attempt to increase 
the volume of funding available. During the Gulf Crisis, the World Bank was 
instrumental in establishing a fund to assist with the costs associated with the refugees 
and returnees. Subsequently it signed an agreement for a loan of US$1 Om, while 
countries, including Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and Luxembourg, also contributed.87 
In addition, the Bank also organised a financing tour of the donor community in April 
1992. Although the response was generally positive, Jordan's current medium-term 
financing requirements were not met. 88 A further example occurred when twenty-four 
states and organisations attended a World Bank-organised meeting, from the 28th and 
29th January 1993, which was successful in raising pledges to cover the balance of 
payments needs for 1993 and 1994 (around US$380m). 89 However, one year later, 
because of the political difficulties of implementing the restructuring programmes, only 
US$175m had been used.90 A further meeting was arranged on the 17th May 1994, 
during which US$200m was pledged to restructure the water, agriculture, health and 
electricity sectors.91 In Paris on the lOth July 1996, at the Third Consultative Group 
meeting,92 donor nations pledged almost US$1 bn, of which approximately US$600m 
was promised for 1996, with the remainder over the following two years. The pledged 
funds were to be used to support trade liberalisation, private sector development, 
privatisation, and physical infrastructure development.93 
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In addition, the World Bank also administered grants donated by other countries. 
For example, in 1993 Switzerland granted US$5m, part of which the Bank used to 
promote local products on the international market through Jordan Export Development 
and Commercial Centers Corporation (JEDC0).94 Another element of the World 
Bank's role was to guarantee facilities, such as the US$50m Eurobond issued in 
December 1994, which was raised to fund expansion of the TCC.95 According to the 
World Bank, the guarantee was the first granted to a MENA government bond issue on 
the international market.96 
Finally, two subsidiaries of the World Bank, the IDA (the soft loan component) 
and the IFC (loans specifically to boost the private sector) were also present in Jordan. 
The IDA had made fifteen loans prior to the crisis but did not assist in the period of the 
study, while the IFC had made ten investments in Jordan with gross commitment of 
US$97m, prior to 1989. Between 1989 and 1995 no further involvement occurred, but 
between 1995 and 2000 the IFC assisted in fourteen projects. The IFC had also issued 
advice on a number of issues, including opening the economy to foreign investment.97 
For analytical purposes, the lending by the World Bank can be divided into three 
types: 
• Social: concerned with alleviating the effects of the adjustment programme on the 
most vulnerable groups in society (table 5.6, page 170); 
+ Balance of payments: associated directly with the SALs of the IMF and is usually 
for balance of payment support (table 5.7, page 171); 
+ Restructuring: restructuring or developing particular sectors of the economy (table 
5.8, page 174). 
In reality, the restructuring loans often contained an element of social provision. Each 
of the three categories of lending involved conditions being set by the World Bank and 
agreed to by the Jordanian government. In addition, the loans were usually part of a 
package involving grants and/or soft loans from other donor sources, not only states but 
also bilateral institutions, such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
(AFESD), and multilateral organisations, such as the Islamic Development Bank 
(IsDB). The following paragraphs give a brief description of the conditionality attached 
to a number of the loans. 
The. social welfare component of World Bank lending was late in arriving, with no 
lending to Jordan until 199798 (despite the Bank's acceptance, from the late 1980s, of 
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the problem of the adverse impact of the SAPs on the poorer elements of society)99 
(table 5.6). Indeed, social lending has only comprised 3.8% of total lending, while 
restructuring has accounted for 55 .1% (figure 5.1). 
Table 5.6 
World Bank Social Loans, 1989-2000 (US$m) 
Date Loan Title Amount Co-Financiers 
21/03/91 Emergency Recovery Refugees 10.0 Yes 
21108/97 Community Infrastructure Project 30.0 Yes 
Source: Adapted by author. World Bank, (vanous), The World Bank Annual Reoort, (Washington: The 
World Bank). 
Figure 5.1 
World Bank Lending by Category, 1989-2000 
55.1 % 
0 Balance of Payrrent Support • Social 0 Restructuring 
Source: Adapted by author. World Bank, (various), The World Bank Annual Report, (Washington: The 
World Bank). 
In March 1997, World Bank Vice-President for Middle East and North Mrica, 
Kamal Darwish, acknowledged that a decline in living standards had followed the 
sectoral reform. Consequently, programmes to tackle unemployment and poverty 
would receive ffiRD money. At the time, the government was in the course of 
implementing a JD400m ($284m) social safety net programme, called the Social 
Productivity Programme (SPP). 100 The SPP had the long-term objective of lifting all 
households above the poverty line, through training and micro-finance schemes and 
better targeting of public cash transfers.101 Darwish's promise of new funding was 
followed in June by a report that the World Bank was to lend US$60m towards the 
social security package.102 However, in September, the loan for the Community 
Infrastructure Project (CIP), part of the SPP, was approved for only US$30m. The CIP 
loan was aimed at providing: 
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"basic physical and social infrastructure for up to about 1.6 million people 
living in the country's poorest municipal areas and villages. The project, 
which represents the pilot phase of the wider government Social 
Productivity Program, will also test the potential for supporting income-
generating activities and, possibly, microenterprise development in Jordan's 
poorest communities." 103 
To date, this loan has been the only one specifically aimed at offsetting the social cost 
of the various SAPs. 
As highlighted in table 5.7, four loans have been granted in support of the balance 
of payments. These loans are more closely related to the short-term stabilisation 
policies of the IMF, than to the longer-term structural adjustment undertaken by the ' 
/ 
World Bank. The first balance of payments support loan for US$150m was approved in 
December 1989, after the IMF agreement earlier in the year. The loan conditions were 
designed to help deepen reforms in industry and trade and to restructure public 
expenditures. The measures, which Jordan was expected to undertake in return for the 
facility, were divided into three policy areas: 
~ Stabilisation; 
0 Growth of industry and diversification of exports; and 
0 Impact of adjustment on the economically disadvantaged. 
Table 5.7 
14/12/89 Industry and Trade Policy 
Ad'ustment Loan 
24/l 0/95 First Economic Reform and 
Develo ment Loan (ERDL I) 
11112/96 Second Economic Reform and 
Develo ment Loan (ERDL II) 
01106/99 Third Economic Reform and 
Develo ment Loan (ERDL III) 
Repayment over 17 years, 
includin 5 ears' race 
Repayment over 20 years, 
including 5 ears' grace 
Repayment over 17 years, 
including 4 years' grace 
Repayment over 17 years, 
includin 4 ears' race 
j:$qJri;.;~i 
150.0 
80.0 
120.0 
120.0 
Source: Adapted by author. World Bank, (various), The World Bank Annual Report, (Washington: The 
World Bank). 
Under stabilisation, the state was required to achieve a unified exchange rate by 
March 1990; to take further action to reduce the budget deficit by enhancing revenues 
and restraining expenditures; and to finalise a public expenditure programme based on 
discussions with the Bank before the release of the second tranche. The growth of 
industry and diversification of exports required the government: 
~ To restructure import tariff rates by reducing the maximum to 60% and increasing 
the minimum to 5%; 
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~ To combine the multiple rates of import taxes into a single rate; 
<> To replace the system of investment incentives with a simplified version in order to 
increase exports; 
~ To increase the effectiveness of the CBI' s export rediscounting facility; 
• To prepare a study on export development and investment promotion; 
<> To complete proposals for building institutional capacity; and 
• To prepare specifications to improve industrial standards. 104 
Prior to the release of the second tranche "the Bank would carry out an overall 
assessment of the progress on macroeconomic policies, as well as other actions 
supported by the loan." 105 In the event, the release of the second tranche of the loan was 
interrupted, not by the failure to meet the conditions but by the Gulf Crisis of 1990 to 
1991, thus highlighting the political element in donor support. 
The Bank's strategy, as outlined in the agreement, was 
"tailored to help the Government respond to the fall in oil prices and the 
resulting slowdown in the regional economies by: 
1) accelerating growth in the medium term, while maintaining a viable 
budgetary and balance of payments position; 
2) minimising the emerging unemployment problem; and 
3) dealing with two critical long-term constraints to future frowth, a rapidly 
growing population and the increasing scarcity of water." 10 
As the temporary boom following the Gulf War petered out, the IBRD lent a 
further US$80m, in October 1995, to be repaid over twenty years, including five years' 
grace. In keeping with the "soft glove" 107 approach, these terms were less onerous than 
those of the 1989 SAL. The loan was to be matched by Japan, and supported by a 
further US$20m from Italy. The full amount of the Economic and Reform 
Development Loan (ERDL I) was to be used to provide for balance of payments support 
and to boost reserves. The conditions sought by the World Bank included new 
legislation to reduce customs duties, and an increase in sales tax to 10%. Other areas in 
which progress was to be made before further facilities could be sought included 
measures on intellectual property rights, reform of the stock exchange (AFM), and the 
implementation of a comprehensive privatisation process. 108 
A further balance of payments support loan was agreed, m late 1996, for 
US$120m, repayable over seventeen years, including four years' grace. The repayment 
terms were tougher than those of ERDL I. ERDL 11 was designed "to promote 
enhanced private sector participation in the wider world economy." The loan was 
closely tied to the Free Trade Agreement (FT A) with the European Community (EC), 
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but also supported investment, savings, and the development of the banking and 
financial sectors. 109 The conditions attached to ERDL II were similar to the areas in 
which progress had been expected at the time of granting ERDL I. These conditions 
included reform of the AFM; new legislation including intellectual property rights and 
leasing; reduction of tariffs; and streamlining of trade. 110 The loan was granted in 
support of the IMF' s EFF with the aim to back "reforms that target[ ed] increased 
competition and exports, a modem financial system, best-practice business laws, and 
· · · , Ill pnvatJsatton. 
In November 1997, discussion on the ERDL Ill for US$75m was initiated with a 
projected approval date of the 18th February 1999. However, due to the economic 
downturn, ERDL Ill was finally approved for US$120m in June 1999. According to the 
loan terms, the "government policy actions will focus first on liberalizing the regulatory 
framework affecting business entry, operation (including pricing policy), and exit; as 
well as separating policy, regulatory, and business operation functions." 112 The key 
objective of ERDL Ill was "to support the Government's reform program which is 
aimed at sustaining high growth with exports playing a major role." 113 The policy 
changes were to include the removal of the remaining trade and investment barriers, an 
Association Agreement on trade relations with the EU; and accession to the WT0. 114 
The loan was, in turn, supported by grants from the Bank's International Development 
Fund, Japan and the USA for technical assistance in the areas of privatisation, freeports, 
legal reform and financial sector reform. 115 
From the outset of the IMF involvement following the economic crisis until the 
outbreak of the Gulf War, only one loan aimed at the long-term restructuring of the 
economy was signed: a loan of US$73m in June 1989 aimed at the education sector 
(table 5.8). Not until 1993, were further restructuring loans agreed. In that year, three 
loans were implemented, which aimed at restructuring the transport (US$35m), health 
(US$20m) and the energy (US$80m) sectors. The US$80m energy loan, which was 
matched by an equal loan from Japan, focused on undertaking key structural reforms in 
the sector in order to ease the burden on state finances. These conditional reforms 
included the phasing-out of energy subsidies in order to attract the private sector into 
power generation and distribution. 116 Furthermore, the loan could not be drawn down 
until increases in electricity and other selected prices had been implemented. 
In 1994, a loan for US$80m was agreed, eo-financed by a thirty million Deutsch 
Mark (DM30m) loan from Germany. The objective was to restructure the agricultural 
- 173-
Chapter Five: Donor Community Involvement, 1989-2000 
sector, along the line suggested in a report drafted in part by the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation. The loan was supported by a smaller World Bank 
Agricultural Sector Technical Assistance Programme loan of US$6.6m and a DM4m 
technical co-operation grant from Germany, which were to be used "to mitigate the 
social effects of the necessary adjustment process in agriculture." 117 According to the 
CBJ the aims were: 
0 To promote a more efficient use of and conservation of natural resources, especially 
water and land, including the phasing out of the control of cropping patterns; 
o To liberalise the agricultural markets; and 
o To enable the private sector to invest, produce and trade. 118 
Table 5.8 
World Bank Restructuring Loans, 1989a2000 
Human Resources Development Education 73.0 OECF, 
Sector Investment Loan UKODA 
11103/93 Third Trans ort Pro· ect Trans ort 35.0 Em 
16/03/93 Health Management Project Health 20.0 Finland, EC, 
USA, France, 
German , UK 
07110/93 En erg Sector Ad'ustment Loan Energy 80.0 
08/12/94 Agriculture Sector Adjustment Agriculture 80.0 Germany 
0 eration 
08112/94 Agriculture Sector Technical Agriculture 6.6 GTZ,KfW 
Su ort Pro·ect 
30/03/95 Second Human Resources Education 60.0 Yes 
28/03/96 Ex orts 40.0 Private Sector 
25/06/96 Housing 20.0 NIA 
31/07/97 Second Tourism Development Tourism 32.0 NIA 
Pro'ect 
19/05/98 Training and Employment Education 5.0 UNDP 
Su ort Pro'ect 
25/11198 Health Sector Reform Pro·ect Health 35.0 No 
16/03/99 Amman Water and Sanitation Water 55.0 Em, Italy 
Management Pro'ect 
29/02/00 Hi her Education Develo ment Education 34.7 NIA 
Source: Adapted by author. World Bank, (various), The World Bank Annual Report, (Washington: The 
World Bank). 
The water element of the agreement sought to achieve efficiency and conservation 
through the restructuring of Jordan's institutions associated with water, the 
implementation of demand management policies for water, the prioritisation of 
government investment in water and the abolition of subsidies. 119 The structural 
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changes to the agricultural sector sought to improve productivity and increase exports 
through the reduction of food subsidies and the revamping of the institutions associated 
with agriculture, such as the Jordanian Co-operatives Organisation and the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation. 120 The Ministry of Agriculture, which was responsible for 
agricultural policy and development, was expected to address three key issues: 
+ To adapt the structure and staffing to a new more limited role; 
• To implement privatisation, commercialisation and other forms of decentralisation; 
and 
+ To make public services more productive and better managed. 121 
The public sector role in the agricultural sector was envisaged, in the long run, to be no 
more than one of regulator and co-ordinator. 122 
The World Bank's view of the agricultural sector in 1994 was outlined in the 
Technical Annex to the Agriculture Sector Technical Support Project. The IBRD 
argued that although agriculture was small in relation to the overall economy, the sector 
was relatively important in the production of tradable goods. On a narrow definition, 
agriculture contributed about 7% of GDP, but if upstream and downstream linkages 
were taken into consideration, the figure increased to 28%. Furthermore, on the broad 
definition, agriculture had accounted for more than half the growth of GDP in the early 
1990s. The sector employed around 10% of the workforce and accounted for 15% of 
exports. The major constraints identified in the Technical annex were water scarcity, 
weak producer services and vulnerable markets. The importance of the relationship 
between water and agriculture was emphasised by agriculture's consumption of almost 
75% of total water usage, while the pumping of groundwater exceeded renewable 
levels. Furthermore, the use of irrigated water was considered to have a low efficiency. 
Prior to the Second Gulf War, 88% of total exports of fresh fruit and vegetables were to 
the Gulf States, while other Arab states took 11% and Europe only 1%. The Gulf War 
considerably eroded the Gulf States market, leaving an oversupply of agricultural 
d . J d 123 pro uce m or an. 
Further loans followed, including a US$60m loan for education reform in April 
1995. This loan, apart from helping to restructure the education system, was designed 
to help share economic growth throughout the population by enhancing "the quality and 
further expand[ing] access to basic schooling." 124 In 1996, the World Bank signed three 
agreements with Jordan, including loans for US$20m to the housing sector (March), 125 
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US$40m for expott development (March), 126 and a grant of US$2.7m for controlling 
pollution at Aqaba (June). 127 
The principal objective of the Export Development Loan was to support the 
government-conceived Export Sector Development Programme, which was designed to: 
"1) reduce transaction costs to firms through simplification of import and 
export procedures, including customs operations; 
2) increase the level of investment flows, in particular, FDI; 
3) facilitate the use of specialised consulting and other support services, to 
enable firms to raise their product standards and quality, and penetrate new 
markets; and 
4) improve access of private firms to medium-to-longer term finance for 
productive capacity development or expansion." 128 
The overall objective was to enhance the: 
"international competitiveness of Jordanian exports and increasing export 
revenues. The immediate objective of the project is to help private firms 
expand their productive capacity through a credit line for term lending.'" 29 
Approximately eighty firms were expected to benefit from the funding provided jointly 
by the World Bank, USAID, the EU and Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), with the provision of an expected one thousand jobs. 130 
The World Bank appraisal of the project points out the difficulties faced in the 
export sector in Jordan, namely: 
• A narrow base of exports; 131 
+ The small size of domestic firms (98% of firms employed less than twenty workers); 
• High tariff and transaction costs; 
• Institutional and regulatory rigidities; 
• Weak enterprise support systems; and 
+ Limited term finance. 
In addition, a major factor was the use of bilateral governmental trade protocols, which 
had stopped the development of an understanding of what to produce for and how to sell 
in global markets. 132 
When signing the Housing Finance and Urban Sector Reform loan of US$20m, in 
1996, the government agreed "to shift responsibility to the private sector for developing 
land and housing for lower income households, and to implement measures to mobilize 
increased longer-term, market based financing for mortgage lending." 133 In the longer-
term, public sector activities would be reduced to policy, planning and research and 
basic upgrading works, 134 with the private sector filling the void. The reforms were 
based on the 1994 project to raise the efficiency of the construction sector (earlier). 
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In August 1997, a US$32m loan to assist with developing the tourist sector was 
announced, to create the conditions for sustainable and environmentally sound tourism 
at Petra, Wadi Rum, Jerash, and Kerak, and to provide income-generating opportunities 
for the local population, including the Bedouin women. 135 The May 1998 US$5m loan , 
for Training and Employment was to fund a pilot project aimed at linking public funded 
training with the requirements of the business community. 136 In November 1998, a loan 
of US$35m was approved to support a Health Sector Reform Project, based on the joint 
government/World Bank study published in April 1997. The state was expected to 
contribute a further US$13.9m. The project focused on three key areas: 
"1) Containing growth in health expenditures; 
2) Assuring the efficient utilization of physical facilities; and 
3) Improving the delivery and quality of health care services." 137 
The five components supporting the first phase of reform were: 
"1) rationalizing Jordan's health delivery system; 
2) developing and implementing health information systems; 
3) improving hospital financing and management; 
4) reforming the pharmaceutical sector; and 
5) continuing the reform process." 138 
In March 1999, the World Bank announced the approval of a US$55m loan to 
improve the efficiency, management, operation and delivery of water and wastewater 
services for the Amman Service Area, which covered about two million people. 
Importantly, the project supported the involvement of a private sector operator. The 
cost was estimated at US$136m, with additional funding from the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) (US$44m), Italy (US$20m) and Jordan (US$17m). 139 
At the end of 1999, detailed discussions were held between the government, the 
World Bank and "other stakeholders in the country" 140 concerning the Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS) 141 for the period 2000-2002. The Bank's assistance in the 
period was forecast to focus on: 
"1) reviving, maintaining, and accelerating economic growth, emphasizing 
higher levels of private investment, export development, and tourism; 
2) promoting human development, including social protection; 
3) undertaking public sector reforms; and 
4) improving water resources management and the environment." 142 
The World Bank involvement for the three years was expected to average US$100-
150m pa, in addition to a total of US$200m in guarantees for private sector 
infrastructure investments. The lending would cover projects in higher education, 
agriculture exports, vocational education, tourism, social protection, water and public 
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sector reforms.143 The first loan of US$34.7m for a higher education development 
project under the CAS was announced in February 2000.144 
Despite the continual stress on water scarcity as a significant constraint on 
economic growth, the sector has only received US$55m of the total of US$606.3m 
lending between 1989 and 2000 (figure 5.2). The importance of education to economic 
growth and poverty alleviation has been addressed with this sector receiving the highest 
percentage of funding (28.5%), followed by agriculture (14.3%), housing (13 .5%) and 
energy (13.2%). Although much has been made of the necessity to increase exports, 
only one loan (accounting for 6.6% of the total) has been specifically assigned for this 
purpose. 
Figure 5.2 
World Bank Restructuring Loans by Sector, 1989-2000 
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Source: Adapted by author. World Bank, (various), The World Bank Annual Report, (Washington: The 
World Bank). 
As with the IMF, the political nature of World Bank lending can be noticed from 
figure 5.3. King Hussein's position of attempting to seek an Arab solution to the 
Second Gulf War was interpreted by the USA as a pro-Saddam stance. The USA cut 
off OEA to Jordan and was able to influence both the IMF and the ffiRD to withdraw 
their support until the cessation of hostilities. The result was a slump in lending in 
FY1991 and FY1992, at a time when the economy most needed assistance. The 
requirement for increased loans was recognised as the economy entered a downturn in 
the mid- to late-1990s. Given the close relationship between the IMF and the World 
Bank, the pattern of lending closely followed that of the IMF. As discussed previously, 
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new loans were only approved after receiving IMF confirmation that the conditions of 
the SAP were being met. 
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3.2.1 World Bank Assessment of Government Policy 
By August 1992, the World Bank was expressing confidence in the government 
policies, following a review by a team led by Caio Koch-Weser, Vice-President 
responsible for Near East and North African Affairs. At the time, the team planned to 
return to Amman in September, once the situation following the end of the Gulf War 
had become clearer, to revamp policies on agriculture, power and water tariffs. 145 The 
1993 World Bank Annual Report stresses the need for Jordan to undertake civil service 
reforms and raises the possibility of requiring "special forms of debt relief." 146 A more 
optimistic note was sounded in the 1994 report, which highlights the broad base of the 
economic growth achieved in 1993, the implementation of stabilisation policies, and the 
occurrence of encouraging signs that private sector activity was picking up. 147 
The 1995 Annual Report emphasises the necessity to achieve rapid economic 
growth. This rapid growth could only be achieved by moving away from the state-
centred development strategies to "a 'new paradigm' for prosperity, based on 
unleashing the energies of the private sector as the engine of growth."148 The Report 
acknowledges that developing the private sector was a "complex task, involving a wide 
range of policy actions," 149 adding that Jordan had been successful to date in 
implementing its reform programme. 150 
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Following agreement of ERDL I, in October 1995, World Bank vice-president for 
MENA, Caio Koch-Weser stated "[w]e are very satisfied with the government's 
economic performance in the past two-three years," adding that the country was / 
deserving of strong donor support. 151 
At the Third Consultative Group meeting in 1996 the World Bank representative 
praised the Government's accomplishments in stabilisation and adjustment, while 
noting that progres_s was still required in four key aspects of reform: 
~ Trade liberalisation and export development; 
~ Financial sector strengthening and deepening; 
• Regulatory reform to improve the investment climate; and 
~ Privatisation. 
The representative also stressed the need for a sound infrastructure to encourage private 
investment in export production and tourism. The major infrastructural challenge was 
deemed to be water, followed by road and rail development. Furthermore, he pledged 
the Bank's continued support for improvements in education and health. 152 Following 
the meeting the press release states that "Jordan is one of the leaders in the region in 
transforming its economy." 153 
At the same meeting, the IFC praised the improved climate for private investment. 
The example of the reform in the telecom sector had allowed the IFC to assist in the 
launching of Jordan's first cellular telephone company. Future investment could be 
expected in the phosphate sector, quality hotels, cement production, leasing, micro-
finance enterprise, an equity fund set up jointly with the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, and a credit reference agency (in association with the Arab Monetary Fund 
(AMF)). 154 
In March 1997, World Bank Vice-President for Middle East and North Africa, 
Kamal Darwish, said that the bank was highly satisfied with Jordan's efforts to 
streamline its economy. As a result, he anticipated lending a further US$1 bn over the 
next five years in support of economic restructuring. However, he suggested that 
- \ Jordan needed to think seriously about reform in the water, power, energy and transport 
sectors. Furthermore, the 1997 Report argues that the reform of the education sector 
backed by World Bank funding was beginning to pay off. 155 According to the 1998 
Annual Report: "[s]ince the late 1980s the Bank's support has increasingly featured 
policy-based lending for comprehensive private sector-oriented economic reform." 156 
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The relationship with the IDRD soured to an extent in June 1998 when Darwish 
expressed concern about the state's estimates for economic growth in 1996 and 1997. 
The estimates had been around 6% for both years, but following the statement were 
immediately reduced by the state to 1% for 1996 and 2.5%-3% for 1997. The forecast 
for 1998 was similarly revised downwards from 6% to 3.2%. 157 Despite having been 
heavily involved in restructuring the economy, the World Bank quickly and publicly 
absolved itself from any blame about the accuracy of the figures. In a statement to the 
Jordan Times, the IDRD points out that it relied on the government to produce accurate 
figures. However, the statement did include praise for the economic reform and 
' development agenda and acknowledges the need to address growth in order to offset the 
effects of poverty and unemployment. 158 In September, John Page, World Bank Chief 
Economist for the MENA region argued that although the investment rate in Jordan was 
favourable when compared regionally, the bulk was focused on housing projects. He 
stressed the need to invest for exports. 159 
Following the death of King Hussein in February 1999, World Bank President, 
J ames D. Wolfensohn, was quick to announce continued "full support to King Abdullah 
and to the people of Jordan." 160 The Annual Report for 2000 praises the privatisation 
programme as one of the most successful in the region, with thirty-three of the targeted 
forty companies having been privatised. 161 
3.3 The lBretton Woods Institutions, the State and Economic Liberalisation 
The importance of the position of the IMF in Jordan's relationship with other 
members of the donor community was pivotal during the period 1989 to 2000. Firstly, 
the World Bank's contribution to the SAP was dependent on an initial agreement being 
reached with the IMF and then adherence to the conditions of the programme. As 
discussed previously, by issuing loan funds in tranches, implementation of the 
conditions agreed between the donor and the recipient can more easily be achieved. 
Secondly, the creditor nations and banks through the Paris and London Clubs would not 
even begin negotiating on debt-rescheduling until the relevant IMF agreement was in 
place. Finally, a number of the important donor nations, such as the USA, switched J 
funding from developmental projects into restructuring programmes associated with the j 
SAP. 
The reaction of the IMF to the government's policy of prevarication throughout 
the majority of the period depended to a considerable extent on the political situation in 
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the region. The conditions attached to SAP I were more onerous than those attached to 
SAP II, at which stage the importance of Jordan to the peace process and maintaining 
sanctions on Iraq was paramount. By the late 1990s, when SAP Ill was 'negotiated', 
the regional situation had changed. The peace process had stagnated, the international 
reaction to the death of King Hussein indicated a perception that Jordan could no longer 
play an important role in unlocking the peace process, and sanctions on Iraq no longer 
received the full backing of the international community: thus, reducing the strategic 
importance of Jordan. Thus, the worsening economic position in Jordan took 
precedence over the regional political situation. 
Throughout the period, the IMF seems to have adopted a public 'carrot' and 
private 'stick' approach to the delays by the state in implementing the agreed 
conditions. The public demonstrations of support by the IMF could be seen as boosting 
the stability of the regime, in the face of public unrest expressed in the riots in 1989 and 
1996. Furthermore, the praise also helped the supporters of change among the rentier 
elite in the face of considerable opposition to the economic reform process (from the 
street, in parliament, and the bureaucracy, as well as from other members of the rentier 
elite). In common with the IMF, throughout the period the World Bank issued a series 
of laudatory comments concerning the government's policy on economic restructuring. 
Regularly, these statements contained a 'but' clause indicating that further progress was 
needed to be achieved on certain fronts: a signpost for future areas of concern to be 
addressed by the state to ensure World Bank support continued. 
4.0 DEBT RESCHEDULING 
As discussed previously, the volume of external debt rocketed during the 1980s, 
so that by 1989 external debt stood at US$8.5bn (JD5.41bn), almost 250% of GDP. 
However, the problem of debt was further exacerbated by the 50% devaluation in the 
dinar. Repayment of the debt was contracted in dollars, thus with devaluation more 
dinars were required to purchase the dollars necessary for repayment. Consequently, 
the cost of debt-servicing reached 37.9% of exports of goods and services. The need to 
address the problem of debt through a variety of methods, including write-offs, swaps, 
buy-backs, 162 and reschedulings, was deemed vital for the future performance of the 
economy. This section assesses the impact of the negotiations with the various 
representatives of the debtors, which also form part of the donor community. The 
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outcome of the negotiations between Jordan and the creditors allows an analysis of how 
the non-BWI members of the donor community impacted on the rentier elite. 
The sudden willingness of the creditor nations, from 1994, to allow debt write-
offs and swaps rather than rescheduling created a new type of indirect rent. In the case 
of write-offs state expenditure allocated for debt-servicing was freed up, potentially 
increasing the funds available on the rent circuit. With equity swaps, foreign debt is 
converted into FDI in an existing or new Jordanian company. The local companies then 
receive not only investment but also foreign technology and expertise, which give them 
advantages over their local rivals. Although usually a one-off exercise, and given the 
limited volumes available, in the short term access to the rent of debt-for-equity can be 
an important element in creating rent-seeking competition within the rentier elite. In the 
longer term, two possible outcomes are possible. If the debt for equity swap has 
resulted in a new company, the business will be less likely to be dependent on the state, 
resulting in a desire to separate the private and public spheres. If, however, the 
investment is in an existing company with close ties to the state, the blurring of private 
and public sectors will remain unchanged. Consequently, the investment will enable 
continuing access to any rent controlled by the state. 
Importantly for Jordan's perilous finances, the 1989 agreement with the IMF 
allowed debt-rescheduling arrangements to be initiated with both the Paris and London 
Clubs of debtors. 163 Around half the external debt was owed to members of the Paris 
Club, with a further 15% to non-Paris Club official creditors, such as the Arab countries 
and the former Soviet Union; commercial debt accounted for another 15%. 164 Finance 
Minister Basil Jardaneh opened negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs, 
requesting that US$650m of debt be rescheduled. The figure covered approximately 
65% of the total of debt repayments due in 1989 to external creditors. The remaining 
35% was to be financed by new multilateral loans and Arab donors. 165 In the event, the 
Paris Club signed an agreement on the 19th July 1989 covering part of the debt of 
US$1.213bn 166 due in 1989 and of US$1.278bn 167 in 1990. 168 Taking into account the 
need for currency to pay for imports of goods and services and to increase reserves, "the 
gap needing exceptional foreign currency finances through the rescheduling amounts to 
US$656m for 1989 and US$622m for 1990."169 Accordingly, the Paris Club agreed to 
reschedule US$696m for 1989 and US$676m for 1990, with repayment over ten years, 
including a period of five years' grace (table 5.9). 170 
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Table 5.9 
Paris Club Agreements, 1989-2000 
1,372 
6/93* 1,400 
6/97 1,215 
5/97 308 
2/99 450 
*Extended, in July 1993, to include debt repayments due until February 1994. 
** Details of the grace period not released. 
On the 11th September, the London Club committee, with a total debt of 
US$1.2bn, agreed in principle to reschedule debts over an eleven-year period with five 
years' grace on US$575m of debt falling between January 1989 and June 1991. Under 
the agreement, Jordan was required to meet its interest of US$82m in full in 1989.171 
However, the Jordanian cabinet rejected the deal as not being sufficiently favourable. 
In November, agreement in principle to release US$50m in new loans (from previously 
undisbursed funds) was forthcoming, but the London Club refused to drop the interest 
rate from 0.8125% to 0.625% over London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. 172 However, the 
banks did cut their management fee to 0.125% from 0.375%. 173 The loan was 
contingent on the payment of outstanding interest. By the time of the invasion of 
Kuwait, the agreement remained incomplete, mainly due to differences regarding 
Jordan's request to include a debt buy-back option. 174 
Immediately prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Finance Minister J ardaneh 
announced a three-pronged policy for dealing with foreign commercial debt: 
+ Using idle industrial capacity as a basis for debt-export exchanges; 
+ Encouraging new investment through debt equity swaps; and 
+ Buying-back debt via concessionary loans from the World Bank and other 
international agencies. 
The IDRD was reported to be happy with the third prong of the strategy as "long as they 
[the government] have adopted a sound, medium-term economic policy." Commercial 
debt at that stage could be purchased at 50-70% of its face value. 175 
As the Soviet Union was not a member of the Paris Club, separate negotiations 
began on the 7th August 1989. After protracted negotiations, an agreement, which was 
highly favourable to Jordan, was reached in February 1990 on US$214m worth of 
repayments due in 1989 and 1990. US$42m of the debt, representing interest due in 
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1989 and 1990, along with the bulk of arrears, was to be bartered for exports. A 
US$4m interest payment was to be made in cash before the 15th March, with the 
remaining US$168m rescheduled over twelve years with six years' grace at a fixed 
interest of 5%. 176 In addition, official debt from Brazil was purchased at a large 
discount. 177 
The collapse of the economy and the debt negotiations following the Gulf War 
resulted in overdue obligations increasing to almost US$800m by the end of 1991, with 
an estimated debt-servicing for 1992 of US$1 bn, 178 around 40% of exports of goods and 
services. The approval of the IMF standby agreement in February 1992 was followed in 
the same month by a second rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club. Debt relief 
was obtained on: 
"all interest and amortization on account of pre-cutoff date which would be 
falling due during an 18-month period beginning on January 1, 1992 and all 
amortization arrears and 50 percent of interest accumulated up to end-
1991."179 
The terms were softer than under the 1989 agreement. 180 The agreement was extended 
in July 1993 in line with the standby arrangement to the end of February 1994. The 
agreement provided for selling or exchange of debt, debt for aid, debt for equity swaps 
or other local currency swaps. 181 
The commercial banks took a pragmatic view of Jordan's situation, realising that 
even with generous debt-rescheduling, debt service ratios would remain threateningly 
high. As reserves strengthened following the repatriation of savings by the returnees, 
the government was able to buy-back debt at a considerable discount. For example, in 
early 1993 the authorities were able to buy debt totalling about US$600m for 
US$115m. 182 Agreement in principle with the London Club was finally reached on the 
30th June 1993 and formalised on the 23rd December 1993. The agreement covered 
principal of US$736m and around US$121 m of interest. As a result of the 
reschedulings, the stock of arrears fell from a peak of US$780m by the end of 1991 to 
about US$120m at the end of 1992, and only US$11 m one year later. 183 
Following the approval of the EFF facility in May 1994, a further rescheduling 
agreement was negotiated with the Paris Club. The sum of US$1215m, corresponding 
to all debt due for three years from the 1st July 1994, including debts of US$322m 
previously rescheduled in 1989, was rescheduled over twenty years, with a ten year 
grace period. 184 In recognition of the attempts to implement policy reform, the terms 
concluded were more favourable than the standard terms applied to other debtors, which 
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were for fifteen years with seven to eight years' grace. The IMF estimated that total 
debt relief by the Paris Club during the consolidation period from the 1st July 1994 to 
the 31st December 1997 was US$1.2bn. 185 
A further agreement was negotiated with the Paris Club in autumn 1996. 
Principal of US$250m and interest of US$58m due for repayment between July 1996 
and May 1997 was rescheduled over fifteen years, with repayments commencing in 
June 1999. 186 The shorter time-scale was an indicator of the perceived recovery of the 
economy. By May 1997, Jordan was again in discussions with the Paris Club members 
over rescheduling debts. On this occasion, the government was hoping to reschedule 
US$520m worth of debt, falling due between the 1st June 1997 and the end of the SAP 
agreement in February 1999. 187 Agreement was reached in June for US$450m worth of 
bilateral debt and export credits. The former was rescheduled over twenty-two years, 
with a ten-year grace period, while the latter was over twenty years, with a moratorium 
of five years. 188 The final Paris Club agreement in the period was concluded in May 
1999, following the new IMF package agreed earlier in the year. The agreement 
rescheduled US$787m of debt, amounting to US$397 in principal and US$390m in 
interest 189 due between the 31st March 1999 and the 30th April2002, over twenty years. 
The agreement also allowed the government to conduct debt swaps of US$1 06m with 
Germany, France and Spain at a discount rate of 50%. 190 At the same time, an 
agreement was concluded to reschedule between US$200m 191 and US$350m 192 in non-
Paris Club official debt. The agreement reduced debt-servicing for 2000 by around 30% 
from 14.2% ofGDP to 8.6% ofGDP. 193 
The bilateral arrangements under the Paris Club agreements resulted in different 
styles of dealing with the problem of debt, including a number of outright write-offs. 
Significantly, the political realities of the Middle East imposed considerably on the 
methods of dealing with the debt. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, the sole approach by 
the creditor nations was to offer simple rescheduling. During the actual crisis, although 
a number of the creditor countries promised and delivered economic assistance in the 
form of grants to cope with the humanitarian aspects of the war, the same countries did 
not consider writing-off any of the outstanding debts. This stance was probably due to 
the position of King Hussein in seeking an Arab, rather than international, solution to 
the invasion. Indeed, negotiations on rescheduling were put on the back burner during 
the war. 
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With its rehabilitation into the world community following the start of the peace 
process in Madrid in 1991, and in particular after the signing of the peace agreement 
with Israel, Jordan was in a stronger position to negotiate various forms of debt-retiral, 
rather than rescheduling, which merely postpones the day of reckoning. By the end of 
1993, Jordan was actively seeking debt write-offs from Washington. In July 1994, on 
his return from the USA King Hussein stated that his talks explored "a formula to lift or 
cancel the debts." 194 He acknowledged that the American administration was willing to 
assist Jordan, but the support was conditional on participation in the peace process and a 
meeting between King Hussein and the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzak Rabin. The 
King was quoted as saying that "if the meeting between me and the Israeli Prime 
Minister is a price to change the picture of this country, I will not hesitate at all and 
consider it a service for my country." 195 On the day of the signing of the Peace Treaty 
between Israel and Jordan, President Clinton promised "to assist Jordan in dealing with 
its burden of debt and its defence requirements . . . I am working with Congress to 
achieve rapid action on both these matters." 196 Shortly after the signing, Congress 
approved a bill allowing the first tranche of debt to be written-off. The US was 
expected to cut US$696m of the US$950m debt in three stages in 1994 ($190m), 1995 
($252m) and 1996 ($254m). 197 When the agreement was signed, the US Ambassador to 
Jordan, Wesley Egan, stated "[t]he US government will support those who take risks for 
peace." 198 Again the idea of the tranches was to ensure that Jordan remained onside in 
the peace process. Later in the same month President Clinton wrote a public letter 
asking the leaders of the Paris Club to take urgent action to relieve Jordan's debts. 199 At 
the same time, the UK announced that £60m (US$92m) of debt would be converted to 
grants (i.e. effectively a write-off). 200 
The influence of political developments within the donor countries was evident in 
the debt write-off from America. Congress first permitted debt forgiveness up to 
US$220m in the Conference Report on FY 1995 Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill 
(H.Rept. 103-633, August 1st, 1994) but the Report added that to obtain further debt 
relief Jordan should sign a final peace agreement with Israel, abrogate the Arab 
economic boycott, and comply with sanctions against Iraq. In March 1995, Congress 
initially refused to sanction the US$252m write off scheduled for 1995, offering, instead 
US$50m. On the 29th July, the House of Representatives agreed that the full amount 
should be written-off, but only US$50m prior to October 1995; the remainder 
thereafter. 201 Within six months, the US promised to cancel all the outstanding debts 
(US$488m),202 the agreement being signed on the 25th September. As a quid pro quo 
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the promise was swiftly followed by the cancellation of a series of Jordanian laws 
banning economic contact with Israel. 
Other methods of debt reduction were also forthcoming. In November 1993, an 
agreement had been signed in which Switzerland wrote-off JD 16.5m, in return for 
Jordan financing development projects to the tune of JD4.5m.203 The following year, 
Germany reduced its debt by DM50m, in exchange for Jordan committing 50% of the 
funds against environmental projects.204 The Jordanian Cabinet approved the first debt 
for equity swap in April 1996. The UK was to sell £35m (US$53m) of debt at 50% of 
its face value to companies wishing to invest in Jordan. In addition, ACCOR of France 
was given approval to use the agreement to cover its US$5.5m equity stake in the Arab 
European Company for Tourism and Hotel Management. 205 A further debt-equity swap 
with France was approved in July. 206 
4.1 Debt, the State and Economic Liberalisation 
Although Jordan has been successful in obtaining debt rescheduling, debt buy-
backs, debt write-offs, debt swaps and debt for equity swaps, 207 due in considerable part 
to the pressure imposed on the bilateral donor community by the USA after 1993, the 
overhang of debt still inhibits domestic and foreign private sector investment, as well as 
threatening economic growth. As can be seen from figure 5.4, the levels of external 
debt have actually increased since 1993, while the percentage of external debt to GDP 
after a initial dramatic fall (from 245.2% in 1989 to 115.8% in 1993) decreased only 
slowly thereafter, before increasing in 1999 to 90.6% and dropping again in 2000 to 
79.8%. One notable exception in the support for debt reduction has been the main 
debtor, Japan. In line with its philosophy for OEA, Japan emphasises the need for self-
help, which does not include a policy of debt write-offs. 
The case of the debt rescheduling highlights the considerable influence of geo-
political factors on the ability of the state to continue a policy of rent-seeking. While 
rescheduling can only be considered a very short term form of rent-seeking, other forms 
of retiring debt, such as write-offs and swaps can potentially be a major one-off source 
of rent. Early attempts at retiring debt were constrained by the conditionality of the 
IMF programme, then by the Second Gulf War. However, the international 
rehabilitation, in particular after 1994, allowed the state to adopt rent-seeking on a more 
pro-active basis. Despite America's efforts to encourage the donor community to 
undertake large-scale debt write-offs, 208 these peaked at just over US$200m in 1995, 
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before falling annually to US$94.8m in 1999. Significantly, although debt rescheduling 
arrangements have been closely linked with IMF policies, the more important debt 
write-off's, such as those by the USA, have tended to be political in nature. The political 
aspect has encouraged the state as an institution to continue to adopt a rentier mentality 
in this field. 
Figure 5.4 
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5.0 THE OEA COMMUNITY 
Having analysed the involvement of the IMF and World Bank and the process of 
the debt rescheduling involvement over the period from 1989 to 2000, the study now 
turns to ODA/OEA. The main details are indicated in table 5.10. Over the period, in 
terms of actual funding, bilateral ODA has been significantly more important than 
multilateral ODA, accounting for almost 76% of the total. However, the figures are 
distorted considerably in 1990 when only US$32.9m of the total of US$970.0 was 
provided by the multilateral agencies. In the later years, bilateral assistance tended to 
account for around two-thirds of the total OD A. Two bilateral donors have dominated 
the scene in Jordan, Japan and the USA, followed by Germany and the Arab countries 
although since the Gulf War the Arab OEA contribution has virtually disappeared. 
Following these donors are of lesser importance have been France, Italy and the UK 
(despite the latter's close historical links). In the multilateral field, the EC has become 
an increasingly important donor, outperforming Germany in the last few years. Since 
1992, the UNR W A has been the most consistent donor, averaging just over US$70m pa. 
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Table 5.10 
Total ODA and Grants, 1989-1999 (US$m) 
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Total Bilateral of which 322.1 937.2 714.5 329.9 194.3 466.0 449.2 355.5 365.3 333.9 350.5 4818.4 
Japan 14.3 165.9 443.1 126.4 45.5 106.7 184.2 123.7 143.8 54.8 76.9 1485.3 
USA 70.0 66.0 38.0 64.0 57.0 259.0 152.0 49.0 132.0 140.0 170.2 1197.2 
Germany 29.5 174.7 128.0 64.0 29.2 35.3 36.4 73.7 35.7 58.6 64.1 729.2 
Arab Countries 174.7 456.1 4.4 2.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 637.9 
France 3.8 10.6 20.9 29.5 5.9 24.8 21.9 22.7 13.3 17.0 13.7 184.1 
Italy 6.2 12.4 9.2 5.4 28.8 17.0 17.8 54.1 10.2 8.7 2.3 172.1 
UK 8.4 9.9 5.5 5.5 7.3 10.2 19.5 13.6 15.2 41.0 7.5 143.6 
Total Multilateral of which 23.9 32.9 249.2 123.0 146.9 163.3 157.3 193.1 183.3 143.4 H9.1 1535.4 
EC 4.2 6.6 193.2 40.8 43.7 57.6 61.9 120.1 93.2 56.6 21.7 699.6 
UNRWA 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.2 63.3 71.4 77.3 65.2 76.8 76.0 83.0 576.2 
Arab Agencies 5.6 4.2 23.3 3.9 28.5 24.8 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.8 99.3 
Total ODA .. 346.0-70.0 963.8 452.9 341.3 629.3 606.5 548.6 548.6 477.4 469.6 6354.0 
r~t>·';t:~. iGRAN!l'~~> .. Jl!i~;t,!ft ~·,~b ~~~ 'L A. ,x; •,;;:" "'"*t !";;~~ . '':,~1%f::l!ic} .;·x',~~:;,J~~~~:~'!~·:l>v 4l';lK'-1r:~~t' ~t t1 J rAt..AW ,,k~:!vl~~ £ .. ,81:: '4 ~1. 
Total Bilateral of which 268.4 714.5 222.6 120.2 96.1 307.9 251.7 151.4 214.4 238.2 289.4 2874.8 
USA 63.0 61.0 36.0 44.0 32.0 243.0 138.0 30.0 106.0 122.6 170.2 1045.8 
Arab Countries 159.8 440.5 1.0 2.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 604.0 
Germany 15.9 141.8 105.8 20.6 19.9 18.2 25.7 35.6 20.8 24.8 27.5 456.6 
Japan 7.4 8.5 6.7 5.1 7.9 11.2 42.5 46.4 49.3 29.2 63.8 278.0 
UK 4.1 9.2 4.8 5.4 7.3 10.2 19.5 13.6 15.2 41.0 7.5 137.8 
Italy 3.0 6.7 6.4 4.7 5.1 4.6 5.6 3.1 4.4 2.3 2.3 48.2 
France 3.0 5.3 2.3 5.3 3.3 7.7 3.1 4.1 3.8 4.4 5.0 47.3 
Total Multilateral of which 17.6 25.4 221.7 114.6 105.3 127.9 126.7 159.9 148.7 95.5 101.9 1245.2 
I EC 3.8 6.5 193.2 39.9 30.7 47.3 37.1 88.5 59.9 11.4 11.0 529.3 
UNRWA 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.2 63.3 71.4 77.3 65.2 76.8 76.0 83.0 576.2 
Total Grants 285.9 739.9 444.3 234.8 201.5 435.8 378.3 311.3 363.1 333.7 391.3 4119.9 
Source: Adapted, for 1989 to 1998 inclusive OECD, (2000), International Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 edition (Paris: OECD) and for 1999 OECD, "International 
Development Statistics: Online Databases", OECD website, http://www.oecd.ore:/dac/htm/online.htm#dac/o. 
Totals may not agree due to rounding. 
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Multilateral OEA has also been important, in that 80.7% of multilateral funding 
has been in the form of grants, compared with less than 58% of bilateral funding. All 
the UNRW A funding has been in grants, as has over 76% of EC funding. In the 
bilateral field, the figures are distorted by the Arab countries, which in the early years of 
the period gave the majority of the funding in the form of grants. The difference 
between the Japanese and American assistance is apparent when the level of grants is 
analysed. Although the Japanese have been the major donor, only 15.2% of the funds 
have been in grants, whereas 85.3% of US funding has been in grants. Indeed, Japan is 
behind both Germany and the Arab countries as to the level of grants. 
Once again, the time series shows the importance of donors' national interests on 
the flow of OEA, resulting in fluctuations in the flow. The reactions of the various 
donors to the Gulf War are a prime example. Arab and American assistance virtually 
dried up, as both sides interpreted the Jordanian position as pro-Iraqi. By contrast, 
Japan, which is reliant on Middle Eastern oil supplies and consequently needs regional 
stability, provided in 1991 over 30% of its total assistance for the period. The American 
involvement has fluctuated dependent on the changes of Washington's perception of 
Jordan's role in the stability of the region, particularly towards the peace process. The 
opening of the Madrid Peace Conference paved the way for increased levels of US 
OEA. The signing of the Peace Treaty with Israel coincided with the peak in US 
assistance followed by a slump as the situation in the Arab-Israeli peace process 
stagnated. In recent years, as the US has attempted to move the peace forward, Jordan 
has again benefited from assistance. 
5.1 Bilateral Donors 
This section briefly analyses the bilateral involvement of Japan, the USA, 
Germany and the UK, bearing in mind that each country has a different structure for and 
national interest in providing OEA to Jordan. In addition to the bilateral funding, each 
donor also contributes to multilateral organisations such as the EU, the UN, the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
5.1.1 Japan 
In the last decade, despite its own economic crisis, Japan has remained Jordan's 
largest contributor of soft loans. OEA has also been provided by way of grants, the first 
of which was issued in 1993 for health and medicine, with a second in 1994 for 
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stmctural adjustment and technical assistance. Japan issued an ODA Charter in 1992, 
stating that its philosophy is to "support the self-help efforts of developing countries" 
and stressing the importance of the environment and human rights. This philosophy, 
Kohama argues, made the situation difficult when Jordan had to continually seek further 
debt rescheduling programmes, particularly at a time when Japanese OEA was under 
the twin pressures of its own economic downturn and the need to provide assistance 
towards the crisis countries in East Asia.209 Japanese OEA to Jordan is predicated on 
three factors: 
+ Jordan's active commitment to the Middle East peace process, coupled with 
Jordan's stability as being integral to peace in the Middle East; 
+ Jordan's active promotion of democratisation and economic reform; and 
+ The good relationship between the two countries, including their royal families. 210 
Following the signing of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, the Japanese 
government established a committee to study Japan's OEA to Jordan. The Committee 
on the Country Study for Japan's Official Development Assistance to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, under the auspices of the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), issued their report in March 1996. The report answers two main questions: 
'why give assistance to Jordan?' and 'what kind of assistance is most appropriate?' In 
answer to the first question the committee argues that 
"assistance to Jordan is integral to support for the Middle East peace process 
and coincides with Japan's national interests in terms of pursuit of security 
and stability throughout the world, including in the Middle East. Japan 
ought also to take into account, of course, that Jordan is striving to become 
more democratic and economically independent; more fundamentally, 
assistance for Jordan has strategic importance to sustain the process of 
regional conflict resolution. "211 
Japan considers that its assistance to Jordan helps to promote Jordan's political 
and economic stability and the regional economy's development, bearing in mind the 
Palestinian question. With these points in mind the committee's report argues that three 
basic OEA orientations should be considered: 
"1) laying the foundations for economic stability and development; 
2) supporting the stability and sustainable development of Jordan's domestic 
communities; and 
3) assisting the Jordanian economy to become a more active entrepot site in 
prospect of the regional economies take-off."212 
In each of these orientations the report lists a number of priority areas for Japanese 
OEA, including support for stmctural adjustment through small grants for 'safety net' 
assistance, for economic infrastmcture (including power and transportation), and for the 
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promotion of industry (particularly small-scale business, tourism, Qualifying Industrial 
Zones (QIZs), and the development of Aqaba region). The report further stresses the 
need for these priorities to comply with "the stipulations of the ODA charter, [and] 
stress on self-help efforts" among other aspects.213 The emphasis on the self-help 
aspect is reinforced later in the report, which stresses that Jordan must be informed at 
every opportunity that continued support depends on the government making 
"independent efforts to end its financial and economic dependence on other 
countries."214 
The Committee is not optimistic that in the short-term (i.e. by 1999) Jordan could 
complete its SAP, arguing that "Jordan is still far from being fully equipped with large-
scale infrastructure and from receiving appreciable foreign investments."215 The 
analysis highlights three types of assistance: short-term, medium and long-term, based 
on the assumptions that the Arab-Israeli dispute would move forward, spreading 
tangible economic benefits and the situation in Iraq would normalise, allowing trade 
with Jordan to recover. Short-term assistance should be designed to permit the 
following: 
"1) to facilitate the various reforms now under way; 
2) to foster Jordan's industry to give its economy a strong foundation; 
3) to make it possible for Jordanians to recognise tangible peace dividends; 
and 
4) to provide backing for the various schemes for establishing co-operative 
ties between Jordan and other countries in the Middle East and give an 
economic underpinning to the political (Middle East peace) process."216 
According to the report, medium-term Japanese OEA should aim: 
"1) to foster industry and better establish Jordanian institutions to activate 
the economy effectively; 
2) to facilitate regional economic co-operation within the Eastern [sic] 
countries and building of infrastructure; and 
3) to meet basic human needs (BHN) and achieve social development."217 
In the long-term (1 0 years), the Report argues that Jordan will have to be more 
economically independent, but that problems with a growing population could create an 
increased economic and social burden. To overcome these difficulties, long-term OEA 
should build the foundations for investment tailored to regional economic development 
and direct attention at improving economic and social infrastructures to make 
sustainable development possible.218 
Following the publication of the report, discussions were held with the Jordanian 
government, after which the Japanese priorities became: 
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o The improvement of basic necessities of life, such as water, food, health and 
education; 
o The promotion of industry, through tourism and transit trade infrastructure, and 
human resource development; and 
0 Environmental protection. 
To this end, a three-year policy advisory co-operation agreement was signed in 
September 1996. The agreement was based on the need for a close relationship of trust 
between the people and the government, with the latter sharing information with the 
population. The objectives of the programme were: 
o The creation of a vision on industrial development and a formulation of coherent 
policies; 
o The improvement of communication between the public and private sectors; 
~ The strengthening of long-term financing facilities for industry; and 
0 The strengthening of the management capabilities of the private sector. 219 
Unlike other members of the donor community, the Japanese have not stressed the 
need to adopt Washington consensus-style economic liberalisation. They do not want to 
amputate companies from the body of the public sector and attach them to the private 
sector. JICA argues that the way forward is to help the formation of a small, vibrant 
independent private sector. Thereafter, parts of the public sector would automatically 
move over to the private sector. JICA's future role, therefore, will be to assess which 
sectors of the economy to develop. However, the Japanese are not optimistic about the 
private sector's will or ability to grow independently of the public sector. 
Consequently, current projects are aimed at attempting to vitalise the private sector.220 
One such project, the Jordanian-Japan Industrial Co-operation Programme, funded 
by the Japanese, is run under the auspices of the Higher Council for Science and 
Technology. The programmes has four objectives: 
• Creating a vision for industrial development in Jordan; 
o Financing: long-term finance is generally unavailable in Jordan, with even the IDB 
only granting short- to medium-term loans. The Japanese use two-steps loans, with 
government-to-government soft loans then being on-lent via the IDB to the private 
sector at a higher, but still less than market, rate; 
~ Enhancing communications between the private and public sectors, although this 
element is still in its infancy; and 
0 Improving the managerial capacity of the private sector. 221 
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Table 5.11 
USA Assistance to Jordan, 1990-2000 (US$m) 
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1990 I 0.0 I 3.7 I 137.0 I 67.8 I 2.1 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 13.3 I 223.8 
1991 I 0.0 I 31.1 I 30.0 I 20.0 I 1.1 0.0 I 0.0 I o.o I o.o I 22.9 I 105.1 
1992 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 30.0 I 20.0 I 0.6 0.0 I 20.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 9.1 I 79.8 
1993 I o.o I 65.0 I o.o I 9.0 I 0.5 I o.o I 30.0 I o.o I o.o I o.o I 104.5 
1994 I 4.0 I 24.0 I 35.0 I 9.0 I 0.8 I o.o I 15.0 I 219.9 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 307.7 
1995 I 5.0 I 7.2 I 15.0 I 7.3 I 1.0 I 0.5 I 21.0 I 417.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 474.2 
1996 I 0.0 I 7.2 I 40.0 I 100.0 I 1.2 I 0.4 I 15.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 163.8 
1997 I 6.0 I 120.0 I 40.0 I 30.0 I 1.6 I 1.4 I 21.0 I 63.5 I 200.0 I 0.0 I 483.5 
1998 I 0.0 I 140.0 I 40.0 I 50.0 I 1.6 I 0.0 I 15.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 246.6 
'I 1999 0.0 150.0 60.0 45.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 271.6 I 
~I 2ooo o.o 15o.o 6o.o 45.o 1.6 o.o o.o o.o o.o 15.o 271.61 
Total 15.0 698.2 487.0 403.1 13.6 2.3 137.0 700.6 200.0 75.3 2,732.2 1 
%of Total I 0.55 I 25.55 I 17.82 I 14.75 I 0.50 I 0.08 I 5.01 I 25.64 I 7.32 I 2.76 I 100.0 
Source: Adapted from USAID files. 
Notes: 
Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
* GSM for FY 1999 includes US$20 for the private sector. 
**In FY 1996 a transfer of US$100 in military equipment was also made. 
Abbreviations: 
DA 
ESF 
GSM 
FMF 
IMET 
TDA 
PL480 
Section 416b 
Development Assistance in the form of grants to promote sustainable development. 
Economic Support Fund in the form of grants to advance economic and social development. 
Soft loans to import food commodities. Repayment terms four to ten years. 
Foreign Military Fund provides grant military assistance. 
International Military Education and Training provides grant assistance to train military personnel in the US. 
Trade Development agency provides grant assistance to conduct feasibility studies in promoting bilateral trade. 
Public Law 480, is a soft loan to purchase agricultural commodities from the US Department of Agriculture. 
A donation of US agricultural commodities that are sold in the local markets. 
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5.1.2 Ul!llited States of America 
The USA 222 has been providing economic aid since 1951 and military aid since 
1957.223 Total aid to 1990 was almost US$3.5bn, of which US$1.9bn (54.3%) was in 
the form of economic assistance. From 1990 to 2000 total OEA was US$2.73bn, with 
US$0.71bn (26.4%) in the form of economic assistance (table 5.11). Four overlapping 
periods of American assistance to Jordan can be discerned, with the focus of each 
preceding time-span being carried forward to each of the following eras: 
o Budgetary assistance and basic infrastructure provision, from 1951: the focus of the 
infrastructure provision centred mainly around transport networks, and basic 
physical infrastructure in social welfare, such as health, education; 
0 Institution building, from the early 1970s: the emphasis switched from physical 
infrastructure to a developmental focus on the provision of the 'basic needs' of 
water, housing, health and education; 
o Private sector and NGO building, from the mid-1980s: local Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) were boosted by grants to Bani Hamida, Queen Alia Fund, 
Jordan River Design and Noor al-Hussein Foundation,224 while the private sector 
was assisted through the establishment of the Jordan Trade Association and other 
export-oriented project drives; the launching of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) initiatives; and an equipment financing programme; and 
o Expansion of USAID, from 1997: The expansion allowed renewed emphasis on 
budgetary support, infrastructure provision, institution building and private sector 
development on a hitherto, unprecedented scale, adding depth to scale. 
Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bush administration placed a hold 
on the disbursement of both economic and military assistance. Indeed, in March 1991 
the US Congress approved a bill cutting off aid, which was frozen the previous month, 
in response to the King's televised statement on the 6th February when he asserted that 
h A . . . I h 22s t e mencans were trymg to assert a reg10na egemony. A spokesperson for 
USAID stated that if the payments were to resume then they would be used "to provide 
financial and technical support to the private sector as the main engine for growth and 
employment generation."226 The sums involved were US$57.2m for 1991 and US$50m 
in undisbursed aid for 1990. Congress then suspended FY 1991 227 funds under 
emergency legislation (P.L. 102-27, April 10, 1993, section 502): 
"unless the President certified and reported to appropriate congressional 
committees that the Government of Jordan has taken steps to advance the 
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peace process in the Middle East, or that furnishing assistance to Jordan 
would be beneficial to the peace process in the Middle East."228 
In addition, Section 586D of P.L. 101-513 prohibited the use of aid funds to countries 
not in compliance with the UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq. The President 
could over-ride this legislation if the actions were deemed to be in the national interest 
of the USA. President Bush waived the suspension of economic assistance in July 1991 
and military assistance in September. However, following discussions between the 
White House and Congress, an informal hold was maintained on FY1991 
disbursements, with the exception of US$1.245m International Military Education and 
Training funding. The Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-
391, October 6, 1992) retained the ban on assistance to Jordan, even strengthening the 
conditions needed for the Presidential waiver. The President had to ensure that: 
+ Jordan had taken steps to advance the peace process in the Middle East; 
+ Jordan complied with UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq; and 
+ The assistance given to Jordan was in the national interest of the USA. 
Not until early 1993, following consultations with the congressional committees 
did the Bush administration begin to release FY1991 funds. By late July 1993, all the 
FY1991 and FY1992 funds had been disbursed. Following the signing of the Jordan-
Israeli agreement to a bilateral agenda on the 17th September 1993, the President signed 
the waiver. The Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act for FY1994 (P.L. 103-87, 
September 30, 1993), which was drawn up prior to the bilateral agreement, maintained a 
strong line against assistance to Jordan, with the President once more waiving the 
restrictions on the 13th January 1994. The Acts for the following years did not contain 
any stipulations on assistance to Jordan, but continued to stress the need for any country 
to comply with the UN sanctions against Iraq. The battles of Presidents Bush and 
Clinton against Congress concerning assistance to Jordan were a reflection of the 
position on debt write-offs in 1994 and 1995 discussed in the earlier section. By 
November 1996, relations between the two countries had improved to the position 
whereby Jordan was decreed a 'major non-NATO ally', entitling the Kingdom to 
priority military aid. 
US economic assistance to Jordan took off following a visit by King Hussein to 
Washington in November 1997 in response to the worsening economic situation. Prior 
to the visit, the talk within USAID had been that Jordan was about to turned into a 
"limited presence country."229 King Hussein was able to build on a number of factors, 
which allowed for increased US-Jordanian co-operation. Two groups of American 
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politicians, both with members of the Appropriations Committee of their respective 
Houses, had visited Jordan prior to King Hussein's Washington visit. The Jordanian 
presentations to these politicians were extremely persuasive. The King's response, both 
verbally and in allowing the allies access to Kamal Hussein, President Saddam 
Hussein's son-in-law, further increased Jordan's standing. In addition, King Hussein 
was credited with playing a major part in pushing through the Hebron agreement 
between the PNA and Israel in January 1997.23° Finally, on the 17th June 1997, 
President Clinton had highlighted the importance of providing extra assistance for 
countries supporting the peace process. Following the visit, the level of American 
funding increased dramatically, from a budget of US$7m in FY1996 to US$126m in 
FY1997, to US$140m in 1998,231 and US$200 in FY1999 and FY2000,232 at a time 
when the overall US OEA budget was being cut. This expansion of USAID activities 
from 1997 added depth to the already agreed 1997-2001 programme. Indeed over 25% 
of total US assistance over the 50 years of the relationship was provided in the years 
from 1997 to 2000. However, the USAID/Jordan Mission Director, Lewis Lucke, gave 
two notes of warning. At a meeting of the Rotary Club in Amman on the 31st August 
1999, he stated that: 
"these funding levels are extraordinarily high .... They cannot and will not 
last forever. They do, however provide Jordan with an important 'window 
of opportunity', offering valuable support for a more long-term economic 
restructuring process that can and must take place. "233 
Later in the speech he emphasised that Jordan should not rely on foreign assistance for 
its development strategy, as "over the long-term, it is private capital, not government 
funds, which will truly transform Jordan."234 
What, then, has been the focus of USAID in Jordan since 1989? As early as 1987 
USAID was attempting to raise the profile of the private sector in Jordan. In the 
Congressional Presentation for FY1988,235 four constraints on the growth of the private 
sector are highlighted for action: 
+ Market entry restrictions caused by government controls; 
+ Inadequate incentive structure caused by pricing controls, taxes and exchange rates; 
+ Controls of financial markets which tend to work against private sector investment 
and the ability to raise working capital; and 
+ Government ownership. 
Interestingly, the Presentation argues that "given the high level of interest of Jordanian 
officials in the subject [of privatisation], it is possible that significant progress can be 
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made in this area."236 Based on these and other constraints the Presentation proposes a 
series of policy initiatives, which include: 
~ Influencing government policy, to establish a policy framework which was 
conducive to private sector growth through specific initiatives, including studies on 
the above-mentioned constraints; an analysis of revenue collection and its impact on 
private sector investment; training for policy-makers concerned with the private 
sector; and funding for the development of private sector advocacy groups such as a 
Consumers' Association, a Manufacturers' Association, and a Private Sector 
Association; 
~ Assisting with privatisation, through helping create a viable privatisation policy, and 
assisting SOEs to develop a privatisation programme; 
• Overcoming financial constraints, through the transfer of technology and 
encouraging institutional development; 
~ Establishing or strengthening private sector business organisations, including the 
Jordanian Business Forum, a Manufacturers' Association, and an Exporters' 
Association; and 
~ Overcoming the lack of marketing skills and investment opportunities.237 
The emphasis on the need for private sector investment to improve, expand and sustain 
productive capacity and employment remained a key feature of the successive annual 
congressional presentations. 
The prescription of the private sector as the medicine to cure the ills of the 
economy was underlined when the IMF and World Bank became involved, dispensing a 
similar prescription. USAID issued a 'Strategy for Sustainable Development' in March 
1994 that had five objectives: 
+ The protection of the environment; 
+ The building of democracy; 
+ The stabilisation of world population growth and the protection of human health; 
• The encouragement of broad-based economic growth; and 
+ The provision of humanitarian assistance and aiding post-crisis transition.238 
Noticeably, despite the new emphasis on poverty in the global development ideology, 
the USAID objectives did not address this particular aspect directly: indeed there was 
little on human development. Simultaneously, USAID began targeting its policy in 
Jordan through a number of Strategic Objectives (SOs) all within the overall objective 
of achieving broad-based economic growth. Two of these SOs have been consistent: 
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water, and health and population. The third has evolved with time from 'increasing 
foreign exchange earnings from selected export industries and services' from FY 1996, 
to 'enhanced private-sector opportunities' in FY 1998, to the more broad-based 
'increased economic opportunities for Jordanians' in FY 1999. The USAID/Jordan 
strategy for the period from 1997, which was approved in June 1997, had three 
objectives: 
+ Water: improved water resources management; 
+ Economic Opportunities: 239 increased economic opportunities for Jordanians; and 
+ Health and Population: improved access to and quality of reproductive and primary 
health care. 240 
The second SO concerning economic opportunities had three sub-objectives, namely: 
+ Increased access to business services; 
+ More effective identification and implementation of policy reform; and 
+ Improved environment for sustained policy reform. 
The second and third sub-measures were concerned with the government's role in the 
SAP. The first measure was aimed directly at the private sector and based on the 
US AID funded private-sector needs assessment, which was completed in March 1997. 
The report identifies lack of access to financial services as the single most important 
constraint facing SMEs (including micro-enterprises). The other constraints highlighted 
included technology transfer, marketing and management.241 
The need to concentrate on policy reform was based on the assumption that while 
policy reform legislation is relatively easily enacted, implementation is often weak. 
Drawing on experience gained in other countries, USAID identified a number of 
constraints to effective policy implementation, including: 242 
+ The failure of mid-level officials to understand fully the technical aspects of the 
policy reform; 
+ The lack of an obvious constituency to galvanise a reform effort; 
+ An inability to explain properly the reasons for reform to the broader public; and 
+ The lack of effective feedback systems to inform policymakers about what is and 
what is not working. 
USAID decided to concentrate its efforts on making the Investment Promotion 
Corporation (JIPC) effective and efficient, to the extent that nearly 17,000 new jobs and 
over US$4.5bn of new investment would be fotthcoming. In addition, assistance was 
planned to help the Customs Department show a 37% improvement in efficiency over 
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the five years, the major constraints to WTO membership were to be removed or 
significantly reduced, an Intellectual Property Rights bill consistent with WTO 
membership was to be passed, and impediments to businesses were to be significantly 
reduced in the economy. 
Table 5.12 
Current Projects under Economic Opportunities §0 
r¥to1~o 8ramme!h\ci~'~:Y}~'·i··i" t '~t·' ''" .oH·ectiV,~· 
, v. il' Jg't ·=·. . ~. ·. "~ "' 'b . < ·>""'" , "' ·w dl .. . ... e .. A~~:~ 
Increase Access to Business Services 
AMIR Microfinance To increase access to sustainable microfinance at the 
Component (US$11.4m) national level, through commercial banks and NGOs; 
25,000 active borrowers by 2001,50% to be women 
Southern Jordan Access to To increase access to sustainable microfinance in 
Credit Project (US$7.0m) southern Jordan 
Micro-enterprise Business To provide business development training to micro-
Services Grant (US$0.6m) entre_preneurs 
Economic Opportunities for To train and provide hands-on experience to secondary 
Jordanian Youth (INJAZ) students in basic business and economic skills 
(US$5m) 
JUSBP (US$15m) To improve competitiveness, productivity and market 
outreach of private sector finns 
Business Services Program Provide additional program development and 
Support Activities (US$2m) management support for business development 
activities 
Improved Identification and Implementation of Policy Reform 
AMIR Policy Reform To identify and implement key policy, regulatory and 
Component (US$15m) administrative reforms that will promote economic 
_growth and _Q_rivate sector investment/expansion 
AMIR Business Associations To improve the capabilities of business associations to 
Component (US$3.5m) provide services to their members and to effectively 
advocate their economic and commercial interests 
Economic Reform Technical To provide support related to the key economic reform 
Assistance Fund (US$15m) related to trade and investment, the financial sector and 
privatisation 
National Competitiveness To increase the competitiveness of key industries and 
Team Unit (US$0.45m) services through sectoral analysis and research 
Government Debt Issuance To develop a modern domestic government securities 
and Management (US$1 m) market 
Improved Economic Statistics To develop the management structure and statistics 
(US$5.5m) systems at the Department of Statistics to bring in line 
with international best practices 
Im_proved Environment for Sustained Policy Reform 
Balance of Payments, Cash To support and leverage key economic and commercial 
Transfer Program (US$300m) reforms that will promote economic growth and private 
investment/ expansion 
.. Source: Adapted by author. US Embassy, Amman, "From the Office of Economic Opportunities: Current 
Projects", USA Embassy Amman website, http://www.usembassy-amman.org.jo/USAID/current.htm. 
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The third sub-measure was to assist in improving the environment for sustained 
policy reform.243 USAID intended to further develop on trade and investment reform, 
financial and legal sector reform, and to increase public sector efficiency. Among the 
aims of trade and investment reform were accession to the WTO, rationalisation and 
consolidation of tariffs, and reduction of costs of imports related to customs 
administration. The financial and legal sector reforms were to include the introduction 
of modern commercial laws and regulations, more efficient financial intermediation 
through central banking law, strengthened banking supervision, and regulated and 
efficient capital markets. To this end, a cash transfer of US$50m was disbursed in 
September 1997 with the aim of improving the environment for sustained policy reform. 
This transfer was associated with the new Companies Law (May 1997), the new 
Securities Law (May 1997), and the abolishing of the remaining foreign exchange 
controls (June 1997). 
The use of targets as a measure of the success of USAID's economic objective SO 
became explicit in the Congressional Presentation FY1999 when the targets set were: 
~ 25,000 micro-finance borrowers to be active by 2001; 
~ Investments facilitated by the JIPC to have created 17,000 new jobs and investment 
of US$4.5bn by 2001; 
• Three micro-finance institutions to have met best practice principles by 200 I; 
+ Two major privatisations by 1999, with a further three by 2001; and 
+ Accession to the WT0244 to have been achieved by 2000?45 
The assumption behind the SO, subtitled 'Increased Economic Opportunities for 
Jordanians', was that with export growth and increased foreign exchange earnings the 
problem was no longer one of accumulation but now one of sustaining and distributing 
the benefits at a time when the benefits of growth were perceived to be narrowly 
distributed.246 Table 5.12 gives a brief overview of the projects active under the 
economic opportunities SO, while table 5.13 lists the grants in the years 1998 to 2000. 
The Access to Micro-finance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform 
(AMIR) programme was one of the new institutional developments funded by the 
increased levels of American OEA. AMIR is a four-year project, which was launched 
in March 1998. The project has two broad objectives: 
• Transforming Jordan's business environment to stimulate greater investment to meet 
the challenges of economic globalisation; and 
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~ Increasing economic growth with equity through sustainable micro-finance 
initiatives. 
09/06/98 60.0 
09/06/98 13.5 
09/06/98 5.7 
10/08/98 50.0 
10/08/98 4.3 
27110/98 15.0 
20/04/99 6.0 
30/06/99 50.0 
30/06/99 60.0 
30106199 24.7 
30/06/99 10.0 
20/07/99 1.8 
30/08/99 50.0 
12/10/99 0.9 
27/04/00 83.0 
07/05/00 46.2 
06/07/00 13.4 
23/08/00 50.0 
Table 5.13 
USA Grants, 1998-2000 
Economic Opportunities SO: technical assistance and training to 
institutions re olic reform and lobal corn etitiveness 
Water SO 
Economic Opportunities SO: technical assistance for new 
business services activit for SMEs 
Economic Opportunities SO: to three Jordanian organisations 
for micro-finance 
Water SO 
Water SO 
ort 
Water SO 
Economic Opportunities SO: as 30/06/99 plus support for 
A aba re ion 
Sources: Adapted by author. Press releases on USA Embassy, Amman, USA Embassy Amman website, 
http://www. usembassy-amman.org.jo/USAID. 
The programme, which is directed by Chemonics International Inc., a USA 
development firm with a team of Jordanian and US-based sub-contractors, has three 
primary initiatives: 
• Sustainable micro-finance247 based on best practices: 248 the goals within this 
element include institutional sustainability, increased outreach, training, overcoming 
constraints and increasing public knowledge and support for micro-finance. 249 
+ Improved implementation of policy reform: the goals include strengthened 
effectiveness for JIPC, improvements to the customs system, the trade and 
investment environment, the business environment and increased public awareness 
and dialogue; and 
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0 Business Associations: the goals include an increased capacity for policy analysis, 
development of advocacy capacity, training in membership services, increased 
membership of the associations, and the development of business association 
coalitions for advocacy. 250 
The first of these initiatives falls under the sub-objective 'increased access to business 
services', while the second and third are related to 'improved identification and 
implementation of policy reform'. 
The micro-finance project, which is run through the AMIR Program, is a four-
year US$13.4m programme funded entirely by USAID. The aim is to develop a 
sustainable micro-finance industry, based on commercial funding and sound business 
practices. To ensure that 'best practices' are followed, AMIR sponsored a banker's 
workshop on the necessary methodologies in July 1998. According to USAID, these 
practices, if followed, result in a profitable diversified portfolio of low risk loans. The 
first of the new generation of micro-finance schemes (i.e. based on sustainability and 
best practice) commenced in 1994, when the Save the Children Fund established a 
Group Guaranteed Lending and Savings pilot in two of the Amman refugee camps, 
Mahatta and Natheef. The programme proved to be successful and has been rolled out 
in the north from late 1996, through a local NGO, the Jordanian Women's Development 
Society, which was specifically created for the purpose. 251 The Co-operative Housing 
Foundation, in co-ordination with the Jordan River Foundation, initiated a second 
sustainable microfinance project in the south of Jordan. The third project, established in 
October 1999, was the Jordan Micro Credit Company. The company is an offshoot of 
the Noor Hussein Foundation, and was grant-funded to the extent of US$1.73m. The 
medium-term aim of the micro-finance project is to involve the private sector on the 
supply side, as a result of which Jordan National Bank, the Bank of Jordan and the 
Cairo-Amman Bank are all becoming actively involved. 252 
The AMIR programme's focus on the business associations (the third primary 
initiative) has been notable in creating new institutions to offset the power of the 
established organisations of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the JBA. 
These organisations are seen to be "charter corrupted," allowing for a limited-scale 
democracy, which ensures that power remains in the hands of the few?53 Thus AMIR 
has concentrated on the more democratic, flexible organisations of the Young 
Entrepreneurs Association (YEA),254 the Amman World Trade Centre, and the Jordan 
Trade Association. These associations have usually been established by the younger, 
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Western-educated generation of the rentier elite. Thus the split is not so much by those 
outside the elite but a generation split within the elite. The younger generation, unlike 
the older elite, does not see its profits coming from a liaison with the government but 
from a market-oriented economy. This erosion of the rentier mentality has been assisted 
by the continuing 'education' process of the donor community, with programmes of 
discussions, 255 lectures, 256 seminars, 257 workshops, 258 conferences, 259 training courses260 
and media intervention?61 
The programme has funded consultants from the Center for International Private 
Enterprise to work with various business associations262 "to perform diagnostic reviews 
and assist in the preparation of three year strategic plans."263 The major areas of 
emphasis were management, advocacy, membership development, human resource 
development, and stakeholder management. A further goal was the establishment of an 
informal alliance of the business associations that would help promote advocacy to 
create a strong private sector in Jordan. 
The Jordan-United States Business Partnership (JUSBP), which came into 
existence in January 1999, was initially funded by a grant of US$15m, signed on the 
27th October 1998. The grant enables the International Executive Agency for 
International Development, an association of American corporate executives, to provide 
on-site, hands-on management expertise. Lewis Reade, a former director of USAID in 
Jordan, was appointed the CEO of the JUSBP.264 The four-year programme, which 
aims to become self-sustaining, has three main purposes: 
• To provide technical assistance and other consulting servtces to SMEs. The 
programmes are aimed at enhancing productivity, competitiveness, profitability and 
employment, i.e. modernising their management practice; 
• To provide similar assistance to the trade associations, to enable them to pass on the 
expertise to their members and, importantly, improve their awareness and skills in 
advocacy; and 
• To provide technical assistance to the Industrial Development Directorate of the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, to enable them to improve the services offered to 
h · M5 t e pn vate sector. 
Institutionally, a joint committee comprising members of US AID, the JUSBP and 
Ministry of Industry and Trade agree the objectives, with the latter having identified the 
possible projects, providing they fall within the USAID's strategic objectives. 
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According to JUSBP, the programme itself is demand driven, with awareness being 
raised regionally in the media?66 
Within the first seven months of operation four associations267 had already signed 
agreements with JUSBP.268 The initial target for the private sector was to assist three 
hundred and fifty companies by the end of the period. Assistance to the companies is 
usually on a fifty-fifty cost-sharing basis, although as the relationship develops the 
companies have to increase their share of the costs. Having identified a number of 
problems (such as price, quality, management skills and marketing as weak or non-
existent), which affected the level of competitiveness, the JUSBP programme was 
designed around these failings. Interestingly, USAID found access to financial 
resources was only a problem at the micro-level of enterprise. 269 
The Jordan Vision 2020 (JV2020)270 was another project implemented with 
USAID funding. JV2020 was set up through the YEA, who invited other business 
associations to become involved in setting out a path for the economic development of 
Jordan by the year 2020. "The intent is to play a catalytic role in a process in which 
Jordan can emerge as a leader rather than as a follower in terms of its role in the 
regional as well as global marketplace."271 
5.1.3 Others 
German OEA 272 has been "based on a country concept developed by the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development."273 The country concept 
identifies structural deficits specific to the country, and OEA is then used to overcome 
them. Two agencies are used to dispense the assistance: Kreditanstalt flir Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) and the GTZ. As at 1998, the assistance was concentrated in the water and 
sewerage sector, the agricultural sector, social infrastructure, and the promotion of the 
private sector, with environmental projects gaining in importance. 
Promotion of the private sector has largely been through assistance to SMEs via 
the IDB, although this type of funding has recently decreased because the funds by-pass 
the Jordanian government.274 Although not explicitly stated, the implicit assumption 
was that the Germans did not seek the reduction, offering an example of the state 
attempting to maintain control of access to rent. By September 1998, a total of DM73m 
had been committed to the IDB in a series of loans. The seventh such loan, for 
DM20m, was used in sixty-four sub-loans to finance, up to a maximum of 30%, plant 
and equipment and raw material purchases by privately-owned SMEs for civilian needs. 
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The ninth loan, of DM5m, was used to finance investments in environmental protection. 
This loan was part of a move to take into account environmental factors in assisting the 
private sector. Future plans for the private sector revolve around the idea of a Public-
Private Partnership (PPP), but at present these are still on the drawing board.275 
According to Dr Hasse, Team Leader, GTZ in Amman, over the last fifteen years 
the German Government has stmted to question the wisdom of funding OEA through 
the recipient government. Although the majority of OEA still follows this path the 
change in thinking has been brought about by three factors: 
• The German perception that funding through the Ministry of Planning IS not 
reaching the target audience; 
• The ideological change, in that government was deemed to be trying and failing to 
do everything, i.e. OEA was propping up a bad system; and 
+ The realisation for the need for partnership between the donor and the recipient-no 
longer a case of telling and doing by the donor but watching and listening. 276 
The KfW director in Jordan, Richard Avedikian, argues that KfW do not pressure 
Jordan to privatise or take certain courses of action. They are concerned, however, with 
trying to increase co-ordination within the donor community. 277 These two factors are 
often not mutually compatible as the main movers in the donor community are seeking 
to have government adopt certain courses of action. 
The German bilateral assistance agreement follows a laid-out path. First, the 
Germans advise the level of funding, and then the Jordanians submit a three to four 
page document of ideas for funding. The Germans pick the ideas most in line with their 
country programme. The ideas are then discussed over two meetings, before the 
Germans undertake a feasibility study of the projects.278 
British OEA is dispensed through the Department for International Development 
(DFID), (previously the Overseas Development Administration). For the first half of 
the 1990s, the British priority was on education, water and telecommunications?79 By 
the end of the decade, the focus had switched to economic reform/privatisation, 
education and poverty-reduction. The majority of the funding is on a government-to-
government basis but a small amount is channelled directly to local NGOs, via a Small 
Grants Scheme: in the period 1990 to 1998, the UK provided £1.08m to one hundred 
and fifty-two different projects.280 Among the projects, in which the UK was involved 
at the end of the period was a Capital Markets Development Project aimed at 
transforming the AFM into three new organisations: the Jordan Securities Commission; 
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the Jordan Securities Exchange; and the Securities Deposit Centre. Future involvement 
was planned to include providing technical assistance to the Executive Privatisation 
Unit (EPU) and the Sales Tax Reform Project. DFID had previously been heavily 
involved with the restructuring and privatisation of Jordan Telecommunications 
Company (JTC).Z81 
At one of the occasional donor community meetings, the Third Consultative 
Group Meeting in July 1996, the importance of different sectors in the Jordanian 
economy to the different donors was highlighted. The German representative, after 
commending Jordan's ambitious adjustment programme, emphasised his country's 
support for the water sector, the environment, and for public sector decentralisation via 
local representation and privatisation. In addition, he stressed the need for a better 
social safety net, in which NGOs would play a greater role, greater participation in civil 
society and improved human rights. 282 The Germans promised that "Jordan would 
continue to stand in the top ranks of recipients in per capita terms, based on its 
commitment to economic and social development and peace in the region."283 At the 
same meeting, the Japanese representative expressed support for Jordan's role in the 
peace process and for its structural adjustment efforts. He urged Jordan to follow the 
"export or death" model followed by post-war Japan. The required policies included 
linking import liberalisation to the needs of exporters, promoting expmts and tourism, 
and forging closer government-business co-operation. He stressed his support for the 
IMF and World Bank programmes but stated that Japanese support would "reflect the 
views of Japan's Government and taxpayers."284 
The Swiss were keen to stress the need to ratify the Jordan-EU Business 
partnership, which would help Jordan's exports immediately. The UK representative 
was concerned with the balance of payment deficit, debt, and the build-up of reserves. 
UK assistance focused on economic reform and the social sectors, including 
privatisation, capacity-building in the social sectors and fiscal reform. Italy's 
representative stressed the importance of the EU agreement, as well as regional 
economic integration. The Italians were concerned also about the abolition of food 
subsidies, as was The Netherlands' representative. Canadian support was to focus on 
management of water, environment and private sector participation; social resources 
development; and facilitating the peace process, particularly in assisting refugees. In 
addition, a number of countries, such as Italy, Switzerland, France and the UK promised 
to assist with debt rescheduling. 285 The importance of Jordan to the US regional 
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interests was emphasised by the latter's call "on donors to give Jordan unequivocal 
support." The representative supported the trade reform efforts, but called for greater 
intellectual and financial property protection for foreign investors. 286 
An important element in the meeting was the call by many of the donors for better 
co-ordination mechanisms, with the Chairman proposing not only that the donor group 
meet regularly, but that specific task forces be set up for the water sector and social 
f . 287 sa ety net Issues. Despite the rhetoric, no serious attempts have been made to 
increase co-ordination. Indeed, since the increase in their levels of OEA, the Americans 
have tended to move away from the idea of co-ordination. 
5.2 Multilateral Donors 
A number of concerns were raised during the Third Consultative Group Meeting 
in July 1996 by the multilateral organisations present. The IsDB representative was 
concerned, among other things, with how the public investment programme would 
support private sector development, especially in potash and phosphates where no 
private investment existed. The IsDB planned to commit US$150-200m over the next 
three years, with around 50% for mineral-based manufacturing activities at the Dead 
Sea Complex, 25% for agriculture, integrated rural development and infrastructure, I 0% 
for human resources development and the remainder to finance exports to IsDB 
members and supporting the Social Development Fund. The AMF joined other voices 
in calling for deeper reforms in the civil service and privatisation. EU assistance was 
directed to budget support, technical assistance and grant to UNRW A, in addition to the 
Association Agreement to develop the FT A between Jordan and the EU. The EIB288 
expected to become more involved in Jordan with the post-1996 Facility for 
Mediterranean Region Activities and identified a number of attractive propositions in 
the state's public investment programme, including water, electricity, tourism, transport 
and SME development. The AFESD, after praising Jordan for having one of the best 
project implementation records in the region, as well as being one of the most effective 
partners, stated that efforts over the next two years would be concentrated on the water 
sector. The UNDP, after congratulating the government's efforts, promised to maintain 
support for the country's progress. However, the representative raised a number of 
concerns on the long-term sustainability of the recovery, given the pressures of the 
population on income distribution and employment. Furthermore, he argued that 
"growth does not automatically trickle down or lead to human development: policies to 
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ensure this must be deliberate and be integrated into the public investment program." 
Future UNDP support would aim at improving revenue collection, strengthening the 
social safety net and improving environmental protection. The social safety net was 
believed to be deficient in important areas such as microfinance provision.289 
5.2.1 UNDP 
The UNDP has been assisting Jordan to build its institutions and to enhance the 
competitiveness of both the government and private sectors. Private sector assistance 
was directed at helping Jordan to achieve competitiveness in manufacturing, and in 
industrial extension services to foster industrial growth, focusing mainly on smaller 
enterprises.290 The focus on small enterprises291 is a deliberate policy, bearing in mind 
that in 1996 89% of the 18,592 industrial firms and 96% of the 35,935 trading firms 
employed no more than five workers. 292 In 1992, the Vocational Training Corporation 
(VTC) initiated a programme offering industrial extension services. 293 The programme 
was supported by the UNDP (which provided technical assistance), the International 
Labour Organisation (which provided its global expertise m small business 
development) and the government (which provided in-kind assistance). The 
Corporation visited business premises and offered seminars and workshops, which 
tackled management and technical issues, with follow-up visits to ensure that the 
teachings were being applied correctly. The UNDP argues that the project initially did 
not meet with much enthusiasm, as this sector was not used to working with the public 
sector. Indeed, arguably the small businessman associates the public sector with tax 
collection and unnecessary bureaucracy. However, nearly five years into the project, 
"the psychological barrier between small enterprises and the VTC has begun to 
crumble."294 The news release points out that no longer do the VTC officers have to 
knock on doors, but that small businesses are actively seeking VTC assistance. 
Further UNDP support was aimed at building the state's capacity to integrate into 
the global economy, especially in investment and trade. To this end, the UNDP assisted 
the government in the WTO negotiations, through a US$300,000 technical assistance 
programme. This funding helped develop technical and mediation skills for the 
negotiations phase and prepared the grounds for the trans-national period, leading up to 
the final integration process into the WTO. 295 
The fourth country programme ( 1988-1992) saw the UNDP concentrate on four 
major areas, namely: 
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0 Human resources development; 
0 Support to the productive sectors; 
~ Macro-economic management; and 
o Science and technology. 296 
In the fifth country programme ( 1992-1996) the major areas were identical, except 
that 'Science and technology' was replaced by 'Natural resources management' .297 The 
programme, which was designed following 'dialogue' 298 between the UNDP, the 
government and other organisations of the UN system, was: 
"formulated to reflect the Government's views as to how best utilize 
UNDP's cooperation in support of the achievement of select national 
development objectives within the overall adjustment process and 
circumstances following the Persian Gulf crisis."299 
In the fifth programme, the support to the productive sector focused on industrial 
development and trade promotion and agriculture. In the industrial sector support 
would aim to: 
"assist the industrial sector to diversify and promote industrial production 
and exports, identify new investments and employment opportunities, 
increase and upgrade industrial productivity, and promote and encourage 
private sector initiatives, specifically those regarding medium- and small-
sized enterprises."300 
The emphasis on the private sector had not appeared in the fourth country programme, 
which commenced before the collapse of the economy and the subsequent adoption of 
the IMF and World Bank philosophy of development. Although the fifth programme 
had assumed a core contribution by the UNDP of US$7.091m, with a further US$3.0m 
from the state, the outturn was just over 50% of the core funding, while the 
government's share proved to be unrealistic. The result was the curtailment or 
11 . f . 301 cance at10n o proJects.-
Country Co-operation Frameworks replaced the UNDP country programmes in 
the late 1990s. The first such framework for Jordan covered the years 1998 to 2002, 
inclusive. The framework notes that the progress witnessed up to 1996 may not be 
sustainable in the medium- to long-term, for a number of reasons, including the fact that 
much of the recent growth (i.e. up to 1996) had occurred in areas highly protected 
against international competition. Once the WTO membership was agreed and the 
Euro-Mediterranean agreement signed with the EU, many structural changes would be 
needed which could cause severe dislocation. 302 The framework proposes that the 
UNDP interventions should aim "to strengthen the sustainability of Jordan's recent 
economic and social progress."303 The areas of concentration were to be: 
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~ Governance, with special emphasis on capacity-building in the public sector; 
o Poverty reduction, with special emphasis on social integration; and 
~ Protection of the environment, with special emphasis on conservation of natural 
resources. 
Within the scope of capacity-building in the public sector the framework included a 
suggestion that given sufficient funding the UNDP programme could cover support for 
the government's privatisation efforts, thereby "ensuring that optimal benefits will 
accrue to the country and the Government from the divestiture of public assets."304 The 
support was to include the expertise of the UN system to facilitate Jordan's integration 
into the global economy, especially concerning trade facilitation, intellectual property 
protection and WTO membership. 305 In 1999 assistance was forthcoming through 
UNDP's project 'Support for Jordan's Integration into the Global Economy', in which 
UNCT AD provided technical support for the private sector in preparing for membership 
of the WTO and the implementation of the EU-Med agreement. 306 Furthermore, 
assistance was to be provided to Jordan JIPC in "articulating a long-term investment 
promotion strategy."307 
5.2.2 The EU 
The EU involvement in Jordan started on a bilateral basis on the 1st January 1979 
with a series of financial protocols, each larger than its predecessor. 308 These bilateral 
protocols have now been replaced by MEDA (the acronym is derived from the French 
mesures d'ajustement),309 which acts regionally. Jordan, therefore, has to compete with 
other regional countries and the PNA for access to the pot. However, the EU looks 
favourably on Jordan due to the political situation related to Iraq, refugees, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, and the peace process, where the issuing of passports to Palestinians and the 
severing of control over the West Bank have gained Jordan credibility. Other factors 
which have positively influenced the EU perception of Jordan include the Kingdom's 
relatively open economic and political situation, the severe water problems and the lack 
of self-sufficiency in food? 10 EU funding has not been imposed with conditions, but 
does support the IMF SAPs, thus effectively creating indirect conditionality. Under 
MEDA, the EU has attempted to by-pass the Ministry of Planning and directly fund 
civil society. 
EU-private sector interaction can be assessed at three levels: 
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0 MEDA: the regional level, where funding is for general priorities with the aim of 
increasing regional integration; 
~ A long-term strategy paper for each country: the priorities for Jordan include SAP, 
water, the environment and support to the private sector; and 
~ An annual identification of needs. 
As political integration has strengthened, the EU has become more deeply 
involved in Jordan, based on the perception that the country is integral to peace and 
stability in the region. However, as with other donors, the EU stands accused of 
pursuing its own interests at the expense of the recipient country. According to Dr 
Mohammed Smadi, Director-General of the ACI, the EU merely implements its plans 
without dialogue. He argues that the previous bilateral agreements were better than the 
new EU-Med partnership, citing the case of Tunisia where the implementation of the 
EU-Med partnership has resulted in 35% of industries being lost. Furthermore, the 
private sector in the countries that signed the agreement were initially offered European 
Currency Unit (ECU) 5.5bn, but this sum was later reduced to ECU4.6bn on a first 
come first served basis. Although Jordan was one of the first countries to sign, no 
funding has reached the private sector.311 Ghalia Alul, Executive Co-ordinator, 
proposed a further critique of the EU-Mediterranean 'dialogue' forward YEA, arguing 
the example of Spain's refusal to accept the terms of the agreement on tomato imports 
from Jordan. Rather than sticking to the tenor of the agreement, the government 
allowed itself to be 'bribed' with promises of extra economic assistance. 312 The EU 
assistance has been subject to criticisms of in-fighting between the different 
nationalities, often resulting in slow and inefficient dispensing of the funds or technical 
assistance. 313 
5.2.3 Arab Agencies 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved to be a watershed for the Arab development 
agencies, whether bilateral or multilateral. Jordan was already suffering from the loss 
of oil revenues when the stance by King Hussein over the Gulf crisis was interpreted by 
the major Arab donors as being pro-Iraqi. Consequently, funding from the Arab 
agencies virtually dried up in the early 1990s. For example, the AMF did not lend from 
1990 to 1993, inclusive, while the OPEC Fund for International Development had a gap 
of five years from 1989. Based on the figures for Arab OEA given by the CBJ, 
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informal bilateral assistance (which bypasses the OECD figures) seems to have 
continued. 
5.3 OEA, the State and Economic Liberalisation 
A lack of coherence between the objectives of each of the OEA donors to Jordan 
is apparent at the bilateral level. These differences occur because of differing national 
interests and differing economic philosophies. The two main donors have both diluted 
the efforts to implement a policy of economic liberalisation. The national interest of the 
USA to impose a regional order in the Middle East (based on ending the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, whilst maintaining sanctions on Iraq), pitched Jordan into a key strategic 
position from the early 1990s. As a result, from the start of the Madrid conference the 
USA was able to convince the IMF and the World Bank to adopt the soft glove 
approach, contrary to their normal global approach. The USA encouragement of rent-
seeking through increased OEA (including debt write-offs) increased with the signing of 
the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. However, the Jordanian government has been unhappy 
with the level of assistance in comparison to the amounts received by Egypt and Israel 
following the Camp David agreement. The Japanese philosophy of development 
differed from the hegemonic Washington consensus. Based on their own experiences, 
they believe the state has a significant role to play and that the way forward was through 
new private sector growth rather than through privatisation of older companies. In 
addition, the Japanese desire for regional stability, based around the Hashemite regime, 
allowed Jordan to continue rent-seeking during the Second Gulf War, when other 
donors pulled out. The funding by Japan has allowed the state to procrastinate to a 
degree on adopting the policies of the Washington consensus. 
Overall, the policies followed by the bilateral donors have reduced the pressure on 
the state as an institution to adopt policies of economic liberalisation, while allowing the 
rentier elite to continue to rent-seek. On the other hand, the multilateral agencies, 
including the UN family, have tended to emphasis the policies of the BWI. Although 
the levels of rent provided by the EU are relatively small, the signing of the EU-Med 
agreement has increased the pressure on Jordan to adopt policies of economic 
liberalisation. 
At the level of the pluralist state, the bilateral donors, in particular the USA and 
Japan, have embraced a policy aimed at creating a new vibrant private sector, to bypass 
the captured old guard. Policies adopted by the donors have included training, 
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seminars, workshops, conferences and media campaigns to encourage an enterprise 
culture. Funding of new enterprises has been encouraged at the grassroots level by 
micro-finance, while larger companies have been encouraged through loans 
administered by the IDB. The emphasis by the donor community on support 
institutions, particularly in the field of advocacy for private sector organisations such as 
the YEA,314 has allowed the divide between the private and public sector to become 
more defined, and helped to swing the balance of power in favour of the reformist-
private sector camp. Although the aim is to create a market mentality, the policy of 
using aid maintains a degree of rentier mentality, with businesses and support 
organisations fighting for access to the aid rent. However, with the donor emphasis on 
sustainability, the funding is usually on a one-off basis, in order to focus long-term 
efforts on the market-based solution. 
6.0 DONOR COMMUNITY HETEROGENEITY 
Since 1989, three factors have dominated Jordan's economic relations with the 
outside world: 
~ The need for loans from the IMF and World Bank; 
+ The need to address the problem of debt; and 
+ The need for OEA. 
The countries and institutions, which could fulfil these requirements, form what this 
study terms 'the donor community', whose price for providing assistance has been to 
extract promises for a change of economic direction by the Jordanian state. The 
pressure for change has not only emanated from the IMF SAP but also from 
international agreements to liberalise trade (including with the WTO, the Jordan-EU 
Med agreement and the European Free Trade Association agreement), as well as 
numerous bilateral treaties. In a related move, the USA also pushed Jordan to adopt the 
global norms of the advanced industrialised countries by placing the Kingdom on the 
intellectual property rights 'watchlist' .315 The eventual 'reward' for implementing 
legislation on intellectual property rights was the signing of an FT A between the two 
countries. 316 
The major players identified within the donor community are the IMF, the World 
Bank, USA and Japan, while included among the less influential players are the EU, 
Germany and the UN. For a brief time at the beginning of the 1990s the Arab bilateral 
and multilateral organisations were important, but following the outbreak of the Second 
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Gulf War this group became virtually invisible. In terms of influence, the role of the 
IMF has been found to be pivotal in the donor community, setting the agenda for the 
relationship between the state and the donor community at the economic level. 
However, for its own political reasons, the USA persuaded the BWis to adopt a soft 
glove approach to conditionality from around 1992. The result has been to slow down 
the move from a rentier mentality to a market mentality at the level of both the state as 
an institution and the pluralist state. 
Initially in 1989, three of the four major players, the IMF, the World Bank and 
USA, adopted a strong version of the Washington consensus requiring a series of 
conditions to be met, in order to ensure future access to funding. The government was 
usually willing to meet the performance criteria of the IMF, such as reduced budget 
deficits, credit expansion, and debt reduction. Other aspects such as the reduction of 
custorris duties, hitherto the main source of domestic revenue raising, and privatisation 
were being forced on the government. 317 
America's perception of the need to restore regional stability following the end of 
the Second Gulf War, through sanctions on Iraq and the renewed emphasis on the Arab-
Israeli peace process, changed the political environment. The US increasingly saw 
Jordan as a key player in the new era, hence the stability of the regime was seen as vital. 
The initial SAP had created tension within Jordan, inducing rioting in Ma'an-an area 
associated with the regime's bedrock supporters. SAP 11 was negotiated with the need 
to maintain political stability, rather than economic change, in mind. 318 While 
individuals within the donor community are committed to the development policy of the 
Washington consensus, the overall policy from 1992 has been to maintain the stability 
of the regime, despite the lack of real growth in the economy. 
Despite the attempts by the IMF to implement strict economic conditionality, the 
political and security situation in the Middle East has allowed Jordan not only to access 
OEA beyond the level normally associated with a developing country with as high a 
GDP per capita, but also to be able to delay the restructuring policies. In May 1999, the 
researcher was told off the record by one of the bilateral donors, of the pressure exerted 
by the "heavyweights of the USA and the World Bank to continue funding in Jordan." 
This pressure has enabled the state as an institution to continue to seek access to and to 
retain control over rent. Simultaneously, USAID has maintained a degree of pressure 
on the state as an institution by adopting conditionality on its disbursements. In the 
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FY2000 Congressional Presentation USAID argues that the disbursement of US$50m 
for FY1999: 
"will require that significant progress toward WTO accession be made and 
further streamlining of trade and investment policies and procedures has 
been completed (e.g. reducing company registration time and licensing 
requirements). "319 
The donor community has never addressed to any major degree the problem of 
bypassing the state in terms of funding. Jordanian legislation requires that all foreign 
funding must either be passed through the Ministry of Planning or receive permission 
from it before the recipient organisation can receive the funds. Consequently, the 
majority of OEA continues to be both received and dispensed by the state. 
Incentives for rent-seeking have been provided by the lack of coherence within 
the donor community, particularly concerning which policies to adopt. The BWis 
adopted a soft glove version of the Washington consensus between 1992 and 1999, 
including the reduction in government expenditure, while the UN family, along with 
other donors, have stressed the importance of allocating extra government expenditure 
for social safety nets. As discussed earlier, the US has allowed Jordan considerable 
latitude because of its role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. In contrast, the Japanese 
have continually questioned the philosophy behind reducing the role of the state which, 
based on their experience, is considered vital for development. However, although 
donors may have their individual perception of what is best for Jordan within the 
context of the donor's national interest the overall tendency has been to support the 
IMF's attempts to change the economic direction. Even the UN family, which has as its 
emphasis human development rather than economic development, has accepted the 
IMF' s conditionality. 320 
The state has been able to influence the coherence of the donor community by 
actively not seeking donor group meetings. The impression is that the state can improve 
its bargaining position through a policy of divide and conquer. 321 The lack of co-
ordination is increased by the approaches of the individual members of the donor 
community. Japan, for example, has a different outlook on OEA, with the emphasis on 
self-help and regional stability, along with a desire for state involvement in the process, 
and therefore has not been active in promoting co-ordination. The USAID approach has 
also veered away from seeking co-ordination since 1997 with the advent of increased 
amounts of OEA.322 Firas Gharaibeh, Senior Programme Assistant with the UNDP, 
argues that donor co-ordination is only possible if a well-defined area, such as water, is 
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present, otherwise too many conflicting interests appear. He adds that as the Ministry 
of Planning is aware of the specific interests of each of the donor community it can 
target the donor directly for assistance. 323 Co-ordination also is difficult because of 
institutional problems. The BWis are not represented locally, making day-to-day co-
ordination difficult. Furthermore, different donors are involved in different sectors. For 
example, the World Bank is concerned at the macro-economic level with stabilisation 
and restructuring, while the UN family is more focused at the micro-level. 
Finally, by playing on the fears of the international community, in particular the 
USA, concerning the domestic stability of Jordan, the state has been able to use the 
threat of the opposition within Jordan to the conditionality to increase rent-seeking, or at 
least ensure that the opportunities for rent-seeking are not as limited as the economic 
position would have justified. However, when necessary the IMF has been able to force 
the state to implement change that was potentially destabilising, as in the case of the 
bread price rises in August 1996. In that case the population was 'prepared' for these 
rises as a result of debate in the media and parliament, as was not the case prior to the 
riots in 1989. 
The situation has changed with the death of King Hussein, which coincided with 
the worsening economic situation and the expiry of SAP II. The almost inevitable first 
reaction of his successor was to attempt to benefit from the plethora of promises of 
support by the international community in the days after the death. A tour of the Arab 
capitals to seek increased OEA, followed by a world tour of the creditor nations, with 
the aim of gaining a 50% debt write-off, met with many promises, but with little in the 
way of actual success. This early failure seems to have convinced King Abdullah to 
change direction from his father's policy of regime stability based on rent-seeking to a 
policy of regime stability based on the Washington consensus version of economic 
development. This change of emphasis has been supported by the terms of SAP Ill, 
which are harsher than those associated with SAP 11. The ability to rent-seek, via OEA, 
has narrowed considerably for the state, although seemingly with the support of those at 
the very top of the regime, with the new king as a driving force behind the new 
approach. At the Davos Forum in January 2000, he spelled out his government's 
commitment to an enhanced private sector. The Dead Sea meeting in the following 
November, initiated by the King, produced a thirteen-page blueprint for socio-economic 
reform via economic modernisation, greater privatisation, legislative and bureaucratic 
reform, and a redefinition of educational objectives at the heart of the programme. The 
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participants wanted the government to withdraw from the mining (previously a taboo 
area due to its 'strategic' nature) and transport sectors and to strengthen regulatory 
bodies governing the privatised companies. A twenty-member ECC, drawn from both 
the private and public sectors, was established to monitor progress of reforms. Unlike 
previous attempts to implement private-public decision-making bodies, the ECC has to 
date been extremely active and successful in not only producing but also implementing 
ideas. 
This chapter has focused on the relationship between the donor community and 
the state, treating the state primarily as a single entity. The analysis has shown that the 
state has been able to use divisions within the donor community to continue its attempt 
at gaining access to rent. However, the constraints imposed by the international, 
regional and domestic environment (chapter 4) have reduced the state's scope for 
manoeuvre to gain access to OEA. The next chapter, using three case studies, assesses 
how the state, both as an institution and as an area of pluralist contestation, has coped 
with the new environment in which the relationship between the donors and state has 
evolved. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STATE, RENTIER ELITE AND CONDITIONALITY: 1989 TO 2000 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the analysis highlighted the relationship between the state 
as an institution and the donor community, and how the differing interests within the 
donor community allowed the former to continue to seek rent despite the declining 
levels of OEA. This chapter concentrates on the reaction of the state to the conditions 
sought by the donor community in general, and the IMF in particular. However, as 
argued in chapter one, the state cannot always be analysed as a monolithic entity. Thus 
the discussion focuses on the rentier elite as the driving force of economic and political 
decision-making, although constrained by the changes in the international, regional and 
domestic environment (chapter 4), along with the changing patterns of rentierism 
(chapter 4) and the increased ability of the donor community to intervene in the 
economy (chapter 5). This elite came to prominence in Jordan in the early 1970s, but 
the recession in the late 1980s saw cracks beginning to appear within the group (chapter 
3). This chapter has three objectives: 
• To assess the degree to which the state as an institution was able to resist or comply 
with the conditionality of the SAPs; 
• To assess to what extent the rentier elite was able to balance the possible conflicting 
outcomes, on its economic and political bases, of implementing the conditions 
sought by the IMF; and 
• To assess the effects of the changes on the homogeneity of the rentier elite. 
The analysis uses three case studies to answer these questions: 
• The implementation of the process of privatisation; 
• The implementation of a VAT system; and 
• The withdrawal of subsidies. 
Each case was highlighted as an area for immediate action in 1989, but over a decade 
later, privatisation remains incomplete. A full VAT system has still not been introduced 
at time of writing, and subsidies continue to be a drain on the government's limited 
resources. 
Privatisation reduces the ability of the state to buy political support as the scope 
for using the companies to reward supporters through directorships, contracts, etc is 
narrowed. On the other hand, if the rentier elite choose, they can actually increase their 
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economic base through the acquisition of the privatised companies. Thus the 
opportunity cost is the loss of a traditional form of political power in return for 
increased economic power. This is not to say that the political power cannot be 
enhanced by new methods. The example of the sales tax/VAT illustrates how the 
rentier elite reacted to a condition that could threaten both its economic and political 
bases. The imposition of a sales tax would increase prices, affecting levels of sales and 
therefore profitability, at a time when the private sector was under pressure from the 
opening of the economy to high-quality, low cost goods. The threat of higher prices 
was also politically sensitive as the riots in 1989 proved. Finally, as with privatisation, 
the withdrawal of subsidies was potentially a double-edged sword. The continued drain 
of subsidies threatened the economic recovery of the economy but at the same time 
withdrawal removed another pillar of the political advantage of expenditure policy. 
Furthermore, a number of subsidies, such as assistance for exporters and agriculture and 
fuel, had a direct bearing on the economic base of the rentier elite. It must be noted that 
in each case the effects would not be evenly distributed throughout the rentier elite, and 
implementation would also offer new opportunities. 
2.0 PRIVATISATION 
The process of privatisation has been a hard fought battle, ranging from periods in 
which the process seemed to be completely bogged down to periods in which 
considerable progress was made. The discussion is broken into four periods, namely: 
+ 1985-1989: the rhetoric years; 
+ 1989-1995/96: the lost years; 
+ 1995/96-1998: the foundation years; and 
+ 1998-2000: the action years. 
2.11985 to 1989: The Rhetoric Years 
The growing emphasis on economic liberalisation and economic conditionality by 
both the donor and the commercial lending communities resulted in Jordan adopting (at 
least rhetorically) a new economic direction nominally based on export promotion, 
privatisation and the encouragement of investment. The new policy began in April 
1985. As mentioned previously, the need to borrow US$63m from the IMF in 1985, 1 as 
well as from commercial sources, meant the country had to be seen to adopt a reformist 
approach to its economic policies, including privatisation. Significantly, therefore, the 
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move towards privatisation was not initiated by private sector pressure, but was a 
response by the state as an institution to enable it to continue accessing rent from the 
donor community, albeit that borrowing was now on a commercial basis. 
As discussed in chapter three on the 26th August 1986, the Cabinet approved a 
five-point privatisation programme, which was intended to alter private-public sector 
relations in favour of the former. 2 The programme sought to increase involvement of 
the private sector in public sector companies, through ownership and management. In 
addition, public sector companies were initially expected to operate on a commercial 
basis: a policy that has become termed 'commercialisation' .3 Three companies were 
earmarked for privatisation: RJ, the PTC, and the TCC. According to Anani and 
Khalaf, the original proposals also included Aqaba Port but the company "appeared to 
offer less potential given current industrial and economic conditions."4 
A paper on privatisation, along with the 1986 to 1990 Development Plan, was 
presented to the Jordan Development Conference, held between the 8th and the lOth 
November 1986. Significantly, the development plan made no mention of privatisation, 
indicating the late switch to this policy. Two areas of action were approved at the 
Conference. The first area was the promotion of an autonomous private sector 
investment through incentives, policies and the legal environment. The second was the 
trimming of the public sector through the sale of shares in mixed companies, 
transferring autonomous enterprises to the private sector, establishing private sector 
universities and leasing public land to the private sector.5 Thus prior to the involvement 
of the IMF Jordan had moved nominally in the direction of privatisation. However, 
Abu Shair argues that at the time "there was no deep-seated commitment on the part of 
Jordan's decision-makers to follow the path of privatisation."6 Dougherty and Wils 
agree that "in practice the realisation of the program was at best half-hearted."7 
2.2 1989 to 1995/96: The Lost Years 
Although the actual terms of SAP I have not been made public, the emphasis of 
the package was undoubtedly on the short-term stabilisation of the economy. The 
Finance Minister, Basil Jardaneh, did reveal certain parts of the agreement including the 
need to "promote exports and efficient resource allocation through revisions in export 
and investment incentives, . . . reform of tariff structure, and simplification of and 
rationalisation of trade procedures."8 No specific mention was made of privatisation but 
the longer-term aim would have almost certainly included the need to move ahead with 
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the policy. In September 1989, Planning Minister Ziad Fariz reaffirmed the country's 
commitment to privatisation. Once again the three companies mentioned were PTC, 
TCC and RJ, but, under pressure from the BWis, he included a new component-that of 
the sales of shareholdings in the tourist sector held by the ne. According to Khalaf and 
Anani, prior to 1989 no thought had been given to selling off government shareholdings 
in domestic corporations held by the ne. 9 
Further moves towards privatisation were halted abmptly when Iraqi forces 
invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The war adversely affected RJ and the tourist sectors 
permitting a delay in their privatisation. Following the re-opening of relations with the 
IMF in late 1991, the Lower House, after considerable debate, passed an investment bill 
lifting certain restrictions on Arab and foreign investment. The bill was a result of IMF 
pressure to open Jordan's border to external investment in order to assist with the next 
stages in the privatisation process. However, by 1995 Jordan had done very little in the 
way of starting the process of transferring state assets to the private sector, with the 
notable exception of leasing the majority of the bus routes in Amman to the private 
sector in 1992 for a fifteen-year period. Indeed the ne continued to invest in new 
companies, through minority shareholdings. For example, in 1994 the ne had been 
instmmental in establishing new companies for the production of glucose, glass 
containers and polypropylene bags. 10 In 1996 two new agricultural companies, the 
Agricultural Marketing and Processing Company and the Agricultural Materials 
Company, were established with a capital base of JD5m, of which the ne invested 
10%. 11 The major effort in this early period of the privatisation process was opening up 
the debate about the necessity for privatisation in the media and in parliament. 12 
In their assessment of the private sector report issued in August 1995 the World 
Bank argues that the reasons that privatisation was less advanced than originally 
expected were: 
"1) a lack of political consensus about the desirability of privatisation; 
2) fragmented management of privatisation without a strong central 
direction; and 
3) social concerns especially about potential labor redundancies 13 in the 
overstaffed public enterprise sector." 1 
To accelerate the process, the report recommended several policy and operational steps 
including: 
"1) clarifying and announcing its privatisation strategy and a concrete 
program; 
2) improving the management of the program by establishing a small 
privatization office 15 in the Prime Minister's Office (or the Ministry of 
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Finance) and giving it clear decision making authority, and by developing 
systematic procedures; 
3) enacting an omnibus privatisation law rather than repealing and enacting 
individual laws; 
4) providing adequate anti-monopoly safeguards in competitive sectors and 
a regulatory framework for non-competitive sectors; and 
5) resolving labor redundancy issues early and quickly.'" 6 
The report also notes that while the privatisation of utilities would be slow because of 
the need to establish agencies to regulate prices and quality of service, divestment of 
shares in non-utility firms could be "accomplished at a faster pace." 17 In addition, the 
report extends the concept of privatisation to accelerating the private sector provision of 
infrastructure services in order to make the provision of these services more efficient. 18 
2.3 1995/96 to 1998: The Foundation Years 
An increase in the rhetoric of, if not the commitment to, privatisation occurred 
with the appointment of the King's cousin, Sharif Zeid bin Shakir, as the new Prime 
Minister in January 1995. The prime minister's policy speech argued for a gradual 
approach to privatisation, which would "initially target investments in the tourism 
sector and manufacturing industries. The government will keep its investments in 
strategic industries." 19 He added JEA to the three favourites for privatisation, although 
the JEA would remain in government hands as a commercially operated company. 
King Hussein had advocated this move in his address to parliament in the previous 
October. 20 Shakir also confirmed that, as a first step towards privatisation, each of the 
three other companies would be commercialised while remaining government-owned. 
In addition, prompted by the IMF, the National Resources Authority (NRA) was to be 
transferred to a private oil company, again through a first stage of a commercialised 
government-owned shareholding company. 
As well as privatising companies, the state as an institution began to accept the 
necessity to commercialise public sector entities. The JIPC in its 1995 publication 
'Business and Investment in Jordan, 1995' suggested thirteen entities which were 
deemed suitable (table 6.1). 
A new era in the privatisation programme was entered following the Cabinet's 
authorisation in June 1996 for the creation of the EPU. The following month, the state 
as an institution officially announced its main goals of privatisation, the most important 
of which were: 
"1) to raise enterprise efficiency and improve the competitiveness of the 
economy; 
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2) to increase private investment in the infrastructure; 
3) to develop the domestic capital market, broad base ownership and 
mobilize long-term private savings; 
4) to consolidate the public finance through the proceeds from privatization, 
so that the government can better address the social agenda and concentrate 
on its core activities; and 
5) to attract foreign investment, technology and know-how."21 
Table 6.1 
PulbDic §edor lEntntnes with Potentnallfor CommerciaDisation nn 1995 
c. ,~·0, \s. . Pu,llli~ .S~ttor;J~J~tifi~# ~;., ... ;• ~L I;~ ~t; '~"i)~·o . . i,fEmplo~e.e§::;~~r,:~~,:. ;. •\ 
Public Administration Institute 71 
Vocational Training Institute 1095 
Jordan Investment Corporation 75 
Free Zone Corporation 446 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation 136 
Civilian Consumers Co!Poration 853 
Royal Geographic Centre 270 
National Resources Authority 521 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation 320 
Water Authority 5183 
Port Authority 2667 
A_qaba Railway Corporation 7l.J.. 
Public Transport Corporation 575 
Source: National Information System, "PnvatJsatiOn m Jordan", NIS website, http://mc.gov.jo/econmmcs/ 
invest/330.html. 
In March 1995, the JIC sold two million shares in Jordan Hotels and Tourism 
Company to Zara Investment Company, reducing its stake from 87.7% to 32.7%:23 the 
first significant step in the divestment of shares by the JIC. Simultaneously, the JIC's 
32.5% stake in the Amman Marriott Hotel was offered for sale by the 7th June. 
However, these shares were not sold at this time. JIC General Manager, Muhammed 
Batayneh, stated that the JIC would sell almost all its public shareholding companies 
over the next two years, with the exception of investments in strategic assets including 
potash, phosphates and cement, although the level of the stake in these sectors could be 
reduced. 24 In the event, in March 1996 JIC sold shares in three troubled companies, 
Jordan Company for Radio, TV and Cinema Production, Jordan Tourism and Spa 
Company, and Jordan Glass Industry Company. 25 In June the intention to sell the 
33.7% share in Jordan Holiday Company was announced26 with a subsequent sale in 
August. 27 In September, JIC failed to sell shares in Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes 
Company, in Jordan Worsted Mills and in Jordan Paper and Cardboard Factories. 
These three holdings were placed for sale on two further occasions during 1997, without 
success. However, the remaining shares in Jordan Hotels and Tourism Company were 
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sold to Zara Investment Company in early 1997. By the end of 1997, JIC had sold all 
its smaller shareholdings, where it held a less than 5% stake.28 Other companies were 
also listed for sale in 1997, including Jordan Tanning Company (June29 and October)30 
and Jordan Himmeh Mineral Company (sold in June). 31 
In his Letter of Designation of June 1991 to Tahir al-Masri, the new Prime 
Minister, King Hussein had apparently cleared the way for the privatisation of RJ when 
he stated, "the Royal Jordanian Airline should be reinforced and transformed into a 
joint-stock company in which the government will have a share and Jordanian citizens 
and others will have another share."32 Although a number of studies had been 
commissioned to investigate the privatisation of RJ,33 and the Cabinet had endorsed "the 
principle of transforming this state corporation into a public company whose shares are 
fully owned by the government and [which] is run on a commercial basis as a first step 
to privatisation,"34 the only positive action by the government had been to convert 
around US$49m of debt into equity, raising the capital base to around US$80m in mid-
1994. A report issued in 1992 had recommended the raising of the capitalisation to 
US$ lOOm. In 1994, a report by KMPG Peat Marwick recommended a capital injection 
of JD130m (US$185m) to improve the equity loan ratio from 13:87 to 40:60. In 
addition the report recommended axing the long haul routes and concentrating on 
profitable regional routes. 35 At the same time, the directors were announcing plans to 
expand routes to south and southeast Asia. In 1997, after three years of little or no 
progress, the new Transport Minister, Bassem al-Saket, announced that the political will 
to privatise RJ existed, but a major problem was the company's debt burden, which at 
end of 1997 was US$846m-almost one-tenth of Jordan's entire GDP. A degree of 
restructuring had taken place within the company, including a series of internal 
rationalisations, the closure of the long-haul routes to Singapore and Canada and the 
sale of five ageing Tri-Stars and the leasing of four new Airbuses. In mid-1998 a five-
phase plan drafted by the World Bank was adopted, the aim of which was substantive 
change by 1999, including the sale of a minority stake to a global strategic investor. 
The plan included the creation of a separate company to operate non-core businesses, 
which would then be sold off. 
In the telecom sector, the government announced, in mid-1993, that its intention 
was to use public funds to double the number of lines from 300,000.36 By the end of 
1994, legislation had been passed to allow the private sector to invest in peripheral 
services such as radio pagers and cellular phones. In November, the Minister of 
-238-
Chapter Six: State, Rentier Elite and Conditionality: 1989-2000. 
Telecommunications and Post, in a statement short on specific details, announced a 
launch date of June 1995 for the plan for privatising the TCC. In August 1995, the 
Lower House had passed Communications Law no. 13 for 1995 allowing for the 
restructuring of the telecom sector, with the policy and regulatory functions being hived 
off. The new company, JTC was to be registered as a fully owned government 
company by January 1996. In September, the state announced its intention to sell a 
26% stake in the TCC37 by the end of 1997. By October, the level of the sell-off had 
increased to 40%.38 Strategic partner bids were invited in November, and by March 
1998 four companies remained in the running for the stake. 
In 1995, a Specialised Tourism Transport Regulation was approved to allow the 
private sector to invest in tourism transport, although the rental prices of the buses 
continued to be dictated by the transport ministry. The regulations were followed by 
two private sector transport companies entering the market in the first half of 1995?9 
The following September, Transport Minister Nasser al-Laouzi announced plans for 
further privatisation of the Amman public bus transport network. The PTC, which then 
operated around 45% of the public transport operations in Amman, was to be 
reorganised, downsized and turned into a regulatory body. The plan called for the one 
hundred and seventy buses to be sold to between three and four private companies, 
which would take over the PTC routes. The PTC was eventually converted into the 
regulatory body in autumn 1997,40 with contracts being signed with three local 
companies41 on the 19th November 1998. 
Also in the transportation sector, the government was attempting to grant a 
concession to operate and manage Aqaba Railway Company (ARC). The company had 
debts of JD50m and the cost of modernising the rolling stock was estimated to be 
JD15m.42 In January 1996, four technical bids, three of which pre-qualified were 
received.43 However, by September the process had been restarted, with consultants 
invited to submit offers.44 By July 1998 eight companies had submitted offers to take 
over the management of the ARC.45 
The JEA was dissolved on the 1st September 1996 as a step towards privatisation. 
NEPCO, the new company with paid-up capital of US$160m and assets of US$190m, 
remained a monopoly but was to be 'commercialised'. No firm timetable for private 
sector involvement was set at this stage, although legislation had been passed to allow 
private sector involvement in the sector. The role of government was to be restricted to 
strategic decisions concerning the power sector. In an effort to attract private sector 
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interest subsidies were to be phased out, with the consequent raising of the electricity 
prices. The first such move was announced in July 1996 with price increases of 12%.46 
In addition, the energy sector was to be opened up to the private sector through the 
building of private power plants following the passing of General Electricity Law no. 10 
for 1996. 
Although work had started to a limited degree on the privatisation policy, by 1998 
no major companies had been privatised. However, JIC had implemented a programme 
of divestment for companies in which it held a minority stake. At this stage JIC was 
estimated to hold shares in companies that totalled 40% of the JD3200m capitalisation 
of the AFM,47 down from around 60% in 1995.48 The outcome of the debate over 
privatisation was still unclear, with Prime Minister Majali arguing that privatisation "is 
neither a process of selling Government shareholdings or enterprises to the local or 
foreign private sectors, nor an opportunity for foreign capital to infiltrate into the 
Jordanian economy."49 In an attempt to overcome domestic opposition to privatisation 
he added that: 
"[t]he privatisation program in Jordan is based upon a redefinition of the 
roles of the Government and the private sector with the primary 
responsibility being assigned to the Government for supervision, follow-up 
and regulation, and to the grivate sector for investments, trading, export and 
import, and acquisitions." 
However, a few months later, the Economic and Finance Committee of the Lower 
House of Parliament called for a curb on privatisation.51 
Nevertheless, in a series of incremental moves, progress was apparent m the 
legislative field from 1994 onwards. Laws were promulgated on Sales Tax (1994), 
Income Tax (1995), Investment Promotion (1995 plus subsequent amendments), 
Telecommunications (1995), Electricity (1996), Labour (1996), Companies (1997), 
Securities (1997), the JIC (1997), and Customs Duties (1997 and 1998). 52 A major step 
was the promulgation of legislation at the end of 1995 that provided for equality of 
treatment between non-J ordanian and Jordanian investors. By the end of 1997 the 49% 
ceiling on foreign investment remained only in the constmction, retail trading and 
mining sectors. In addition, the Cabinet had approved the sale of the CBJ holding of 
750,000 shares in the Housing Bank, the specialised credit institution, which was being 
transformed into a commercial bank. 53 Also in response to the World Bank's 
suggestion, an institutional framework, had been created with the establishment of a 
higher ministerial committee led by the Prime Minister to implement and supervise 
privatisation policy. In a move that highlighted the new importance placed on this 
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policy, a technical unit on privatisation was established in the Prime Ministry in 1996. 
The formation of this institution kick-started the next phase of the privatisation policy 
by creating, for the first time, the semblance of a centralised co-ordinated approach to 
the whole issue of privatisation. Previously, individual ministries had been responsible 
on an ad hoc basis for the process. In mid-1997, under pressure from parliament and 
the media over the issue of privatisation, the state announced its intention to establish a 
fund with the revenues from privatisation. Debate over the use to which these funds 
would be put continued over the next few years. 
2.4 1998 to 2000: The Action Years 
Following the death of King Hussein in early 1999, SAP Ill was quickly 
concluded with the IMF to replace the previous agreement, which had been allowed to 
fizzle out. Because of the prevarications of the state concerning previous conditions, 
the IMF placed stricter conditionality on the new loan. Indeed the agreement could 
have been seen as a last chance for the Jordanians to retain the support of the donor 
community. Among the conditions was the requirement to develop a clear strategy for 
privatisation, including a plan for JTC by the end of June and to effect a sale by the end 
of the year. The privatisation of RJ and NEPCO was also highlighted. The state, in its 
Letter of Intent of the 28th August 1999 stated that privatisation would be extended to 
new areas, including the postal service and the storage facilities of the former Ministry 
of Supply.54 In addition, the state was preparing a privatisation bill to provide "a 
framework for the treatment of privatisation ... ensuring privatisation proceeds are not 
transmitted into unsustainable increases in government expenditure."55 At a national 
seminar on the Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1999-2003) 
organised by the Ministry of Planning on 17th and 18th June 1999 the government 
admitted that "progress [on privatisation] has been very slow."56 
Although the new King is often credited with kick-starting the privatisation 
process, a major step had already been taken in October 1998 with the sale of a 33% 
stake in JCFC57 to the Lafarge Cement Group of France for US$102m.58 The sale was 
concluded despite the continuing recession and the faltering of SAP II. Lafarge have 
subsequently increased their stake to almost 40%. Although Lafarge holds the majority 
of the voting stock, it only has four of the eleven seats on the board. 59 As with JTC, the 
Chairman of the JCFC, Hamdi Taba' a, had been opposed to the idea of introducing a 
foreign strategic partner, seeking instead local investment.60 However, King Abdullah 
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undoubtedly gave the privatisation process a considerable boost. In his letter of 
appointment to his first prime minister in March 1999, he stressed that "[p ]rivatisation 
needs to be further institutionalised."61 
The death of King Hussein, who many argue had viewed RJ as an important 
marketing tool for Jordan rather than as a profit-making company, paved the way for the 
privatisation of the airline. Indeed, in his letter of appointment to the new Prime 
Minister Kabariti, the King had indicated a lack of willingness to privatise the company 
when he stated that: 
[t]he Royal Jordanian Airlines has undertaken an important role in bearing 
the bright image of Jordan to the world. It is one of the state institutions of 
which we are proud. Its merit from us every care and attention, so that it 
may overcome its difficulties and fulfil its function with the efficacy that we 
desire. "62 
By October 1999, a legal, financial and technical restructuring63 of the company had 
been completed and expressions of interest for the purchase of a strategic 49% stake 
were being sought. The significant problem of debt had been overcome with a financial 
restructuring which reduced the airline's debt to an estimated US$150m from an 
estimated US$1bn.64 A new law (no. 31 of 2000) was enacted that transformed RJ into 
a shareholding company wholly-owned by the government. Throughout 2000, a 
number of subsidiaries were floated, with the aim of selling them as independent 
companies. The first, Jordan Airports Duty Free Shops Company, was purchased by 
Aldeasa of Spain for US$60.1 m.65 The other subsidiaries added to the sales list have 
been the Training Centre, the Catering Centre, the Engine Overhauling Centre and the 
Aircraft Maintenance Centre.66 In addition RJ shares in Alia Hosting Company, Alia 
Hotel and Royal Tours have been transferred to RJ Investment Company.67 
Despite inviting bids in November 1997, the JTC privatisation remained in 
abeyance at the beginning of 1999, as the state seemed unable to make a decision on 
who the strategic partner should be or on what terms the bids should be made. In 
addition, JTC's Director-General Ali Shukri, who had links with local telecom interests, 
was strongly opposed to bringing in a strategic foreign investor. His resignation in 
March 1999, citing intolerable government interference, paved the way for the sale of a 
40% stake to a foreign strategic investor. Shukri's replacement was Jamal Saraireh, 
who had links to international telecommunication companies. The first attempt to find 
an investor had failed in October 1998 after Southern Bell withdrew from the bidding 
leaving only Cable and Wireless in the process. The state, at the behest of the Shukri, 
had introduced two new conditions for the sale at the last minute. One of the conditions 
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included revising the number of seats on the executive council to which each partner 
would be entitled, after the end of the period of JTC exclusivity. The second change 
was the sale of extra shares to the SSC, JTC employees and other local investors.68 A 
new plan was unveiled at the beginning of August 1999 for an accelerated programme 
to sell a 40% stake within three months. Formal expressions of interest were to be 
lodged by the 21st August, financial offers by the 2nd October and a final decision 
concluded by the 15th October. Three bids were received by the due date: as two were 
identical at US$508m the process was delayed. However, on the 23rd January 2000, 
40% of JTC was finally sold to a consortium of France Telecom (35.2%) and the local 
Arab Bank (4.8%). A further 8% was purchased by the local SSC, while 1% was set 
aside for a staff pension fund. To satisfy opponents of the process the government 
retained a majority on the board. In deference to the IMF, however, a seven-member 
'operation committee', with five people from France Telecom and two from the 
government, was formed. 
At the behest of the IMF, the NPC had been established in 1995 with a capital 
base of JD20m, owned principally by the JIC,69 with the IDB holding shares to the 
value of JD10,000.70 The NPC took over the work of the NRA, including the 50-year 
prospecting concession in the 8,000 sq km Risheh area. The company was expected to 
operate as a fully independent company without government interference. However, 
according to Khadduri, the concession agreement "has given the firm a very narrow and 
limited mandate within which to operate, thereby impeding any momentum towards a 
proper take-off."71 The Minister for Energy and Mineral Rights retained "full technical 
and financial control over the company's activities, as well as the right to inspect at any 
time all its records, correspondence and accounts."72 In August 1999, the company's 
drilling activities were hived off to a new commercially-operated state-owned company, 
the Petra Drilling Company. The company was expected to be privatised within the 
following two years. Also in the field of energy, the Energy Minister announced 
towards the end of 1999 that "[i]n the next three or four years, the government has to 
contemplate adopting the principle of competition through the establishment of 
refineries for the purpose of exporting." However, he added that the interest of the 
country was a prerequisite in any changes.73 
Negotiations for managing and operating ARC started on the 21st November 
1998 74 with a consortium led by the Raytheon Corporation and the Wisconsin Central 
Transportation Corporation of the USA and which also included the local Kawar Group, 
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JPMC and Mitsubishi of Japan. The deal, which was finalised in August 1999, 
committed the consortium to upgrading the existing railway line, and to investing an 
estimated US$154m to extend the line at the Shidiyeh mine and at the industrial jetty at 
Aqaba. Two hundred and fifty of the workers deemed surplus to requirements 75 were 
found jobs at the JPMC; the rest were absorbed in other government posts or retired, 76 
in recognition of the objections of parliament. When it debated the law for privatising 
the company in December 1998 fifty-seven out of the eighty deputies opposed the 
Iaw.77 
At the beginning of 1999 NEPCO was separated into three firms: one for 
generation, the Central Electricity Generating Company (CEGCO); one for distribution, 
the Electricity Distribution Company (EDCO); and one "to own and manage the 
transmission network and control centers"78 (a scaled down NEPCO). The new firms 
for generation and distribution were set for privatisation but transmission, control, 
buying and selling of power were to be commercialised but remain wholly-owned by 
the state.79 Under Jordanian law these companies cannot be privatised until they have 
produced two annual reports. In addition, the Electricity Law no. 13 for 1999 allows for 
the establishment of a regulatory body. 80 In September 2000, the Energy and Resources 
Ministry announced its intentions to privatise both EDCO and CEGCO, and that the 
state would divest its 70% holding81 in Irbid Electricity Company. 82 A further 
indication of the move towards the private sector was the opening of negotiations to 
construct a 300mw-450mw power plant on a build-operate-own (BOO) basis. 
However, the negotiations have progressed at a snail's pace since the announcement in 
1998 with the state continually changing its mind on the nature of the arrangement. 
The first contract for private operation of wastewater treatment plant was awarded 
m April 1997.83 Thereafter, the ministers responsible for water and irrigation 
maintained pressure to increase private sector involvement in the water sector. The 
Minister, Dr Mundhir Haddadin, stated in May that if the Water Authority of Jordan 
(W AJ) was in the private sector it would be bankrupt. In September of the following 
year the Secretary-General of the Water and Irrigation Ministry, Qusau Qutayshat, 
called on the private sector to become involved in equipment maintenance, designing, 
constructing and supervising projects and managing wastewater projects. In addition he 
specified three projects for private sector involvement, namely: 
• Managing Amman's water supply 
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~ Wastewater treatment projects for the Amman-Zarqa basin under build-operate-
transfer (BOT) arrangements 
+ Pumping Disi water to Amman via a BOT scheme. 
With seemingly little public debate or political opposition, on the 19th April 1999 
the operation and management of all water-related services with the Amman region 
(these represent about 40-50% of the total W AJ operations)84 was awarded to a French 
company, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, in association with Jordan's Arabtech Jardeneh. 85 
During 2000, further moves to involve the private sector included the construction and 
management through a twenty-five year BOT scheme for wastewater facilities at al-
Samra, as well as the operation and maintenance of the West Zarka pumping station, the 
Hashamiya pumping station and the main wastewater pipeline to al-Samra from Ain 
Ghazal. 86 In September, the WAJ also sought to widen involvement for the 
management of water and wastewater facilities in the governates of Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun 
and Mafraq. 87 
A lull in new initiatives occurred in the latter part of Abdul-Ra'uf S. Rawabdeh's 
premiership. However, the installation of Ali Abul Ragheb in June 2000 as prime 
minister gave fresh impetus to the process. Moves to privatise the postal sector were 
reintroduced, having first been raised in July 1998, and approved by Cabinet in January 
2000, along with new proposals for the storage facilities of the former Ministry of 
Suppll8 (first approved the 21st November 1998),89 the media and the Civil Aviation 
Authority (including Queen Alia airport, Marka Airport and Aqaba Airport), and Royal 
Jordanian Aviation Academy. By October 2000, thirty-four of the forty companies 
targeted for privatisation in 1997, had been fully or partially privatised.90 At the 
beginning of 2001, the latest candidates for possible privatisation included JPMC, APC 
and Aqaba Port.91 The privatisation of these 'strategic' companies would be seen as a 
decisive step forward in the process. Other candidates, including the Amman-Zarqa 
light railway, the Disi-Amman water conveyor, the Egypt-Jordan gas pipeline, the 
private power station, have been discussed for a number of years now, but problems of 
profitability and a lack of decisiveness on the best way forward have haunted them. 
JIC continued to divest government shareholdings in mixed investment 
companies. The plan was to reduce the fifty shareholdings to between twelve and 
fifteen by 2002.92 By November 2000 the number had been reduced to thirty-three, 
with plans to sell another ten in 2001. During 1999 ten sales were achieved with a net 
trading profit amounting to about JD14.9m.93 The most significant sale was that of 
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US$30.3m worth of Housing Bank stock, but the semi-autonomous SSC purchased 
these shares. A number of the JIC's divestments have been of this nature, which has 
resulted in the shares in SSC's assets increasing by 38% from JD148.4m (12.5% of total 
assets) in 1998 to JD205.4m (15% of total assets) in 1999. As the ai-Arab ai-Yawm 
columnist Khalid Zubeidi comments: "selling the shares to the SSC is like swimming 
against the tide and a way of skirting privatisation and its economic and investment 
indications."94 In early 1999, the JIC also used a policy of leasing to increase private 
sector involvement in its activities. The management of the Ma'in Spa Hotel was 
leased95 for a period of thirty years to the French company Accor, with Ali Ghandoor as 
the local partner. 96 The second arrangement was to lease Jordan Poultry Processing and 
Marketing Company to a local company with an option to buy at the end of the five-
. d 97 year peno . 
A debate had been simmering since the start of the programme concerning the 
state's use of the proceeds raised through privatisation. For once, the IMF, along with 
the rest of the donor community and the street were in agreement that the proceeds 
should not be wasted on the recurrent spending in the budget. The donor community 
wanted the entire funds to be used to retire debt; by contrast, the street was looking for 
the money to be spent on offsetting the negative effects of privatisation, through 
schemes such as re-training of those made unemployed and improving the welfare 
infrastructure of the state. The final law balanced the competing pressures by allowing 
for "up to 15% of the proceeds [of privatisations] for high quality spending on 
infrastructure and social sectors," taking into account future recurrent costs. The 
remainder would be invested in financial assets or used to retire public debt.98 By the 
end of 2000, privatisation proceeds spent amounted to JD 191.9m, of which JD 104.6 
was used to buy back debt, JD42.6m to repay RJ debts, and the rest on infrastructure 
development99 (with exception of JD2.3m which went to Merill Lynch for fees). 100 
This section has highlighted the changing nature of the state's response to the 
BWis' insistence on the implementation of a programme of privatisation. The first 
moves occurred in 1986 (before the advent of IMF conditionality), with the need to 
borrow commercially on the international markets. However, at this stage the adoption 
of the policies was more rhetorical than real. In 1989 IMF conditionality was first 
imposed, but the outbreak of the Second Gulf War intervened before any change of state 
policy was evident. From this time, however, the donor community as a whole can be 
seen as 'educating' the rentier elite, parliament, the street and the opinion-formers in 
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Jordan as to the benefits and necessity of privatisation. The education policy eventually 
paid off, with an increase in the acceptance from 1995 when a raft of legislation was 
passed that enabled the next stage of the privatisation to be undertaken. A further 
increase in the commitment could be seen in the late 1990s as the divestment of 
government shareholdings was initiated. However, a major boost was received for the 
IMF policies following the death of King Hussein and the failure of King Abdullah' s 
world tour to increase the levels of OEA. 
2.5 State, Rentier Elite and Privatisation 
Although the analysis has highlighted an increasing commitment to privatisation, 
the state still continues to prevaricate on a wholehearted pledge to the process. RJ, for 
example, has been mooted for privatisation since 1986 but, at the time of writing, 
although parts of the company have been hived-off and some sold, a strategic partner 
had yet to be found. Opposition can still be raised concerning the highly sensitive 
issues of the threat of job losses in the newly privatised companies (at a time when 
unemployment is unofficially estimated at over 25% )101 and the question of security. 102 
Despite the existence of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, the lack of progress 
over the Palestinian track and the continued Israeli aggression worries many Jordanians. 
Local sentiment fears that opening the economy to foreign investment could lead to a 
legitimate Israeli take-over of vital assets, such as the phosphate industry. Nevertheless, 
the pressure on the state by the donor community to adopt privatisation by promising 
continued, albeit lesser, volumes of OEA-indeed OEA is often granted specifically to 
help with various aspects of privatisation-has been successful to a degree. The state 
has used a number of defensive policies that can be interpreted by the donor community 
as assisting with the process of privatisation, although in reality the policies may merely 
be a form of procrastination. For example, the plethora of legislation promulgated in 
the mid-1990s, which although in place, may not necessarily be acted upon. Secondly, 
the commercialisation of SOEs as a prelude to later disposal of shares to the private 
sector can again be seen as playing for time. In addition, commercialisation allows 
political advantages of the two-dimensional state policy to be retained. Thirdly, a 
further method of prevarication has been changing the terms of the sale whilst the 
process was actually underway-leading to potential investors pulling out. Fourthly, 
there has been a failure to develop the necessary institutional infrastructure to support 
the process. 103 Finally, the transfer of assets from the JIC to the SSC is merely 
swapping ownership from one semi-autonomous government agency to another. 
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Four types of actual privatisation have been used to date: 
o Part sales to strategic foreign investors (JCFC and JTC); 
o Sales of minority shareholdings held by ne to local investors; 
o Leasing of operations to consortiums of local and foreign companies (ARC and 
WAJ); and 
o Leasing of operations to local businesses (PTC). 
The sales of shares in companies in which ne held a minority holding were relatively 
easy to achieve: thus the disposals from 1995. The sale of minority holdings could 
allow the rentier elite to increase their economic base, while not threatening their 
political base. The rentier elite have potentially been able to cherry-pick the more 
attractive holdings, while allowing shares in the more troubled companies, such as 
Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes Company, to be retained in the state's possession by 
transferring them to the SSC. As discussed earlier, the part sale of JTC to a strategic 
investor was not without difficulty, but it did highlight the lack of unanimity within the 
rentier elite over the direction of privatisation. However, the state attempted to offset 
the potential loss of the political advantages caused by the privatisation by retaining a 
majority of directors on the board. Opposition to the leasing part of privatisation has 
been muted, despite the potential for loss of employment and the threats to security, 
perhaps because the rentier elite have been in a position to benefit economically, while 
not being disadvantaged politically. The first transfer of the PTC's bus-routes was able 
to take place as early as 1992. 
Overall, the state has, by various methods, been able to subve1t the process of 
privatisation, thus retaining much of its ability to use these economic assets for political 
gain. The rentier elite has been in the position to be able to improve its economic base 
through the sales of the ne shareholdings and the leasing arrangements, without losing 
its political base. However, the process (including that of 'education') has highlighted 
potential differences within the rentier elite which may be used in the future by the 
donor community to further its own objectives. 
3.0 THE SALES TAX 
One of the conditions of the first SAP was that the government should introduce a 
V AT system by 1991. As a first step towards compliance, a consumption tax on a range 
of imported and locally-produced items was introduced in the 1990 budget. Thereafter, 
a GST was to be introduced before VAT was fully implemented. After only one year, 
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the IMF was already expressing dissatisfaction with the government's commitment to 
introducing VAT. 104 The hiatus caused by the Gulf War saw little progress being 
achieved in the immediate aftermath. Thus, by June 1992, in the Kingdom's Letter of 
Intent, the government promised to implement a GST by January 1993. 105 Although, 
the draft law was prepared by November 1992, the government failed to implement the 
tax as promised. After considerable debate, a watered-down version of the General 
Sales Tax Law was eventually enacted on the 1st June 1994. The IMF had initially 
sought a rate of 12% and the government 10% but parliament diluted the rate further, to 
only 7%. On luxury goods the government had sought 25%, but this rate was reduced 
to 20%. In addition, a number of exemptions from the tax were granted. Finally, 
parliament decreed that the government could not commit itself to implementing VAT 
for five, rather than three years, and also that the change would have to be discussed in 
parliament first. 
The IMF had agreed tacitly to delay the introduction of GST until after the 
November 1993 elections because of the unpopularity of the tax both on the street and 
in parliament. However, the major reason for delay was the considerable pressure 
applied by the private sector, which argued that the economy was not prepared for the 
tax. Partly in an effort to gain support from the private sector, a joint private-public 
sector committee was established at the beginning of 1994 to study GST. As a result, 
certain sections of the private sector were able to gain significant levels of exemptions. 
Indeed, local economist Dr Fade! Fanek argues that private sector importers and 
professionals (i.e. those with access to the rent circuit) were able to benefit at the 
expense of local industry and government revenue. 106 In addition, the private sector had 
also been able to delay the extension of the tax to the service sector from six to thirty-
six months. The private sector was also able to influence the bill through parliament. 
As Ali Abul Ragheb, 107 Chairman of the Financial Committee of the Lower House, 
commented (concerning the changes to the bill) that the committee had met with many 
economic figures "particularly those associated with the Amman Chamber of Industry, 
the Amman Chamber of Commerce and various professional associations."108 
Following the promulgation of the Jaw, a committee was established to close the 
loopholes. The committee comprised the Director-General of the Customs Department, 
the head of the FJCC, the Chairman of the ACI and the Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. However, rather than expand the base of the tax, 
pharmaceuticals were also given exemption within two months. 109 
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A recurring feature of the state's policy since 1989, particularly in the economic 
field, has been to allow parliament to water down various proposals, only for the policy 
to be fully implemented at a later date: often with little protest in parliament or on the 
street despite the strength of the initial opposition. Thus, sixteen months after sales tax 
was first introduced the rate was raised from 7% to 10%, albeit at the insistence of the 
IMF. However, as a quid pro quo, the number of goods exempted was raised from 
fifty-five to seventy-eight. 
The conditions attached to SAP Ill, which was agreed in April 1999, included the 
agreement to replace GST with V AT. The Memorandum on Economic and Financial 
Policies, dated the 4th July 2000, acknowledged that the legislation modifying GST to 
convert it into V AT had not be submitted to parliament before the end of March 2000, 
as promised. The government blamed the necessity on passing the WTO-related 
amendments for the failure to process the legislation. V AT was eventually 
implemented at the beginning of 2001, the sales tax rate having been increased from 
10% to 13% in mid-1999, 110 with the number of exemptions also being reduced. 
3.1 State, Rentier Elite and the Sales Tax 
The case study of the sales tax illustrates the ability of the rentier elite to be able 
to use the threat of instability to stave-off its implementation, as well as reduce the level 
(at least temporarily). The imposition of a sales tax was another case of a double-edged 
sword. The declining levels of rent required new sources of revenue if the state was to 
be able to maintain any semblance of an expenditure policy. Importantly, the choice of 
sales tax as the new vehicle for the state to raise its revenue can be seen as part of the 
continuance of elite control of the decision-making process-an indirect tax, such as the 
sales tax falls proportionally more heavily on the poor than a progressive direct tax such 
as income tax elite, which hits the rich harder. Thus revenues were required to be raised 
to ensure the continuance of the political base of the rentier elite, but the necessary price 
rises provoked the spectre of renewed social dislocation, as happened in April 1989. 
However, the tax also directly threatened the economic base of the rentier elite, through 
reduced sales and therefore reduced profits. These threats help explain the long battle 
against the implementation and the level of the tax raised. On the question of 
homogeneity of the rentier elite, certain sectors, the importers and the service industry 
professionals in particular, were able to benefit by gaining exemptions from the tax, at a 
direct cost to other parts of the economy. 
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4.0 SUBSilD>IlES 
The question of food subsidies has been even more politicised than that of the 
imposition of the sales tax. On two occasions, in 1989 and 1996, riots have broken out 
over the withdrawal of subsidies. Worryingly for the regime, on both occasions the 
disturbances have emanated from amongst what are considered to be the traditional 
supporters of the Hashemites. 
Prior to the involvement of the IMF, the Ministry of Supply set the prices for 
basic staples, including wheat, bread, sugar, rice, milk, beef, lamb and poultry. By 
maintaining the price below the market level, the state was forced to meet the shortfall. 
Before the collapse of the dinar, the cost was approximately JD4m pa. 111 However, 
with the onset of the recession, the budget for 1989 had initially allocated JD33m for 
this purpose, 112 but by March the estimates had already grown to JD60m. 113 Despite the 
growth in the cost, the state reiterated its commitment to subsidies on basic goods as 
well as continuing "to support the military and civil consumer corporations, which serve 
about 350,000 employees, military, retired and their families." 114 The eventual cost for 
1989 was JD72m 115 and by 1990 subsidies on food reached JDl 02m (3.9% of GDP). 116 
Before the IMF would allow SAP I to be confirmed, the government was forced in 
April 1989 to implement a series of price increases, including fuel prices, telephone 
charges, oats and barley. The outbreak of violence in reaction to these increases in non-
food items created extra space for the government in later discussions with the IMF, 
because of the fear within the donor community of political instability. 
The IMF was, nevertheless, determined to cut the food subsidy bill through the 
targeting of the subsidies to those most in need, thereby reducing some of the political 
concerns of addressing the problem. In March 1990, the IMF was reported to have cut 
short its annual review because, among other reasons, it felt the government was not 
serious about addressing the problem of food subsidies, 117 which were expected to cost 
JD90m in 1990. 118 The refugee crisis of August 1990 helped focus the minds of the 
decision-makers, with the result that food'-rationing coupons were introduced on the 1st 
September for sugar, rice and powdered milk. A year later, the scheme was extended to 
include flour. 119 The coupons were available to all families, thus creating a two-tier 
pricing system, which was expected to reduce the cost of the subsidies by around JD20-
30m pa. 120 These changes met with a subdued reaction on the street, in the media and in 
parliament. 
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In January 1994, subsidies on sugar, rice, dried milk, frozen chicken and olive oil 
were restricted to families with an income of less than JD500m per month. 
Nevertheless, the failure to address the main subsidy, bread, resulted in the cost of the 
subsidies rising to JDIOOm in 1995, 121 with the Minister of Supply, Munir Subar, 
claiming that the cost would be JD 150-160m for 1996. 122 The escalating cost was 
partly due to an increase in the world price of wheat. As a result, Subar announced in 
early July that bread prices would be increased from 85 fils per kilo to 250 fils per kilo. 
The proposed increases were condemned in the media, in parliament and on the street. 
However, the IMF maintained pressure by refusing to accept the Letter of Intent of the 
13th June 1996, arguing that Jordan had already promised to deal with the question of 
subsidies in the Letter of Intent of the 31st December 1995. The regime, in the person 
of Crown Prince Hassan, was reported to have requested leeway from the IMF in 
implementing the price rises, but the IMF said that arrangements made with other 
donors could not be implemented until the subsidies were lifted. 123 Although attempts 
were made to debate the situation in parliament, the sitting was suspended on the 8th 
August without the issue being resolved. Eventually, the price was raised to 180 fils per 
kilo 124 on the thirteenth, with the result that riots broke out on the sixteenth in Karak 125 
and spread to Amman the following day. 126 
The coupon system of subsidies on rice, sugar and milk was replaced on the 1st 
September 1997 by cash for those families with an income of less than JD500m per 
month. In January 1999, all general cash transfers on food had been replaced by 
targeted assistance to the needy families. This system met the requirements of the IMF 
by targeting welfare spending to the needy. In addition, the prices of fruits and 
vegetables, along with a number of other consumer commodities, were liberalised. 127 
Nevertheless, the price of a number of other commodities, including the important ones 
of bread, oil derivatives (at the end of 2000, subsidies accounted for 20%-40% of the 
price), 128 and agricultural inputs such as fodder still remain set by the state, which in 
effect creates a subsidy system for these products. Furthermore, the Civil and Military 
Stores, which supply cut price, if not subsidised, goods to government employees, were 
opened to the general public in 1998. Indeed after the signing of the 1999 IMF SAP 
one official was quoted as saying "[t]here is no lifting of remaining subsidies, no 
increase in water prices, etc." 129 Thus, with the National Assistance Fund providing 
cash to one quarter of a million Jordanians, 130 subsidies remain a political and economic 
issue for the government. 
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4.1 §tate, .IRentier JEHite and §ulbsidlies 
The subsidies' case study demonstrates that as the levels of state rentierism fall 
the rentier elite had to adopt different policies in order to continue the legitimacy of 
their political rule. No longer were they able to buy wholesale political support; the 
support now required more careful targeting in order to husband the declining resources. 
However, broad-based subsidies could be continued through controlling the price of 
basic staples, such as bread, and via the Civil and Military Stores. The riots in the face 
of declining state rentierism enabled the rentier elite to gain support from the donor 
community, which did not wish to see the collapse of the Hashemite regime, fearing this 
reaction would cause further instability in a region already considered to be inherently 
unstable. 
5.0 §T ATE, RENTIER ELITE AND CONDITIONALITY 
The three case studies have highlighted the complexity of the relationship 
between the donor community, the state and the rentier elite. The relationship has not 
only been affected by the declining levels of OEA rent, but also by the changing 
interests of the central actors. The priority of the economic conditionality of the IMF 
SAP has been diluted by the political interests of certain members of the donor 
community. The threat of political instability within Jordan and regionally has allowed 
the rentier elite greater latitude than would have been expected, given the severity of the 
economic crisis. However, over the period, the IMF has managed to exacerbate 
differences within the rentier elite created by the changing patterns of the rentier 
economy, thereby reducing the cohesiveness of the latter. This split within the rentier 
elite has allowed an increasing acceptance of the conditions sought by the donor 
community. However, a full-blown commitment is not yet possible due to the historic 
relationship between the rentier elite and society in general. In Jordan considerable 
opposition to the policies of economic restructuring still exists in parliament, on the 
street and within the media. The need to preserve the support of certain sectors of 
society in order to maintain political legitimacy continues to be a major factor in the 
behaviour of the rentier elite, and in particular the regime. 
What, then, has been the relationship between the state, rent and economic 
liberalisation in relation to the BWis? Between 1986 and 1989, prior to the 
involvement of the IMF, plans were made to initiate the process of economic 
liberalisation. Despite the rhetoric, very little progress was actually made. These 
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'window dressing' moves were driven by the desire of the state as an institution to 
continue to maintain access to and control of the rent in the form of loans and grants. 
The rentier elite at this stage was still relatively homogenous in its agreement on the 
economic direction, putting little pressure on the state to actually adopt wholesale 
economic liberalisation. 
The three case studies indicate the pressures faced by the state in attempting to 
implement the change of the economic direction sought by the IMF. The slow and 
uneven move towards a democratic state following the 1989 riots has resulted in 
parliament and the media being able to question the state to a greater degree than 
previously. The state, in turn, has been able to use this opposition as a bargaining chip 
in the negotiations with the IMF. However, when the IMF has exerted pressure, as with 
the case of the bread prices in July and August 1996, the state has been able to force 
through the issue despite opposition in parliament, in the media and on the street. 
Following the intervention of the IMF from 1989, a number of phases m the 
relationship between the state, the BWis and economic liberalisation can be adduced. 
From 1989 to 1995, the state was to a large degree able to repel the main thrust of the 
conditions sought by the BWis. From 1995 to 1998, the pressure applied by the BWis 
began to tell with positive moves, especially in the legislative field, to implement the 
policies of economic liberalisation. Finally from 1998, came an acceptance by the state 
of the need to adopt the conditions sought. However, even in this period the degree of 
support for the process has fluctuated, such as the drop in initiatives towards the end of 
Rawabdeh's premiership. The ebb and flow can be seen as part of the battle within the 
rentier elite concerning the desirability of adopting economic liberalisation, and also 
regarding the most appropriate method of implementation: should the change allow a 
state-led economy or, as sought by the donor community, a market-based economy. 
The case studies indicate the increasing internal differences within the rentier 
elite. The example of the privatisation of JTC is an excellent case, with the Director-
General, Ali Shukri, attempting to stop the sale of 40% of the company to a foreign 
strategic investor, due to his local connections with the telecommunications industry. 
The sales tax saga also highlights the fight within the rentier elite to continue to access 
rent, through exemptions from the tax and by delaying its implementation. From 1995, 
the process can be envisaged as one in which the BWis have been in the driving seat, 
trying to reduce the state's dependence on rent. Simultaneously and as a result of the 
education process, the consensus within the rentier elite concerning economic 
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liberalisation was breaking down. The acceptance of the importance of economic 
liberalisation by the state as an institution from 1998 is indicative of a change in the 
balance within the rentier elite between the conservative elements resisting change, and 
the reformist elements seeking change. 
Overall, the rentier elite has shown a willingness to comply with the general 
principles of the IMF SAPs. However, the support has been watered-down by the need 
to maintain political legitimacy, and also by short-term, self-interested economic 
expediency. Major threats, such as the imposition of the sales tax at 13%, were fought 
bitterly as the tax was perceived to be a major threat to the interests of the majority of 
the rentier elite. The private sector economic interests of the elite have not sought a 
fully-fledged free market, but have been increasingly willing to support liberalisation. 
A complex balancing act has been forced on the state to maintain sufficient support for 
the IMF policies to ensure the continued support of the rest of the donor community; to 
maintain the political support of certain segments of society; and to ensure that control 
and access is maintained to the decreasing volumes of OEA rent. This balancing act has 
been achieved by following the general momentum of the IMF policies, while 
continually grinding out concessions that are later often diluted, as the educating effects 
of the donor community win out. 
Despite poor economic conditions (during which privatisation can be difficult to 
implement) in the late 1990s and the continued security fears over normalisation with 
Israel, the majority of the economic elite in Jordan seemed to be convinced of the need 
to privatise. What swung the balance in favour of reform? A number of reasons can be 
found to account for the change. Firstly, the debate over privatisation encouraged by 
the certain sectors of the state and donor community for the previous thirteen years had 
helped prepare both the street and parliament as to the necessity of the programme, 
through a continual drip-by-drip approach. Secondly, the donor community aimed 
considerable resources at helping foster a climate of acceptance for the idea of 
privatisation. By funding academic seminars, training courses, media advertising, 
discussions through local and foreign NGOs and the promotion of advocacy groups the 
donor community was able to slowly build up a groundswell of support for 
privatisation. Not only was the street and, to a degree, parliament convinced, but more 
importantly elements of the rentier elite previously opposed now realised that personal 
gain could be won. Their conversion was not ideological but for reasons of self-
interest. However, this new pressure for reform is not only driven from the top of the 
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regime but is also now coming from the private sector. Two private sector initiatives 
backed by donor funding and expertise have been produced recently. JV2020 is a 
comprehensive plan to double GDP per capita by the year 2020, and the IT REACH 
initiative aims to increase exports earnings in the IT sector to US$550m pa by 2004, 
creating 30,000 new jobs in the process and attracting US$150m in cumulative foreign 
investment. 
This chapter has built on the analysis of the relationship between the donor 
community and the state (chapter 5) to establish the effects on the rentier elite. The next 
chapter discusses the effect of these changes on the relationship between the state and 
the private sector. 
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CIHIAJP'1l'IEIR§IEVIEN 
TJHIIE §'Jl' A TIE= MAIRJKE 1I' liN'Jl'IEIRIF A CIE: 
liNJDUCIED §'Jl' A TIE JRJEN'Jl'JIJERJ[§M, PRIIV A TJE §lECTOR 
IRJEN'Jl'liiEilU§M OR MAR1K1E1l' JECONOMY? 
1.0 KN'JI'RODUC'JI'KON 
The IMP-inspired reform programme had two main objectives, namely: 
o Macroeconomic policy adjustment to reduce internal and external imbalances, 
mainly by reducing the fiscal deficit and maintaining a flexible and competitive 
exchange rate; and 
0 Trade liberalisation and industrial policy reforms. 
It has also one sub-objective: 
0 Protection of the poor through targeted safety nets. 
The two main objectives were based on a range of policies that aimed to roll back the 
state and increase the role of the private sector. The Washington consensus assumes 
that state intervention in the economy is ultimately counter-productive, while in contrast 
the engine of growth was thought to be the private sector. This assumption is 
predicated on the notion that the public and private sectors are separate entities, each 
with their own clear-cut identifiable interests. In virtually any process of change, such 
as economic liberalisation, winners and losers are created. In an economy with a clear 
division between the public and private sectors the major problem facing the 
implementation of economic liberalisation would be to convince the potential losers in 
the public sector that in the long term their interests would best be met by switching the 
economy to a market-based one. However, as has been discussed in the earlier chapters, 
by 1989 in Jordan the public and private sectors were deeply enmeshed, leaving 
potentially important losers in both camps following the introduction of the reform 
programme. Thus economic liberalisation is not only an economic process but also, 
importantly, a political process. 
This chapter is set against the background of three important changes in the 
1990s: firstly the type and volume of rent entering the economy (chapter four); secondly 
the attempts by the donor community to wean the state from the addiction of OEA 
(chapter five); and thirdly the limited acceptance by certain members of the rentier elite 
of the need to introduce economic change (chapter six). In addition, the changing 
international regional and domestic environment highlighted in chapter four must be 
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borne in mind. Two questions are discussed. The first question raised is: to what 
degree have these three factors affected the relationship between the public and private 
sectors? The main thrust of the analysis uses the state-market model developed in the 
introduction. To recap, the model uses five continua of the state-market relationship, 
namely: 
+ Contribution to the national economy; 
+ Planning; 
+ Institutional development; 
+ Support for the private sector; and 
+ State ownership of productive assets. 
The second question is: to what degree are the changes highlighted by the model 
reflected in changes in the rentier aspects of the economy, bearing in mind that the 
model is not driven solely by changing patterns of rent? As was discussed in chapter 
one, the rentier mentality adopted by both the private and public sectors results in a 
unique style of economic development, of private and public sector development, and of 
a relationship between the two based on the evolution of a rentier elite, with public 
political interests and private economic interests. This question is answered by 
assessing the degree to which the aspects of rentierism evident by 1989 (chapter 3) have 
been broken clown, but bearing in mind that other factors can also influence the 
measures (i.e. the cause-effect relationship between both the retreat of the state and the 
fall in the IRSE and the changes in type of rentierism are not necessarily straight-
forward). At the level of the economy, three aspects are of interest: whether the level of 
government expenditure and consequently the budget deficit has fallen; whether the 
volume of imports has fallen both in relation to GDP and to exports; and, more 
importantly, whether the productive sector has gained at the expense of the service 
sector. In terms of the private sector, the theoretical discussion noted that under ISR the 
private sector tended to be relatively homogenous in outlook. Therefore an assessment 
will be made of this feature. In addition, the analysis concentrates on the response of 
the private sector (whether homogenous or heterogeneous) to the changes of rent, donor 
involvement and the reactions of the rentier elite. In terms of the state, the rentier 
mentality is evidenced by the use of 'expenditure' policies to maintain political support 
from relevant groups in society. One of the assumptions in chapter one was that in an 
economy in which rent changed from state to private sector the state would attempt to 
change policy to maintain control of the new style of rent. The study will look at the 
state's policies in this respect, such as taxation, exchange and interest rates, and 
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maintaining relations with the labour-importing Gulf States. The final aspect to be 
discussed will be the type of interaction between the two sectors: whether through 
informal ISR-type relations or formal-PSR type relations. 
2.0 STATE-MARKET CONTINUUM: 1989 TO 2000 
As was shown in chapter three, the state continued to dominate the Jordanian 
economy, despite (or perhaps because of) the recession in the mid- to late-1980s, the 
change of direction to an export-oriented economic policy and the dominance of the 
free-market ideology of monetarism. Indeed, the rentier elite, which controlled the 
major parts of the private sector, actively encouraged the status quo in Jordan. Four 
main features of the public-private sector relationship were highlighted: 
• The heavy involvement of the state in the productive sector through SOEs (many in 
liaison with the private sector); 
• The state involvement in the market through price controls, subsidies, licences and 
contracts, input restrictions and investment and credit control; 
• The granting of access to the economy in return for political support; and 
• The institutional structure of the private sector being adapted to allow informal 
contacts with the political public sector elite. 
This section measures the changes (if any) on those aspects of the state-public sector 
relationship from 1989 to the end of 2000, based on the five-continua state-market 
model. 
2.1 State Prognosis of the Private Sector 
Throughout the period in question the state has issued a series of official 
statements indicating its desire to implement economic reform that would involve 
reducing the role of the state, while simultaneously assisting with the development of 
the private sector. These statements were forthcoming at the highest levels, with King 
Hussein repeatedly charging his governments to promote the private sector. 1 The 
various prime ministers reiterated this message in their statements to parliament on 
assuming office, and in their speeches in support of the budget. For example, Prime 
Minister Badran, in February 1990, stated that: 
"the economic reform programme is principally based on improving the 
efficiency of the public sector and reducing it as far as possible; and on 
increasing, broadening and diversifying the private sector's investment 
opportunities."2 
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Prime Minister al-Masri in his policy statement to parliament in July 1991 confirmed 
that he would create a healthy environment for private sector investment. 3 Furthermore, 
at a seminar to the Jordanian Businessmen Club in Amman in August 1993, he 
confirmed the need to "reassess the relationship between the private and public sectors 
in a manner that ensures the private sector will have freedom of initiative, action, 
investment and trading."4 He added: 
"[i]t is no longer reasonable that the public sector should assume the 
responsibility of running commercial and industrial companies and 
institutions, or interfere-under jurisdictions that are no longer acceptable-
in pricing policies, and confiscate the freedom of the private sector, making 
decisions on its behalf."5 
By the middle of the 1990s, the state was still emphasising the need to activate the 
role of the private sector through creating a suitable environment for investment while 
maintaining a role for the state which would "continue to develop the infrastructure for 
the national economy and provide the basic auxiliary services, especially water, 
electricity, communications and roads."6 A further two years down the line, the state 
was anticipating expanding the role of the private sector into the field of infrastructure. 
King Hussein in his address at the opening of parliament in November 1996 stated that 
the government sought "to encourage the private sector's participation in national 
production through the expansion of its role in initiating infrastructure projects, 
especially in the fields of telecommunications, energy, transport, water and tourism."7 
In 1998 the struggle to separate the private and public sectors was still in full 
flow. As discussed in the previous chapter, Prime Minister Majali defined privatisation 
not as a matter of sell-off shares but more fundamentally as a redistribution of roles 
between the public and private sectors. The advent of the new king witnessed a 
continuation of the calls for restructuring the economy so that "the private sector must 
be allowed to play a vigorous role in this endeavour."8 By May 1999, King Abdullah 
was attempting to reactivate the joint public-private investment board meetings, while 
stressing the need for the private sector to make decisions jointly with the government.9 
The King continued with this theme in his speech to parliament in November and again 
in his letter of designation to the new Prime Minister in June 2000. However, the tone 
of his statements indicated that the process should be a two-way one, in which the state 
ought to create the legislative and economic environment to allow the private sector to 
develop. Nonetheless, the private sector was expected to play its role fully in the 
process of development. 10 
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The statements of support for restructuring the economy in favour of the private 
sector were also issued in the publications of the official state organs, such as the CBJ. 
In the Annual Report for 1993, the CBJ argues about the necessity of: 
"concentrating efforts to activate the role of the private sector and enhancing 
its participation in the development process, improvement of the incentive 
and institutional structure of investment within the framework of a clearly 
defined and applicable strategy." 11 
The report calls on the state to: 
"reconsider legislation related to foreign trade and facilitate administrative 
measures related to investment activities as well as exports, to adopt the 
international system for specifications and measurements enabling 
Jordanian exports to compete on the basis of quality, to expand the program 
for the introduction of production technology, to increase support for 
potential exporters through providing information on external markets, to 
promote the use of communication and information technology and to 
increase efforts on attracting foreign investment especially in joint 
ventures." 12 
This very brief review of the calls by the state for an increase in the importance of 
the private sector, and by implication a reduction (or at least change of direction) for the 
state, has demonstrated that, publicly at least, there was strong support among the apex 
of the rentier elite for this policy. The remainder of this section discusses how these 
calls were translated into action by using the state-market continuum model. 
2.2 Contribution to the National Economy 
The government's share of the national mcome IS measured in two ways: 
government revenues (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP and government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (figure 7 .I). On the first measure, the 
government's share increased dramatically from 24.3% of GDP in 1989 to 33.5% in 
1992. The increase was due to the continued economic recession, which hindered the 
growth of the private sector, but mainly because of the improved revenue-collecting 
abilities of the government. Levels of domestic revenue increased by over 100%, from 
JD565.4m in 1989 to JD1168.9m in 1992. Despite this increase, state expenditure as a 
share of GDP fell sharply, from 42.6% in 1989 to 33.7% in 1992, as result of tight fiscal 
policies. In the same period, government expenditure rose from JD992.6m to 
JD1177.7m, an increase of 18.6%. Since 1992, government revenue as a percentage of 
GDP has drifted downwards to less than 27% by 2000, whilst the figure for expenditure 
has fluctuated downwards to less than 34%. Although the state has increased its share 
of the economy in terms of revenue, it is actually under-performing according to the 
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level of 31% set by the World Bank. 13 In terms of expenditure over the period a clear 
withdrawal of state is evident, although since 1992 the levels have been relatively 
stable. 
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Talbllle i.D. 
BUI!dgeted Capit~d and 1Recurren1 Government lEx.pendituJre, 1989-2000 
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_Year Amotunnlt % Annnn UllmTI Amoull111l: % AiniDll1llaR Amownillt- % AnnnnllD~D 
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1989 688.9 10.4 346.5 -23.3 1035.4 -3.7 
1990 852.5 23.7 253.3 -26.9 1105.8 6.8 
1991 889.2 4.3 230.0 -9.2 1119.2 1.2 
1992 940.0 5.7 330.0 43.5 1270.0 13.5 
1993 988.0 5.1 340.0 3.0 1328.0 4.6 
1994 1128.4 14.2 357.7 5.2 1486.1 12.0 
1995 1231.0 9.1 443.0 23.8 1674.0 10.8 
1996 1329.0 8.0 470.0 6.1 1799.0 9.2 
1997 1481.0 11.4 435.0 -7.4 1916.0 6.6 
1998 1565.0 5.7 422.0 -3.0 1987.0 3.7 
1999 1683.0 7.5 477.0 13.0 2160.0 8.7 
2000 1775.0 5.5 435.0 -8.8 2210.0 2.3 
To1aR 141551.0 157.7 41539.5 25.5 19,090.5 113.41 
Sources: Adapted by author. MEED, vanous Issues (figures for 1989 to 1999) and for 2000 Jordan 
Economic Monitor, (1999), issue 12/99, Dec., p.5. 
An important aspect of the government expenditure is the changing pattern 
between recurrent and capital expenditure. Although the level of expenditure has fallen 
in terms of GDP, the policy has deliberately focused on budget cuts in capital 
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expenditure, allowing high levels of recurrent expenditure (table 7.1 ). Between the 
budget for 1989 and the budget for 2000 the state projected current expenditure to 
increase by ah 
increase by jus 
· ~"rrt~: in contrast, projected capital expenditure was expected to 
The budgeted figures are reflected in the actual outcomes (table 7.2), with actual 
state current spending increasing by almost 130% while capital expenditure increased 
by only 19.0% over the period. The emphasis on recurrent expenditure is particularly 
important given the need to fund the high level of employment in the state sector. Thus, 
although the indicators of ISR have been seen to decline, the state has continued 
attempting to maintain the rentier policy of garnering political support by economic 
means, in this case employment. The need to apply fiscal restraint in the early years of 
the SAP resulted in the government's share of total consumption falling from 27.5% in 
1989 to 22.7% in 1992; thereafter, the share increased and has remained consistently in 
excess of 27% since 1995 (figure 7.2). Thus, whereas expenditure to GDP indicates a 
decrease in the government's share of the economy since 1989, the figures record an 
unchanged relationship between measures for private and public consumption. 
Table 7.2 
Actmd Capitan and! Recurrent Governmel!llt lExpendliture, 1989-2000 
While consumption figures are an indicator of the present condition of the 
economy, investment figures ought to give an indication of the future path of the 
economy. The figures for GFCF show, contrary to expectations, how the state's share 
has increased by the end of the period. The percentage climbed to just over 39% in 
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1990, before falling to less than 20% in 1993; thereafter, the state's share increased to a 
high of 45.2% in 1998 as the government tried to overcome the downturn in the 
economy (figure 7.3). Although the share grew significantly between 1994 and 1998, 
this change is not due entirely to increased government spending. The public sector's 
GFCF increased by 10.5% from JD483.5m in 1994 to JD534.1m in 1998, while private 
sector GFCF fell by 28.5% from JD970.5m to JD648.8m in the same period (figure 
7.4). Almost 60% of the public sector GFCF between 1990 and 1998 has been invested 
in government services; in contrast, in the same time period, no private sector GFCF has 
been invested in this sector, despite the exhortations of the donor community for the 
private sector to become involved in service provision. Government services have 
remained around 21.5% of GDP since 1992, having fallen from 23.2% in 1989. On the 
other hand, almost three-quarters of the private sector GFCF has been invested in 
finance, insurance, real estate and business services. The latter is a major indicator of 
the failure of the policies to move in the direction of an industrial export-oriented 
economy. 
Figure 7.2 
Government Percentage Share of Total Consumption, 1989-1999 
30 -- -~ -- --~-~-----------~ 
QJ 
:24+---~~-~~~~~~~---~----~~---~---~ 
~ 
~ t ll+--------~~~--~--~~-----------------~~ 
~ 
w+---~~--~-~~~-~~--~~--~--~~~~~~-~~ 
18+-------------------------------------------------------~ 
16+----,-----r----.---~----~----r---~----.---~.----.--~ 
1989 1gx) 1'})1 1'})2 1'})3 1<})4 19)5 
Year 
1%'6 1'})7 1'})8 1WJ 
Source: Adapted by author. IMF, (various), International Financial Statistics Yearbook, (Washington: 
IMF). 
The macroeconomic figures paint a confusing picture ofthe changing levels of the 
state involvement in the economy. While the percentage of state expenditure to GDP 
indicates a withdrawal of the state from the economy, the figures for the state's share of 
total consumption show little change over the period. Indeed, the state's share of total 
GFCF has actually increased considerably between 1989 and 1998. 
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Figure 7.4 
Public and Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1989-1998 
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jo. 
2.3 Planning 
Following the involvement of the IMF, five-year development planning by the 
state was no longer considered to be an appropriate response to the problems facing the 
economy. The IMF believed that SAPs were in effect a plan for economic 
development, and therefore replaced the need for the five-year plans which had been a 
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feature of the previous decades. However, in an attempt to highlight its independence 
from the IMF (a move especially important in light of the increasing political 
liberalisation) the state still sought to produce medium-term plans. Although in 
November 1990 the King intimated that a plan for 1991 to 1995 was being prepared 14 
the next plan that emerged was for the years 1993 to 1997. The plan evolved as the 
Arab-Israel peace process was beginning to bear fruit, bringing new optimism for 
economic growth to the region. For example, over US$16bn of Jordanian investment 
was planned in joint projects with Israel, valued at US$33-42bn (table 7.3). In addition, 
the stock exchange was booming in anticipation of the peace dividend as Jordan was 
expected to assume the mantle of moderator between Israel and the Arabs. 
Table 7.3 
Planned Jordan~Israel Projects (US$m) 
8 746 3000-4000 
4 2368 3000-6000 
6 8864 6000-8000 
Tourism 3 1622 2000-2500 
Communications 2 1566 1000 
Environment 3 69 1500-2000 
4 670 1000-1500 
3 388 500-1000 
Total 33 16293 17000~26000 
Source: Adapted by author. "Projects of Peace", MEED, 25111/94, pp.3-4. 
As with the previous plan, the 1993-97 one was drawn up in the context of the 
IMF SAP. In the words of the Ministry of Planning: 
"the Plan is not an alternative to the adjustment and economy recovery 
programme. It complements the programme [SAP II] and enhances its 
prospects of success by encompassing social aspects and providing 
decision-makers with a comprehensive view of the socio-economic situation 
in Jordan." 15 
The state justified the existence of the plan on the grounds that: 
"the package of adjustment policies that the programme entails is not 
sufficient, on its own, to address all imbalances in the economy, nor is it 
capable of providing an adequate and appropriate social package for solving 
Jordan's poverty and unemployment problems." 16 
The plan was considered by the Ministry of Planning to be more comprehensive than 
the IMF SAP, adding the dimensions of unemployment, poverty, administrative reform 
and an integrated water policy. 17 
The government introduced the plan as a radical departure from the previous 
process of economic and social planning. The changes included presenting the plan as 
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"a package of integrated economic and social policies," 18 rather than a list of projects 
and investment programmes, with the objective of not just attaining economic growth 
but also of achieving sustainable economic and social growth. In addition, the Ministry 
claims the new plan "aims at providing a greater role to the private sector in investment, 
direct production and employment." 19 Previous plans had reflected government control 
over economic life. In contrast, this plan: 
"respects private sector decisions and affirms the sector's need to run its 
own affairs. It imposes no policies or projects on the private sector but 
rather seeks to influence its decisions in the direction of conforming with 
the government's general framework, without prejudice to the principles of 
economic freedom and private enterprise."20 
The plan was deemed to be a "testimony to Jordan's new economic approach."21 
Furthermore, for the first time the whole process was to be subject to review and annual 
updating to reflect changing circumstances and the actual levels of performance. 22 
In line with the thinking of the IMF, the Ministry of Planning admitted that the 
"public sector [had] emerged as a competing and restraining force vis-a-vis the private 
sector," as indicated by: 
+ The government's determination of various prices; 
+ The subsidisation of production inputs, of locally-produced commodities, and by 
supporting inefficient public enterprises; 
+ The granting of concessions to certain businesses; 
+ The lack of anti-trust and consumer protection legislation; and 
+ The involvement of the public sector in production?3 
The planners listed the main problems facing the private sector in what they 
termed 'the investment sector', which was deemed to include agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, trade and tourism. The problems highlighted, with which the state could 
assist, can be divided into existing and missing factors. The tariff system, overlapping 
authority among public enterprises in the field of investment management, and the 
complexity of registration and licensing procedures were all stressed as major existing 
problems. In addition, the lack of a comprehensive investment strategy, including a 
unified source of information, the lack of inadequate incentives provided both by the 
Income Tax Law and the Investment Promotion Law and the lack of support services 
for this sector, were deemed to be barriers to development.24 
The plan was based on a number of important principles, including the 
liberalisation of the economy. This change was to be implemented in a number of 
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ways, such as enhancing the regulatory and supervisory role of the government; 
reducing the government's role in direct production, while enhancing the private sector 
by encouraging investment; increasing the areas in which the private sector could 
operate; improving the efficiency of public sector institutions and government 
departments; and encouraging certain industries. Among the other principles 
highlighted was the need to develop the export sector by opening new markets, 
expanding existing markets, and improving human resources. 25 
The focus of the plan on the private sector as the engine of growth is confirmed by 
the planned investment levels during the period (table 7.4). These were expected to 
total JD5242m, of which almost 50% was to be spent on the social and services sectors, 
with the remainder divided almost equally between infrastructure and the productive 
sectors. The private sector was anticipated to provide almost two-thirds of the total 
investment. Private funding was expected to account for over 85% of the investments 
in the productive sector, almost 70% in the social and services field and one-third of the 
infrastructure spending. 
Table 7.4 
Social and Services JD810m 31.2% 49.6% 
Infrastructure JD890m 66.3% JD453m 33.7% JD1343m 25.6% 
Productive JD174m 13.4% JD1127m 86.6% JD1301m 24.8% 
Total JD1874m 35.7% JD3368m 64.3% JD5242m 100% 
Source: Adapted by author. Ministry of Planning, (undated: a), Plan for Economic and Social 
Development: 1993-1997, (Amman: Ministry of Planning), p.l39 and p.l97. 
The growth rates of total consumption at 1991 constant prices were anticipated to 
be 2.8% for the period 1993 to 1997, of which private consumption would increase by 
3.0%, while public consumption was expected to rise by 2.1 %. Although the plan 
aimed at increasing the role of the private sector, over the five years the public sector 
was expected to provide the majority of the growth in GFCF. However, if the figures 
for 1993 are removed from the equation then in the last four years the private sector was 
expected to provide more impetus for growth than the public sector. Thus, after an 
initial fall of 30.1% in 1993, private GFCF at 1991 constant prices was planned to rise 
by a total of 8.9% over the last four years of the plan. The public sector figures were 
expected to grow by a total of 3.4% over the last four years.26 Overall, the contribution 
of the private sector in GFCF was expected to rise from 60.2% in 1993 to 64.3% in 
1997.27 
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The fiscal policies aimed at achieving the programme were a repetition of the 
policies sought by the IMF, namely: 
~ Broadening the tax base; 
~ Replacing consumption tax with GST as a prelude to the implementation of VAT; 
~ Reducing and targeting subsidies; 
o Pricing government services to ensure cost recovery, specifically regarding 
electricity, water and sanitation, irrigation water, postal services, and transport fares; 
and 
~ Covering a larger portion of the costs in the health and education sectors, whilst 
taking into account the needs of lower income groups.28 
Specific polices aimed at assisting the 'investment sector' had the objective of 
providing "a suitable investment environment conducive to increasing domestic 
production and exports and to rationalising imports."29 The policies upon which the 
plan was predicated included: 
+ Providing investment information by establishing a central body within the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade to provide an information database, to simplify registration 
procedures, particularly for trade licences, tourist related licensing, and to confine 
all registration and licensing procedures to a single point; 
~ Encouraging the financial sector to provide investment funding though developing 
an institution to provide partial guarantees for SMEs; 
+ Creating an export credit guarantee institution; 
+ Expanding the remit of the IDB; 
+ Simplifying custom regulations; 
+ Granting tax incentives, through the Income Tax Law; 
+ Amending the Investment Promotion Law to increase investment incentives; 
+ Upgrading the quality of goods by complying with international standards and 
building awareness of the necessity for quality; and 
+ Restoring financial and administrative autonomy to public institutions, and 
permitting the private sector to provide public services.30 
The plan argues for "a detailed study to explore the most feasible options for 
moving towards privatisation on a clear foundation." 31 Three types of companies were 
envisaged for privatisation: those considered best served by privatisation; those of 
strategic importance which should remain in the public sector but be run on a "cost-
effective basis"; and those to be run on a commercial basis, with privatisation to follow 
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at a later stage. 32 The proposals for privatisation specifically highlighted in the 
programme were to: 
~ Convert the PTC and the United Company for Organising Land Transport into 
public shareholding companies run by the private sector; 
~ Restructure RJ to make it amenable to gradual and partial privatisation; 
~ Promote private sector participation in energy and electricity projects; and 
0 Provide JEA with the financial and administrative autonomy to allow operations on 
a commercial basis. 
No mention was made of privatisation efforts m the water and telecommunications 
sectors. 
After a gap of two years, the state produced another five-year social and economic 
development plan covering the years 1999 to 2003. The process for the new plan was 
initiated in 1997 but by mid-1999 it was still being debated. During the three-day 
National Seminar in Social and Economic Development, in July, the King asked for it to 
be prepared within the next two months.33 The specific objectives for the plan were 
drawn up at the Dead Sea retreat in November 1999. Overall the plan is a continuation 
of the three pillars of the IMF policy from 1989, viz: 
~ Liberalising the national economy; 
+ Encouraging the private sector; and 
• Attracting Arab34 and foreign investment.35 
In addition, the need to increase productivity, fight unemployment and poverty, and 
improve the quality of life through achieving consistency between economic 
development and human development are highlighted.36 
Among the general goals of the plan are: 
+ To create conditions of sustainable growth in excess of population growth rate; 
• To continue the policy of openness in trade and investment; 
• To continue to reform the administrative and legislative frameworks that regulate all 
economic activity, including privatisation; 
• To maintain the monetary and fiscal stability, eliminate production and pnce 
distortion, increase domestic savings and secure a proper climate for private sector 
investment; 
+ To restructure the role of the public sector in economic activities; and enhance the 
role of the private sector in these activities; and 
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~ To confront corruption and emphasise transparency in both the public and private 
sectors.37 
The specific economic objectives are: 
~ Achieving real growth of 4.5% annually; 
~ Achieving annual growth of 5.2% in exports and 5% in imports; 
~ Decreasing debt service to 24.2% of the value of exports and reducing the 
percentage of the general indebtedness to 75% of GDP; 
~ Maintaining national savings of 30% of GDP; 
~ Maintaining monetary stability, containing inflation, and maintaining a sufficient 
[unspecified] level of hard currency; 
~ Reducing the budget deficit before grants to 1.2% GDP by the last year of the plan; 
and 
~ Reinforcing the role of private sector and following up the privatisation 
programme. 38 
As with the previous plan, the state acknowledged the importance of the private 
sector to the future of the economy. The aim of a balanced, sustainable and 
comprehensive development could not be achieved "without the real patticipation of the 
private sector. This sector could be encouraged by providing a suitable environment for 
investment and the removal of all obstacles."39 
TabHe 7.5 
!Planned Capital Expenditure, 1998-2003 
1998 
1999 1444.7 
2000 1143.8 1506.2 
2001 1500.3 1888.8 
2002 1708.1 80.7 2117.4 
2003 1870.9 80.7 2319.2 
Source: Adapted by author. Ministry of Planning, (undated: c), Plan for Economic and Social 
Development: 1999-2003, (Amman: Ministry of Planning), Table l.IO. 
In terms of the public and private contributions to the economy, the plan 
anticipates that private consumption will increase by on average 7.3% pa, in contrast to 
a public consumption increase of 2.7% pa.41 In line with the objective to increase the 
level of domestic savings, the overall level of consumption is expected to fall from 
96.1% of GDP in 1998 to 87.6% in 2003.42 On the question of investment levels, the 
plan envisages that the private sector will be investing 80% of total investment by the 
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end of the plan, an increase from less than 75% at the beginning of the plan (table 7.5). 
In addition, it seeks to change the quality of investment by increasing levels in industry, 
communication and the financial services and moving away from the construction 
sector.43 
On privatisation, the plan admitted that a slowdown had occurred.44 The plan 
defines privatisation as: 
"an organised and methodological process, which aims at preparing a 
suitable environment that would support sustainable economic growth and 
which is represented in the re-distribution of roles between the public and 
the private sectors. This entails that the government restricts its activities to 
drawing up policies, control, organising, and focusing on activities such as 
health, security, education, and preserving the environment. The private 
sector controls the economic activities including public projects which are 
run on commercial bases."45 
This broad definition allowed the state to argue that the success/failure of the process 
could not be measured solely by the divestment of shares in the SOEs. The reasons 
given for implementing the privatisation process were in line with dominant economic 
thinking associated the Washington consensus, namely: 
+ To enhance and improve productivity and the competitiveness capability through 
activating market forces, and removing economic distortions; 
+ To encourage domestic savings and attract investments (domestic, Arab, and 
foreign) through opening markets and abolishing monopolies; 
+ To halt the drain in public capital due to loss-making projects and to limit foreign 
borrowings that are designed to help the loss-making projects; 
• To deepen the market for domestic capital and direct investment towards the long 
term; and 
+ To facilitate the acquisition of technology and modem managerial means. 
Again in line with the Washington consensus concerning privatisation, the plan 
commits the state to withdrawing from production activities while increasing its 
enabling, supervisory and regulatory roles both in the process of privatisation and in the 
subsequent post-privatisation period. The plan lays out the new role for the state as: 
+ Finding and developing a suitable competitive environment for the market; 
• Completing the organisational and legislative frameworks to support privatisation; 
• Establishing independent bodies for organising and controlling the privatised areas 
to monitor quality, issue permits and control monopoly; 
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0 Introducing privatisation gradually. For example, transforming the governmental 
institutions or companies into share-holding companies owned by the government 
and governed by the Companies Law. During this period, commercial and financial 
methods followed by the private sector should be used in order to facilitate its later 
privatisation; 
0 Evaluating the value of the companies to be privatised in order to know the value of 
the project as an initial indicator for the process of privatisation; 
o Selecting the ideal method for privatising each project; 
~ Ensuring transparency and publicity in decision-making relevant to privatisation; 
and 
+ Preserving the acquired rights for all parties.46 
The plan also indicates the priority given by the state to the various sectors in 
implementing privatisation, namely: 
~ The energy sector; 
+ Transportation: public transportation, railways, air transport (including airports), and 
ports; 
$ Communications and post; 
$ Water; 
~ TV and radio; and 
+ Hotels and rest houses.47 
The approach to each of the four MENA economic summits IS instructive in 
highlighting the change of emphasis of the state's role in the development of the 
economy, including areas such as infrastructure provision that were previously 
considered the sole preserve of the state. Following the signing of the Oslo accords, a 
series of economic summits aimed at regularising economic relations between the 
MENA countries and Israel were conducted. The first summit took place in Casablanca 
in 1994, followed by Amman (1995), Cairo (1996) and Doha (1997).48 At each summit 
Jordan put forward a list of projects for consideration. The lists for the first two 
conferences sought investment from the private sector, the state, and mixed ventures.49 
In line with the dominant economic theory of neo-liberalisation, the take-up rate at the 
two conferences was weak. However, prior to the Cairo conference, the decision-
makers realised that in order to succeed the private sector had to become the main 
engine for growth, particularly if considering external investment. As a consequence, 
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the list of twenty-five schemes,50 with an estimated value of US$3,700m, was 
exclusively seeking private investment.51 
Although the state continued to be involved in the economy through the use of 
five-year plans, the focus of these plans had changed in number of ways. Firstly, the 
plans themselves were no longer 'wish lists' but approached development in a more 
holistic manner. Secondly, they actively encouraged the development of the private 
sector, which was now seen as the motor of growth. Thirdly, they acknowledged the 
changing role of the state away from that of the leader in development to that of a 
facilitator, which involved the state's withdrawal from productive activities to focus on 
supervision and regulation. This change of role can be considered as a move towards 
the market end of the continuum. 
2.4 Institutional Development 
The institutional development related to the process of economic liberalisation in 
the period 1989 to 2000 can be divided into two types. The first is the creation of joint 
committees comprising members of the private and public sectors in an attempt to 
formalise the informal arrangements already existing in the economic decision-making 
process. If this institutionalisation of state-private sector relations becomes effective it 
can be seen as an indicator of the declining aspects of state rentierism. The second type 
of arrangement is the creation or revamping of organisations to assist the promotion of 
the policies of economic liberalisation, in particular attracting investment and promoting 
exports. In addition, the section also briefly analyses the evolution of the specialised 
credit and investment institutions. 
In the autumn of 1989, the ECC,52 which had been established m 1986 and 
suspended in January 1989 by the Cabinet after only meeting a further twice, was 
revived.53 The Council, which was chaired by the Prime Minister, had the aim of co-
ordinating private and public sector activity to ensure best use of investment and to 
facilitate increased output. The scope of the ECC was to discuss "investment 
legislation, economic and monetary policies, prices and wage policies, privatisation, 
[and] the contribution of the public and private sectors to economic activities."54 Also 
included in the remit were oil and gas exploration; agriculture; employment conditions 
and training; health; the environment; food and water; and infrastructure and tourism. 
Private sector representatives were drawn mainly from the commercial, industrial, 
tourism, banking, insurance and transport sectors.55 According to the EIU, the private 
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sector initiated the resurrection of the ECC,56 presumably in response to the threat of the 
process of economic liberalisation. As with similar previous attempts the formalisation 
did not prove to be successful, despite further attempts to restructure the Council in 
1993. The close web of informal ties between the private and public sectors built up 
under the ISR proved resilient to the attempts to formalise the interaction. 
On the 13th December 1999, a new ECC was born following a conference at the 
Dead Sea from the 26th to 27th November initiated by King Abdullah. On this 
occasion the appointed twenty-member committee was drawn primarily from the private 
sector (fourteen), thereby emphasising a switch in priorities of the rentier elite.57 The 
recommendations that were announced following the retreat also underscored the new 
priorities. For the first time, the state was recommended to withdraw from the mining 
sector, an area previously considered sacrosanct due to its 'strategic' nature. Among the 
other recommendations (the usual list of suspects) were the call for the withdrawal of 
the state from productive activities, incentives to help the private sector raise standards 
in health, education and social services, the reshaping of policies to attract local and 
foreign investment, an increase in the number of BOO/BOT schemes in major economic 
projects and, finally, the placing of more emphasis on the educating process about the 
benefits of privatisation. 58 In contrast to the previous ECC, the latest reincarnation has 
been successful at initiating and implementing change. For instance, recommendations 
for the introduction of English and computer studies at first grade level in primary 
schools, a reduction in telecom charges, increased spending on tourism promotion and 
an easing of visa procedures have already been implemented. 59 
Two further committees established during the period highlight the desire by the 
rentier elite to retain control of or access to the rent circuit. The committee established 
to close the loopholes in the sales tax law (previous chapter) was an example of how the 
rentier elite with private sector economic interests was able to maintain access to the 
rent circuit. Previously, those with private sector interests had been able to delay the 
implementation of the tax and also to reduce the tax rate levied. The committee itself 
allowed further exemptions from the tax to be negotiated rather than to close the 
loopholes, as had been the intention. A twelve-strong Royal Committee for 
Modernisation and Development, headed by Crown Prince Hassan, was created in 
August 1994, following a letter by King Hussein to the Crown Prince. In the letter, the 
King argued that the judicial system, the Audit Bureau and the Bureau of 
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Administrative Control and Security should have modern laws to deal with trade. 
Furthermore, he added that: 
"[a]mong the duties of this committee is to endeavour to establish an 
economic and investment climate on clear foundations in order to give 
everybody his right without negligence, disorder or deviation. This should 
cover both the public and private sectors."60 
The top priorities were reported to be the establishment of a central purchase system and 
the drafting of a foreign trade policy.61 Although the commission comprised of 
representatives of the private and public sectors, the members were hand-picked by the 
rentier elite. 
A series of institutions was established or revamped from 1992 onwards to assist 
with improving the climate for investment and the ability to export. Two types of 
organisation were formed: those directly linked to the state, say, through various 
ministries and joint public-private limited companies. Among the first type were: 
~ JCCC became JEDCO in 1992, with an increased responsibility to implement the 
government's commitments on all trade protocols. In addition, JEDCO has the role 
of developing exports and assisting manufacturers in gaining new markets, through 
trade promotion, technical export development, providing information services and 
developing human resources; 
~ The JIPC was formed in 1993 as part of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In 
1995, it was converted into a separate body with the aim of concentrating "on 
promoting rather than controlling investment;"62 
+ The Higher Council for Investment Promotion ( 1995), under the chairmanship of 
the Prime Minister, with the Ministers of Industry and Trade, Finance, Planning, 
Tourism, and Transport, and the Governor of the CBJ, the chairmen of the FJCC 
and the ACI, and three private sector representatives recommended by the 
Minister.63 The goal of the Council was to "create a suitable environment for 
. " 64 mvestment ; 
+ The investment window (1995)65 in the Investment Promotion Department as a one 
stop shop,66 with a three-week deadline to approve investments67 and to deal with 
. 68 
mvestment matters; 
+ An industrial development investment unit ( 1997) was created at the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade to facilitate further investment after a project has been 
established; and 
+ Jordan Investment Board (2000) was launched as the revamped version of the JIPC. 
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Among the jointly-subscribed companies launched were: 
$ The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (1995) which has the aim of financing 
small and medium scale projects by granting guarantees to cover financial 
borrowing. The company was established with a capital base of JD7m, of which the 
CBJ provided JD3m by way of a USAID funded grant. Other subscribers were 
licensed banks, two insurance companies, the SSC, the Cities and Villages 
Development Bank and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry;69 
• The Jordan Export and Finance Bank (1995), which is required, as a condition of its 
licence, to devote 50% of its resources to export-related activities. The capital 
(JD20m) was subscribed to by, among others, JPMC, APC, JCFC, members of the 
Jordan Trade Association, a number of insurance companies, SSC, JIC, and JEDCO: 
the majority of these are SOEs; and 
~ The Jordan Mortgage Refinance Company (1996), which was founded with a capital 
of JD5m, including JD0.9m from CBJ, also contributions from SSC, HUDC, and 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation. The objective of the company is to refinance 
medium- and long-term bonds in the capital market. 
In line with the move to an export-oriented private sector, Free Zones in Jordan 
have undergone a series of reforms during the IMF years. The FZC had two free zones 
under its auspices by 1989, both primarily focusing on tax-exempt warehousing. 
Towards the end of 1993, the FZC announced plans to develop two new zones, one at 
Queen Alia Airport and one in Amman at the Sahab Industrial Estate,70 both of which 
are now active. In 1994, a new draft law was prepared granting further incentives and 
simplifying the procedures for investment. The FZC came under heavy criticism in 
JICA's 1996 study for restricting its activities virtually entirely to tax-exempt 
warehousing, without encouraging heavy industry, or providing the free trade zones or 
transportation routes to other countries. 71 In response, the following year, the concept 
of Free Zones was extended to the private sector, since when nine further zones have 
been established, namely: 
+ The Jordan Indo Chemicals Private Free Zone for producing phosphoric acid at 
Shidiyeh, with three hundred and fifty jobs; 
+ Jordan Japanese Private Free Zone for producing compound fertilisers at Aqaba 
town, with one hundred and three jobs; 
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~ Dutch Sulphochem Private Free Zone at Aqaba for storing and distribution of 
chemicals which are used in paint and plastic materials industry at Aqaba, with 
thirty jobs; 
+ Jordan Norwegian Private Free Zone area for the manufacturing of fertiliser at 
Shidiyeh and Aqaba providing one thousand job opportunities; and 
+ Five private free zone areas at Quwaira, Aqaba and Qaa' Khana operating in the 
field of importing, slaughtering and distributing sheep in the local and neighbouring 
markets, with one thousand jobs.72 
The JlEC was established in 1980 to manage the industrial zones, the second of 
which, Al-Hassan Industrial Estate, was initiated in 1989 and operational by 1991. In 
the mid-1990s the JlEC's remit was extended to include Q1Zs.73 The QIZs are a direct 
result of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. 74 In March 1998, the US Trade Representative 
designated the Al-Hassan Industrial Estate as a QIZ, followed in October 1999 by the 
Al-Karak Industrial Estate.75 In February 2000, after a delay of over two years, a joint 
QIZ was agreed with Israel called Jordan Gateway. 76 Towards the end of the year, the 
JlEC and USAID announced the US$10-15m development of a further QIZ at Aqaba.77 
In late 1999, the private sector also announced its intention to establish a site at Dulayl 
and a second at Sahab. 78 In May 2000, Boscan Middle East Investment of Hong Kong 
announced that it would create an IT-based QIZ, dubbed CyberCity, adjacent to the 
University of Jordan. 79 The position at the time of writing on the establishment of QIZs 
can be found in table 7.6. In addition, a further four are under construction.80 The four 
operational QIZs host thirty-three factories with a total investment of JD82.5m, and 
employ 11,000 workers, and a further thirty-nine projects (valued at JD 182.5m and 
potentially creating 21,000 jobs) are in the pipeline. The success of the QIZs can be 
seen by the growth of exports from the QIZs to the USA from US$2.5m in 1999 to 
US$25m in 2000. The hope is that over the next four to five years the QIZs will create 
up to 100,000 jobs with exports of US$2,500-3,000m. 81 
The final move in the free zones development was the announcement in mid-2000 
of the King's wish to establish a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the region of Aqaba. 
Parliament approved the draft law in July of the same year, 82 with the intention of 
having the zone functioning at the start of January 2001. 83 The law grants the Aqaba 
SEZ complete exemption from: 
"customs duties and any other rates and taxes on imports into the SEZ; and 
GST or any other tax that replaces sales tax on imports into the SEZ, or on 
sales of goods and services within the designated SEZ area."84 
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Initial expectations, which seem over-optimistic, are that the zone will attract 
US$6,000m in investments and create more than 70,000 jobs. 85 
Table 7.6 
QIZs 
Source: Adapted by author. Atlas Investment Group, (April 2001), Jordan Country Survey, (Amman: 
Atlas Investment Group), p.29. 
An important development was the abolition of the Ministry of Supply on the 1st 
November 1998, a move that formally signalled the end of much government 
involvement in the economy. The Ministry had been responsible for subsidies and price 
regulation of a number of basic goods, but as these elements were gradually phased-out 
it became redundant. As a prelude to the scrapping, from August 1996 the private 
sector was allowed to import wheat, wheat derivatives, sugar and rice, all of which were 
previously part of the Ministry's monopoly: as recently as 1995 the Ministry had been 
responsible for JD320m worth of food imports86 (over 60% of the total food imports). 
In the case of privatisation, two main institutional developments were important. 
The Privatisation Unit was established by a Cabinet agreement on the 6th June 1996, at 
the recommendation of the World Bank. The EPU comprised of a Higher Ministerial 
Committee, under the supervision of the Prime Minister, to "formulate general policy so 
that the process of privatisation is conducted in an organised manner, thereby ensuring 
economic growth and greater productive efficiency."87 A technical unit to implement 
the process of privatisation was also formed. This move was the first step in producing 
a co-ordinated policy towards privatisation. The second step came with the 
promulgation of Privatisation Law no. 25 for 2000, which replaced the EPU with the 
Executive Privatisation Commission under the supervision of the Higher Ministerial 
Council for Privatisation. In addition, the law controversially granted the government 
"a distinct voting power through the 'Gilded/Golden' share, which empowers it to 
oppose resolutions of a Company's board of directors or general assembly, if the 
national interest so requires."88 
The growth of the specialised credit institutions shows mixed results between 
1989 and 2000. The Housing Bank lost its status as a specialised credit institution in 
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1997 with the promulgation of Law 16, which cancelled the Housing Bank for Trade 
and Finance Law, no. 4 of 1974. Consequently, the organisation now operates as a 
normal commercial bank. The loan portfolio of both the IDB and ACC grew 
dramatically between 1989 and 2000, the former by 160.6% and the latter by 216%. In 
comparison, GDP grew by 168%. These figures are at odds with the World Bank's 
1995 Report,89 which argued that these institutions were a major constraint on the 
development of the private sector. However, the loan portfolio of the Cities and 
Villages Development Bank grew by only 9.1 %, while the HUDC's portfolio actually 
declined by almost one-quarter. The lack of growth in the loan portfolio of these two 
institutions supports the tenor of the 1995 Report. The growth of the ACC has been in 
great part due to the drought conditions, with the packages of cheap loans and roll-overs 
of existing facilities. In contrast, the growth of the IDB has been primarily due to donor 
assistance. Generally, though, the importance of these institutions has diminished over 
the period, with the state encouraging the banking sector to fund private sector 
development. In addition, the donor community's concentration on establishing 
sustainable micro-finance schemes has assisted the funding of the small enterprises in 
the private sector. 
To summarise, the relationship between the private and public sectors became 
more formalised towards the end of the twentieth century. In addition, the creation and 
revamping of the various institutions associated with the economy have also shown a 
tendency to move to the private sector end of the continuum. The state organisations 
have moved from an objective of outright control to one of facilitation of investment 
and exports, while the joint public-private organisations have as their objective the 
facilitation of the efficiency of the markets, in particular the financial market. A similar 
change has been apparent in the development of the Free Zones, the Industrial Estates, 
the QIZs and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone. The institutionalisation of 
privatisation has also highlighted a move to the private sector, with state control moving 
from ownership to regulatory control. Finally, the reduction in the role of the 
specialised credit institutions is another example of the move away from the state 
dominance of the economy. Overall, then, the measure of institutional development has 
moved towards the private sector end of the market continuum. 
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2.5 Private Sector Support 
The main areas of state support for the private sector over the decade had three 
foci. The first was the continued support for the agricultural sector, driven by internal 
pressures of the farming lobby. The second and third were new, with a switch to 
export-oriented companies and the desire for increased investment, whether domestic, 
Arab or foreign. These latter two foci were initially instigated at the insistence of the 
donor community. 
The agricultural sector remains small, accounting for only 6-7% of the GDP, 
while not contributing significantly to the employment situation. Indeed, as many as 
half a million migrant labourers are employed in the sector, at a time when in excess of 
this number are unemployed locally. Furthermore, the sector uses at least 70% of the 
water consumed annually. Despite the small size of the sector, and considering that 
Jordan has not been self-sufficient in food since the Second World War, the importance 
of attempting to maintain food security remains important in the Jordanian psyche, 
mainly as a result of the unstable security in the region. A second reason for the 
strength of influence of the agricultural sector is the preponderance of land-owners 
among the rentier elite. The significance of the sector was reflected in the debate in 
parliament concerning the WTO agreement. As part of the agreement for accession to 
the WTO, the state agreed to reduce estimated domestic support and export subsidies by 
13.3% over seven years from the date of joining. The WTO allowed the extra time due 
to the drought conditions over the previous few years.90 However, debate in parliament 
expressed concerns about the effects on the agricultural sector, in particular. Farmers 
were concerned that Jordanian agricultural products would not easily compete in 
Europe, given the stringent quality standards applied and given the fact that Europe is 
traditionally protective of its agriculture sector and under pressure from its own 
influential farming lobbies. Local farmers also fear that they will be threatened in the 
Jordanian market as well, when high quality agricultural products enter the Kingdom at 
extremely competitive prices. 
At the beginning of the period, the state controlled significant aspects of the 
sector, including fixing the prices of many inputs and outputs and what could be grown 
through the use of crop licences, as well as subsidising outputs and inputs including 
finance and the scarce resource of water. In February 1993, following a report drafted 
with the assistance of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the state announced 
that the public sector role would in the future be no more than one of regulator and eo-
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ordinator, with an emphasis on encouraging exports, investments and water 
conservation.91 In December 1984, after more than a year of discussions, a World Bank 
loan of US$80m was approved. The loan was to enable the restructuring of the sector 
and was aimed at improving productivity and exports, through phasing-out subsidies 
and price controls, improving water conservation and restructuring the associated 
institutions (such as the ACC and the Jordanian Co-operatives Organisation). In the 
twelve months prior to signing the agreement, the sector had been granted exemption 
from customs duties for all inputs to agricultural production. In addition, exemption 
had been granted from interest payments at varying rates of between 30% and 100% for 
small farmers, at a cost to the Treasury of JD1lm. Finally, the purchase price set by the 
state of locally-produced grain was raised to encourage production. The only move to 
liberalise the market was the abolition of the purchase of tomatoes at fixed prices by the 
Jordan Agricultural Marketing and Processing Company. The price was now left to 
market forces. 92 The following year, customs duties were imposed at a flat rate of 30% 
on imported fruit and vegetables and 10-30% on poultry.93 In 1996, domestic fodder 
prices were restructured and a system of direct cash transfer for owners of one hundred 
or fewer goats and sheep was introduced.94 The following year, the prices of fruit and 
vegetables were finally floated. In addition, over the period, the state has consistently 
rescheduled loans, granted exemptions from interest payments and granted custom duty 
exemptions on inputs for agricultural production. The question of water subsidies 
remains to be addressed. In April 1999, a new package of assistance (worth JD12-15m) 
was announced which included the provision of livestock fodder barley at JD75/tonne 
and bran at JD65/tonne. The package also: 
+ Exempted 50% of interest on ACC loans and rescheduled the remaining 50%; 
+ Provided farmers with vaccines and veterinary supplies and transport for usmg 
them; 
• Continued to purchase field crops from local producers; 
• Granted free water for livestock; and 
• Provided farmers with pesticides.95 
Part of the WTO agreement was that the state agreed to reduce estimated domestic 
support and export subsidies to the sector by 13.3% over the following seven years.96 
The moves to assist the export sector have included: 
- 286-
Chapter Seven: The State-Market Interface: Induced State Rentierism, Private Sector Rentierism or Market Economy? 
o Abolishing most trade licences and easing trade regulations (1992). The number of 
licences issued had increased from 36,000 to 1000 traders in 1985 to 100,000 
licences to 36,000 traders in 1992;97 
o Allowing exemption from income tax on 70% of net profits accrued from exports 
(1993); 
o Reducing interest rates for export facilities to five points below discount rate ( 1993); 
0 Increasing the allowance in commercial bank credit for exporters to JD400m, of 
which JD335m was set aside for the private sector (1994);98 
o Abolishing export licences for Jordanian commodities, except to countries with 
which the Kingdom has payment arrangements (1997);99 and 
+ Reducing difficulties in obtaining import licences through Ministry of Industry and 
Trade regulation no. 1, which makes import licences a formality rather than a barrier 
(1997).100 
In the industrial sector, the state has been reducing the level of customs duties101 
in line with the IMF agreements and the need to meet the international agreements with 
the WTO, the EU, European Free Trade Association, the USA FT A, and other bilateral 
accords. This move has not been actively sought by the state since the reductions have 
always met the minimum conditions necessary to meet the various agreements. Despite 
the agreement to join the WTO, the state has still attempted to protect manufacturers 
against the increasing global competition. In November 2000, new regulations were 
passed to increase duties on imports, providing that local manufacturers could prove the 
damage sustained by their industries. The duties could be imposed for up to four years, 
and could be extended if the situation remained the same. However, local companies 
are expected "to enhance efficiency and upgrade their status" according to Minister of 
Industry and Trade Secretary-General, Samir Tawil. 102 
A series of laws have been implemented to encourage investment, in particular 
FDI. Initial attempts to allow foreign investment were hampered by the Islamic 
opposition in parliament. In August 1991, they defeated three articles in the draft biii, 
on each occasion by 29-28 votes, with twenty-three deputies refraining from voting. 
The first article would have required any foreign investment to be approved by Cabinet, 
whereas the deputies were interested in allowing only Arab investment to be approved 
in this manner. The second article was said to interfere with local labour organisations, 
while the third would have allowed foreign investors to participate in all tenders and 
projects provided that they deposited convertible currency to the extent of JD25,000. 103 
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A spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, Deputy Mohammed Abu Faris, stated 
"We are not interested in those investments which aim at ruling us in the future." 104 In 
1992, a new law regulating Arab and foreign investments was passed, allowing income 
tax and social security exemptions from five to seven years in Amman, ten years in the 
Irbid and Balqa regions and fifteen years elsewhere. 105 The Law Governing Arab and 
Foreign Investment, no. 22 of 1992 also allowed for non-Arab foreign investment to be 
approved by Cabinet. This system did not actually prove to be an incentive for 
investment: in 1993 approval was granted for US$60m, but the actual investment 
totalled only US$0.7m, a take-up rate of just over 1%. 
A new draft investment law was submitted in 1994 and approved in 1995. The 
Investment Promotion Law no. 16 of 1995 contained two elements: 
• Easing bureaucratic disincentives for businesses, including no longer requmng 
government approval for projects and investments in the stock market. In addition, 
the law allows any non-Jordanian investor to own all or part of a project or 
economic activity in the Kingdom, provided that the capital, the value of the share 
or the amount of the contribution to the project is transferred to Jordan in 
convertible foreign currency before the conveyance procedures are finalised; and 
• Increasing incentives for businesses, such as reducing corporation tax from 50% to 
30% in the banking and insurance sectors, from 40% to 15% in priority sectors (for 
example tourism and mining), and to 25% in other sectors. 
The specific details concerning restrictions on investment were covered in Non-
Jordanian Investment Promotion Regulation, no. 1 of 1996. The regulation aimed at 
encouraging foreign investment by opening up certain sectors, such as tourism, in the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to foreign investment beyond the 49% ceiling. 
However, the ceiling remained in construction and contracting, land and air transport, 
trading and trade services, banking and insurance, telecommunications, mining and 
agricultural products. 106 In addition, foreign investors were able to buy shares on the 
ASE for up to 50% of existing companies unless the percentage of the non-Jordanian 
ownership was more than 50% at the time of closing of subscription in the shares of the 
public shareholding company, in which case the maximum limit for non-Jordanian 
h. f' d h 107 owners 1p was 1xe at t at percentage. The minimum level of any foreign 
investment in ASE was reduced from JD5000 to JDlOOO. The minimum level of FDI 
was set at JD 100,000 in any one project. 108 
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Finance Minister Jardaneh argued that the new Jaw was "a very liberal by-law and 
the spirit of the by-laws is that foreign and domestic investors will be treated equally 
with no discrimination." 109 The law also states that "a non-Jordanian investor can 
repatriate his foreign capital ... and what he has gained in profits or the liquidation or 
sale of his project or stock without delay and in convertible currency." 110 The law 
grants customs and GST exemptions (among other incentives) to industry, agriculture, 
hotels, hospitals, marine transport, railways and "any other sector or sub-sectors the 
Council of Ministers approve of upon the Council's recommendation." 111 In addition, 
leisure and recreational compounds and conference and exhibition centres have been 
added by virtue of the Cabinet's resolution dated 28 October 1997. 112 
In July 1997, the Higher Council for Investments recommended the abolition of 
the 50% ceiling on foreign investment in the mining, construction contracting, and 
commercial and commercial services sectors. 113 In September, Regulation no. 1 of 
1996 was amended by Regulation no. 39 of 1997. Originally, the intention was to lift 
all restrictions on foreign ownership in all sectors. Restrictions were lifted in land and 
air transport, trading and trade services and mining products. However, following 
pressure from the private sector, the ceiling remained on the three areas recommended 
for liberalisation by the Higher Council for Investments. 114 In addition, the law reduced 
the minimum investment by non-Jordanians in any project from JD100,000 to 
JD50,000, as well as abolishing the previous minimum of JDlOOO in the AFM. 115 In 
1999, the Higher Council for Investments again recommended that the 50% ceiling on 
foreign investment be removed, this time using the banking and insurance sectors as the 
. 1 116 pnme examp es. Despite the recommendation, Non-Jordanian Investments 
Promotion Regulation no. 54 for 2000 maintained the ceiling. However, as a result of 
the WTO agreement, the state must allow 100% foreign ownership in the eleven service 
sectors, including construction services, communications, business services, tourism 
and financial services. 117 
Other steps to improve the regulatory environment for investment included: 
+ The Securities Law 1996, which allows dual-listing of Jordanian firms on AFM and 
international exchanges; encourages Jordanian Global Depository Receipts; and for 
the first time allows the listing of mutual funds on the stock exchange; 118 
~ The Company Law 1996, which among other aspects abolished the state issuing 
committee which determined the price of new share issues; 119 
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0 The Companies Law no. 22 of 1997, which abolished the Companies Law no 12 of 
1964; 
0 The Securities Law no. 23 for 1997, which separated supervision from the operation 
of the AFM, through the creation of the Securities and Stock Exchange Commission 
(a public body), the ASE and the Securities Depository (both private companies); 120 
o The agreement to establish an Arab Free Trade Zone by 2008, which was reached in 
Cairo in February 1997; 
0 The amendment of 1999 to the 1997 Companies Law, which controversially allows 
the Trade and Industry Minister to dissolve the Board in the event of any financial 
irregularity. The Minister can then appoint members until elections for a new Board 
take place; 121 
0 The EU-Med partnership which was ratified by parliament in September 1999, and 
activated at the beginning of 2000; and 
o The WTO agreement signed on the 27th December 1999, which came into force in 
March 2000; and 
o The agreement to sign a Ff A with the USA, 122 although to date the agreement has 
not been implemented. The agreement eliminates all tariffs in four stages over ten 
years on bilateral trade for goods and services, including textiles, farm goods and 
other products. 123 
The success of the emphasis on gaining FDI124 is apparent from the IMF figures, 
which show a jump from US$15.5m in 1996 to US$360.9m in 1997, US$310m in 1998 
and US$158m in 1999. The result has been an increase in the share of foreign 
ownership in all sectors of the AFM, although to varying degrees (table 7.7). Services 
have shown the most dramatic increase, climbing 18.4 percentage points to 21.3%. 
However, a significant part of this gain can be attributed to the restrictive nature of 
investment in the services sector prior to 1995. 
The support for the private sector by the state has shown a move on the continuum 
away from the state end. Although the strength of the agricultural lobby has allowed 
subsidies and other forms of support to continue, a very gradual liberalisation of the 
sector has been evident. A greater change has been apparent in the reduction of customs 
duties (although this change has been at the instigation of the donor community rather 
than the state). State involvement in the export sector and in the promotion of 
investments has altered from direct intervention (with the aim of complete control) to 
indirect control by regulation (with the aim of maintaining as much control as possible). 
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Table 7.7 
Share of Foreign Ownership in AFM, 1994-2000 
'. ~y,L· Date;· Banks arid fJnsnrance · ~:": ~~$euices '}ndustrf y,Au SeqO~: 
: 
' Finance . . ·lt_::=:~ .. , :'1 ::: ... ~~",••C &c ,; . :· · • •• c · •-·.·::E >•.:' 
1994 46.7 16.0 2.9 23.6 31.1 
1995 46.3 15.7 3.3 19.9 31.0 
1996 47.7 16.5 7.3 21.8 32.8 
1997 53.8 16.0 9.3 26.0 39.1 
1998 56.3 15.1 11.6 28.1 43.9 
1999 56.7 15.6 11.7 30.6 43.1 
2000 55.1 17.9 21.3 30.2 41.7 
Source: Adapted by author. AFM, (various), Annual Report, (Amman: AFM) and AFM, (various), 
Monthly Report, (Amman: AFM). 
2.6 State-Owned Enterprises 
The attempts to privatise the SOEs have been dealt with extensively in the 
previous chapter. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give a brief review of the sales by the state. 
According to the re-named Executive Privatisation Commission, the JIC had divested 
shares in thirty-nine companies by the end of 2000. Twenty-one of the companies had 
less than 5% government ownership, ten between 5% and 10%, and eight over 10%. 125 
The JIC sales have raised US$100m. 126 In theory, therefore, the divestment of the SOEs 
ought to mean a strong move in the direction of a market economy. However, two 
factors mitigate this analysis. Firstly, many of the divestments have been to the SSC. 
Although the organisation is legally and administratively independent, the board of 
directors is dominated by state officials; the Chairman is the Minister of Labour, and 
should any legal conflict occur the Minister is considered the representative of the 
organisation. 127 Secondly, the JIC has continued to invest in new projects in partnership 
with the private sector. The JIC still encourages investment promotion activities by 
identifying investment opportunities, developing feasibility studies for projects and 
inviting the private sector to invest in these projects, with or without JIC pariicipation. 
However, the maximum state investment is presently limited to 10%. 
One of the early suggestions of the ECC had been the enactment of a privatisation 
law, 128 something the donor community had been actively promoting for a number of 
years. In the final law, parliament managed to have a 'golden share' clause inserted that 
allowed the government to veto company policy that it deemed was against the 'national 
interest'. Interestingly, parliament promoted this clause against the advice of their 
normally influential Economic and Finance Committee, headed at the time by future 
Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb. The state did not seem to seek this power but the 
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clause was not revoked by the Upper House, a more representative element of the 
rentier elite. Thus, although privatisation per se ought to be a move towards the market 
economy, the control of the process by the state has allowed the process to be subverted. 
'fable 7.8 
Completed Privatisation Transactions to 31/12/00 
Public Transport 
Co oration 
Jordan Cement Factories 
Corn an 
Water Authority of Jordan 
Aqaba Railway Corporation 
Jordan Telecommunications 
Corn an 
Duty Free Shops (RJ) 
10/98 
11198 
12/98 
04/99 
08/99 
01/00 
08/00 
30-year lease agreement with consortium led by 
French corn an ACCOR. 
10-year contract with 3 local companies, annual 
fee of JD0.7m. 
33% stake to French company Lafarge Group 
for JD72m (US$102m). 
Management agreement to a consortium led by 
French compan Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. 
25-year management lease to consortium led by 
US corn an Ra heon for JD20m. 
40% stake to France Telecom and Arab Bank for 
US$508m. 9% to local arties for US$114m. 
100% sale to Spanish company Aldeasa for 
US$60.1m. 
Source: Adapted by author. Atlas Investment Group, (April 200 I), Jordan Country Report, (Amman: 
Atlas Investment Group), p.42 and Executive Privatization Unit, (various), Privatization News. 
Table 7.9 
Major §ales by JIC to 31/12/00 
Jordan Pa er and Cardboard Factories; Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes (all) 
1998 Jordan Cement Factories 
1999 The Housing Bank; Cairo Amman Bank; Export and Finance Bank; Jordan 
Dairy Company; Petra Tourist Transport Company; The Industrial 
Commercial Agricultural Company; Jordan Electrical Power Company; 
Jordan Ceramics Industries Company; Jordan Worsted Mills Company; 
and Jordan Tannin Corn an (all) 
2000 Arab International Hotels Company; Jordan Poultry Processing & 
Marketin Corn an 
Source: Adapted by author. ASE, "ASE-Foreign Investment Regulations; Privatisation", ASE website, 
http://www.ase.com.jo/pages/privatisation_eng.htm. 
One particular change of outlook by the SOEs has been their acceptance of the 
need to become involved in joint ventures with foreign companies. 129 JPMC negotiated 
a US$600m joint venture with Norway's Norsk Hydro, which eventually failed 
(ostensibly due to an internal restructuring of Norsk Hydro). Two successful joint 
ventures have been the lndo-Jordan Chemicals Company (with sales of US$82m in 
1998) and the Nippon Jordan Fertiliser Company (with US$40m in the same year). 
APC has concluded 50:50 venture agreements with Albemarle Holdings of the US for a 
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US$120m bromine project and with Kemira Agro (Finland) for a US$100 potassium 
nitrate and dicalcium phosphate project. In addition, the APC subsidiary Jodico has 
signed an US$80m agreement with Monenco Agra (Canada) and Atilla Dogan (Turkey) 
for the turnkey construction of a magnesium oxide plant. A further thirty-two projects 
have been identified by Jodico that are suitable for joint ventures. 
This measure has again highlighted a move towards the market end of the state-
market continuum. However, the move has not been as clear-cut, with continuous 
delays with the process of privatisation and the insertion of the golden share clause in 
the privatisation bill. In addition, the key export earner of mining has not yet been 
privatised, although since the creation of the ECC the state has begun to acknowledge 
the need to include JPMC and APC in the programme. 
2. 7 The Changing Role of the State 
This review of the changing public-private sector relationship has highlighted how 
certain elements of the rentier elite have been proclaiming the necessity to change the 
direction of the economy to enable the private sector to become the engine of future 
development. This approach is in line with the donor community's objectives in 
introducing the SAP. The successful implementation of the policy would reduce the 
state's ability to continue with its expenditure policy, while the policy's adoption would 
result in a move towards the market end of the state-market continuum model on all five 
measures. The evidence highlighted in this section has not produced any clear-cut 
result, although overall the tendency has been to move the economy to a more market-
based one. Part of the confusion has stemmed from the changing role of state which has 
latterly been encouraged by the donor community. 130 The involvement of the state in a 
market-based economy is essentially restricted to the regulatory sphere and the 
provision of goods/services of a 'common good' nature. In Jordan during the 1990s, a 
slow withdrawal of the state was evident in the productive sector, with a commensurate 
increase in the regulatory functions. However, the state still retains its role as facilitator 
in the economy through investment in infrastructure, the planning process, and 
institutional support. Thus, the state's role has shifted from direct intervention with the 
aim of complete control to indirect control by regulation with the aim of maintaining as 
much control as possible, with a view to continuing access to rent. 
What, then, has been the outcome on the four manifestations of the Jordanian 
state-market relationship as at 1989 (chapter 3)? The four features discussed were: 
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o State involvement in productive companies; 
0 The manipulation of the market by the state; 
o The politicisation of the economy; and 
o The institutional arrangements of the private sector. 
The first three features are discussed immediately below, while the final feature is 
discussed in section three. 
Firstly, the state has reduced its share of ownership in the productive sector, 
although it still dominates the economically and strategically important mining sector. 
Furthermore, the scope for the state to influence the SOEs through other means, such as 
pricing, subsidies and monopoly arrangements, has been reduced by international 
agreements and pressure from the donor community. However, pricing of phosphates, 
for example, remains dictated by the state rather than the market. In addition, the 
composition of the boards of directors of a number of companies, as well as who serves 
on these boards, is still in the hands of the state. 
Secondly, pressure from the international community, along with the economic 
recession, has resulted in a considerable reduction in the direct manipulation of the 
market. The abolition of the Ministry of Supply, which used subsidies and price 
regulation extensively during the 1970s and 1980s, had a major effect on the new 
direction. In addition, a reduction in the influence of the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
has been apparent, particularly in the field of external trade. However, the Ministry of 
Planning has been able to maintain an important influence in the economy by redefining 
its roles and activities. It has been able to strengthen its role in the economy as the 
interlocutor between the state and the donor community, as well as retaining its role of 
dispensing the OEA received and continuing to issue five-year development plans, 
despite the wishes of the IMF to the contrary. 
Thirdly, the politicisation of the economy remains, although the state is less able 
to grant access to the economy in return for political support due to the twin constraints 
of the donor community and the economic recession. The appointments by the regime 
to the influential ECC are an example of the continued politicisation of the economy. In 
addition, the relative success of the ECC when compared with previous attempts 
indicates the increased acceptance of formal arrangements between the state and the 
private sector. 
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Thus to a degree the changes in the state-market continuum are reflected in the 
changes in the state-market relationship. The next sector analyses how these changes 
have been mirrored in the changes in the rentier features of Jordan's political economy. 
3.0 CIHIANGKNG CIHIARAC'fERKS'fliCS OJF 'f!HIE l?OlU'fliCAJL ECONOMY 
In chapter one, the theoretical discussion highlighted an important number of 
differences between production economies, IRSEs and PSREs. The main differences 
are illustrated in table 7.10. At the macro-economic level, PSREs and IRSEs both 
display similar aspects of: 
o Dependency on rent (albeit of differing types); 
0 Suffering from chronic balance of trade deficits due to the high levels of imports; 
0 Showing high levels of consumption in comparison to GDP; and 
0 Having a tendency towards a service-oriented economy. 
However, only the IRSE can afford to run continuous budget deficits as the levels of 
OEA can cover the shortfalls. 
'falbBe 7.10 
Summary of State andll?rivate Sector in JD>ifferent 'fypes of Economies 
Induced Rentier mentality Relatively homogenous; Regime elite; Blurred 
State results in expenditure Dependent on state; with elite circulation; 
Rentier policy aimed at Service orientation. Voluntary eo-
Economy control of access to optation; Informal 
rent. contacts· 
Private Rentier mentality Relatively Separate; Formal but 
Sector results in policy heterogeneous; weak contacts. 
Rentier adapted to gaining Independent of state; 
access to rent. Service orientation. 
Production Taxation policy to Heterogeneous; Separate; Formal but 
Economy recreate itself. Independent of state; strong institutional 
Production orientation. contacts. 
The following section assesses to what degree and in what direction the political 
economy of Jordan has moved from that of the ISR exhibited in 1989. Different 
outcomes have been possible given the decline in state rent, the increase in private 
sector rent and the attempts by the donor community to induce the birth of a market 
economy. Which element has won out? Has the state managed to maintain the political 
economy of ISR; or has the increase in remittances allowed a PSR to be become 
dominant; or has the market economy won over the state-led economy; or are all three 
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aspects (ISR, PSR, and the market economy) now part of the political economy 
landscape of the new millennium in Jordan? 
To recap, the following aspects of ISR were strongly in evidence in Jordan in 
1989 (chapter 3). An economy exhibiting a dependency on rent, with consequent 
imbalances in the budget and balance of trade, a bias towards the service sector and high 
levels of consumption. Secondly, the private sector was relatively homogenous in its 
outlook, dependant on the· state and service-oriented. Thirdly, the state had adopted a 
rentier mentality that was manifested in a two-dimensional policy. On the one hand the 
policy was based on maintaining control of and access to the rent, while on the other 
hand the expenditure policy allowed the state to buy political legitimacy (figure 1.2, 
page 24). Finally, the relationship between the private and public sectors was 
predicated upon the rentier elite, voluntary co-aptation or capture of the private sector 
by the state and informal contacts between the two sectors. Based on these aspects, the 
following sections analyse the changes in the political economy of Jordan during the 
1990s. 
3.1 Economy Level Analysis 
This section discusses the changes in the macro-economy relevant to the changing 
rentierism between 1989 and 2000. The first measure is the continuous budget deficit 
excluding OEA, which can be maintained in an IRSE, but not in a production economy 
or under PSRE. The second and third measures are the high levels of imports and bias 
towards the service sector, both of which are evident in either type of rentier economy, 
but not in a market economy. 
3.1.1 Government Expenditure 
As discussed earlier in the chapter (section 2.2) government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP has declined over the period as the expenditure policy has been 
weakened. Initially, the related budget deficit (excluding ODA) fell dramatically from 
in excess of JD425m to under JD 1 Om, but thereafter the deficit climbed until reaching a 
peak in 1998 of JD558.6m (figure 7.5). By the end of 2000, the deficit had fallen to 
JD438.7m, still higher than in 1989. Relating the deficit to the GDP, a similar pattern 
emerges. However, the percentage of the deficit falls from a peak of over 18% in 1989 
to only 7.4% by 2000. Overall, then, the figures indicate a move away from ISR 
towards a production economy. 
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Figure 7.5 
Budget Deficit, 1989-2000 
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Sources: Adapted by author. CBJ, (various), Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (Amman: CBJ) and CBJ, 
"Monthly Statistical Bulletin", CBJ website, http://www.cbj.gov.jo/docs. 
3.1.2 Imports 
Figure 7.6 
Imports as a Percentage of Exports and ofGDP, 1989-2000 
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One of the effects of an IRSE is that higher levels of consumption can be 
maintained and that this excess of consumption becomes directed towards imports 
because of the underdeveloped industrial sector. In normal circumstances, if the IRSE 
were being replaced by a successful export-oriented industrial market economy then the 
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relative levels of imports should decrease. Two indicators have been used to assess 
whether this reduction has taken place in the last decade: imports as a percentage of 
GDP and imports as a percentage of exports (figure 7.6). The first measure indicates 
the importance of imports in the economy as a whole. The expected path ought to be 
downwards as the rentier mentality of high consumption can no longer be maintained. 
If the economy has successfully moved towards an export-oriented one then a 
downward curve should also be in evidence in the second measure. As can be seen, 
both sets of figures follow roughly similar paths. However, although a general decline 
is evidenced in both cases between 1990 and 1999, between 1989 and 2000 no clear 
pattern can be traced. In the case of imports as a percentage of GDP, in 1989 the figure 
is 52.8%, climbing to a high of 65.6% in 1992, before dropping to 45.8% in 1999. 
Nevertheless, the figure for 2000 is 54.2%, a level higher than in 1989. 
In the relationship between imports and exports the figure for 2000 (238.2%) is 
again higher than the starting point of 1989 ( 192.9% ). The problem for the IMF in 
attempting to reduce the level of imports whilst simultaneously raising exports, is that 
the constraints facing Jordan, such as the lack of resources and investment, are 
exacerbated by the fact that the IRSE has been replaced by the PSRE: as discussed in 
chapter one, PSRE also encourages high levels of consumption, which are directed 
towards imports. The evidence would seem to suggest a move away from an IRSE, but 
in the direction of a PSRE rather than a production economy. 
3.1.3 Service versus Industry 
As was highlighted in the theoretical chapter, one of the major effects of ISR is 
the over-development of the service sector vis-a-vis the industrial sector. Has the 
decline in state rentierism allowed the balance to be redressed to any degree, especially 
considering the aim of the donor community to promote industrialisation? This section 
answers the question by looking at the following statistical data: 
• Numbers and capitalisation of registered companies by sector; 
+ Numbers and capitalisation of individual enterprises by sector; 
+ Output as percentage of GDP by sector; 
• Share of exports by sector; 
+ Trading volumes and market capitalisation on the ASE by sector; and 
• New issues on the ASE by sector. 
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The difference between the first two measures is that registered companies include all 
forms of partnerships, limited liability companies and public shareholding companies; 
by contrast, individual enterprises are owned by a single person. Intuitively, since the 
registered companies have a larger average capitalisation (table 7.11 ), they ought to be 
more likely to have closer contacts with the rentier elite. Therefore, the individual 
companies lacking the comfort of links to the rentier elite ought to be more responsive 
to the pressure to adopt a market-oriented approach. As a result, any movement from 
rentierism to a market economy ought to be more evident in these enterprises. 
Table 7.11 
Capitalisation of Registered Companies and Individual Enterprises, 1989-2000 
},''<·', 
1989 1871 7169 24.9 
1990 2393 7919 28.1 
1991 4145 94.0 10755 40.0 
1992 4556 162.6 11944 61.1 
1993 4409 242.5 55001 11119 76.1 
1994 4462 408.4 91528 12169 114.6 9417 
1995 4456 460.1 103254 12368 103.3 8352 
1996 4217 288.1 68319 12174 66.2 5438 
1997 4294 206.7 48137 11740 62.2 5298 
1998 4097 191.3 46693 11549 51.7 4477 
1999 3755 138.6 36911 12710 76.1 5987 
2000 4351 145.5 33441 16025 74.9 4674 
Source: Adapted by author. Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministrx of Trade and Industrx website, 
http:// www.mit.gov.jo. 
The dramatic increase in numbers and capitalisation of both types of companies in 
the early 1990s can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, the boom was driven by 
returnees' capital after the outbreak of the Gulf War. The second factor was the 
relaxation by the state of the entry requirements for all types of business, but especially 
in the manufacturing sector-a move associated with boosting the production economy. 
Thirdly, the outbreak of optimism following the progress in the peace process helped 
promote a boom in the registration of new companies. 131 However, the overall number 
of companies stagnated for the rest of the decade as the boom fuelled by the returnees' 
capital extinguished itself, the peace process stagnated and the economy again entered a 
period of recession. Further evidence of the effects of the recession is that although the 
number of companies has tended to remain static (with the notable exception of 
individual enterprises in 2000), the total capital of the companies has fallen significantly 
since peaking in 1994/95. In the case of registered companies, total capitalisation has 
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fallen from around JD460m in 1995 to just over JD 145m in 2000, while the individual 
enterprises' total capitalisation fell from just under JD 115m in 1994 to just under 
JD75m. 
In terms of the numbers of registered companies, the balance between industry 
and services has swung dramatically in favour of the latter, with the industrial share 
falling by almost 50%, from 20.4% in 1990 to only 10.3% in 2000 (table 7.12). The 
industrial share had fallen as low as 7.1% in 1996 and 1997 before recovering slightly. 
The recovery coincides with the strengthening of the move towards economic 
liberalisation, while the slump covers the period of the repatriation of the returnees' 
capital which, according to most analysts, was invested mainly in constmction. 
Although a clear picture of a swing to services is evidenced by the numbers of 
registered companies, a more complex picture emerges when the capitalisation of those 
companies is analysed. The volume of capital invested in industry increased from 
36.1% in 1990 to 62.1% by the end of 1992. The share then collapsed to less than 10% 
by the end of 1996, before recovering erratically to 17.4% in 2000. However, over the 
period, the capital of industrial companies has fallen by over 50%. Overall, between 
1989 and 2000 this measure indicates a consolidation of the rentier economy, although 
since 1996 a small move towards the production economy is in evidence. 
Table 7.ll2 
Number and Capitalisation of .Registered Companies lby Sector, 1989-2000132 
Source: Adapted by author. Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Trade and Industry website, 
http:// www.mit.gov.jo. 
Turning to the evidence of the individual enterprises, in contrast to the registered 
companies, the relative numbers of industrial enterprises has fluctuated to a lesser 
degree, falling from 9.5% in 1989 to 8.5% in 2000, although a slight growth over the 
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last three years is apparent (table 7.13). As with the registered companies, a more 
complex picture emerges when looking at the capitalisation of the individual 
enterprises. After an initial decline from almost one-third in 1989, the share increases to 
a peak of almost 55% in 1994 before declining haphazardly to around one-quarter in 
2000. As predicated, the shift towards the service sector is less evident than among the 
registered companies (figure 7.7). Nevertheless, these figures would seem to reflect a 
failure to promote either an industrial sector or a market economy. 
Table 7.13 
Number and Capitalisation of Individual Enterprises by Sector, 1989-2000133 
To date, the analysis has concentrated on the numbers and capitalisation of the 
registered companies and individual enterprises. However, these figures ignore the 
overall contribution to the economy of the productive and service sectors. A clearer 
picture of the changing balance in favour of the service sector emerges when the share 
of GDP is measured between services and the productive sectors. The service sector 
has increased its strength relative to the productive sector since 1994, while industrial 
output has generally fluctuated around the 16% to 17% mark (table 7.14 ). In contrast to 
the recovery of the industrial sector in 1996 highlighted in the previous two measures, 
the relative output of the service sector has shown an increase in the same period. This 
trend of increasing the relative importance of the service sector is contrary to the 
objectives of the SAP in the same period. 
A major objective of the SAPs has been the promotion of exports. As can be seen 
from table 7.15, a gradual move in favour of goods from 44.2% of total exports in 1993 
has been experienced. By 1999 this figure had increased to 51.8%. This move towards 
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increasing industrial importance is the opposite of that experienced in other measures to 
date. 
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Figure 7.7 
Capitalisation of Registered Companies and Individual Enterprises, 1989-2000 
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Table 7.14 
Output as Percentage ofGDP by Sector, 1989-1999 
Date Productive Sectors of which Industry Service Sectors 
1989 35.3 16.9 64.7 
1990 35.2 17.3 64.8 
1991 35.1 16.1 64.9 
1992 37.4 16.1 62.6 
1993 35.1 15.4 64.9 
1994 36.3 17.7 63.7 
1995 35.9 17.8 64.1 
1996 34.1 16.2 65 .9 
1997 32.9 16.8 67.1 
1998 32.0 16.7 68.0 
1999 31.1 16.9 68.9 
Source: Adapted by author. CBJ (vanous), Annual Rewrt (Amman: CBJ). 
The final set of measures of the changing balance between the productive and 
service sector is concerned with the ASE. The stock exchange, to a degree, reflects the 
level of investor (both foreign and domestic) confidence in the economy. As can be 
seen from figure 7.8, regarding both the service sector share of volume oftrade and the 
market capitalisation, the figures fluctuate considerably. In the case of trading volumes, 
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a low of just below 35% was recorded in 1989, with a high of almost 65% in 2000. The 
lows and highs for market capitalisation were just under 50% in 1993 to just below 77% 
in 1998. However, when the trend lines are added, a clear picture emerges of the 
strengthening of the service economy over the period, supporting the case for the 
strengthening of the rentier economy. 
Table 7.15 
Share of Exports by Sector, 1989-1999 
Goods Services Total 
Date JDm o/o JDm % JDm 
1989 1109 47.2 1239 52.8 2348 
1990 1063 42.4 1447 57.6 2510 
1991 1129 45 .5 1351 54.5 2480 
1992 1218 45.7 1449 54.3 2667 
1993 1246 44.2 1573 55.8 2819 
1994 1425 47.7 1562 52.3 2987 
1995 1770 50.9 1709 49.1 3479 
1996 1817 49.6 1846 50.4 3663 
1997 1836 51.4 1737 48.6 3573 
1998 1802 49.7 1825 50.3 3627 
1999 1832 51.8 1702 48.2 3534 
Source: Adapted by author. EIU, (vanous), Jordan Country Report, (London: EIU). 
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Figure 7.8 
Service Sector Trading Volumes and Market Capitalisation, 1989-2000 
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The trading volume and capitali~ation on the stock market tend to paint a picture 
of investor confidence in the present. In contrast, new issues can be seen as a mark of 
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investor confidence in the future. New issues tend to be offered when the business 
climate is optimistic that economic growth is or will occur in the sector in which the 
shares are offered. Therefore, new issues ought to be a good barometer for judging 
business optimism in the industrial and services sectors. As can be seen from tables 
7.16 and 7.17, the levels of new issues in general have followed the pattern of economic 
growth in increasing during the first part of the 1990s, before declining as the economy 
faltered from 1995. In the growth period, industry led the way in the new issues 
accounting for almost 62% in both numbers and volume, but in the latter part of the 
decade the service sector took the major share in both numbers (67.7%) and volume 
(77 .4% ). Again, the evidence suggests an increase in the strength of the rentier 
economy. 
Talbne 7.Hi 
New lissues on Primary Market on AFM by Sector, ].989a].998 
Tabne 7.17 
New lissues on Primary Market on AFM by Sector §hare, 1989a].998 (%) 
Sources: Adapted by author. AFM, (various), Annual Report, (Amman: AFM) and AFM, (various), 
Monthly Report, (Amman: AFM). 
Overall, the different measures used, with the exception of exports, all paint, to 
varying degrees, a picture in which the service sector has become more dominant during 
the period: a move that indicates a consolidation of the rentier economy. A number of 
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the measures highlight a two-stage process, with a turning point around 1996, which 
coincides with the move towards the implementation of economic liberalisation 
policies. Even in this latter period, the evidence suggests the growth of the service 
sector at the expense of the production sector. However, the necessity to provide the 
market economy with the relevant financial infrastructure has helped boost the changes 
highlighted. As the 1995 World Bank Private Sector Report argues "[t]he private sector 
is especially dependent on the efficiency of financial intermediation to fund its 
investments and business operations." 134 Therefore the development of the banking and 
insurance sectors has been actively encouraged, helping skew development of the 
economy in favour of the services sector. Thus, the initial conclusion about the 
strengthening of rentierism can be questioned, as the services increases could merely be 
the foundations for building the production economy. 
3.2 Changes in tlhle JP>rivate Sectol!' Charactell'istics 
The private sector under ISR had become homogenous in its outlook, dependent 
on the state and service-oriented. The last aspect has already been addressed in the 
previous section, while the second element is assessed in section 3.3. If the economy 
was moving towards either PSR or a market economy, then the private sector ought to 
be becoming more heterogeneous. This move would be reflected by a change in the 
institutional structure of the private sector, including an increase in the number of 
independent business advocacy organisations and the possibility of splits or a reduction 
in the power of the existing institutions. This element will be analysed in the second 
part of this section. The first part will study the initiatives and responses of the private 
sector between 1989 and 2000 to assess to what degree the private sector has changed, 
and if possible in which direction the sector has moved. 
3.2.1 JP>rivate Sector initiatives and Responses 
The donor community, in particular USAID and the World Bank, has been a 
powerful champion of increasing the role of the private sector in the economy through 
promoting the advocacy skills of the latter. Indeed, one of the objectives of the USAID 
policy is to encourage: 
"[a] vibrant business association community that is effective in identifying 
and advocating market-oriented policies and practices, including those that 
support the increased participation of women in all aspects of the 
economy." 135 
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In the present USAID programme, US$3.5m has been set aside to promote this 
particular aspect through AMIR. 136 The 1995 World Bank Report on the private sector 
had previously recommended that these organisations required to develop the following 
functions: 
"1) collecting and disseminating business information ... relating to their 
own members; 
2) carrying out business-related economic and financial analysis to inform 
their members and to be able to give informed advice to the government; 
3) providing a forum for forming collective networks for SMEs; and 
4) carrying on an active and regular dialogue with the government on 
economic and business matters." 137 
In response to these pressures, a change in the pattern of private sector lobbying 
activities has been in evidence since the mid-1990s. The lobbying has moved from 
being one that could be described as existing on an ad hoc informal basis to one of a 
more focused formal nature. Paradoxically, on a number of occasions, the emphasis on 
improved lobbying and advocacy has created problems for both the state as an 
institution and the donor community, during attempts to introduce new policies 
concerned with economic liberalisation. Firstly, the private sector was extremely 
influential in having the sales tax adopted at only 7%, when the IMF was seeking a rate 
of 12% and the state 10%. However, the victory was short-lived, with the rate being 
increased to 10% sixteen months later, before being increased further to 13% in mid-
1999. Furthermore, the private sector organisations successfully lobbied for the 50% 
ceiling on non-Arab foreign investment in certain sectors to be retained in the 1995 
Investment Law .138 Once again, in the longer run, the state was able to overcome the 
private sector resistance. In both cases, the initial outcome was against the wishes of 
the donor community. Recently, a further example was the ACI's139 insistence on the 
imposition of a 5% flat tax on the Aqaba SEZ and offshore income "in order to dissuade 
industrialists from moving their current operations from other parts of Jordan." 140 The 
adoption of the sales tax and the opening of the economy to foreign investment 
threatened the position of the rentier elite. Thus these acts have to be seen in light of the 
rentier elite with private sector connections attempting to maintain their control over the 
economy and therefore the rent within the economy. 
A major case where the private sector was unsuccessful in challenging the state 
was the WTO agreement. 141 The WTO agreement was passed by parliament in 
February 2000 with a "degree of reservation" by a majority of forty-six votes out of the 
sixty-three cast. Parliament, along with the private sector, was concerned about its 
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impact on the economy, in particular on the agricultural (page 276) and pharmaceutical 
sectors. At the time of the debate, Jordan had seventeen registered pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, four of which had only recently started production. In both 1998 and 
1999, pharmaceuticals were the fourth largest contributor142 to export earnings with an 
annual value of JD 101 m (US$140m). 143 Local consumption in 1998 was estimated at 
US$120m, roughly 60% of which was spent on imported medicine. Only 2% of the 
Kingdom's production was under licence from foreign companies, with the remainder 
'copied' or 'pirated' from both patent and off-patent drugs from countries around the 
world. A major American pharmaceutical lobby claimed that pharmaceutical piracy in 
the Kingdom costs US drug manufacturers US$25-50m a year in lost exports. Many 
Jordanian manufacturers expressed fears that the terms of WTO membership, which 
compel compliance with the TRIPs (trade related aspects of intellectual property) 
agreement, would drive the cost of medicines too high for most Jordanians, while the 
cheaper local substitutes would be forced from the shelves. 
The cases discussed to date have been concerned with the private sector responses 
to state policies. However, in the late 1990s, for the first time since at least the early 
1970s, the private sector undertook a couple of high profile initiatives in the form of 
publicly-issued long-term plans. The REACH Initiative was launched by the Jordan 
Computer Society in conjunction with AMIR in July 1999 in response to a request by 
King Abdullah the previous month for a concrete proposal aimed at strengthening 
Jordan's IT sector. The first plan (REACH) was presented to the King in October 1999, 
with an updated version (REACH 2.0) published in January 2001 by the newly-formed 
umbrella organisation, the Information Technology Association, Jordan. The document 
critically assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the IT sector, with the aim of 
developing it over a five-year period. The plan outlines a comprehensive framework 
covering the regulatory environment, the necessary infrastructure, education, capital 
finance and human resource development. The USAID-funded plan aims to create 
annual exports of US$550m by the year 2004, up from only US$7.5m in 1999. In 
addition, the initiative anticipates increasing the number of jobs in the sector from 3,000 
in 1999 to 30,000 by the end of 2004. 144 Jordan produces 2,400 IT graduates per year 
(one of the highest rates per capita in global terms). 145 However, a major problem for 
Jordan is whether these graduates stay in the country or become the latest labour 
exports. In addition, better infrastructure and lower wages in countries such as India 
reduce the competitiveness of Jordan as an outsourcing IT country. Despite these 
disadvantages, the industry has already benefited by attracting FDI (table 7 .18). 
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'fable 7.18 
New Investment in TI'f to 2mn 
Cisco Systems-the world's leading producer of networking equipment for the Internet has 
invested $1 million in the EFG-Hermes Venture Capital Fund developing new technology 
companies in Jordan. Cisco's Networking Academies program, which teaches people how to build 
and maintain Internet networking systems, has an expanding presence in Jordan. 
Maktoob-Maktoob is the first Arabic web-based e-mail solution on the Internet. Launched by the 
Jordanian firm, Business Optimization Consultants (B.O.C.) in October 1998, Maktoob is rapidly 
becoming one of the major Arab virtual communities on the Internet. New and innovative services 
are continuously being introduced to spread the use of the Arabic language on the Internet and to 
make it easier for Arabic users to communicate. Maktoob has attracted $2 million in investment 
from the EFG-Hermes Venture Capital Fund. 
Syntax Digital-received an undisclosed amount of investment from EFG-Hermes. 
NETS and Firstnet FTG-Bahrain Telecomm (Batelco) has formed Batelco Jordan, purchasing 
51% of the ISPs, NETS and Firstnet, and merging them into one. The value of this deal is estimated 
at $13.9 million. 
OneWorld Software Solutions-One World designs, develops and deploys E-business and Internet 
software products for its clients in the U.S., with 100% of its business outsourced from the U.S. to 
Jordan. Investments in OneWorld totalling $12.2 million have been made by 4san, Citigroup, 
Advent International and New Horizons Venture Capital. 
AI Bawaba - a regional, general-purpose Internet portal, raised $5.15 million in international 
funding. 
Arabia.com-Arabia.com has created 80 new jobs and accumulated $9 million in Foreign Direct 
Investment. A leading Internet company in the Arab World, Arabia.com has been operating since 
1995. Arabia.com's portal combines world-class search, content and other services and is regarded 
as the leading Arab world site on the Internet. 
Menafn.com - this financial portal for the Middle East region raised $1.5 million in investment. 
Info2Cell.com-Info2Cell provides mobile phone information services through Wireless 
Application Protocol (W AP) and has attracted $4 million in investment from Italy's Acotel. 
UNEXT.com-this Internet education company delivering graduate-level academic programming 
on-line visited Jordan in July 2000 and committed to investing $10 million in Jordan over the next 
10 
EFG-Hermes-Egypt's EFG-Hermes (owned 20% by Citigroup), is establishing a $15 million 
Jordan IT Venture Capital Fund to encourage investment in promising small information 
technology companies. ($1 million in funds come from Cisco Systems, $1 million from Norway, 
$4 million from the European Investment Bank, with the remainder coming from Arab investors). 
Crescent Venture Partners with Export and Finance Bank-this $30 million fund based in 
Amman expects to invest in approximately 15 promising Internet and IT firms in the Middle East 
region. In addition to cash investment, Crescent will provide incubation services to these firms to 
assist them in their growth. 
Foursan- Foursan Technology Partners ("4san") is a Jordanian venture capital firm focused on non 
publicly-traded startups and emerging IT ventures in the Middle East and North Africa region. 4san 
is investing in OneWorld Software and a joint venture with Fujitsu Systems that will be 
headquartered in Jordan. The joint venture company, called 4Mena, will provide corporate clients in 
the MENA region with customized E-business applications and integrated solutions. 
Jordan Technology Group-The European Investment Bank and Jord Invest both signed share 
to invest 2.9 million in this VC · IT 
Source: The REACH Initiative, "Reach 2.0: Final report", The REACH Initiative website, http://www. 
reach.jo/document.shtml, p.l3. 
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The second initiative, JV2020, has been eo-sponsored by the YEA and the US-
funded AMIR programme. The plan was initiated in April 1999 at a meeting with 
representatives of sixteen of the business associations. By the time JV 2020 was 
launched, twenty-eight business associations, representing over 80% of the economy, 
were involved. JV2020 aims to double GDP per capita by 2020 through expanding FDI 
to US$3.5bn pa. The plan lists nearly fifty specific immediate (within twelve months), 
medium-term (eighteen months) and long-term (twenty-four months) recommendations, 
along with appropriate benchmarks for implementation. Although the start date for the 
recommendations was the 1st January 2000, the plan was not presented to the King until 
the following year. The recommendations are divided into seven strategic areas: 
leadership, governance, competitiveness, market access, business environment, 
infrastructure and human resources. As the YEA argues: 
"[t]hese areas are critical to Jordan's modernisation and to its ability to 
generate jobs of the quality and quantity necessary to meet the expectations 
of its young and rapidly growing population." 146 
The REACH initiative and JV2020 are important steps forward in the relationship 
between the private and public sectors. During the 1970s, the private sector had come 
to rely on the public sector for its continued existence. This reliance ensured that moves 
towards economic liberalisation and establishing a market-based private sector were not 
actively sought initially by the majority of the private sector elite. The promotion by 
the private sector of initiatives related to the process of economic liberalisation, albeit at 
the prompting of the donor community, represents a significant change of ethos. 
However, both plans still stress the importance of the government in achieving a 
successful outcome. One of the six strategic thrusts of REACH 2.0 states that "total 
commitment and active government leadership is required to stimulate, facilitate and 
promote the software and IT services sector." 147 Similarly JV2020 acknowledges that 
an effective private-public partnership is necessary. 
The state has responded positively to these moves. In the case of the REACH 
initiative, a REACH Advisory Council comprising members of the private and public 
sectors, but headed by the Minster of Information and Telecommunications, was formed 
at the end of 2000. The objective of the committee is to help with the implementation 
of the plan. According to the Reach 2.0 final report of the thirty actions suggested, five 
have been completed, thirteen partially achieved and ten were pending. Of the other 
two, one remains ongoing, while the other has been revised. 148 One of the participants 
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in JV2020 is the Ministry of Planning's Competitiveness Unit, while the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade and the Royal Hashemite Court have observer status. 
The examples used in this section have highlighted the improved ability of the 
private sector in being able to use advocacy to respond to threats to its interests, such as 
the sales tax. However, in the long run the economic recession, backed by the influence 
of the donor community, has allowed the state as an institution to introduce policies that 
conflict with the (short-term) private sector interests of the rentier elite. These cases 
appear to indicate a growing division between the private and public sector elites. The 
REACH and JV2020 initiatives also imply a division within the rentier elite, on this 
occasion between the traditional state-dependent private sector and a younger, western-
educated group that is less reliant on state contracts. These plans can be taken as a sign 
of success of the donor policies to create an independent, vibrant private sector. 
However, given the close ties of this new element with the rentier elite, and given that 
both plans are predicated on a close partnership between the state and private sector it 
would seem fair to indicate the continued strength of the rentier elite, albeit in a 
different format. This difference could be an indicator of a move from ISR to PSR, 
diluted by an increasing market economy. 
3.2.2 Homogeneity 
Inherent in all private sectors are a number of cleavages. In Jordan, in the 1970s 
and early 1980s the existence of state rent allowed the private sector to develop with 
few risks. The risk-free environment tended to disguise these cleavages and resulted in 
a private sector that was relatively homogenous in its relationship with the state. 
However, with the advent of the economic crisis and the donor community's attempts to 
introduce economic liberalisation, the comfortable symbiosis between the state and the 
private sector was threatened, as was the homogeneity of the private sector. As the 
1990s wore on, the cleavages along sectoral lines, across space, and also 
demographically, became more apparent. 
One reason for sectoral cleavages is the requirement of different forms of state 
backing. For example, broadly speaking, industrialists may seek protection from 
imports through the imposition of customs duties and quotas. On the other hand, those 
involved in the export/import business do not want these barriers to trade. The case 
quoted in chapter three is a prime example. In August 1988, Hamdi al-Taba'a, the 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Supply who had close links to the trading community 
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via the ACC, removed a ban on imports. The ban, which had been introduced a couple 
of years earlier, was part of a package of policies aimed at protecting Jordanian 
industry. However, the ban had hit the trading community and was replaced by the 
introduction of higher customs duties, which had less direct effect on the importers. 149 
Other divisions in the private sector can be found spatially, with those businesses 
outside the Amman-Zarqa conurbation requmng extra infrastructure and 
grants/incentives. As became apparent in the interviews with the YEA representatives, 
a relatively new phenomenon in Jordan is the demographic division between the older, 
established elite, who have prospered under the old policies and the younger more 
dynamic elite who have a western-style approach to the separation of state and 
market. 15° Finally, the perception of the Transjordanian-Palestinian divide remains 
strong with the former being associated with the public sector and supposedly 
obstructive to the private sector and the latter as the private sector. Although a number 
of recent studies have challenged the dichotomy, 151 the perception remains powerfully 
embedded in the minds of many Jordanians and scholars of Jordan. 
One arena in which these differences have been exposed IS the business 
associations. Three main business organisations were prominent in Jordan in 1989: the 
FJCC, the ACI, and the JBA. In addition, a number of other organisations were also in 
existence, usually catering for specific sectors, such as the Bakery Owners Association. 
Prior to 1989, the problems of the private sector in maintaining a monolithic outlook 
were already apparent. As discussed in chapter three, the JBA had been formed in 1985 
by the rentier elite as a defensive measure against the differing requirements of the 
FJCC and ACI. The spatial dimension of the heterogeneity of the private sector 
surfaced in February 1998 when twenty-three industrialists from Zarqa and Irbid sought 
to split the ACI into two due to the "power [being] centralised in ACI hands," 152 with 
the consequent marginalisation of industrialists outside Amman. The initial response of 
the ACI was to lobby the Ministry of Industry and Trade to pass a law to establish a 
Jordan Chambers of Industry, thereby retaining power in Amman. However, later in the 
year, two new chambers, the Zarqa Chamber of Industry and the Irbid Chamber of 
Industry, were allowed to be established. 153 The battle for control has been sustained, 
with the ACI continuing to lobby for a centralised institution while industrialists from 
the south are seeking to form a fourth chamber. 154 
The donor community's promotion of advocacy as an integral feature of the 
business associations, with the aim of increasing pressure on the state to promote 
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economic liberalisation and an independent private sector, met with a degree of 
unresponsiveness from the established organisations. Direct donor influence to 
overcome this problem could be seen with the registration, in November 1998, of the 
Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA) with the assistance of the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation. 155 Part of the pressure for creating the YEA came following a survey by 
the University of Jordan which found that most private sectors companies were family-
owned, risk averse and little schooled in modern ways of doing business. The 
objectives of the YEA are: 
"1) to identify and organise entrepreneurs in Jordan; 
2) to change the mindset through the promotion of innovation and creativity; 
3) to affect public policy to improve the business environment; 
4) to facilitate success of entrepreneurial ideas through provision of relevant 
training and education; 
5) to develop a forum for networking among members and the global 
business community; and 
6) to promote best ethical business practices." 156 
Importantly, although the members of the YEA are usually Western-educated 
entrepreneurs whose ideological belief is free-market capitalism, many are also the 
younger relatives of the rentier elite. 157 Over 50% of the eleven members of the latest 
board of directors, elected in April 2000, are from families in the main circle of the 
rentier elite. 
This section has highlighted the increased fragmentation of the private sector. At 
first sight, the evidence would seem to support the thesis that the political economy was 
moving in the direction of becoming market-based. However, as the strength of the 
JBA and the direction of the YEA would seem to suggest, the rentier elite is adjusting 
its strategy in the face of the changing economic environment: again, evidence of a 
move towards PSR. 
3.3 Changes in the State Characteristics 
In section two of this chapter the state's policies based on the state-market 
relationship were analysed in light of the declining volumes of OEA. The conclusion 
was that the state had reduced its role in the economy to a limited extent. However, to 
date the study has not assessed the state's attempts to access the increasing volume of 
remittances. As has been discussed previously, the state cannot directly access these 
funds, but has a number of policies that firstly ensure their continuing flow and 
secondly gain access to the funds through indirect taxation. The maintenance of high 
interest rates and over-valued exchange rates can be used to attract remittances, but both 
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these measures are detrimental to building an export-oriented private sector. 
Furthermore, maintaining political relations with the labour-importing countries must be 
considered a priority. Finally, (as discussed previously) in order to access the rent of 
remittances the state must use indirect taxation policies. This section briefly reviews 
these policies. 
As mentioned previously, the Gulf War had a dramatic effect on the expatriate 
workforce of Jordan, when King Hussein's attempt to provide an Arab solution to the 
conflict was interpreted by the Gulf States as one which supported the Iraqi position. 
As a consequence of the conflict and the King's stance, around 300,000 people returned 
to Jordan in a relatively short space of time of time. Around 60% of these had been in 
Kuwait for more than ten years, and 25% were born there. 158 Remittances, already in 
decline due to the recession of the 1980s, fell further, from just under JD360m in 1989 
to just over JD300m in 1991. Having the constraint of a significant percentage of the 
population who were Palestinian in origin, 159 the regime was unable to support the 
American-1ed coalition. In this case, as Brand argues, the short-term interests of regime 
stability overrode the need to ensure the flow of remittances. 160 The dramatic increase 
in remittances in the rest of the decade to just short of JD1200m by 1999 suggests that 
the policy adopted at the time was correct for the regime. The policies followed since 
the end of the Second Gulf War have included high interest rates, with discount rate 
being increased from 6.25% in 1988 to 8.5% in 1990. Although the rate fell to 7.75% in 
1997, it increased again to 9% in 1998. The onset of the recession in the late-1990s 
required the adoption of new policies to boost business, with the result that interest rates 
were steadily decreased to 6.5% by the end of 2000. By this stage, the stability of the 
dinar was argued to be sufficient to continue attracting remittances: its value had fallen 
by around 50% in 1988 to 1989. Nevertheless its value against the dollar continued to 
fall from an average of US$1.753 to the dinar in 1989 to US$1.41 in 1996. Since then 
the dinar has been tied to the dollar (which has been a strong currency for the majority 
of the period). The result has been a dinar that can be considered to be over-valued and 
thus able to attract remittances. 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq put pressure on the relations between Jordan and 
the Gulf States. On the 19th September 1990, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company cut off 
supplies of oil, then running at 33,000 bpd, at only six hours notice-allegedly for non-
payment of bills. 161 The situation escalated when the Saudi Government requested that 
Jordan close the office of its military attache in Riyadh and also to reduce the numbers 
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of employees at the embassy in Riyadh and the Consulate General in Jeddah. 162 On the 
30th of the month the Saudis refused entry to Jordanian lorries. 163 The relationship hit 
its nadir on the 4th October when Jordan recalled its ambassador; the recall was 
followed by reciprocal action a couple of days later. 164 No positive moves were made 
by either side to restore the relationship until June 1992, when King Fahd wished King 
Hussein a speedy recovery: the latter in his reply expressed the hope that the painful 
breach with Saudi Arabia would end. 165 However, eighteen months later when King 
Hussein was on 'umrah166 King Fahd failed to met him. 167 Three years after the 
outbreak of the War, Kuwait still refused to resume relations. The Kuwaiti Foreign 
Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, was reported to have said that Kuwait had no 
objection to resumption of relations with Arab states who supported Iraq, except for 
Jordan and the PL0. 168 By 1995, relations between Saudi Arabia and Jordan had been 
regularised with ambassadors being exchanged. However, access to the Saudi job 
market remained controlled until after the death of King Hussein. Direct trade with 
Kuwait was not resumed until March 1997, 169 with the first visit of a Jordanian minister, 
Rima Khalaf, taking place only in July 1998. 170 Relations were finally officially 
restored in March 1999. 171 Throughout the period, King Hussein made periodic 
attempts to return relations to normality, not only because of the labour market, but also 
for other economic reasons, such as trade and OEA. However, not until his death were 
relations able to be restored to previous levels. Indeed one of King Abdullah's initial 
priorities was to ensure a speedy return to normalisation of relations with Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. 
The tax-raising policies of the state have been dictated to a considerable degree by 
the pressure exerted by the donor community and the signing of various international 
treaties, such as the WTO agreement. The result has been a move away from tax-
raising on imports to a sales tax. The introduction of the latter has allowed the state a 
wider base of indirect access to the flow of remittances. In this case, the interests of the 
state as an institution and the donor community have coincided. However, as discussed 
previously, the slow introduction of the tax was due to the threat faced by the rentier 
elite with private sector interests. 
Apart from the state's attempts to access the remittance rent circuit, the rentier 
elite also sought other methods of gaining access to rent. The state attempted in 
February 1998 to introduce a draft Provident Funds Law governing savings funds, 
which includes company pension funds. The law would have allowed the state to 
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intervene in the management and investment policies of the funds of the professional 
associations and large private companies. The state was concerned that these funds, 
estimated to have a value of JD250-300m, 172 lacked effective regulation and 
consequently claimed that the objective was to protect the small investors from 
corruption and malpractice. However, the media and a number of deputies were 
concerned that the policy was merely a ploy to gain access to the funds held by the 
savings plans. The private sector was unhappy with the draft law to the extent that 
members of the Arab Bank plan voted to dissolve their fund with assets of JD30m, 
rather than allow the state to gain access to the assets. 173 A second example is the 
question of privatisation, which has two elements: the ownership and control of the 
privatised company, and the use of the privatisation proceeds. In terms of ownership 
and control, the state has maintained a significant holding in the major privatisations of 
JCFC and JTC, while also using regulatory measures to maintain control, as with JTC. 
In the debate over the privatisation proceeds (a form of rent), the state has attempted to 
maintain control of their usage, despite pressure from parliament and the donor 
community. 
Since 1989, the state as an institution has attempted to access new sources of rent 
to replace the declining OEA. However, other pressures, such as the Second Gulf War 
and international economic demands have constrained its choices. As a result, the state 
has not only attempted to gain access to the remittance rent circuit but also has looked at 
internal sources of rent, such as the savings funds. The rentier mentality has continued 
to drive the actions of the state despite external and, to a lesser degree, internal 
pressures to the contrary. Again, the evidence suggests a move towards a PSRE rather 
than a production economy. 
3.4 Changes nn The State-Private Sector ReDationship 
Since the advent of IMF conditionality, the three main business associations have 
become progressively more influential in the public debate concerning all aspects of 
economic liberalisation, as has been discussed in section 3.2. Dougherty and Wils 
argue that a more formal process of negotiation between state officials and private 
sector associations has been evident from 1990, although they conclude that relations 
between the economic elites "are as much, or probably more affected by informal 
processes behind the scenes." 174 The article was written prior to the formation of the 
ECC in 1999 which, as argued in section 2.4, has increased the level of formal relations 
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between the private and public sectors. Overall, the change in the patterns of public-
private sector relations and the acceptance of the need to move along the path of 
economic liberalisation have reduced the ability of the informal network to operate as 
powerfully as previously-a sign that certain aspects of the rentier state were beginning 
to be eroded. Nevertheless, the informal relationship still seems to dominate public-
private relations, indicating that the donors' wishes to create an independent private 
sector remains a distant goal. In addition, no clear evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, is 
apparent that the reformist elements in the private sector are yet fully behind the idea of 
a market-driven economy, rather than a market economy with preferential access for the 
rentier elite (see figure 3.11' page 128). 
4.0 INCREASED IPSR AND MAR1KJET ECONOMY, REDUCED ISR 
This chapter has sought the answers to two main questions; 
~ How have the changes in the 1990s affected state-market relations? 
~ Are the changes highlighted by answering the first question reflected in changes in 
the rentier aspects of the economy that were evident in 1989? 
The first question was answered by using the five-continua model of the state-market 
relationship. A number of significant changes have occurred in the 1990s, namely: 
~ In the type and volume of rent entering the economy; 
t In the increased pressure from the donor community to adopt policies of economic 
liberalisation; and 
t Within the rentier elite. 
Despite these transformations, the evidence of a move towards the market end of the 
state-market continua can be described as positive but far from clear-cut. The state has 
reduced its role in the ownership and control of productive assets and in influencing the 
market, but continues to politicise the economy. Part of the reason has been the 
changing role of the state, from direct intervention (with the aim of complete control) to 
an acceptance of indirect control by regulation (with the aim of controlling as much of 
the economy as possible). In addition, the flow of remittances has helped the state as an 
institution to access significant flows of rent via indirect taxation. 
The second question was answered by looking at the characteristics of ISR 
relating to the economy, the private sector, the state and the state-private sector 
relationship. In the economy, expenditure had been curtailed which was a move away 
from the ISR. The evidence from the changes in volume of imports indicated a move 
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from ISR to PSR, while an assessment of the strength of the service sector indicated a 
possible growing rentierism. The discussion about the aspects of private sector 
rentierism indicated that splits were becoming more apparent within the rentier elite 
along two lines: those with public sector interests and those with private sector interests, 
and, secondly, those with traditional state-dependent relations and those with a more 
market-based focus. The section concluded that a move away from ISR had occurred, 
although the new direction was a mixture of PSR and a production economy. However, 
a clearer picture emerged when looking at the state aspects, with a move towards PSR 
rather than a production economy. Finally, the strength of informal relations between 
the sectors remains strong, again indicating a failure to establish a market-based 
economy. 
Although the evidence is extremely confused, the conclusion can be made that 
while ISR has weakened (admittedly not dramatically, but sufficiently), PSR and the 
market-based economy have both been strengthened to a degree. The rentier elite, 
although becoming more divided, seems to remain in control of the direction of the 
economy, despite the pressure from the donor community. On the whole, as Dougherty 
and Wils argue, "rather than challenging the old private and public sector relationship, 
the process of privatisation and liberalisation has opened new areas for their co-
operation and given the regime new opportunities for patronage." 175 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is comprised of four parts. The first section briefly reviews the 
preceding chapters, while the second part recommends relevant areas for future 
research. Thereafter, the third section assesses the impact of the study on the debate on 
rentierism in the Middle East and North African context. The penultimate section turns 
from the theoretical implications to the practical repercussions for the actors involved 
before the final conclusion. 
2.0 THESIS REVISITED 
The thesis sets out to understand the effects on the political economy of Jordan (in 
particular on the state and the private sector and their relationship) of two major changes 
since 1989, namely: 
+ The transformation from an economy primarily based on OEA (which tends to be 
distributed by the state) to one primarily based on remittance income (which tends 
to be distributed through the private sector); and 
+ The increased level of involvement of the donor community, led by the IMF and the 
World Bank, which has as its stated aim the desire to increase the involvement of 
the private sector in the economy at the expense of the state. 
The analysis is conducted through the prism of rentier theory. This theory contends that 
an economy based primarily on OEA creates a different political economy (ISR) from 
one based primarily on remittances (PSR), both of which are different from a 'normal' 
market economy. The thesis identifies four areas in which the outcomes are 
differentiated: the natures of the economy, the state and the private sector and the 
relationship between the state and the private sector. 
The second and third chapters establish the context for the main analysis. In these 
chapters the historical investigation illustrates that by 1989 Jordan's economy had 
moved from one primarily based on OEA to a mixture of OEA and remittances (with 
the latter becoming relatively more important). Despite this transformation, which had 
started in the early 1970s, the characteristics of the political economy were still those of 
ISR. These characteristics included: 
• The existence of a rentier elite; 
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~ State ownership and/or control of productive assets; 
o State involvement in the market; 
~ The (ab)use of the economy by the state for political purposes; and 
~ The co-optation of the private sector institutions by the state. 
In the main analysis, the thesis concludes that by the year 2000 the economy had 
become a high-level PSRE, with only low-levels of ISRE. In addition, the stated 
intention of the donor community, following the introduction of IMF conditionality 
from 1989, was to increase the role of the private sector at the expense of the state. The 
first of these changes ought to have pushed the political economy in the direction of 
PSR, while the second aimed to create a market-based political economy. However, the 
lack of coherence (for political reasons) within the donor community has allowed the 
state and the rentier elite to maintain a degree of control over the changes. Thus, despite 
the increasing evidence that the homogeneity of the rentier elite was being eroded, at the 
end of 2000 both the rentier elite and the state continue to be able to rent-seek, albeit in 
reduced and different formats. 
The conclusion of the analysis in the seventh chapter, using the five-continua 
state-market model, is that the economy has moved slightly towards the market end of 
the continuum. However, the role of the state has also altered from one of direct control 
(e.g. through the ownership of productive assets) to more subtle indirect methods (e.g. 
using regulatory techniques) in order to attempt to maintain control of the rent flows 
within the economy. An analysis of the characteristics of the political economy 
highlights that the features of ISR have been slightly reduced, while the features not 
only of the market economy, but also, against the wishes of the donor community, of 
PSR (due to the inflows of remittances) have been strengthened. 
3.0 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The two models used to assess the degree of rentierism proved useful. However, 
the measures of high, medium and low need to be strengthened. This problem could be 
overcome by further research using a comparative study of a number of induced rentier 
states (not solely restricted to the Middle East and North Africa) to establish a more 
refined measure. There ought to be a possibility of combining each of the measures of 
the models (six in the case of OEA and four in the case of the remittances) 
econometrically in order to produce a more accurate degree of assessment-a challenge 
for some brave person! 
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A second aspect, which could be developed more fully with extra space, time and 
money, is an investigation into the composition of the rentier elite in Jordan. The 
research would need to establish, over the last few decades (but preferably from at least 
1946), who have comprised both the political decision-making elite (i.e. families/tribes 
that have held ministerial posts, advisors to the Hashemite family, top bureaucratic 
posts and also high military positions) and the economic decision-making elite (i.e. 
ownership of large companies, significant shareholders in major companies, and 
directorships of private companies and SOEs). Thereafter, the ties between the two 
parties would need to be assessed. The research could also establish whether, as posited 
by this study, the rentier elite have been able to increase their economic power base as a 
result of the economic liberalisation process since 1986. 
4.0 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The study has contributed to the existing band of knowledge concerning rentier 
theory in the Middle East and North Africa in four ways: 
+ The clarification of the terms used; 
+ The introduction of new terms; 
+ The innovation of four models to measure various aspects of rentierism; and 
+ The answering of a number of criticisms of the theory. 
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Terms, such as 'rentier economy', have been used previously in a conflicting 
manner. Figure 1.1 (page 11) expanded above as figure 8.1 has helped to clarify the 
relationship between the various concepts associated with rentierism. Secondly, the 
new concepts of private sector rentier economy and private sector rentierism have been 
forged, in order to take account of the effects of remittances on the political economy of 
the receiving country. The introduction of these terms has allowed an extension of 
Kiren Chaudhry' s pioneering study on remittances (i.e. private sector rent) in Yemen. 1 
The thesis has also initiated the idea of measuring degrees of both the IRSE and 
the PSRE through two separate models. The third innovative model is the five-continua 
state-market model, which is used to help assess the relationship between the state and 
the private sector. This model also assisted with the detection of the changing role of 
the state from one of direct control to indirect control. The final model used measures 
of the characteristics of induced state rentierism, and allowed an assessment of how 
these changed during the period studied. 
Rentier theory has not been without its critics, the majority of whom raise 
questions on the theory's inability to account fully for the political economy of the 
Middle Eastern and North African states affected by significant volumes of rent. The 
study has helped to answer the following four criticisms: 
+ The failure to acknowledge the state-society relationship prior to the advent of the 
rent income; 
+ The lack of dynamism within the theory; 
+ The argument that rentierism causes authoritarianism; and 
+ The argument that the theory ignores tensions within the elite. 
The first criticism is the failure of proponents of rentier theory to take into account 
the state-society relationship prior to the advent of rent income.2 Whilst the researcher 
acknowledges that this criticism has been valid in a number of cases, Jordan provides a 
perhaps unique study in that the state was established and then constructed through the 
use of OEA. This coincidence helped Emir Abdullah to purchase his initial political 
legitimacy (or in the words of Weber to use patrimonial power). Thus in Jordan the 
state-society relationship has effectively unfolded in conjunction with the changing 
patterns of rent. 
Herb criticises what he terms 'simplistic' rentier theory as positing that rentierism 
causes authoritarianism? However, the claim of rentier theory is that it impedes 
democracy4 rather than causes authoritarianism.5 For example, Huntington in his 
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analysis of the third wave of democratisation following the end of the Cold War argues 
that the Middle East has been able to resist this move because of its rent income.6 A 
closely related criticism is that rentier theory cannot account for political change, 
although in reality revolutions have occurred in the rentier economies of Iraq, Libya and 
Iran. In addition, the shock of an endogenous or exogenous crisis in a rentier economy, 
whether economic (e.g. Saudi Arabia in the 1990s) or political (e.g. Kuwait following 
the invasion by Iraq), can result in increased pressures for political change. The study 
has illustrated that in Jordan, the political liberalisation at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s coincided with the economic crisis. However, as the economy 
has recovered and the rent-seeking activities have continued so the political 
liberalisation has been curtailed with, for example, the promulgation of a less open 
electoral law (1993), the cancellation of the November 2001 elections and the 
introduction of a series of repressive Press and Publication laws. Furthermore, the study 
has provided an answer to this criticism by highlighting the changing patterns of rent 
and how the various actors have adopted new policies in an attempt to maintain control 
of and access to the flows of rent-these policies are not claimed to guarantee the 
continued success of one group of actors in maintaining control of the rent flows, nor it 
is claimed that underlying political structure will remain static. 
Finally, Dougherty and Wils argue that the relations of important social actors are 
not taken into account. They contend that the theory not only fails to take into account 
tensions within the elite but also wrongly posits a dichotomous relationship between the 
economic elites of the public and private sector? However, the study has shown how 
the changing patterns of rent along with the influence of the donor community have 
helped to create and/or exacerbate tensions within this elite. Furthermore, this thesis 
has used an analysis based on a relatively homogenous rentier elite (especially in the era 
of high-level IRSE), comprising both the private and public sector economic elites, thus 
overcoming the second objection of Dougherty and Wils. 
5.0 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION§ 
Finally, what practical considerations have been highlighted by the analysis? The 
first implication concerns the relationship between the state and the rentier elite, which 
has previously been relatively consensual as the interests of both actors have been 
virtually synonymous. In order to recreate themselves, all states have to walk the 
tightrope of extracting sufficient resources from the domestic economy without 
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upsetting the basis of their political power. Admittedly, in the short term they can rely 
on external forms of assistance (grants and/or loans) but this option is not feasible in the 
longer run as the case of Jordan has demonstrated. From its inception in 1921 until at 
least 1989, the state in Jordan relied to a considerable extent on the provision of OEA, 
rather than on recourse to local means of extraction. As has been proved, this option is 
no longer viable. However, the twin assaults of the reduction in OEA and the 
conditions set by the donor community have forced the state not only to increase its tax-
raising powers and also to cut-back on its policy of purchasing political legitimacy. 
This reduction resulted in the start of the process of democratisation, although this 
process has been reversed to a degree in the last few years as the economic crisis has 
receded. The state now faces a problem that its external sources of OEA are atrophying, 
while rent accrues to the private sector in the form of remittances. This changing 
pattern of rent means that more resources have to be extracted from the domestic 
economy-an outcome not appreciated by the rentier elite on whom a considerable 
portion of the tax burden ought to rest. The scene is set therefore for a divergence of 
interests between the state as an actor and the rentier elite. 
The final point concerns the relationship between the donor community and the 
state. The SAPs associated with the IMF and the World Bank have been the focus for 
considerable criticism since their implementation. One strand of the critique has been 
concerned with the social effects of the policies, 8 as the major losers in the initial stages 
(at the very least) of the programmes were the disadvantaged members of society due to 
the cutbacks in government expenditure. A second strand of criticism has been from the 
economic angle, in which the argument is that the SAPs have tended to be 'one size fits 
all', i.e. no account is taken of the differing causes of the economic crisis, nor the 
differing economic structures of the countries involved. The reaction to the Asian crisis 
of 1997 to 1998 is but one example of this stereotypical approach, with the IMF 
recommending its 'holy trinity' of government austerity, interest rate rises and 
liberalisation.9 This thesis has highlighted the need for a further aspect to be considered 
by the IMF and the donor community: the lack of a private/public sector dichotomy in 
an IRSE. The preponderance of OEA helps create a rentier elite which significantly 
blurs the boundaries between the two sectors. If the aim of the donor community, in 
particular the heavyweights of the BWis and the USA, is to reduce rent-seeking 
activities and implement a 'normal' market economy, then the problems caused by the 
existence of the rentier elite must be addressed. The present policies have allowed this 
elite to continue to rent-seek, and have also opened up the possibility of increasing its 
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economic power, albeit at the expense of a slight loss of political power (the 
democratisation process since 1989). 
In conclusion, the medium-term to long-term prognosis for Jordan, as a whole, 
remains bleak unless the positive aspects of the policy of structural adjustment are 
delivered to the vast majority of the population and not just restricted to the rentier elite. 
1 Chaudhry, K.A., (1989), op. cit., pp.101-146. 
2 Herb, M., (1999), All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern 
Monarchies, (Albany: State University of New York Press), p.lO and Dougherty, P. and 0. Wils, (1999), 
op. cit., p.3. 
3 Herb, M., (2001), "Michael Herb: Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Georgia State 
University", Georgia State University website, http://www.gsu.edu/-polmfh. 
4 I argue that democracy historically and at present remains the exception, while authoritarianism tends to 
the normal political structure. 
5 Ross, M.L., (2000), "Does Resource Wealth Lead to Authoritarian Rule? Explaining the Midas Touch", 
paper presented to the World Bank Research Group on "The Economics of Political Violence", Princeton 
University, March 18-19. 
6 Huntington, S., (1991), "Democracy's Third Wave", Journal of Democracy, no. 2, Spring, pp.31-32. 
7 Dougherty, P. and 0. Wils, (1999), op. cit., p.3. 
8 See Cornia, G.A., Jolly, R. and F. Stewart, (1987), op. cit. 
9 For examples of this criticism see Michie, J. and J. Grieve Smith, (eds.), (1999), Global Instability: The 
Political Economy of World Economic Governance, (London: Routledge). 
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